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
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CONTENTS.

CONTENTS OF No. V.

ARTICLE	PAGE
I. The Resurrection of the Body. By Daniel R. Goodwin, Professor in Bowdoin College	1
II. The Sin-Offering. Translated from "The Mosaic Offering," of J. H. Kurtz, Second Division, Chapter IV. pp. 155—196. By Rev. David B. Ford, Canton, Mass.	26
III. The Four Gospels as we now have them in the New Testament, and the Hegelian Assaults upon them. By C. E. Stowe, D.D., Professor in Bowdoin College	49
v. Comparison of the Canonical Gospels with the Apocryphal Gospels still extant	49
The Apocryphal Gospels	50
Abstract of the Apocryphal Gospels	53
Remarks on the Apocryphal Gospels, as compared with the Canonical	67
vi. Comparison of the Canonical Gospels with the Fragments of Gospels supposed to be lost	69
Memorabilia of Justin Martyr	76
Diatessaron of Tatian	79
Gospel of Marcion	80
IV. The Kingdom of Congo and the Roman Catholic Missionaries. By Rev. John Leighton Wilson, Missionary in Western Africa	81
V. Hebrew Criticisms. By M. Stuart, lately Prof. of Sacred Literature, at Andover	106
VI. The Theology of Richard Baxter. By George P. Fisher, Resident Licentiate, Andover.	133
§ 1. Sin	136
2. Ability	148
3. The Bible	151
4. The Trinity	153
5. Decrees	156
6. Redemption	157
7. Regeneration	160
8. Justification	164
9. Christian Virtue	166
10. Eschatology	167
VII. New England Theology. By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in Andover Theol. Seminary	169
VIII. Notices of New Publications :	
i. Patmos, and the Seven Churches	217
ii. Henderson's Commentary on Jeremiah	218
iii. Recent Works on Church History	219
iv. Select Discourses of Sereno Edwards Dwight, D.D.	220

ARTICLE	PAGE
IX. Correspondence:	
Letter from Rev. Dr. J. Perkins, Ordmiah, Aug. 9, 1851	222
From Mr. Pischon, a pupil of Neander, and now private Secretary to the Russian embassy at Athens, July 1851	225
X. Select Literary and Theological Intelligence:	
United States	230

CONTENTS OF No. VI.

ARTICLE	PAGE
I. India as a Field for Inquiry and Evangelical Labour. By Rev. H. R. Hoisington, Missionary of the American Board.	231
II. The Grotian Theory of the Atonement. Translated from the German of Dr. Ferdinand Christian Bauer, Prof. Ordinarius of Evangelical Theology in the University of Tübingen, by Rev. Leonard Swain, Nashua, N. H.	252
III. Life of Zuingli. By R. D. C. Robbins, Professor of Languages, Middle- bury College	265
Labours, Cares, and Studies of Zuingli at Zurich, 1520-1522	265
Marriage and Domestic Life of Zuingli	269
The First Colloquy before the Council of Zurich; the Invocation of Saints, &c.	271
The Second Colloquy at Zurich upon the Worship of Images, and its Results	278
Reforms in Switzerland. Publication of the "True and False Re- ligion"	280
Change in the Manner of Celebrating the Lord's Supper	283
The Establishment of the New Academy at Zurich	285
Struggles against the Anabaptists	288
IV. The Writings of Richard Baxter. By George P. Fisher, Resident Licen- tiate, Andover	290
V. Observations on Matthew xxiv. 29—31, and the Parallel Passages in Mark and Luke, with Remarks on the Double Sense of Scripture. By M. Stuart, lately Prof. of Sacred Literature at Andover	319
VI. The Practical Element in Christianity. By Rev. Charles White, D.D., President of Wabash College, Ia.	344
VII. Remarks on the Idea of Religion, with Special Reference to Psycho- logical Questions, by D. Karl Lechler, Chaplain of the Insane Asylum at Winnenthal. By Rev. William A. Stearns, Cambridge, Mass.	363
VIII. Notices of New Publications:	
i. Mornings among the Jesuits at Rome	403
ii. Unity of the Human Race	414
iii. The Typology of Scripture	416
iv. Stuart's Commentary on the Book of Proverbs	417
v. Works of Lyman Beecher, D.D.	417
vi. The New Testament translated from the Syriac	418
vii. The Book of Genesis in Arabic	419
IX. Select Theological and Literary Intelligence:	
Germany	420
Switzerland	434
Great Britain	436
United States	438

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
AND
AMERICAN BIBLICAL REPOSITORY.

COMBINED SERIES.—No. V.

ART. I.—THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

BY DANIEL R. GOODWIN, PROFESSOR IN BOWDOIN COLLEGE.

[The following Article needs some explanation. The Essay in the Democratic Review, to which it refers, appeared in September 1847. This Article was immediately written in reply, and offered for insertion in that Review in the November following. The Editor declined to publish it, giving as his only reason that such discussions were foreign to the purposes of his Review. The manuscript has therefore lain quietly in our desk till the present time, with no expectation on our part that it would ever see the light. And if the views here controverted were peculiar to one individual, we certainly should not have thought it worth while to trouble the readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra with our reply. But similar views are widely held. Similar objections and statements in regard to the doctrine of the resurrection are often made and industriously urged to the unsettling of the minds and the faith of many; and for ourselves we have not seen them distinctly answered. Besides, as the Democratic Review has since retracted nothing and made no explanation, but as articles similar in tone and character to that here replied to still appear not unfrequently in that and other political Journals, we have at length concluded that if those Journals, while they freely open their columns to one party, do not choose to allow a hearing to both sides, it is no more than simple justice that the public should know it.

This Article is therefore here presented *verbatim et literatim*, as it was sent to the Democratic Review, with the exception of one short note which has been added. This fact will explain to

our readers the peculiar form in which it appears. We have thought this a better course on the whole than to make any change in it for the purpose of adapting it more perfectly to the usual style of this Theological Review. If we should have leisure, we propose to follow this up with an Essay towards a full historical and dogmatical development of the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection. In that case we shall have an opportunity to make *positive* amends for the *negative* character of the present Article.]

THIS is the title of an Article in the September number of the Democratic Review, from the general doctrines and conclusions of which, the present writer feels bound earnestly and strongly to dissent. As the resurrection of the body has been a part of the creed of the church catholic in all ages, I trust it will not be insisted that a flat denial of that venerable doctrine shall pass in the pages of this Review, unchallenged and unquestioned. The author of the article referred to acknowledges that this doctrine is one of great speculative importance and of universal practical interest; and, since, at the same time, its discussion does not involve any of the exciting and hackneyed questions of party strife, I trust that the editor will, in this case, so far depart from any rule which he may have laid down to the contrary, as to allow what has already been published in this Review to be controverted in its subsequent pages; provided the discussion be managed with good temper and an honest love of truth.

With the author, from whom I beg leave to dissent, I have not the honour of the slightest personal acquaintance. I know nothing of his creed or character, of his age or standing, of his social, political or ecclesiastical connections; absolutely nothing but what I learn from the article in question. He will, therefore, not interpret anything which I may say as having an offensive personal application; and I hope he will not consider it discourteous that an entire stranger should, in a spirit of earnestness and candour, call in question his published opinions.

He opens the discussion thus: "In treating this subject, the starting point is to determine two things, viz., what is, and what is not; the body either does or does not rise again."

We have meditated upon this statement, and analyzed it in every way we can think of; but must acknowledge ourselves utterly unable to divine what it means. It seems either to require such a vast comprehension of the knowledge of all facts to "start" with, or so to confound the "starting point" with the goal, or both, that we cannot flatter ourselves with having got any glimpse of its true sense. And yet, no doubt the author had a distinct and logical meaning, which he has logically ex-

pressed ; for his very next words are, " to reason at all we must reason on fixed principles." Still, as with our best efforts we cannot find his " starting point," he will excuse us for not following the course of his argument in his own order. We shall take the liberty of the epic poets, and begin *in mediis rebus*.

We think the statement of our author's general doctrine will be found in the following paragraph :

" If this identical body was raised, how painful, how awful would be the sight! There would be the lame, the blind, those who had lost limbs, who were crippled, the maniac, the savage! This must be if the identical body is raised up ; for any different body would not be a resurrection of the body ; in *fact*, would be no resurrection at all, but would be a new creation ; so that, if the resurrection of the body takes place at all, it *must* be *this identical* body, or else it is no resurrection, but a new creation of some other body."

We suppose it is clear from this that the author means, by the " identical body," strictly and precisely *the* body as it exists and is constituted at the moment of death. This must be so, or there can be no motive for the horror expressed at the resuscitated forms of the lame, blind, maimed, crippled and crazed. If we may go back to one day before death to find the " identical body," which is to be raised, how can any theoretical limit be set to the right of retrogression? We understand the author's major proposition, therefore, to be: that *if the resurrection of the body takes place at all, it must be a resurrection of each body precisely as it existed and was constituted at the moment of death*. His minor proposition, as gathered from the general drift of his article, is: that *it is impossible that each body should be raised precisely as it existed and was constituted at the moment of death*. Ergo, *there can be no resurrection of the body*. Such, if we understand it, is his argument reduced to a syllogistic form. For the sake of brevity and convenience of reference we shall beg leave to retain throughout these remarks the designations *major* and *minor proposition*, as we have just applied them.

Now, we utterly protest against and deny the *major proposition*. But, inasmuch as our author has vouchsafed no proof of it except what may be contained in the strong assertions of the paragraph just quoted, we shall defer for the present what we have to say on that head. He spends his strength in endeavouring to establish his *minor proposition*. If he has failed in this, of course his conclusion fails ; and if he has succeeded in this, the *major proposition* yet remains to be tested before his conclusion is established.

Let us see, in the first place, how he succeeds in proving that the resurrection of "this identical body" is an "utter impossibility."

He begins very scientifically and learnedly with proving at large, that, as far as can be ascertained by chemical or any other physical tests, the human body is subject to the same general laws of development, growth, and decay, while it lives; and of dissolution, decomposition, and dispersion, when it dies, as those to which the bodies of the ox and the horse are subject. All this is "what is;" and, of course, it is no news to any body. But what does it prove? Does it prove that therefore it is *impossible* for God to reconstruct and re-animate the human body? Is it therefore to be thought a thing incredible that God should raise the dead? We can see no such force of proof in those facts. We are not aware that any body has undertaken to bring positive evidence of a resurrection of the body from chemistry or natural philosophy; and we cannot conceive what disproof there is in the absence of proof derivable from those sciences.

But, (it is insisted,) after the minutest chemical analysis, after the most patient and thorough testing by all known agents and re-agents, after the most careful examination, and after ages of experience, we have never found any more signs of a tendency to a resurrection in the body of a dead man than in that of a dead dog. And what then? Therefore there is and can be no resurrection of the human body? Most lame and impotent conclusion! As though we already knew everything pertaining to the powers, properties and possibilities even of material things; as though we were not prying deeper and deeper into the secrets of nature every day; as though there were not evidently dynamics and laws at work in the material world, which elude all our chemical tests and physical re-agents; and, *as though we could see distinctly around and above the power of Almighty God*, which, with its higher, and perchance for ever inscrutable, laws, presides over and controls all the laws and functions of nature. All positive evidence for a resurrection of the body must be sought for in the teachings of Revelation; and that evidence, be it more or less, is not in the slightest degree affected by this chemico-physical argument; it is left just as it was and where it was, entire and intact.

But, says our author, "if these remarks serve to prove this fact, viz., that the same particles which now form our bodies will [may?] hereafter enter into the formation of others, which none can successfully deny, it at the same time will make self-evident [*make self-evident?*] the fact, that the moment a body is resolved into its elementary principles, they at once cease to

bear any relationship whatever with the form which they had previously entered into, so that the gases which now constitute any specific body will, when it ceases to exist, and they in consequence become set free, *cease to bear for ever afterwards any more relationship to that PARTICULAR body, than if they had NEVER entered into it at all.*"

Now we assert, with all due deference, that those elementary principles do and always must continue to bear a practical, historical relation to that body; that it is and will ever remain a fact in their history, that they once entered into the composition of that body; and that this is not a barren fact, but that all their subsequent history is modified and in some degree determined by that fact; so that all the changes and transmutations through which they afterwards pass, all the combinations into which they afterwards enter, are different from what they probably would have been, had that fact been otherwise. And, moreover, there is nothing in the proposition just quoted, with all its italics and capitals, which can ever "make it self-evident," either that it transcends the power, or that, as a matter of fact, it is not the will, of Almighty God, to reconstruct that dissolved body, restoring those elementary principles to their former positions and relationships. There is nothing in that proposition which renders any positive conclusions in regard to a resurrection of the body, derived from a well-authenticated revelation, incredible or even improbable. Again, it leaves all such positive evidence untouched and unimpaired.

But it is still insisted that "no restoration of bodies could take place without a destruction and complete annihilation [?] of very much that has been brought into existence. The restitution of any specific body whose original elements now form a component part of another body, must necessarily cause, if it took place, a destruction of that body." [And what if it did? Did not the construction of this latter body require the destruction of the former? And is not this process of destruction and construction the mere ordinary course of nature?] "Moreover, is it not a fact, that bodies go out of existence, and become as entirely extinct as though they had never existed at all [?] and therefore a resurrection of this identical body could not possibly be implied or understood; for in order for a resurrection or restoration to take place, the thing so restored or raised must *necessarily be in existence*. Now, if a body has gone entirely out of existence, it is *impossible* for it to be restored."

The statement that "a body has gone entirely out of existence," we suppose must mean one of two things; either, that,

as a body, in respect to its form and constitution, it has ceased to exist; or, that, in respect to its very substance and the material which composed it, it has been annihilated.

The latter sense cannot be that which our author intends, for he elsewhere expressly recognizes "the law of nature, that no particle of matter is ever lost;" and yet it is only with this latter sense of the words that there is any self-evidence or convincing power in the proposition "that it is *impossible* for a body which has gone entirely out of existence to be restored."

But if, when the terms are explained in the former sense, that proposition be self-evident, then the trouble of all his elaborate argumentation might have been saved; for, in that sense, it is a mere formal decision of the question in debate, and, if that decision itself is self-evident, all discussion is clearly a waste of time. And yet we are not aware that those who believe in the resurrection of the body have denied that, so far as the point could be ascertained by chemical and physical tests, the human body is, in many cases, resolved into its original elements. To *their* minds, therefore, the proposition that "it is impossible for a body which has been thus dissolved to be restored," cannot be supposed to be "self-evident." But if the proposition be not "self-evident," then the author has furnished no evidence for it whatever. Indeed, it will be seen that, according to his statements, the restoration, reconstruction, reorganization of any body, under any circumstances and on any hypothesis, is a sheer absurdity; for, in order that a body may be restored, reconstructed, reorganized, he expressly makes it necessary that it should already exist, actually constructed and organized!

It is true our author, immediately hereupon, goes into a profound argument to show that, though the body might perchance be restored if it were simply resolved into "dust," yet, inasmuch as it is resolved into oxygen and other "gases," its restoration is impossible and inconceivable. Now we must honestly confess, whatever imbecility of mind, whatever lack of science or of philosophy, the confession may betray, we must confess that the assertion of its being any jot or tittle more absurd or inconceivable for God to reconstruct a body from its original gaseous elements than for him to reconstruct it from its scattered particles of dust, is neither "self-evident," nor in any other way evident to our humble apprehension.

We agree fully with our author that the great difficulty in this discussion is "that men do not define things properly to their own minds. They are content with indistinct pictures, vague imaginings, dreamy and indistinct sensations, instead

of fixing and defining things permanently, and giving them a tangible, fixed and definite form and position." We shall, therefore, endeavour not to be juggled with at this point.

We take for granted that the "elementary principles" into which the body is said to be resolved, are matter, true and proper matter. This they certainly are unless our author, with Leibnitz and Herbart, prosecutes his metaphysical analysis beyond the power of all his chemical tests. At all events, they are either matter or not matter. If they are not matter, then the material particles which have been resolved into them, have, according to our author's own principles, utterly ceased to exist. But this is contrary to his express assumption that no particle of matter is ever annihilated. If, on the other hand, they are true and proper matter, then, like all matter, they are, or consist of, material particles. And the definite, identical, material particles of a cubic inch of oxygen gas are no more annihilated, or absolutely lost and confounded by being mixed with another cubic inch of oxygen gas, than are the definite, identical particles of a cubic inch of "dust" by being mixed with another cubic inch of "homogeneous dust."* It certainly is assuming more than is "self-evident" to say that omniscience cannot identify them and trace them through their new combinations, and that omnipotence cannot segregate them and restore them to their former connections. We do not here contend that this could be done by any human power or merely natural process, but we insist that the thing is not inconceivable and therefore is not absolutely impossible.

The case just stated involves precisely the pinching point in the argument on the other side, if that argument pinches anywhere. For as to saying, as our author seems to do, that one simple substance loses its identity by entering into *composition* with another simple substance; that is plainly false, even on natural principles. Let us try a few instances.

If a certain number of grains of pure copper be combined with their definite proportion of oxygen, and this oxyde of copper be dissolved in nitric acid, we shall have the nitrate of copper,

* Our author evidently assumes oxygen in the state of a *gas* to be an "elementary principle." Of course he does not recognise the materiality of caloric. In this we are willing to follow him. It will be perceived that we have instanced a mixture of dust with *homogeneous* dust. As the "gas" was assumed to be mixed with a *homogeneous gas*, it was but fair that the "dust" should be placed in similar circumstances. But if any one prefers the hypothesis of a mixture of *heterogeneous* dust, he is welcome to all the advantage to be gained thereby; which will be this, that, as he has no right to assume the "dust" to be so coarse as to be separated by mechanical means, in order to its separation by chemical agents, one more step will ordinarily be necessary than in the case of the gas, for the "dust" must itself be reduced to a fluid state before it can be brought under the influence of the attraction of affinity.

which may exist in a perfectly liquid form. But by decomposing this nitrate of copper the pure copper may be reproduced—the very same copper and no other—the “identical” copper, with which the process was begun. Now copper is as truly an “elementary principle” as oxygen gas.

But gases may be recovered from their combinations as well as metals. Let a quantity of oxygen and hydrogen be combined in due proportion for forming water. Let the water be decomposed by means of a quantity of potassium, and the hydrogen will be liberated, the very same hydrogen as at first; and, the potash being decomposed, the original, identical oxygen may also be recovered. If, in these processes, some portion of the original, simple substances should escape from us, it would only show the imperfection of our instruments, but would not in the slightest degree affect the applicability and force of the argument for our present purposes. We have here a mere business of *degrees*. No *principle* is involved in the recovery of the whole, which is not involved in the recovery of a part. If then, with our limited, practical powers, we can recover a part, surely it cannot be said to exceed the bounds of omnipotence to recover the whole; it cannot therefore be absolutely impossible.

So much for cases of *inorganic* combinations. Now take cases which involve the *organic* influence of the principle of life.

Let a quantity of calcium and a quantity of phosphorus be respectively combined with a due proportion of oxygen; let the lime be combined with the phosphoric acid; and let this phosphate be mixed with a soil (or, certain ingredients of a soil) which did not before contain a particle of calcium or phosphorus. Let some grains of wheat be planted in that soil; and, by an analysis of the product, we may obtain, in its original, simple form, a portion at least of the identical calcium and phosphorus with which we began, mingled perhaps, in this case, with a small proportion of each of those substances derived from the seed.

One case more: A. takes certain crystals of arsenic, and, having pulverized them and combined the metal with the proper proportion of oxygen, mingles the poison with B.'s food, who swallows it, and dies. Some time after, by an analysis of the contents and *coatings* of B.'s stomach, the arsenic is recovered and recrystallized. It either is or is not the “identical” arsenic which A. gave. If it can be proved, to the satisfaction of a jury, that it is not the same, then the evidence that A. is guilty of the alleged act of poisoning B. is not at all increased by the detection of this arsenic in B.'s stomach, for it is not the arsenic which A. is alleged to have administered, but some other.

If it be said here that the arsenic, as a mass, is indeed the same, but that the individual crystals are not "identical" with those originally pulverized, we answer that thus the specific point for which we are now contending is yielded, viz., that the alleged impossibility of the resurrection of the "identical" body cannot arise in any degree from the fact that the simple elements, into which it has been resolved, enter into *new combinations*. The whole difficulty is carried back to the point to which we have already referred it, viz., the fact that these simple elements become mingled with other quantities of *homogeneous* elements. We admit, in the case supposed, a very high degree of improbability that the reproduced crystals of arsenic are, each of them, as a matter of fact, identical with some one of the original crystals. But can any one positively prove that, even as a matter of fact, they certainly are not identical; still more, can he prove that it is absolutely impossible and self-contradictory that they should be? As to the supposition of mechanical marks or defects, they could not indeed be reproduced by crystallization; but, the identity being in other respects restored, they could easily be reproduced by mechanical means.

We plant ourselves at one of those original crystals. It consists of certain individual and identical, though homogeneous, particles, arranged according to a certain law in certain definite, relative positions. It is dissolved; and its particles are mingled with other homogeneous particles. Now the question is, can it be rationally conceived that those original particles should be segregated from their present mixture, and restored each and all to their original relative positions, and the whole to its original form? We freely admit that such a result cannot be *secured* by any power of man or known law of nature; but we fearlessly assert that the accomplishment of such a result cannot be proved to transcend the power of Almighty God, who can identify every particle of matter which he has created, and control its movements according to the counsels of his own will. We not only assert that such a result can be conceived to be accomplished by the exercise of *miraculous power*, but we assert that its actual accomplishment would not violate any known, positive laws of nature, but would be in perfect accordance with them all; and indeed is one of the possible contingencies under those laws. Therefore it is not absolutely impossible.*

* The most scientific men will confess that there may be exceptions to the recognized laws of nature, or, perhaps, we should rather say, higher laws, harmonizing both the rule and the exception—laws which may transcend the scope of their loftiest generalizations. A king of Ava is said to have heard patiently all that the Christian missionaries had to tell him about heaven and hell, and the mysteries and doctrines

If now it be insisted that, after all, the crystal so reproduced, i.e., with all its original particles in their original relations, is not "identical" with the original crystal, then the word "identical" must be used in a sort of hyper-metaphysical sense, in which it is not applicable to material, visible things at all. For, according to such a view, supposing an ultimate particle of water to consist of a particle of oxygen united to a particle of hydrogen (and the contrary cannot be proved), it would follow, that, if this particle of water be decomposed into the two gaseous particles, the reunion of these same gaseous particles would not reproduce the "identical," original particle of water, but a different one. And *à fortiori* it would follow that an ounce of water being decomposed and the same elements reunited, or being converted into steam and that steam condensed, or even being poured out of one vessel into another, the water which would result and remain would not be "identical with" the original water, but somewhat different. Hence it would follow that, as all visible material things are in a constant flux, the idea of identity would be absolutely inapplicable to anything in the physical universe, except, perhaps, to the elementary and unchangeable, constituent particles. Nay more, all such words

of Christianity; but when they chanced to say that water, in their country, was sometimes found in a solid state, he declared *that* to be so palpable a lie that he would not believe anything else they had told him. Now he will hardly be thought to have shown himself much of a *savant* or a philosopher; yet he reasoned from what were to him familiar and invariable laws of nature. Had he been told that the solid water, though much colder than the liquid, would float upon it from comparative lightness, he might have denied the possibility of such a phenomenon, even though he had known much more of nature's laws than he did: for, that bodies are expanded with heat is one of the best established laws in the material world. But how would his incredulity have been excited almost to madness, had he been told that water, which he knew to be one of the best means of extinguishing fire, is composed of two ingredients, one of which is among the most inflammable of substances, and the other a substance without which no flame whatever can exist!

Scientific men will also admit that (assuming the so-called imponderable agents *not* to be material substances) a body may present a great variety of forms, without either losing its substantial identity or even suffering decomposition. Water will serve yet again as a convenient and striking illustration. It is the massive ice that renders rivers, lakes and seas impenetrable to the lightest and the bulkiest ships; it is the expansive steam which propels the hastening vessel across the vast ocean, bringing into proximity regions the most widely separated. We seek it from the spring to quench our thirst; we inhale it with the atmosphere to sustain our lives. Blown into an attenuated bubble, it is black; dashed headlong in the foaming cataract, or gently descending in wintry flakes, it is white. Falling in drops, it exhibits all the colours of the prism in the rays of the sun; floating in clouds and vapours, it adorns with unnumbered hues and untold beauty the evening and the morning sky. It may be so heavy that the power of myriads of horses could not raise some of its masses from the earth; it may be so light, so much lighter than air, that the power of myriads of horses could not prevent its ascending towards heaven. It may be pellucid in the purling brook; or it may be frozen into opaque, compact masses, or into little, solid, lustrous, acicular crystals. Thus *real identity amid apparent diversity* is one of the recognized laws of nature.

as reproduction, reorganization, restoration, involve a logical absurdity; and not only so, but the very terms "identical with" are nonsensical, for, inasmuch as in every proposition, which conveys any meaning, the predicate must be conceived in some respect diverse from the subject, to assert that the one is "identical with" the other is a downright and palpable self-contradiction!

But our author cannot have used the terms in any such super-refined sense, for then his whole argument should have assumed a purely metaphysical character, and all his elaborate, physical reasonings and illustrations are a perfect *hors d'œuvre*. And, moreover, he will have uttered unadulterated nonsense in asserting that the reorganization of this "identical" body from its gaseous elements is any more manifestly impossible than would be its reorganization from scattered particles of elementary "dust."

Here we are met with the exhortation: "Let those who would answer by the power of God reflect but a moment, and they must see that this very power would forbid such a state of things, for it can never act in *contradiction* to itself." We simply answer that, in reconstructing the body from the elementary principles into which it may have been resolved, omnipotence will not be acting in *contradiction* to itself. Such a work is no more inconceivable in itself than the ordinary processes of growth, dissolution, renovation, which, with every changing year, we see all around us. Or, if the mere fact of its being *diverse* in some respects from the known and actual course of nature and physical laws, be the point objected to as contradictory, then we reply that, on that ground, it is no more contradictory than any miraculous interposition whatever; than *the resurrection of Christ, or of Lazarus*, for example; or than *the act of creation itself*, than which no act can be conceived more utterly diverse from, and even contrary to, the whole system of natural laws as learned from the inductions of empirical philosophy. We wish distinctly to know whether or not our author here intends to assert the absolute impossibility of all miracles and of an act of creation among the rest. If he does not, we send back his argument to be amended; if he do, we have no answer at present to offer, as it would require a greater sweep of discussion than we can now undertake.

But, says our author: "In reply to the question, Does the body rise again? I answer, No! It is impossible, wholly and utterly impossible, and incompatible with all that we see and know of the works of God." Here is a sufficiently positive assertion, if that can settle the question. But a reason for the assertion follows; and what is it? "It is impossible on the

ground that it is contrary to the wisdom that God ever displays." Of course that is irrefragable proof. A man thinks that it would not be wise in God to raise the dead, therefore it is *impossible* he should do it, even though he may himself have assured us by a special revelation that he shall! So much for the impossibility. Now for the incompatibility. "It is incompatible, because, if it took place, it must necessarily produce a state of things wholly inconsistent with the character of the infinite, and at variance with all the laws by which he governs the world." That is to say, "It is incompatible with all that we see and know of the works of God," *because* its results would be "wholly at variance with all the laws by which God governs the world;" [a very perfect circle, surely;] *because*, also, those results would be "inconsistent with the character of the infinite!" This is the way of determining the unknown by means of the known! This is what is called "defining things permanently and giving them a tangible, fixed, and definite form and position!" But let us not wrong the argument which we would refute. It may be that those general propositions are intended to find their real support, not in their own "self-evidence," or in any assumed knowledge of the "character of the infinite," but in the evidence which results from the subsequent sentence. That sentence is as follows:

"According to computation on the subject, there has already existed upon the earth a sufficient number of inhabitants to constitute a bulk of matter approximating in amount to the whole contents of this globe, which amount will increase as time rolls on, until it may exceed it by ten thousand fold."

Here we have no longer any lofty speculations about the "character of the infinite;" no more metaphysical refinements about "elementary principles" or absolute "identity;" no more "indistinct pictures, vague imaginings, dreamy and indistinct sensations;" we have a "tangible, definite," intelligible proposition. Here is a question of facts and numbers. Now facts are stubborn things, and numbers will not lie. In this case, therefore, we may be pretty sure of "what is and what is not." We propose to subject our author's statement to a patient and rigorous examination.

We take the following six points as our data:

1. Let the mean diameter of the earth be 8,000 miles.
2. Let the specific gravity of the earth's mass be five times that of water.
3. Let a pint of water weigh one pound; from which, there being 231 cubic inches in a wine gallon, it will follow that one cubic foot of water will weigh 60 pounds nearly.

4. Let the average weight of each person at death be 100 pounds.
5. Let the average duration of human life be 80 years.
6. Let the average constant population of the globe be 1,000 millions; consequently the whole number of mankind in 6,000 years will be 200,000 millions.

Before proceeding to our "computation" from these data, let it be observed that if, for the sake of round numbers, we have in some cases assumed a fraction in our favour, we have far more than counterbalanced it by what we have granted in other cases. For the greatest population of the globe is rarely set at so high an estimate as we have allowed, and we have assumed it to have been just as great immediately after the Creation and the Flood—events which are commonly recognised amongst Christians—as at any other time. And, since it is estimated that one half of mankind die in infancy, and since the rest die at various ages and ordinarily after some degree of emaciation, 75 pounds would probably be nearer than 100 pounds to the average weight of each individual at the moment of death.

Now, if the mean diameter of the earth be 8,000 miles, its surface will be equal to more than 5,000,000,000,000 square feet; and its cubical contents will be equal to more than 170,000,000,000,000,000,000 cubic feet of *water*; which is more than 10,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 pounds; which is equal to 100,000,000,000,000,000,000 of human bodies; or to 500,000,000,000 times the mass of all the human bodies which will have existed on the earth at the end of 6,000 years from Adam.

Thus, in the sense in which it is true that one is an "approximation" to five hundred thousand millions, in the same sense does it appear by "computation" that "there has already existed upon the earth a sufficient number of inhabitants to constitute a bulk of matter approximating in amount to the whole contents of this globe." The imagination is staggered in the effort to conceive the *nearness* of such an "approximation."

It may put the subject in a clearer light to say, that one half of a cubic mile of the earth's mass contains a greater quantity of matter than all the bodies of all the generations of mankind (195) which have actually existed on earth since the creation of Adam. Or, to illustrate the subject in still another form; there are 7,000 grains in a pound avoirdupois; consequently, in one body weighing 100 pounds there are 700,000 grains. Now if we take one such body and divide it into grains, and then take one of those grains and divide it into as many parts as there were grains in the whole body, the ratio of one of these last infinitesimal portions to the mass of that one human body is nearly

the same as the ratio of the entire mass of the bodies of all mankind hitherto to the contents of this globe; and this is what is called an "approximation!"

But our author anticipates that, "as time rolls on," that approximative quantity will go on increasing until it shall exceed that with which it is compared "by ten thousand fold." By our computation it appears that, before such a result shall have taken place, more than thirty millions of millions of millions of years will have rolled away. The German astronomer who has computed that, in some twenty millions of years, our sun will have completed one revolution around the newly-discovered centre of our stellar system, is generally thought to have stretched the imagination far enough into the abysses of futurity. But what is *that* to anticipating a time when more than a million of millions of those inconceivable cycles shall have been completed? We may safely assume that none who believe in the resurrection of the body *take for granted* that it will be deferred so long. Will those who disbelieve undertake to *prove* such a delay?

But, says our author, a little further on: "If a resurrection of all who have lived should take place . . . their numbers would cover the whole surface of the earth in one solid mass to a depth or height of miles in thickness."

If this statement were literally true, we see not what difficulty could arise from it; "For, (says the apostle Paul,) if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him. For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God; and the dead in Christ *shall rise* first; then we which are alive and remain shall *be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air*: and so shall we ever be with the Lord." 1 Thess. iv. 14—17.* So that it will not be necessary that the whole multitude should be piled or even stand on the surface of

* The first verse of the above quotation is to our mind one of the most exquisitely touching passages of Scripture; and we almost feel as if we had desecrated it by introducing it in such a connection.

The whole passage, *being expressly spoken "by the word of the Lord,"* may be considered as settling one or two other points. In the first place, that the resurrection, which the Apostle taught, of those who *are dead*, is not a past or present but a future resurrection, (or at least *was* so when he wrote)—"the dead in Christ *shall rise*." In the second place, that that resurrection does not take place with each individual at the moment of death, but that the dead in Christ generally will be raised together at the great day of the glorious coming of the Lord. These two points cannot reasonably be supposed to be affected by the bold, figurative language in which the coming of the Lord is described.

the earth. But even supposing it were necessary, let us see if there would be such a lack of room as our author supposes.

Taking the area of the surface of the earth and the number of all who have lived upon it as before given, it will appear that, allowing 2 1-2 square feet to each individual, more than 10,000 times the whole number of past and present generations could be accommodated upon the earth's surface. In other words, the whole multitude could stand comfortably side by side, with three square feet each, on one third of the surface of the state of Virginia; and, so far from there being any necessity of piling them in solid mass miles high upon the whole surface of the terraqueous globe, a single shower of rain over the state of Virginia, measuring two inches and three-tenths of an inch by the rain gauge, would be equal in mass to all the matter contained in the bodies of the entire multitude.

We are utterly amazed that one who is so fully aware of the importance of "reasoning on fixed principles," and avoiding "vague imaginings and dreamy and indistinct sensations," should have allowed himself in statements so wild and loose. We can hardly trust our senses as we compare those statements with the results of our own calculations. We have been tempted to believe there must be some error in our data, or some mistake or fallacy in our computations; we have carefully reviewed them, and can find none. Neither can we conceive of any possible mistake in our interpretation of the statements themselves; unless the author may mean, when he speaks in them of the immense mass of the "inhabitants" of the earth, "of those *who* have lived" in it, and when he elsewhere refers to the "whole billions of millions *who* have lived from *Adam* downwards,"—that, in that mass and number should be included not only the bodies of men but those of all other animals. Yet, on reflection, that cannot be his meaning; for, in that case he would only have set up his own man of straw to knock him down again. Who maintains the doctrine that the bodies of all animals will be raised again? Our author has not shown, nor do we find that he has pretended to show, such an intimate connection between the bodies of men and the bodies of other animals, that God could not raise the former without also raising the latter. Moreover it is clear from the whole current of our author's remarks in and near the statements referred to, and in some instances from the grammatical construction of his sentences, that he had in mind only human bodies. And finally, every reader would understand him to refer exclusively to human bodies, and he must have known he would be so understood; therefore it would be charging him with gross dishonesty to suppose him to have meant otherwise; therefore he did not mean otherwise; and

therefore, finally, either he or we have committed a gross blunder. If we have committed the blunder we shall stand corrected. If he has committed the blunder, then the propositions which these statements were intended to support must be left to stand alone, as well as they can.

Those are all the arguments and facts, so far as we can discover, which our author has brought to establish his *minor proposition*; and we think our readers will agree with us that they fail to accomplish his purpose. Whether it be or be not impossible that this "identical" body should be raised, we submit that he has not proved such an impossibility. And whether it be or be not the doctrine of Scripture that there shall be such a resurrection, it is our firm conviction that its absolute impossibility can never be proved; although much stronger arguments may, perhaps, be adduced for it than any we have been called upon to consider at present.* But, finally, be that as it may, the assertion that "if the resurrection of the body takes place at all, it must be a resurrection of this identical body," i.e., of *this body*

* There is one form of objection to the possibility of a resurrection of the "identical" body, which we do not understand our author specifically to urge, (though it may be involved in his general statements,) but which, to our apprehension, brings the idea of such a resurrection nearer to an apparent self-contradiction than any other form of objection we know of. It is this: The same particles may have constituted a part of several successive human bodies at the moment of their dissolution; therefore it is impossible that each of these bodies should be raised identical with that which was dissolved. There are at least two ways of answering this objection. 1. However likely the alleged fact may be, unless its absolute certainty can be demonstrated, there is room left for the possibility of the contrary. How can we know but that God so watches over the dust of every human body, and so guides it in all its transmigrations, that it shall never be found to constitute a part of any other human body when that body dies? Thus the objection is answered by demanding proof of the alleged fact on which it is based. 2. As our bodies are constantly undergoing change while we live, without being thereby destroyed, so "the identical body" being raised, it may undergo an instantaneous change to an unlimited extent. It may, therefore, be instantly divested of any particles which may be required for the reconstruction of another body; and this last being reconstructed, any needed particles may be transferred to a third; and so on to any extent. We have only to suppose, therefore, that the bodies of mankind shall be raised successively, in the order of their dissolution; (at intervals however small, infinitely small if you please, so that there shall be a practical simultaneousness;) and, though a certain particle should have been common to every one, having passed through the whole series in six or eight thousand years, yet it may be caused to circulate through the whole number again, as they may be successively raised, in less than a millionth part of the least assignable instant of time; for no limit can be set to the possible rapidity of motion. Thus the objection is answered, admitting the allegation on which it is based.

It may be said that these are violent suppositions. We may admit it; but at the same time we have four things to say with that admission: 1. Neither of those suppositions is, like the creation of matter from nothing, absolutely inconceivable to our minds. 2. If the objection alleged merely a high improbability instead of an absolute impossibility, we should not urge such suppositions in reply to it. 3. Those suppositions are made in answer to the objection taken on its own principles, and entirely *irrespective of what may be the actual doctrine of Scripture* on this question. 4. However violent the suppositions suggested may be, they will answer their present purpose, and it will be seen in the sequel *that we shall have no need of them.*

precisely as it existed and was constituted at the moment of death, (which we have called our author's *major proposition*,) we utterly deny. He has given no proof of it, and we will be as brief as possible in our remarks upon it.

Some of our author's axioms, in this connection, deserve, perhaps, a passing notice. "Things either *are* or *are not*, (says he,) they *must* be or they *must not* be." To the first of these axioms we need make no objection. Profound and startling as it may be, it will serve our turn quite as well as his. But in regard to the latter axiom, we would respectfully suggest that either its English needs amendment, or we shall be compelled to adopt in full the Hobbean doctrine of necessity. All things come to pass by necessity, said Hobbes. For example, "It must either rain or not rain to-morrow." Now as one or other of these is necessary, that which actually comes to pass is of course that which was necessary. So of all other events. Here was a demonstration of the doctrine of necessity in a nut-shell. We trust it needs no refutation of ours. But whatever be its self-evidence or its fallacy, for us it may suffice here to give distinct warning, that, when we deny the proposition that, "if there be any resurrection of the body, it *must be* a resurrection of this identical body;" we do not therefore hold ourselves bound either to prove or to admit that other proposition, that, "if there be any resurrection of the body, it *must not be* a resurrection of this identical body." We merely insist upon it that there is no such necessity at all in the case, and that the question of fact is an open question.

It is obvious to remark that in proportion as our author might urge any metaphysical refinements upon the idea of identity to strengthen the evidence of his *minor proposition*, in the same proportion is the evidence of his *major proposition* enfeebled; so that nothing is thereby gained for his conclusion. And as we would not knowingly or carelessly "assert in one place what we deny in another," we wish distinctly to bear in mind *the conditions of identity* which we have all along supposed our author to assume. A body being dissolved into its elementary particles, we have supposed that if all those particles, without any addition or admixture of others, were restored to their precise original positions, combinations, and relationships, the "identical," original body would be restored; and not otherwise. We think that, even with these strict conditions of identification, the *minor proposition* has not been proved. If now, in order to strengthen the evidence for the *major proposition* a looser idea of identity is proposed, let it be remembered that the evidence for the *minor proposition* will become still weaker than before. We shall therefore demand that the same strictness of the conditions of identity shall be retained in interpreting the one pro-

position as were allowed in interpreting the other. When, therefore, it is asserted that "if the resurrection of the body takes place at all, it must be a resurrection of this identical body," we understand the meaning to be, 1st, that the body raised must be identical with the body as it existed and was constituted at the moment of death; and 2nd, that, in order to be thus identical, it must consist of the very same particles exclusively and inclusively, arranged in the very same positions, combinations and relationships. And, so understood, we deny the proposition. We deny it, because, in order to a resurrection of the body in a true, proper, scriptural, and (as Guizot says) "human" sense, it is neither necessary, in the first place, that the body raised should be identical with *the precise body which expired the last breath*; nor, in the second place, that it should be *identical with any body whatever* in so strict a sense as that required.

The first point may be settled at once. Here is a man at the age of thirty years, in perfect health and soundness of body and mind. Before he dies, he may lose his arms or his legs, he may become a maniac, blind and deaf; he may die in utter decrepitude. Now, if, at the last day, the body given him should be identical with his present body instead of being identical with that decrepit frame with which he will have died, would there be no resurrection of the body, no resurrection of his own proper body? Would it be a "new-creation" instead of a resurrection, simply *because* the raised body would not be identical with the body precisely as it existed and was constituted at the moment of death? Does a man's body never become *his own* until he dies? Reason and common sense answer, No! And what becomes, then, of all the horror expressed by our author at the imagined reappearance "of the lame, the blind, those who have lost limbs, who were crippled, the maniac, the savage?" Pray why did not he insist upon the resuscitation of the fevers and ague fits, the cancers, gouts, and rheumatisms, and all the mortal diseases and ills the flesh was heir to at the moment of death? In short, why did he not maintain that if the body be raised at all, it must be, when raised, *in the very act of dying again*? for, the internal states are as essential to identity as the external features!

We turn to our second point, viz., that in order to a proper resurrection of the body, it is not necessary that the body raised should be identical with any former body whatever, in such a sense as that it must consist of precisely the same elementary particles, neither more nor less, arranged in precisely the same positions, combinations, and relationships.

Now it is a well-known fact, that not only does a great change take place in our bodies between the periods of infancy

and old age, but, while we live, they are constantly in a process of change, so that the body which we have at one moment is not perfectly "identical" with that which we had at any preceding moment; and it is evident, from a sentence which our author cites with approbation from Bishop Butler, that he fully recognizes this fact. But from this fact it follows that no person ever wakes with that "identical" body with which he went to sleep; and consequently it follows further, on our author's principles, that, as often as the body sleeps, it sleeps an eternal sleep, and the body with which a man wakes is always a "new creation!" for the body which wakes is never "identical" with that which was lulled to slumber. We think our author will find few to agree with him in insisting upon such a conclusion. We will suppose, therefore, the body which rises to differ from the body which lived before, *only to the same extent* as the body which wakes differs from the body which slept; would there then be a resurrection of the body in any proper sense? If so, then our proposition is established and our author's overthrown, without further ado. And, besides, a principle is thus gained which reaches much further than is barely necessary to overthrow that proposition of his; for, if a slight difference is consistent with such a practical and substantial identity as is required for a proper resurrection of the body, will any one tell us precisely the limit of this difference; except, that there must be some organic or real connection, something in common, between the body which is raised and that which lived before? And so much we shall certainly maintain.

Let us amuse ourselves here for a moment in constructing an hypothesis.

The principle of animal life in man is presumed to be distinct from the intelligent and immortal spirit; but, as it is not itself a substance, when abstracted entirely from the body it ceases to be. Now we will suppose, on such premises, that in the economy of human nature it is so ordered that, when the spirit leaves the body, this vital principle is neither lost and annihilated on the one hand, nor on the other able to keep up the functions of the animal system, but *lies dormant* in connection with so much of the present, natural body as constituted the seminal principle or essential germ of that body, and is to serve as a germ for the future, spiritual body; and this portion may be truly body, material substance, and yet elude all possible chemical tests and sensible observation, and all actual, physical dissolution.* On the re-union of the spirit at the appointed

* Johannes Müller, one of the greatest physiologists of the age, has given a well-known theory of the "vital principle." As it coincides so perfectly

hour with this dormant vital principle and its bodily germ, we may suppose an instantaneous development of the spiritual body, in whatever glorious form God shall see fit to assign it. Such a body, so produced, would involve a proper resurrection of the present body. The new body would be a continuation of the old, a proper development from it. The germinal essence is the same, the vital principle is the same, the conscious spirit is the same. The organic connection between the two is as real as that between my present body and the seminal principle from which it was first developed in the womb; as that between the blade of wheat and the bare grain from which it grew.

We throw out the above as a mere casual hypothesis. We do not pretend that it is a statement of ascertained or *ascertainable* facts. We do not even propose it as a *theory*. We offer it as *one among many possible hypotheses*. Its absolute impossibility, at least in its essential features,* we challenge any body to demonstrate; and its bare *possibility* is of such force as to demolish our author's argument *de fond en comble*. As a *positive doctrine* we do not hold ourselves bound to admit our own hypothesis or any particular parts of it; and if any one should seek to impose it upon us in that form, we should resist the imposition with all our might. We admit it only with the implied assumption that it involves a true and proper *resurrection of the body*; for this is a doctrine which we shall not willingly compromise or suffer to be compromised in any way.

For ourselves we do not pretend to say *how the dead are raised up*; nor do we feel bound to do so; although our author seems to think we are, when he says, "let those who still believe that the body is raised, fix in their own minds and define to themselves clearly if they can, how it is raised." We wonder that the author, when he wrote that, did not remember the reply which the apostle Paul makes to a man whom he represents as urging the same requisition. "But some one will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool!" We wonder the more at this oversight on the part of our author, because he actually quotes the words which the apostle proceeds to address to the fool, while he forgets to insert the address itself.

with the hypothesis described above, we venture to add it in this note. It is as follows:—

"Life is a principle, or imponderable matter, which is in action in the substance of the germ, enters into the composition of the matter of this germ, and imparts to organic combinations, properties which cease at death." He denies that there is any more obscurity in the physiological views of this subject than in the philosophical doctrines concerning light, heat, and electricity.—See an able article on "the Principle of Life," in the *Whig Review* for Oct. 1847.

* The part assigned to the "vital principle" may be omitted, if any so prefer.

He seems to us to have committed an oversight of much greater practical importance in his interpretation of the words he quotes: 1 Cor. xv. 36, 37, 38, 42, 43. The apostle, as it seems to us, would *illustrate* the mysterious connection between the natural body and the spiritual body, and the identity in diversity which characterizes that connection, by pointing to the equally mysterious connection between the bare grain of wheat sown and the plant that grows from it. According to our author's interpretation, he points to the connection in the latter case to illustrate the fact that there is no connection in the former case at all! But if *what is raised* has no connection at all with *what is sown*, why talk about the *sowing* at all? the apostle could certainly have made a simple statement of the fact, which would have needed no illustration, and which is quite obscured by the illustration he has given. "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption;" says the apostle; "it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body." What is sown? the body, not the spirit. What is raised? the body, not the spirit. If the apostle is to be presumed to have any object in view which needed his illustration, the subject of the two verbs, though only implied in the original, must be logically *identical*; and yet our author adduces the passage in proof that Paul did not believe in a resurrection of the identical body! If the apostle Paul taught anything in regard to a resurrection of the dead, he certainly taught that *our vile body shall be changed*, that *it* may be fashioned like unto *Christ's glorious body*; that *this corruptible* shall put on incorruption, and *this mortal* shall put on immortality. If such expressions do not assert a real connection between the spiritual body and the natural body, we are at a loss to conceive what language could assert it.

A wiser than St. Paul once solemnly declared, "The hour is coming, *and now is*, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live. . . . Marvel not at this: for *the hour is coming* in the which all that are *in their graves shall come forth*; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation." John v. 25, 28, 29.

Now if the 28th verse is to be taken in a "spiritual sense," what is to be made of it as contrasted with the 25th, where there is an acknowledged "spiritual sense?" And what metaphorical sense of any kind can any one reasonably attach to the terms of the 28th verse, uttered in such a connection and under such circumstances? We do not ask, what metaphorical sense he may feel compelled to attach to them in order to save them from expressing what he looks upon as a self-contradiction and

an absurdity ; but we ask, what metaphorical sense *those who heard them could attach to them, or could be expected to attach to them, by him who uttered them?* When Christ said, speaking of himself, "I am the vine," "I am the door;" or, speaking of a loaf of bread, "this is my body;" we suppose that those who heard him could not have been expected to understand him literally, judging from the natural and recognized laws of human language and human thought. But when he says, "all that are in *their graves shall come forth*," what reason is there for supposing that those who heard him were expected to understand the words in any other than their plain, literal sense; in any other sense than that in which the Christian church has generally understood them?

In the case of Paul, our author admits that he did teach a "physical resurrection," as he chooses to call it, or seemed to teach it. And he gives this singular reason for the apostle's teaching or seeming to teach what was so grossly inconsistent with what he really meant, viz., that it was out of condescension to the prejudices and scepticism of the gentile world! As though it were not notorious that many of the heathen *philosophers* believed, or half believed, in the immortality of the soul, *without being laughed at* by their neighbours; and that even the *popular* belief implied *some* continuance of existence after death. While no point in Paul's preaching excited more ridicule or incredulity among the philosophizing Greeks than his doctrine of the resurrection, whatever that doctrine may have been. *They* manifestly understood him to mean a resurrection of the body; nor do we see how they could reasonably have been expected to understand him otherwise; since it was his almost uniform custom—as in this 15th chapter of Corinthians and in the passage before cited from Thessalonians—to present the resurrection promised to Christians as inseparably connected with the resurrection of Christ, both as its type and as its indispensable condition. The Greeks may have held that the immortality of the soul was deficient or even destitute of proof, but they were not accustomed to look upon it as absurd or ridiculous. Yet Paul's doctrine of the resurrection seemed as absolutely irrational and impossible to them, as does the resurrection of the body to our author; and probably for similar if not "identical" reasons.

But we find ourselves becoming gradually involved in the Scripture argument, into which it was entirely contrary to our intention to enter at present. Indeed, we should hardly consider it worth while to enter into that argument at all; unless both parties were distinctly agreed to seek the simple, natural meaning of the Scriptures, interpreting them according to the

recognized laws of human language and human thought ; with the honest intention of abiding by the result, as authoritative and absolutely decisive.

We wish our position to be distinctly understood. To prove the absolute impossibility of a resurrection of the body, we hold to be impossible. To show its *antecedent* probability or want of probability on mere natural principles, we hold to be, for Christians, irrelevant. The *fact* is to be determined solely by the authority of revelation. And, though, when that fact has been thus ascertained, it may be supported and illustrated by analogies drawn from the physical world, it can never be refuted by any want of antecedent probability drawn from such a quarter. Nothing short of a demonstrated impossibility will suffice for its refutation. Analogy may prove or at least confirm, but it can never disprove, *what rests upon its own direct and decisive evidence*. Analogy has merely a corroborative or apologetic character. It may serve to remove objections ; but it cannot stand alone as *positive* evidence, especially when the subjects compared are of a widely different nature. As *negative* evidence it is good for nothing at all, except to show that a certain sort of confirmation is wanting. If nothing is to be received as a doctrine of Scripture, unless it can be shown to be probable by independent evidence drawn from the known laws and principles of nature, then, we see not but the *creation of the world, the incarnation of the Son of God, his glorious resurrection and ascension*, and many other doctrines which have been received by the church in all ages, must be put under the ban as well as the resurrection of the body. If the principle is received, it must be consistently applied. But if all prejudices of antecedent impossibility or improbability are fairly silenced and set aside, so that the mind comes to the interpretation of Scripture in a perfectly unbiassed state, we have no fears at all for the result. *Without* such a state of the premises, we should think it of very little consequence to discuss the Scripture argument for the resurrection of the body ; and *with* such a state of the premises, we should not think it of much greater consequence, believing as we do, that no intelligent man, in such a state of mind, would honestly deny that that doctrine is taught in the New Testament. The trouble is, as we understand it, that men settle first in their minds that the thing is impossible or improbable, and then, honestly enough, endeavour to save their Christianity by interpreting the Scriptures accordingly. Yield your argument of impossibility and waive that of antecedent improbability, and you are welcome to construct your Scripture doctrine as you may see reason. Our course is, therefore, first to refute the charge of

impossibility, and, secondly, to hold the question of analogical probability in abeyance, until the *fact* has been determined by the appropriate, positive evidence, that of Scripture. That *fact* being ascertained or admitted, natural analogies will not be wanting to confirm it; although the whole process involved in it may never thereby be rendered perfectly plain and comprehensible.

We confess ourselves to belong to the class of those old-fashioned, and, if you will, old-womanish people, who, in the words of our author, "think it a commendable habit to acknowledge that such and such things are beyond our comprehension; we must leave them in his hands who does all things well." But he would fain shame us out of the supineness of such unmanly modesty; and continues in the following eloquent strain:—

"If this had been the real intention of the Almighty, he would never have created man with mind, and endowed with that high intelligence which is ever seeking to make itself acquainted with not only the material world, but also that world which lies beyond—not only with the visible, but the invisible; a mind whose ardent seekings long to comprehend the universe of God. Now, those who are content to remain in ignorance of any great truth, do not discharge the duties they owe to God, themselves, and their fellows. There is a limit to man's power, because he is finite; but then where that limit is, who can tell? Has not his genius discovered and become familiar with things which those who lived before him never dreamed of, or thought wholly impossible? Has he not made the elements subserve his will, and matter subject to his pleasure? Does not the experience of every year teach us, as plainly as if it were written with a fire-beam on the roof of heaven, that man is rapidly advancing to a high and higher state of being, bringing home to us all the bright and glorious truths, that God has indeed made "man a little lower than the angels, and has crowned him with glory and honour?" And do we not find that each discovery, each grand truth that is unfolded, increases our reverence, our love and adoration for the God who made us? Who feels the greatest admiration, and comprehends most his power—the astronomer who sees a world in every star, many surpassing his own by a thousand fold in extent, and all rolling in beauty and order through space; or the simple and uninformed mind, who sees nothing in the stars but small lights to give light by night? The question requires no answer; and the experience of the past tells us that we shall go forward, that our progress is onward and upward, and the revelation of every truth is a step higher in the order [?] of

our existence. The investigation of no subject, however solemn, if done [?] in a proper spirit, but what [?] must be attended with more or less advantage; and to ascertain the attributes of our Maker, and our relationship to him, is our first and highest duty."

Now it may be that we honour science and philosophy as highly as our author himself; yet we must take the liberty to think that the moral and spiritual qualifications and means for a right and religious apprehension of the knowledge of God, are quite as important as any scientific or philosophical attainments. We have no doubt that Moses and Samuel and Peter and John, and many a simple, pious peasant in every age, have felt as great "reverence, love and admiration for the God who made them," as were ever felt by the infidel La Lande or the atheistical La Place,* with all their vast astronomical views and scientific acquisitions. We believe that a right apprehension and a heart-felt reception of the doctrine of *a crucified and risen Saviour* will do quite as much towards developing all right affections towards God as the comprehension of the profoundest scientific analysis contained in the *Mécanique Céleste*.

But we do not profess ourselves to be friends of self-satisfied ignorance. We would gladly know all which can be known, and we fully recognize the duty of diligently improving all the powers and means of knowing, which God has given us, whether in our own reason, in his works, or in his word. But we are at a loss to know what our author means when he seems to charge those who profess to believe in the resurrection of the body and yet acknowledge it to surpass the comprehension of their minds, with being "content to remain in ignorance of a great truth." If the resurrection of the body is "a great truth," they certainly are not content to remain in ignorance of it. If either our author or any body else clearly comprehends all that is involved in that "great truth," and can furnish them with any satisfactory explanations so as to render the mode and process of such a resurrection clearly comprehensible to their minds, we presume they will not reject any such assistance. For ourselves, we promise to accept all such helps with profound gratitude.

But, if our author means, in the passage just quoted, that, with such a glorious genius and such vast powers as we possess, what we cannot comprehend we have therefore a right to pronounce impossible, then he has confuted himself; for the very facts he alleges forbid such a conclusion. For, if the genius of man has already "discovered the truth of what those who lived

* If the epithets we have applied to these scientific giants do not belong to them, we shall be most happy to know and to acknowledge it. Our argument will not greatly suffer.

before him thought wholly impossible," what right has *our* ignorance or *our* impotence to dictate to our successors? At all events, if *he* has a right to pronounce impossible what he cannot comprehend, he must allow *us* the same right; and we must confess that, though the whole passage which we have transcribed may be very, very fine writing, we cannot comprehend at all what logical connection it has with the proof or disproof of the resurrection of the body; ergo, it is impossible it should have any such connection.

ART. II.—THE SIN-OFFERING.

Translated from "The Mosaic Offering" of J. H. Kurtz, Second Division, Chapter IV. pp. 155—196, by Rev. David B. Ford, Canton, Mass.

[The volume from which the following article is taken, is properly a review of the more extended work of Dr. Baehr, "The Symbology of the Mosaic Cultus." It is much to be lamented that a work of so profound and varied merit should yet be defective and erroneous in regard to some important points which the evangelical church holds especially dear. It will be seen by the readers of the following pages that Baehr recognizes nothing of a penal or substitutionary character in the Mosaic offerings. In his view, the imposition of hands signified merely the offerer's ownership of the animal and his willingness to give it up to Jehovah in death, and this willingness was yet more strongly expressed by his slaying of the victim. In the offering, the death of the animal was not the essential act, but only incidental to the principal thing—the sprinkling of the blood. The sprinkling of the blood (the principle of life) on the altar symbolizes the giving away of the soul or life of the offerer, and was thus an act emblematical of repentance, faith and self-dedication to God. "As the presentation of the blood of the animal is a giving away of the life of the animal in death, so should also the natural, selfish life of the offerer be given away, i. e., die; but since this is a giving away to Jehovah, it is no more ceasing to be, but a dying which *eo ipso* becomes life." And this symbolical character merely, he would in like manner attribute to the death and sacrifice of Christ. Some of these false views are combated, and, we may say, confuted, by our author in the following pages.—TR.]

"THE name of this kind of offering (חטאת, properly, sin) points very distinctly and directly to its design. It has to do

with sin, i. e., it aims at a removal, an expiation of sin. This, indeed, is the design of offerings generally; for the idea of expiation lies at the foundation of all the various kinds of offerings. If, now, any particular offering bears a name expressly derived from this idea, we may infer that it has reference not to sin generally, but specifically, i. e., to individual and distinct offences, and that to atone for these definite, individual offences is its more especial and exclusive aim." Baehr, Vol. II. p. 386. This view is perfectly accordant with our own previous investigations on this point. The question which now first claims our attention is whether this expiation is available to every offence and to all sins without exception, or if not, what is the ground of this exception? An answer to these inquiries is found in Num. xv. 27—30, "If any soul sin בְּשִׁגְגָה (i. e., through

mistake, oversight, inadvertently) he shall bring a she-goat of a year old for a sin-offering. And the priest shall make an atonement for him with the sin-offering on account of his sin (of inadvertence) before Jehovah, to make atonement for him, that he may obtain forgiveness. But the soul that doeth aught בְּיָד רָמָה (with upraised hand, i. e., in malice, revolt, wilfully)

the same blasphemeth Jehovah; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people." Of the same import is Lev. iv., the proper *locus classicus* of the sin-offering. If any soul sin בְּשִׁגְגָה

against any of the commands of Jehovah, the same shall bring a sin-offering, verses 2, 13, 22, 27. Thus, only those sins which were committed undesignedly, through inadvertence or precipitancy, could be atoned for by the sin-offering, while the sins of premeditation and malice were inexpiable. These last, since they partake of the character of rebellion and high treason against Jehovah, the King of Israel, must be punished with death. So strong were the claims of the theocratic-civil interest in these cases, that the sacrificial atonement, and the reception within the theocratic communion consequent thereto, could find no place. The exclusion of such offences from the theocratic expiation was indispensably necessary to the existence and permanency of the theocratic confederacy, which without this would be exposed to the workings of malice, licentiousness and caprice, and to inevitable failure. The *unpremeditated* transgressions of existing laws are not so destructive and ruinous in their tendency, and hence they appertain rather to the forum of one's conscience than to that of the civil jurisdiction.

Mosaism, however, goes still further, and even here evinces a most tender regard for the interests of morality. It recognizes even in those sins which are committed ignorantly and unde-

signedly that which is sinful and vile, and which separates from God. In unintentional murder the sin indeed does not consist in the act itself, but in the זָכַח which occasioned it; in the

want of attention and vigilance, of foresight and circumspection, from which the act proceeded. Even this want is a sin, a breach of the covenant, a violation of the command, "Be ye holy, for I am holy," and hence it excludes from the theoretic communion. But it is not a wilful, determined, and premeditated violation of law, and the less the sword of civil justice is appealed to here, the more room is afforded for the institution of expiatory offerings.

Baehr, however, not satisfied with this view (Vol. II. p. 387), wishes to exclude not only intentional offences, but also all violations of the universal, moral law, all *moral* transgressions in the stricter sense, and, accordingly, would limit the atonement simply to theocratic offences, or, in his form of statement, to the "violations of the positive-religious law, which was given to the people of Israel." And this principle he applies not only to the sin-offering, but to all the offerings, e.g., p. 405, and many times, especially to the trespass-offering, pp. 402, 403, 405, 409.

We must, however, at the very outset, protest against this division of the Mosaic law into the positive-religious (pertaining to divine service, ceremonial) and the universal, moral law. With such a distinction our catechism has indeed made us familiar, and there, as from the New Testament point of view generally, it may be correct; but from the Old Testament, especially from the Mosaic point of view, nothing can be more erroneous. We ourselves distinguish in Mosaism a permanent and a transient, that which is universally binding, and that which was obligatory only during the then present stage of development; but it is only the fulness of times, history, Christianity, which has taught and authorized us to make this distinction. To the Israelite there was no such distinction whatever; but the one was to him as binding as the other.

The universally moral is in Mosaism so interwoven with the positive-religious, so organically united with it in one, that it is this unity which constitutes the essential character of Judaism; and the dissevering or destruction of this unity would be the destruction of Judaism itself. Never and nowhere does the law make such a distinction, or authorize such to be made. Nay, from the fact that the universal moral laws stand in the midst of the purely positive-religious, and conversely, such a distinction is, in a twofold manner, forbidden in the same breath. The *whole* law is theocratic and religious; for the King of Israel was

also the God of Israel. Sleeping and waking, eating and drinking, all the occupations of life, the whole life with its manifold ramifications, were all ordered under this theocratic-religious point of view. Every sin of an Israelite was a theocratic offence, since the person of the sinner and his obligation to holiness were both theocratic.

On the other hand, the whole law was of a *moral* nature. Even the positive-religious commands fell within the sphere of morality, for morality in its perfect form is holiness, and to this the whole law had reference, as it many times expressly declares. An injury committed against the property, person, or honour of a neighbour, was as much a theocratic offence as the violation of any law of the cultus; for the Israelite stood to his neighbour in a more intimate relation than that of man to man, even in that of a covenant-member to a covenant-member. Hence the relation of one to another was a purely religious one, and a violation of the same was thus a religious, a theocratic offence. The transgression of a moral law was not only an offence against God as the King and Judge of all the earth, but also against Jehovah, the special King of Israel, and accordingly was a theocratic offence. Hence the strictly moral transgressions excluded from the theocratic communion as well as the specially religious—murder as well as idolatry. And the Israelite regarded as immoralities not only theft and adultery, but also the worship of images and of high places, the profanation of the Sabbath, the neglect of circumcision, the violation of the laws of food, &c. Both these kinds of offences possessed in his view the same features, since the laws relating to both were to him alike important and sacred.

Even from this general point of view, the theory of Baehr, which limits the sin-offering to theocratic offences in the narrower sense, appears to us untenable. Had this restriction been directly specified in the canon of the sin-offering, or if all the instances in which this offering was required had reference only to such positive-religious offences, then and only then should we be obliged to acknowledge the correctness of his theory. But neither of these is the case. In Lev. iv., where the sin-offering is treated of *ex instituto*, it is stated with great distinctness, whenever the occasion for the sin-offering is mentioned (vs. 2, 13, 22, 27), that for the undesigned transgressions of all the commands (without exception) an atonement by means of the sin-offering was both available and necessary (אֲדָתָּא מִכָּל מִצְוֹת).

(דָּוָה). What now can possibly justify us in limiting "all the commands of Jehovah" to the ceremonial laws? Or are not

then the moral laws as much the commands of Jehovah as the laws of the cultus?

In Num. xv. 22—24 the canon of the sin-offering is expressed if possible in still more comprehensive terms: "If ye have inadvertently transgressed any one of the commands which Jehovah spake to Moses, even all that Jehovah has commanded you through Moses, from the day when Jehovah gave commandment and thenceforward to your posterity," &c. Throughout both of these passages mention is made only of *sins* without any particular reference or special limitation. If now Baehr would endeavour in earnest to establish his theory, he must show that the words חַטָּאת or חַטֹּאת (and אֲשָׁם) are used exclusively, or at

least principally, of those offences which relate to the laws of rites and of worship. But this he cannot do; and thus even the name of our offering bears witness against him. If now in the few cases where the reasons for the sin-offering are specified, (especially in the Levitical purifications,) these reasons are in truth mostly of a positive religious character, even this opposes nothing to those unequivocal passages which indisputably refer to *all* the commands. And especially is this the case, since the reason why the specification was made in these instances is, that even according to that general canon for the involuntary states of Levitical impurity, which certainly were not *transgressions* of the laws of Jehovah, an atonement by means of the sin-offering would not be regarded as necessary.

The case of the *trespass-offering*, also, militates against this theory. Here, along with those sins which are of a positive-religious character, express mention is made of such as are manifestly of a purely *moral* nature, e. g., the embezzlement of another's property, the disowning of anything found, &c. From the close relation of the trespass-offerings to the sin-offerings, and from the explicit direction that for both there should be but one law, we are justified in predicating the same thing of the sin-offerings.

Let us, however, attend to the reasons which our distinguished opponent has advanced in support of his restrictive view. (1) First of all, he urges the circumstance that both the selection of the animal, and the diverse application of the blood, depended on the theocratic standing of the offerer, and not on the magnitude of the sin to be expiated. With the diversity of the *material* of the offering (for the high priest and the whole people a bullock was appointed; for the ruler, a he-goat; for the private individual, a she-goat or a sheep, and in special cases even doves. Lev. iv. 3, 14, 23, 28, 32. v. 7), there was also

a similar diversity of expiative acts. In the sin-offering of the high priest or of the congregation, the blood was sprinkled in the holy place seven times towards the curtain before the capporeth (mercy-seat) and also on the horns of the altar of incense. In the offering of the ruler and of the private person, the blood came not into the holy place, but simply upon the horns of the altar of burnt-offering. Lev. iv. "From this results," as Baehr supposes, "the important conclusion: If the theocratic standing of an individual was the determining rule for the sin-offering, then also must the sin with which the sin-offering has to do, have a theocratic character, i. e., must be a violation not of the universal, moral laws, but of the positive-religious law which was given to the people of Israel." P. 387. Against this, we remark, in the first place, that the inference is by no means a necessary one. From the same premises we could quite as easily draw the directly opposite conclusion. If the sin itself makes no difference, but only the person sinning, it follows that this offering was of universal application, and available to all sins. Should we, however, concede the justness of Baehr's inference, it then could have no significance only as we limit the theocratic system to the cultus and to the laws of outward observances. If this restriction, however, is, as we have proved, erroneous, the conclusion founded upon it must also be false. That the diversity of the material and of the expiative acts had reference to the theocratic position of the offerer and not to the importance of the offence, or rather, that the degree of the crime was measured by the position of the person sinning, and hence that the sin was regarded under a theocratic point of view, we certainly wish not to deny; but, on the contrary, we maintain that each sin of an Israelite was a theocratic offence, and that this theocratic point of view was taken not from the sin in itself, but from the person who sinned. (2) "The same result, moreover, is in a measure obtainable from the Mosaic idea of offerings in general. Since the Mosaic offerings had respect to the covenant with Jehovah, so also must those special offerings whose design is *κατ' ἑξοχὴν* to atone, have respect to those offences which relate to this covenant."

Even Baehr himself has felt this argument to be unsatisfactory and inconclusive, and hence he well qualifies his assertion by the conditional phrase. That the decalogue was the basis of the covenant with Jehovah, Baehr himself would be the last to deny, (Vol. I. p. 90 et passim,) and yet its commands are pre-eminently of a universal, moral character. Transgressions of these commands, then, were violations of the covenant with Jehovah; and thus from the given premises and by the same method of argument we arrive at a conclusion entirely opposite

to that of Baehr, viz., that the sacrificial atonement had reference chiefly to the universal-moral commands.

This argument, however, which in the form stated by Baehr proves nothing, or rather the direct reverse of what it should prove, may be so applied as to constitute what would seem to be a conclusive proof against the universal applicability of the sin-offering which we have maintained. This objection we will anticipate by its statement and refutation. The sin-offering and the trespass-offering were first instituted by Moses, since they confessedly did not exist prior to his time. This extension of the sacrificial rite must be based on an extension of the law, and thus also of the knowledge of sinfulness. The extension of the law, however, consists in the addition of the positive-religious law to the universal, moral law which existed before the legislation of Moses, and hence it would seem to be clearly demonstrated, that the sin and trespass-offerings could refer only to the violations of these positive-religious laws. To this we reply, that the extension of the sacrificial rite is certainly determined by the extension of the law, but this latter is misconceived when regarded as consisting in the simply mechanical addition of the ceremonial law. This was not something absolutely new. Iken, notwithstanding the very limited accounts, has written two extended Dissertations *de institutis et cæremoniis legis Mosæ ante Moysen*. And we certainly have to presuppose far more copious developments of the religious principle than the ante-mosaic history has occasionally presented to our notice.*

The Mosaic legislation, especially the Mosaic cultus, is no *deus ex machina*, but grew organically, though of course under the divine care, out of the religious cast of character possessed by Abraham and his seed, just as the flowers and fruit, under the influence of sunshine and showers, are developed from the seed-corn. Hence, in strict accuracy, the institution of the sin and trespass-offerings cannot be regarded as a wholly new event. They had a previous existence, not indeed as distinct items, but *implicite* in the burnt-offering. On the other hand, even the moral law in Mosaism acquired a new feature. Through its relation to the king Jehovah, and to the fundamental principle of the theocracy, "Be ye holy, for I am holy," it also became a theocratic law. (3) "Never do we find, in point of fact, that murder, theft, and the like offences, were expiated by the sin-offering, since for these the law provided punishment alone. Even when such offences were undesignedly committed, they

* Much which is true and striking in reference to this subject, together with much that is groundless and false, is found in Bruno Bauer's "Religion of the Old Testament," in the first section of the second book,—The historical presuppositions of the law.

were never expiated by an offering; see especially Num. xxxv. 11, &c." Passing by the fact that, according to Lev. vi. 1—6, theft is actually expiated by the trespass-offering, which hereafter we shall notice more fully, we would give the following answer: That the crimes of theft, murder, and the like, when they were committed (בִּיד רָמָה) with a malicious and

rebellious spirit, should not be expiated but punished, we have already shown to be necessary. Hence we are concerned only with the proposition, that such offences, even though committed undesignedly (בְּשִׁגָּגָה), were excluded from the sacrificial expiation.

Let us *instar omnium* consider the alleged example in Num. xxxv. 11. Here the subject treated of is the protection which the free cities should afford to "him that killeth unawares." From this Baehr concludes that for the inculcate there was no sin-offering, and that in this and similar cases generally, no offering was made. Even he, however, does not hold to the universal correctness of this inference, and hence the whole objection loses its point and power of demonstration. We, moreover, contend in the first place, that, in view of the whole connection of the passage, this was not the place to speak expressly of the ecclesiastical atonement; and hence to argue the non-existence of a thing from the silence maintained respecting it, is in this case a gross fallacy. In the second place, we affirm that there is a plain indication that such a case, in the *ecclesiastical* economy, does belong to the rubric of offences which may be expiated by the sin-offering. In regard to our first affirmation, it is to be observed, that the chapter in question does not treat *ex professo*, of the undesigned manslayer, for then certainly we should have expected some direction given in regard to the ecclesiastical atonement; but of the free cities and of the manslayer, only so far as he had a claim to the privilege of the free cities. Therefore the reference in this chapter to the undesigned manslayer, is limited simply to some special instructions in regard to the investigation to be instituted; whether the deed was truly unintentional, and also in regard to the security of the inculcate from the avenger of blood.

The *indication*, spoken of above, is found in the repeated designation of murder by בְּשִׁגָּגָה, v. 11, 15. This clearly refers to the canon of the sin-offering in Lev. iv.: "whoever shall transgress בְּשִׁגָּגָה any one of the commands of Jehovah, the same shall be expiated by the sin-offering." "Thou shalt not kill," is undeniably one of Jehovah's commands. The in-

culpate has violated this command, but (בְּשִׁגְגָה) inadvertently, and hence he is not delivered up to the sword of justice, but must be atoned for by the sin-offering. Against the justness of this reasoning and inference, no one can have anything to object. Whether this sin-offering was to be brought immediately or only after the death of the high priest, when for the first time his appearance outside of the free city would be unattended with danger, we may not positively decide, though in our opinion the *latter* supposition is correct. Since he durst not leave the free city to come to the sanctuary, his theocratic rights and duties were suspended, and consequently his obligations in regard to the sacrificial atonement.*

We have now shown, as we believe, that the limitation of the sin-offering to the positive-religious commands is wholly incorrect. We will, however, cheerfully concede, that as a matter of fact, the sin-offering was mostly concerned with such religious offences. The inadvertent violations of the moral law must, in comparison with the like violations of the positive-religious laws, be of extremely rare occurrence, since these latter extended in an especial manner over the whole life, to all its various departments and relations.

The preceding investigation has detained us longer than we anticipated. This, however, we cannot regret, since the result obtained is far more important to us than we might at the first sight suppose. We wish not to conceal the fact, that on the theory of Baehr, were we obliged to acknowledge its correctness, an objection would lie against the juridical view of the offering which it were difficult, if not impossible, to remove. Baehr has merely hinted at it, Vol. II. p. 281. Steudel, on the contrary, has sought to give it force in the words already examined: "If

* The same which is here predicated of unintentional murder, holds true also of undesigned theft, as also of all unpremeditated transgressions. More difficult is it, to form a judgment in reference to theft designedly committed. That this was not punished with death, but only with a fine, seems directly to oppose Num. xv. 30. It is here well to remark that the rendering of בִּיד רָמָה by "designedly" is inaccurate and too weak.

It means with "hand upraised" against Jehovah, and denotes malice, revolt, a wilful, determined rebellion against Jehovah. Simple theft, however, can hardly possess a character so aggravated, and is an offence moreover which admits of reparation. Theft belongs generally not to those offences which proceed from a determined rebellion against Jehovah, and hence is not punished with death; it belongs, however, generally not to those offences which are unintentional and which arose by mistake; it can, therefore, not be expiated simply by the sin-offering. So far as it is intentional, it is obnoxious to penal justice. So far as it arose from open rebellion, and admits, in a measure, of reparation, the exclusion from the theocratic communion was not absolute. Since now every exclusion from this communion can be abrogated only by an expiatory offering, it is more than probable, that so soon as civil justice was satisfied, he was received again into the communion of the church and theocracy by means of such an offering, and doubtless, as we shall see more plainly hereafter, by means of a trespass-offering.

offerings were appointed even for *external* offences, how important, in case substitution were to be thought of, must offerings have been for the far weightier, the strictly *moral* transgressions !” What our learned author has further said, p. 391—393, respecting the kind and method of the expiation, commands, for the most part, our assent, and as we cannot state our views more clearly or happily, we appropriate his own words :—

“ The expiation must be something different from that of the burnt-offerings and thank-offerings. These had to do only with sin in general, and hence the expiative act, the sprinkling of blood, had a more general and indeterminate character. The sin-offering has to do with sin exclusively and in its distinct manifestations. Its sole design is to atone. For these reasons the sprinkling of the blood must here be more definite, and generally more prominent. Hence the blood was sprinkled, not as in the other kinds of offering, in general only upon the altar (round about), but on distinct and prominent parts of the same. It was also sprinkled on other and diverse vessels of the sanctuary, and on the more or less sacred and important ones, according to the degree of the crime to be expiated, or rather, according to the standing of the person to be atoned for; thus there appear to be different degrees of expiation.

“ The *first* degree of expiation above that of the other kinds of offerings, was the sprinkling of the horns of the altar in the forecourt. The horns are the insignia of the altar, and in them its meaning is concentrated. Hence the sprinkling of these must, in comparison with the sprinkling of the sides of the altar round about, appear the more important. This degree of expiation was appointed for each private individual of the people and also for the ruler; yet with this difference, that in the first case the blood of a female, in the second, the blood of a male, animal of the same species was employed. The *second* degree of expiation was the (seven-fold) sprinkling of the horns of the altar in the holy place and towards the curtain which hung before the ark of the covenant. This expiation is manifestly to be regarded as belonging to a still more elevated grade. The sprinkling towards the curtain did not have this for its object, but the capporeth, which was here sprinkled, not directly, but only indirectly and symbolically. This second degree of expiation was appointed for the whole congregation or its representative and substitute, the high priest. Lev. iv. 3—7, 13—18. The *third* and highest degree of expiation was the sprinkling of the capporeth in the most holy place. The sprinkling is here expressly designated as sevenfold, and this number, which is the number of the covenant and of expiation, directs us at once to the design and the importance of the sprinkling. This third

degree of expiation was in like manner appointed for the whole people, and the high priest, yet it had reference, not to a particular offence, but to the aggregate offences of a whole year; and hence this highest expiatory act took place but once a year on the great festival of atonement. Lev. xvi."

Thus far are we able to agree with our author. The points of difference have for the present been avoided, by omissions in the passage cited. These refer to the different views respecting the three divisions of the sanctuary. We will state our own view as briefly as possible. The tabernacle (the tent of the congregation, the dwelling) symbolizes the kingdom of God where Jehovah dwells among His people and meets with them. The fore-court is the vestibule to the sanctuary, as Judaism is to Christianity. The former represents the real, the latter the ideal residence of the people. In that dwell the people, who still say, (Ex. xx. 19) "Speak thou with us, and let not God speak with us lest we die;" who indeed have a priestly calling, (Ex. xix. 6) for which, however, they are not yet perfectly prepared, but must first be educated to its practice; who still need a human mediator, and may not yet approach (קָרַב) directly to Jehovah. Here, there-

fore, prevails the shadow-service. Here, therefore, bleeds the imperfect animal-offering, which must daily and yearly be repeated. Here, therefore, stood the altar of burnt-offering, the symbol of a people, sinful indeed, but waiting to receive expiation, the first representative form of the kingdom of God.

The *holy place* is the ideal residence of the people, who are a priestly kingdom, a holy nation, a people of possession. Here the sacrificial utensils are wanting; the sacrificial service has ceased, for the expiation is accomplished. The people are no longer laden with sins, which separate them from Jehovah. They are a people of light, of prayer, and of good works. Therefore, here stand the candlestick, the altar of incense, and the table of show-bread, as symbols of this people. The people in their present stage of development and culture are still excluded from this place; yet in the hope that, when they shall become fitted for their priestly calling, and shall have entered upon their priestly rights, then this place also shall become their actual abode. In the meanwhile, however, this place is not empty and desolate. Its vessels rest not idle. The candlestick sends forth its light, the altar its sweet odours, and the table proffers its gifts. For the people were now virtually a priestly kingdom and a holy people; the relative manifestation only was not yet conformed to the absolute idea. Suitably to the lower and still inadequate degree of their culture, admittance was to them denied. Their priestly calling and priestly rights are still

ideal, but not, therefore, imaginary. These they already exercise, though only through their priests, whom Jehovah has chosen for this purpose, from the priestly nation. These, the flower of the people, their representatives, and, for a time, their mediators, are the familiars, the קרובים; these tread this holy place and perform the service.

In the most holy place dwells Jehovah, among the people, and yet separated from them. Here stands the ark of the covenant, which contains the law, the tables of testimony which testify against the people, but which are covered by the mercy-seat (the expiatory cover, the capporeth). On this most holy mystery, the cherubim, the symbols of the most perfect creature-life, the ideal creation, whose idea man is called to realize, look down with bowed face in adoration. And between the wings of the cherubim hovers the cloud, the shekinah, the symbol of the most immediate, yet reconciling, forgiving presence of Jehovah. A curtain separates the holy place from the holy of holies. So long as this partition-wall remains, only the high priest, in whom was centered all the priestly significance of the chosen, sacerdotal race, and even he only once a year, may approach unto the mercy-throne. But when once that mystic temple (John ii. 19, &c.) shall be demolished, and the veil (Heb. x. 20) shall be rent in twain from the top to the bottom, then shall each one of the priestly nation have free access to the throne of grace (Heb. iv. 16).

The signification of the fore-court is concentrated in its principal vessel, the altar of burnt-offering. Its contents, as we have already seen, represent the church as *contentum*, or the people; the enclosing framework represents the church as *continens*, an institution originating from God and appointed by Him for salvation.* From the altar the horns jut out, in which again its meaning is comprised. "The horn is the image of power, strength and might, which in the animal are centered in the horn, Amos vi. 13; Ps. cxlviii. 14. Hence it serves as a symbol of regal power, Dan. vii. 7, 8; viii. 3—9, &c. With this is connected the signification of honour and renown, as the horn is not only the weapon of the animal, but also its ornament, Ps.

* The altar of burnt-offering, as is stated in Ex. xx. 24, was made of earth. In the symbology of our author, earth is the representative and symbol of the people. The physical man was taken from the earth, and unto the earth will it return. The earth was cursed from man's sake. It thus stands in close relation to man, especially as fallen and sinful, and hence was the fittest material for the altar, the symbol of the people. The earth of the altar taken from this common earth especially represents the Israelites, a people, sinful indeed, yet chosen from among men in order to be made holy. The earth of the altar is embraced within a chest or box, and this represents the church as *continens*, as embracing within itself the elect and holy. Much of this to unimaginative minds may perhaps seem a little fanciful.—T. A.

cxii. 9 ; lxxxix. 17 ; Job xvi. 15, &c. Quite peculiar is the use of the horn as a symbol of fulness, abundance, and so of prosperity and blessing, Ps. xcii. 10. Hence the expression, Horn of salvation, Ps. xviii. 2 ; 2 Sam. xxii. 3 ; Luke i. 69." The church as *continens* is the appointed institution for the bestowment of protection and ornament, blessing and salvation. This power of the church in its acme, is symbolized by the horns of the altar. As now the sprinkling of the blood of the sin offering is distinguished from the like act in the other offerings, chiefly by the circumstance that the blood was sprinkled, not in an indefinite manner on the sides of the altar round about, but particularly on the *horns* of the altar ; so by this is indicated an advance in the character and efficacy of the atonement. This higher expiation was required, since it had to do with a definite, open, and thus an *enhanced* offence, by which the theocratic communion with Jehovah was broken off. This mode of sprinkling was limited to the sin-offering of the private individual and of the ruler. In the sin-offering of the priest, the atonement must be of a still more advanced character, since, from his higher theocratic standing, his offence appeared the more aggravated. The priesthood, to whom was transferred the entire priestly dignity of the people, dwelt as such within the sanctuary. Here, therefore, the whole work of the sacrifice should have been performed, had not this entirely opposed and destroyed the *idea* of the holy place. The offering could only be brought into the fore-court by the altar. There the imposition of hands and the slaying took place ; and there also the blood which remained was poured out at the bottom of the altar. But in order to represent the entire transaction as having special reference to the priest, and thus to satisfy the above claim, the *application*, at least, of the same, the sprinkling of the blood, was made within the sanctuary, the symbolical residence of the priesthood. Here the blood was sprinkled, not on the candlestick nor on the table of show-bread, although these were symbols of the priesthood, but on the altar of incense ; both because this was ever the most important and essential vessel, since in it was centered in the highest degree the *idea* of the whole apartment, but especially because this vessel fell under the view of an altar, and therefore in its degree corresponded to the altar in the fore-court. Here also the horns were sprinkled or besmeared. But even this was not enough, and hence the blood was sprinkled seven times towards the curtain, before the cap-poreth. In the most holy place the expiatory blood could be brought only once a year, on the day of atonement, and not until that day could the priest even be allowed to enter. The priesthood in its essential character, however, was closely related

to that which the most holy place contained and symbolized. In order, therefore, that the expiation of the priest should be valid, the *application* of it should have there been made; but to this end it was sufficient that the blood was sprinkled *towards* the curtain, where the capporeth was. The sin-offering of the whole congregation was of equal importance and worth to that of the priest. It had similar rites and a similar expiation, not only because the priest was a member of the congregation, but chiefly because the whole priestly dignity which was transferred to the priesthood properly belonged to the congregation, though as yet it had not attained such a degree of maturity that each of its individual members could be regarded as a priest.

The third and highest degree of expiation was that where the blood was directly sprinkled on the capporeth. What the horns are to the altar, the capporeth is to the ark of the covenant, the concentration of expiatory power. Upon this, therefore, the blood was sprinkled. Hence, also, we perceive why and through what means the capporeth effects the most perfect expiation. In itself, it is indeed a cover, and is employed as such, but its peculiar, ethical power of expiation is obtained from the blood of the most holy offering with which it is sprinkled and covered; for, "without the shedding of blood is no remission."

Some further particulars respecting the sin-offering are furnished us in Lev. vi. 24, &c. And first of all is the command, v. 27, No one may touch any of the flesh of the sin-offering excepting only the consecrated priest; and if the garment of any one is accidentally sprinkled with the blood, it shall be washed in a holy place. The strict meaning of this ordinance obviously is this: The flesh is so holy that only the holy person of the priest may touch it; the blood is so holy that not a drop of it must be borne without the sanctuary. "So the passage was explained from ancient times," remarks Baehr, and adduces especially Theodoret, Abenezra, Maimonides, Deyling, and Clericus. "De Wette (*de morte expiat.*, &c., p. 16) first made the observation, '*videtur opinio fuisse victimarum sanguinem, culpa peccatoris in eas translata, impurum esse factum*,' and this passage has since been largely employed in support of the theory of imputation and penal death. Scholl, p. 154, and Tholuck, p. 78, quote it in this sense. But even the connection is decisive against this view. If the flesh was so holy that no one except a holy person might touch it, so the blood, as the special means of atonement and sanctification, was still holier. Besides, nothing can be more contradictory to the whole nature of the Mosaic offering than to maintain that anything could be defiled by the blood of the offering, the very means of sanctification. Then the altars and the capporeth itself were defiled, while, on the con-

trary, they were purified yearly even with blood. Lev. xvi. 19. Heb. ix. 21, 22. In fact, a weaker, more distorted argument in support of the theory of penal death in the offering, cannot be given." These remarks are so convincing that no objection can be urged against them. However, futile reasons for a thing prove nothing against the thing itself. But of this, by and by.

The same care lest any of this most holy offering should come without the sanctuary, and thereby be profaned, is manifested in the directions given in regard to the vessels, in which the flesh of the offering was boiled, v. 21, 28. If they were earthen they must be broken to pieces, since earthen, unglazed vessels gather moisture. If they were of metal, they must be carefully scoured before they could be applied to their customary use. Here, also, some defenders of the juridical view have fallen into a mistake. "Thus Scholl has strangely been pleased to find therein an argument for the impurity of the flesh of the victim, and thus indirectly for substitution; but he did not consider that in the preceding verse the flesh of the offering is designated as so holy that only the holy priests might touch it; and in the following verse it is commanded that only these priests should eat it, and that, too, in a holy place. The appeal to Lev. xi. 33 is untenable; for, from the command to break in pieces those vessels into which a carcass had fallen, it surely does not follow that the 'most holy' sin-offering which the holy servants of Jehovah ate within the sanctuary, belongs to the category of a carcass." Vol. II. p. 393.*

Finally, in the chapter specified, v. 26, 29, it is directed that the priest who performs the expiation shall eat in a holy place the flesh of the sin-offering which comes not upon the altar (though from this the female members of his family were precluded), yet those sin-offerings whose blood comes into the holy place were prohibited from such a use, v. 30. Their flesh must not be eaten, but burnt in a clean place without the sanctuary. "Since the entire combustion of the animal on the altar constituted the distinguishing feature of the burnt-offering, so, in case this peculiarity were continued to the burnt-offering, the like transaction could not here take place. Hence, only the best of the offering as representing the whole, came upon the altar, as in the case of the thank-offering, while that which remained was eaten by the priest, or burnt." Vol. II. p. 394.

* J. D. Michaelis, with his usual stolid sagacity, explains the ordinance in the following manner:—Moses would not recommend the use of earthen vessels since they were so fragile, but would inculcate upon his people in this delicate manner the truth that the costlier brazen vessels were cheaper than the less expensive but fragile earthen ones. These, indeed, gather a light rust, but for this reason they were appointed to be cleansed.—*Mosaic Laws*, Vol. iv. p. 314.

What parts the priest was to eat is not specified, since the reason which required such a specification in the thank-offering, viz., the distribution of the flesh of the offering between the priests and the offerers, was here wanting. Since now in case of the larger animals—as sheep, goats, and rams—the priest could not eat the entire animal (excluding the fat portions) in *one* day, (for even the thank-offerings, though they were not most holy offerings, must be eaten on the first day, and certainly in case of the most holy sin-offering no longer period was allowed,) so here, the same course was taken, although it is not expressly stated, as was pursued with the remaining flesh of the thank-offering; it was burnt in a clean place without the sanctuary.

If we now consider the eating, and compare it with the eating of the thank-offering, “it thus appears as an entirely different thing from this. The character of a repast is entirely wanting to it. Not the offerer even, and much less his family, could have a part therein. Nay, not even the relatives of the priest might partake of it, but simply the priests themselves. It was peculiarly a *priestly* meal, and the joyousness and festivity, which, according to the Oriental idea, are inseparable from a repast, are wholly wanting. Here the priests appear as priests in the exercise of their peculiar office and dignity.” Vol II. p. 394.

To the question, By what association of ideas is the eating of the flesh of the sin-offering connected with the official character of the priest? it is somewhat difficult to reply. Lev. x. 17 (a passage which Baehr has not considered) would seem to afford some information on this point. Moses here inquires of Aaron, Why have ye not eaten the sin-offering in a holy place? For it is a most holy thing, and it is given you (לֶשְׂמַת אֶת־עֹזֶן) to

bear the iniquity of the congregation, to make atonement for them before Jehovah. Ingenious, at least, is the explanation of this passage in Deyling, Obs. ss. 1. 65. § 2: nam hoc pacto, cum ederent, incorporabant quasi peccatum, populi que reatum in se recipiebant, ut indicaretur, aliquando sacerdotem et victimam unam fore personam, nempe Messiam, id quod in Jesu Nazareno exacte impletum fuit. Against this view we may not urge the objection, that the phrase לֶשְׂמַת אֶת־עֹזֶן is taken in the

sense of *portare peccatum* (to bear sin), while, like the analogous αἰρεῖν ἀμαρτίαν of the New Testament (John i. 29. 1 John iii. 5), it rather means *peccata auferre* (to remove sins), for Lev. v. 1 is plainly used in the former sense, but that the eating did not take place until after the expiation was accomplished, when the sin was already covered, expiated and removed. Further-

more the phrase נָטָא עֵן is here explained more definitely by the subjoined clause לִכְפֹּר עֲלֵיהֶם. The predominant signification then of נָטָא is that of *removal*, yet the other, of *bearing*, is by no means excluded thereby; rather was the bearing in this case, even a removal. The priest as mediator between the sinful people and the Holy God was a representative of both. The *portare* of iniquities appertains to him as representative of the former, the *auferre* of iniquities as representative of the latter. Certainly there could be no bearing and removing which were perfectly adequate, and correspondent to their idea, unless he as a proper mediator should take sin *upon himself* and by himself make expiation. But even in this is found that which rendered the typical sacrifice imperfect and unsatisfying, so that it could only be *σκία* and not the *σῶμα*.

Though we cannot with Deyling regard the eating as a symbolical *incorporatio peccati*, yet we must consider it an *incorporatio sacrificii*. The relation of the eating to the *priestly* efficacy of the atonement is from the above passage undeniable, and this can be explained only on the supposition that by this act was represented an intimate connection of the priest on the one hand with the offering, and therefore with the offerer for whom it was presented as a substitute; and on the other hand with Jehovah, to whom the whole offering belonged, but who was satisfied with the fat portions as the most excellent, and gave the remainder to the priest, which should otherwise be given up to the fire. The relation of the sacrificial animal to the offerer was signified by the imposition of hands, as the same to Jehovah was signified by the burning of the best portions, and both these relations were united in the priest, when they were expressed by the eating of the remaining flesh. Baehr to a certain extent recognizes these relations, though in another form and on a different ground. "In the eating of the most holy offering in the holy place, the priests appear in the closest connection and communion both with this offering and also with Him from whom all holiness proceeds, and whose instruments they are, with Jehovah." Vol. II. p. 395. That this connection between the offering and the priest obtained only in the sin (and trespass) offerings, and not in the burnt and thank-offerings, has primarily an external ground. In the burnt-offering the entire combustion of the animal, and in the thank-offerings the so essential sacrificial meal, precluded all opportunity for the representation of this idea. There is also an internal reason why this relation must be found, if anywhere, in the sin-offering. As expiation is the central point of

the offering, so is the sin-offering the most important one, the offering *κατ' ἑξοχὴν*. It is this offering, therefore, which, as the concentration and highest (Old Testament) expression of the idea of sacrifice, was brought on the great day of atonement, and which of all the offerings most fully imaged forth the sacrificial death of Christ. Hence it was appointed that here should be manifested those necessary relations of the priest to the offerer and to Jehovah, which were realized through the *divine humanity* of Christ.

"Accordingly," to proceed with Baehr, "it lay without doubt in the peculiar character and design of this kind of offering, that neither the offerer nor any one except a priest could have a part in the eating." And hereby also is explained the ordinance that, of those offerings whose blood came into the holy place, nothing should be eaten, but that the flesh should be burnt without the sanctuary. "It is," he remarks, "well to observe that *such* were the offerings which were brought for the expiation of the whole people, including the priests, or of the high priest as the head and representative of the people. Here, then, the priests, including likewise the high priest, were the persons who were to be expiated and sanctified, and not, as in the other sin-offerings, exclusively the sanctifiers or procurers of sanctification. They here appear by no means simply in their priestly character, but as offerers and needing expiation. Therefore even they were not permitted to eat of this offering, and that which under other circumstances was eaten, must be disposed of in another manner. In this case, then, the transaction was not of a priestly character, and belonged not to a properly sacrificial act; it was rendered necessary by special circumstances, and did not proceed directly from the fundamental idea of this offering. As the animal for a peculiar and extraordinary reason might not be eaten, the only course remaining was, in some suitable way, to remove and destroy it. For this purpose it was brought without the camp, though to "a clean place," and then it was not consigned to decay and corruption, which would seem like a despising and a profanation of the holy offering, but it was immediately consumed by fire and converted to ashes, in a manner entirely similar to the disposition made of the flesh of the *shelamim* (thank-offerings), which on the second or third day might no longer be eaten, but must be burnt. That this act of burning possessed more of a religious than a properly priestly character, is shown by the twofold specification, according to which, this was to take place without the sanctuary, and the animal also (which elsewhere never happened, not even in the burnt-offering) was consigned to the fire with its skin and offal. Yet was this

always designated as an offering, since this burning took place where the ashes of all the sacrificial animals were generally brought." Vol. II. p. 395, 396.

Even this removal and burning of the animal without the camp have been very incorrectly urged by Scholl and De Wette as an argument for the imputation of sin, and the consequent impurity of the sacrificial animal, on the ground that "nothing impure was suffered in the camp." In refutation of this, we very gladly employ Baehr's own words: "These sin-offerings in comparison with those of private individuals were certainly the more important, for their blood came even within the sanctuary. Hence they were the holier, and the expiatory or sanctifying power of their blood was greater. If now the lower class of the private sin-offerings was so little impure that they could be and must be eaten, even by the holy priests; so the burning of the higher class cannot possibly be accounted for by its greater impurity, but must have been occasioned by far different circumstances. Were the cause of the burning to be found in the impurity effected by the imputation of sin, then it surely must have taken place in *all* the sin-offerings, even in those of private persons, since the imputation and hence the impurity were entirely the same in both classes. If everything impure must be removed out of the camp, it does not follow that everything which was carried from thence was impure. That which was unclean was wont to be brought to an *unclean* place, Lev. xiv. 44, 45. In opposition to this, the law commands that the sin-offering shall be brought to a *clean* place, from which circumstance it follows quite as necessarily as naturally that the offering itself was pure. Nothing can be more opposite and contradictory to the whole doctrine of the Mosaic offerings than the affirmation that those offerings which served to atone especially and in a high degree were in an especial degree impure." Vol. II. p. 397.

As in our explanation of the ritual of the sin-offerings, we have for the most part coincided with Baehr, it is now incumbent upon us to show that the views adopted or modified by ourselves are accordant with the juridical idea of the offering. And to this work are we the more strongly impelled since we are here met by our distinguished opponent with these words of victory and triumph: "While by our theory the management of the sin-offering appears to be based on the fundamental idea of the offering, and is consistent throughout, the common juridical view is here especially reduced to straits." Vol. II. p. 396. And in a note, he places before us the hopeless prognostic, "never will the juridical view succeed in getting safely over this point."

Let us then hear what the obstacles are which so impassably

block up the way. On page 396, he remarks: "If all guilt and sin were, as is maintained, imputed to the sacrificial animal, and if in consequence of this it died a penal death and was impure, how, we ask, since even the contact with things unclean caused defilement, could the *eating* of the animal have been commanded, especially, how could this command have been given exclusively to the priests, who, otherwise more than any layman, were required to avoid, as possible, all defilement? Wherefore was the animal, having become unclean, to be eaten in 'the holy place,' while otherwise nothing impure, even in the slightest degree, was suffered to remain, and least of all, within the sanctuary? The law says, 'All the males among the priests shall eat thereof; it is most holy.' According to the juridical view, the opposite command should be given; no one, and least of all a priest, shall eat thereof, for it is wholly unclean."

This whole argumentation furnishes new evidence, though similar to much which has already fallen under our notice, that the prejudices of our distinguished opponent against the juridical view held by the church have so completely mastered him, that they have darkened his vision, otherwise so clear and penetrating, and have not once allowed him to make himself acquainted with the opposite theory, so as to learn what in it is essential and necessary, and what is accidental and indifferent. He is so firmly fixed to his own point of observation that he does not once leave it, even for a moment, in order that he may properly reconnoitre and appreciate the territory of an opponent.

To Scholl, (from whose notice the contradiction in which he had involved himself did not escape, since he confesses, "this only is inexplicable to me at present, that it was permitted, nay, even commanded, to the priests to eat the flesh of the defiled victim,") to him the above argument is perfectly convincing and triumphant. It, however, affects only the *faulty* development and defence of the juridical theory, for which this theory itself is not and cannot be responsible, unless that view of the impurity of the offering were a necessary consequence from this, so that the former could not be given up without at the same time destroying the latter. But this is by no means the case, though Scholl seems to believe it to be such, and Baehr very willingly follows him in this belief. On the contrary, it is not difficult to show not only that this view in no way necessarily follows from "the penal death theory," but even that it stands in direct opposition to it, that it contradicts its essential nature, and originated only from a distorted view of the same. But thus the whole boasted argu-

ment falls to ruins, and the shout of victory is sounded forth much too early.

According to the so-called "penal death theory," sin is (symbolically) imputed to the animal appointed for sacrifice, by the imposition of hands.* This has to do with the principle of vitality, the blood. So far now as the blood is infected by the imputation of the sin to be expiated, the whole life of the animal is thereby infected (just as the whole life of the sinner is infected). For since the life or the soul is in the blood, and the blood which sustains the soul permeates the whole physical being of the animal in every direction, to the remotest limits, so the whole animal may be regarded as infected with sin, which is expressed in the strongest manner by this circumstance, that the animal itself is now called **חַטָּאת** (sin), and hence is re-

garded as sin, which is, as it were, individualized in the animal.†

The blood as the seat of the soul and of feeling, as the sensitive principle, is also the seat of desire, and hence the birth-place and source of sin. As now the blood is concerned in the imputation, so also in the punishment. The blood as the seat of life is the source of sin; against the blood then as the seat of life is the punishment also directed, and this in consequence takes the form of death. The shedding of the blood is the death. So soon as this is shed, the punishment is suffered; so soon, however, as the punishment is suffered, the sin is annulled, abolished, the *status integer* restored. Until the blood be shed its desire is not annulled by aversion nor its life by death, and hence it was impure; but so soon as this takes place, this impurity is destroyed. The blood was now not only pure but purifying, and as such, as the means of expiation, was holy. If the garment of any one was sprinkled with it, the garment was not defiled thereby, but the blood rather was profaned, for the garment is a profane thing. Still less could the blood of the slain beast be regarded as unclean. It was not in itself properly impure, even before the death and expiation, but was only so in a measure by its connection with the blood. Had the blood been impure it could not have come upon the holy vessels. Had the flesh been unclean, then its better parts, the fat, could not have been given up to Jehovah through the fire, for Jehovah suffered nothing impure to approach Him.

* During this act the offerer, according to the Rabbinic tradition, made the following confession: *Obsecro, domine, peccavi, deliqui, rebellavi, hoc et illud feci, nunc autem penitentiam ago, sitque hæc expiatio mea.* Maimonides de rat. sacrif. 3.—Tr.

† Even the names **חַטָּאת** and **זֶבַח** for the offerings in question, form an

example in favour of imputation and substitution, which the opposite view will never be able to eliminate.

In regard to the *material* of the sin-offering, the want of the meat-offering comes first into consideration. That this want was important and essential is shown by the ordinance (Lev. v. 11) which appointed in case of extreme poverty a bloodless offering to be brought instead of a bloody one, and which, furthermore, prohibits any addition of oil or frankincense to this substituted, bloodless offering, and expressly adds as the reason for this prohibition, "for it is a sin-offering." Accordingly it was the oil and incense whose presence made the bloodless offering a meat-offering, and whose absence in the substitution of the bloodless for a bloody sin-offering, was essential and necessary. In this then lies the reason why in general no meat-offering was united with the sin-offering. Oil and incense symbolize the spirit of God and the prayer of man. The meat-offering in general is the symbol of good works. These, however, are good works and acceptable to God, only when they proceed from the depths of a godly and sanctified heart, when they are produced and matured by the Holy Spirit, and when, furthermore, they are presented to God as His own work in man, and the latter acknowledges with thanksgiving and praise, that the works are not the product of his own goodness, but of the grace of God. The sin-offering, however, was the expiatory sacrifice *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. The idea of atonement was here so entirely predominant that no room for the other ideas remained. The giving up of all the members and capacities, subsequently to the expiation, to the sanctifying fire, already retires to the background; while the consecration of the good works is here wholly wanting, and can appear only in the succeeding stage of the sacrificial institute, the burnt-offering.

In regard to the material of the *bloody* sin-offering, we perceive that the value of the animal to be chosen stood in a proportionate relation to the higher or lower expiation, and hence also to the rank and position of the offerer within the theocracy: "Most commonly, and certainly in the more general and important cases, the he-goat (*שְׂעִיר עִזִּים*) was appointed. That this selection was not made without design is too manifest to be overlooked, yet the reasons assigned for it are very diverse." We here confess our ignorance, and passing over the most wonderful and even absurd explanations of the same, we shall note only the opinion of Baehr, which, though it be purely conjectural, yet possesses the merit of being a very ingenious and certainly a not improbable conjecture: "The name of this kind of goat will guide us to a correct conclusion. They are called *שְׂעִירִים* on account of their long, shaggy hair. From this the garments of the mourners, and of the preachers of repentance,

were commonly manufactured (comp. Zech. xiii. 4 with 2 Kings i. 8). Among the mourners such a garment was called שָׂק,

σάκκος (Isaiah xx. 2). That these garments possessed a significant character needs no proof. With the mourners they were the direct signs of sorrow. With the prophets, they indicated that he who was thus clad proclaims sin and repentance,—a *sermo propheticus realis*. The שְׂעִיר עִזִּים, as the sin-offering, had

a similar reference to sin, and the mourning necessary for it (repentance). Very suitable then was the appointment of this animal for those offerings chiefly which had to do *only* with sin; and this was the more appropriate in case offerings, especially burnt-offerings, were brought at the same time. That this selection had not to do with male goats as such, is shown by the simple circumstance that not male goats in general, but only this species of the same, were selected for the sin-offerings, and never the other species, the עִזִּים which were employed in the thank-offerings (Num. vii. 17).

Finally, Baehr passes to the case of indulgence, Lev. v. 11, to which we have already alluded: "The oil is to the meal what the fat is to the animal. It is the sign of fulness and prosperity, and as such is the ornament and grace of the offering. The frankincense also, like all perfumes, is expensive, and is of the nature of ornament. The absence of both these has reference to the offerer as well as to this particular kind of offering. It was a poor offering, destitute of ornament and grace." Vol. II. p. 400.

This interpretation is clearly an unfortunate one, and must have had its origin in utter perplexity. If the oil bore the same relation to the meal as the fat to the animal, then it must have been as indispensable as this. As the fat of the sin-offering was offered to Jehovah, in the fire, so the oil must have been presented to Jehovah, on the altar. And if the oil, as the sign of fulness and prosperity, as the ornament and grace of the offering, was wanting, and if this destitution belonged to the idea of the sin-offering, then there should have been selected for the sin-offering as lean an animal as possible, or at least the fat portions of the same should have been set aside, and not have been laid on the altar. The reason, as we have already seen, is entirely the same as that by which the addition of the meat-offering to the sin-offering was prohibited. In the burning of the fat portions, nothing peculiar presents itself. Only this appears remarkable, that the expression occurring so frequently in the burning of the flesh of the burnt-offering אֵשׁה רִיחַ-נִיחֹחַ לַיהוָה

(fire of a sweet savour unto Jehovah), is here never employed. Since the burning of the most excellent part of the flesh had manifestly the same significance as the burning of the whole flesh, so from the absence of the expression we cannot argue the non-existence of the fact. In the burnt-offering, the burning is the essential thing, the properly characteristic function which renders the offering a burnt-offering; and hence the phrase "of a sweet savour for Jehovah," which denotes the effect of the burning, is here chiefly and even exclusively employed. What the burning is in the burnt-offering, the sprinkling of blood is in the sin-offering, the *expiation*; and hence to this sprinkling, the לִכְפֹּר (to make atonement) is chiefly and almost exclusively ascribed. As in the burnt-offering, the expression לִכְפֹּר is extremely rare, occurring indeed only once, so that "of sweet savour," in the sin-offering, never occurs. But even if the כִּפֹּר had never been affirmed of the burnt-offering, yet, on account of the blood-sprinkling which here took place, expiation could not be denied to it; so also the "sweet savour for Jehovah" cannot be denied to the burning of the sin-offering, although it be not expressly ascribed to the same. The difficult passage, Lev. v. 1—13, which, we are convinced, appertains to the sin-offerings, yet as it has been placed by many, and especially by Baehr also, in the rubric of trespass-offerings, we can only consider hereafter.

ART. III. —THE FOUR GOSPELS AS WE NOW HAVE
THEM IN THE NEW TESTAMENT, AND THE
HEGELIAN ASSAULTS UPON THEM.

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[Concluded from Vol. II. p. 56.]

V. COMPARISON OF THE CANONICAL GOSPELS WITH THE
APOCRYPHAL GOSPELS STILL EXTANT.

THE impugnors of the New Testament gospels appeal to the fact that there are gospels acknowledged to be apocryphal, as a proof of their theory that our recognized gospels are also myths or forgeries. Any one who candidly examines these spurious gospels, and compares them with the New Testament, will find

in them, not a refutation of our sacred writers, but a most convincing testimony to their intelligence, honesty and supernatural inspiration. So totally diverse are they from the genuine gospels, in conception, in spirit, in execution, in their whole impression—in all respects so entirely unlike, so immeasurably inferior, that the New Testament only shines the brighter by the contrast. They have scarcely so much resemblance to the genuine gospels, as the monkey has to a man.

An elaborate history and collection of these writings was first published by Fabricius near the beginning of the last century. The first volume of a new and critical edition was issued at Halle by Thilo in 1832. Prof. Norton has given an account of them in the third volume of his work on the Genuineness of the Gospels, but with an incredulity in regard to the testimony of the ancients which amounts almost to credulousness; yet it is very useful to be studied in connection with other and more credulous authorities. Ullmann gives a very good abstract of them in his treatise entitled *Historisch oder Mythisch*; and Guerike in his Introduction to the New Testament makes a brief and intelligible catalogue of them. Quite recently Dr. Hoffmann of Leipzig has compiled a Life of Jesus according to the Apocrypha, accompanied with learned annotations. English translations of the principal apocryphal writings of the New Testament have been collected and published both in England and the United States. If this has been done with any purpose of bringing discredit on our genuine New Testament, the design has most signally failed, for on every fair-minded and intelligent reader they must produce directly the opposite effect.

Fabricius gave the titles of about fifty of such spurious writings, and the industry of subsequent investigation has added to the number; but scarcely one-tenth part of these are now extant, and probably there were never more than ten or a dozen distinct works of the kind, the others being different recensions of the same narrative, or different titles of the same work, or mere repetitions of each other.

The Apocryphal Gospels.

Not more than seven of these now remain, which are worthy of notice—three of them in the Greek language, two in the Latin, and two in the Arabic. They are the following:

1. *The Protevangelium of James the Brother of the Lord*, of which the full Greek title is this: Διήγησις καὶ ἱστορία πῶς ἐγεννήθη ἡ ὑπερᾶγία Θεοτόκος εἰς ἡμῶν σωτηρίαν, that is, *Declaration and history how the most holy mother of God was born for our salvation*.—This seems to be the most ancient and valuable

of these books; it was first made known in Europe by W. Postel about the middle of the sixteenth century, and was published by Fabricius in his *Codex Apoc. Nov. Test.* The principal part of it is occupied (cap. 1—20) with the history of the birth and childhood of Mary, and the circumstances attending the birth of Christ. Then follows briefly and much in the manner of our gospels (cap. 21, 22) the visit of the Magi and the flight into Egypt; and it concludes (cap. 23, 24) with an extended description of the murder of Zachariah, the father of John the Baptist. The style of this gospel is far more simple and pure than that of any other of these apocryphal narratives, though in this respect, as in all others, it is immeasurably below the canonical books. Some things mentioned in it are alluded to by Justin Martyr and Clemens Alexandrinus, and the book is expressly quoted by Origen. It was in existence, at least a part of it, as early as the third century, though it was much later than that, before it was ascribed to the *brother of our Lord*, or took the title of *Protevangelium*. It gives some indications of a Gnostic origin. It was for a long time held in high estimation by the Greek church, and publicly read at their festivals, especially those which pertained to Mary. Very probably many of the early church traditions respecting Mary are preserved in it; and in this respect it may gratify a curiosity for which the canonical gospels make very little provision.

2. *The Greek Gospel of Thomas*.—This is one of the most extravagant of the apocryphal books, and professes to give a minute account of Jesus from the twelfth year of his age. It is filled with miracles which are wholly ridiculous, and some of them decidedly immoral and malevolent. The beginning and close of the book are very fragmentary. Irenæus (*adv. Hær.* I. 17) refers to some things contained in the book, and Origen (*Hom. in Luc.* I.) expressly mentions it. There is not the shadow of probability that it was written by Thomas the apostle. It is evidently of heretical origin, and was highly esteemed and in great use among the Manichæans. It is probably of considerably later date than the preceding one, and its Greek style is very impure.

3. *The Greek Gospel of Nicodemus*.—This, next to the *Protevangelium*, is the most important and respectable, as well as the most widely circulated of the apocryphal gospels. It is divided into two unequal parts, which seem originally to have been separate works. The first part (cap. 1—16) contains a minute description of the examination of Jesus before Pilate, and of his crucifixion and resurrection, and appears to be a remodelling and amplification of certain *epistles and acts of Pilate*, which are very early mentioned, but have not come down to us in a reliable

shape. (See Justin Martyr, Apol. I. 76, 84. Tertull. Apol. 21. Oros. Hist. VII. 4. Euseb. Hist. Ecc. II. 2.) It is probably of Jewish-Christian origin, and written for the purpose of affecting unbelieving Jews by the example of Annas and Caiaphas, who, it alleges, were converted by the testimony of Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea.

The second part (cap. 19—27) describes Christ's descent into Hades and the wonderful things he accomplished there. This is apparently more modern than the first part. Some Latin MSS. have an additional chapter, in which Annas and Caiaphas make oath before Pilate, that they are convinced, from all the testimony, that the Jesus condemned and executed at their instigation is truly the Son of God. There are also printed with it, by Thilo, letters of Pilate to the emperors Claudius and Tiberius.

The book, in its present form, cannot have been earlier than the fifth century, and was probably much later. It is not expressly mentioned until the thirteenth century. The prologue, which states that it was written in the Hebrew language by Nicodemus in the time of Christ, and translated into Greek by a Jewish Christian, named Annanias, during the reign of the emperor Theodosius, is evidently a mere fiction. The book was held in high esteem during the middle ages; and before the invention of the art of printing, it had been translated into Latin, Gaelic, Anglo-Saxon, German and French.

4. *The Latin Gospel of the Nativity of Mary.*—This probably belongs to the sixth century. The prologue, which states that it was written by Matthew, and translated into Latin by Jerome, deserves no regard. It goes over the same ground as the *Protevangeliium*; but is more minute as to the birth of Mary, and more condensed on the other points.

5. *The Latin History of the Nativity of Mary and of the Infancy of the Saviour.*—The first part (cap. 1—17) from the annunciation of Mary to the Bethlehem massacre, follows mainly the *Protevangeliium*, though with considerable variations and amplifications; while the latter part, the childhood of the Saviour, is more like the apocryphal books which we find in the Arabic language.

6. *The Arabic History of Joseph the Carpenter.*—In this book, Christ is introduced as discoursing with his disciples, and giving them a long and marvellous account of the life, death and burial of Joseph. Its Arabic style has an air of antiquity about it, though it is somewhat bombastic. It seems to be the product of a Jewish-Christian, and a translation from the Hebrew. It may possibly, in its present form, be as early as the third or fourth century.

7. *The Arabic Gospel of the Childhood of the Redeemer.*—This book was in high esteem among the Nestorians, and may have been the product of some Nestorian Christian of the fourth or fifth century, and originally written in Syriac. Cap. 1—9 relate minutely the birth of Christ; 10—26, the flight into Egypt, and the wonderful miracles wrought by his presence, his clothes, the water in which he had been washed, &c.; 27—35, another course of miracles through the instigation of Mary; 36—49, miracles wrought by the boy of his own accord, all of them childish, some of them obscene; and cap. 50 relates a visit made to the temple at Jerusalem.

Abstract of the Apocryphal Gospels.

Having thus given an account of these books, it remains that we present an outline of their contents, in order to afford opportunity for a comparison between them and the genuine. To avoid repetition, it will be most convenient to do this in the form which Ullmann has adopted in the work above referred to, namely, by grouping into one view what is said in the different books respecting the same person or subject. Each subject, however, has some one book particularly devoted to it, so that an analysis of a subject is generally the analysis of a book. We begin with

JOSEPH.—According to the Arabic *History of Joseph* (No. 6), Christ seated in the midst of his disciples on the mount of Olives, relates for substance the following story: "Joseph, well acquainted with the arts and sciences, was a priest in the temple of the Lord; but he pursued his carpenter's trade, and lived, even in Egypt, by the labour of his hands, that, according to the law, he might not, for his support, be chargeable to any one. He was highly distinguished, not only by his intellectual qualities, but also by the physical; he never suffered from weakness, his sight never failed, he never lost a tooth nor had the tooth-ache, he never lost his presence of mind, he always walked erect, he never had a pain in his limbs, and was always fresh and cheerful for labour. He lived to be a hundred and twelve years old, and it was not till near the close of his life that he felt any diminution of the liveliness and vigour of his mind or body, or lost in any degree his interest in his handicraft. An angel announced to him his approaching death, and he fell into great fear and distress, and earnestly entreated God for help and relief. He prayed God not to permit frightful-looking demons to come in his way, nor the gate-keepers of paradise to obstruct the entering in of his soul, nor the lions to rush upon him, nor the

waves of the fiery sea, through which his soul must pass, to overwhelm him, before he had seen the glory of God. In the anguish of death Joseph cursed himself, his life, the day of his birth, the breasts he had sucked; he heaped up all kinds of accusations against himself, besides original sin, all kinds of actual sin, untruthfulness, hypocrisy, reproachfulness, fraud, and many others. In this distress he calls upon Jesus, the Nazarene, as his Saviour and deliverer, his Lord and God, begs his pardon that he, through ignorance, had sinned against the mystery of his miraculous birth by an unworthy suspicion, and then concludes, 'O my Lord and God, be not angry, and condemn me not on account of that hour; I am thy servant, and the son of thy handmaid, and thou art my Lord, my God and Saviour, the Son of God in truth.' This earnest prayer of Joseph not to be forsaken, being satisfactory, Jesus laid his hand upon the bosom of the dying man, and perceived that his soul was about to flee out of his mouth; and from the south he sees death and hell approaching with their fiery troop; and then, at his prayer, the archangels Michael and Gabriel appear, receive the soul of Joseph, enfold it in a lustrous garment, and protect it from the demons of darkness, which are found on the way. At the lamentations of the family, Nazareth and Galilee come together and take part in the mourning. Jesus utters a prayer which he had composed before he was born of Mary, and as soon as he says 'Amen,' a multitude of the heavenly host draws near; he commands one of them to spread out a resplendent shroud, and therein enwrap the body of Joseph. Then he blessed the dead; no smell of death should proceed from him, no worm should touch him, no limb should be decomposed, no hair should fall from his head; but he should remain entire and uninjured till the millennial feast. Afterwards the most distinguished men in the city come to array Joseph in his grave-clothes, but they cannot remove from him the linen garment; so closely and immoveably does it adhere to his body, that they cannot find a single fold by which they can seize hold of it."

The apostles, to whom Jesus relates all this, only wonder that Joseph, the just one, whom Jesus calls his father, whose festival by the command of Jesus all the world must annually celebrate, was not, by the miraculous power of Jesus, made immortal, like Enoch and Elijah. To this Jesus replies, that by Adam all men without exception, who descend from him, are made mortal—that this is the fate which even Enoch and Elijah, who as yet retain their bodies, will experience at the final consummation, when four will be slain by anti-christ, namely, Enoch and Elijah, Shilo and Tabitha.

Towards the close of the book the celebration of Joseph's festival is most earnestly enjoined, as also the copying and circulating of this history of Joseph. Whoever, on the festival of Joseph, distributes alms, or offers gifts and prayers, shall be rewarded thirty, sixty, and a hundred fold; whoever copies the history of his life, him will Christ commend to the special protection of God for perfect absolution; the poor, who have nothing to give, must at least give the name of Joseph to a newborn son, and thus protect him from poverty and sudden death; and finally, as Christ in the canonical gospels says, "Go and teach all nations," so here he says, "Proclaim to them the death of my father Joseph, celebrate his birth with a yearly festival, and he who adds to this word or takes from it, is guilty of sin."

In reading such a gospel as this, what a totally different atmosphere we breathe from that of the canonical gospels! We are transported at once to another age, to a different planet, to a totally diverse world of ideas. It is as different from the New Testament gospels as Jack the Giant-killer is from Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*. Yet it was written in or near the same country as the canonical gospels, and probably not many generations later.

MARY.—Here we derive our information mainly from the book already quoted (No. 6), from the *Protevangelium* (No. 1), from the *Gospel of the Nativity of Mary* (No. 4), and from the *History of the Nativity of Mary* (No. 5). In the *History of Joseph* (No. 6), Jesus makes the following statements respecting his mother, namely, that when she was three years old she was brought into the temple and remained there nine years, till she was twelve. At the close of this period, on consultation with the priests, that the change of constitution might not occur to her in the temple, and thereby God be incensed, it was resolved to give her to a just and pious man. Twelve venerable men from the tribe of Judah were called together, and the lot cast, by which she was given to Joseph, who took her away. With Joseph, Mary found children of a former marriage, among them James, whom she brought up, and thence she was called the mother of James. In the fourteenth year of Mary's age, Christ, with the approbation of the Father, and the concurrence of the Holy Ghost, accomplished through her his incarnation, being born in a mysterious way which no created being can understand. The birth, on account of which Joseph went with Mary to Bethlehem, occurred in that prophetic city in a cave near the grave of Rachel. Satan informed Herod of it, and this occasioned the persecution and the flight into Egypt. Says Jesus: "Then Joseph arose and took my mother, and I rested in her

bosom, and Salome accompanied us on our journey to Egypt." The family remained in Egypt a year, and Jesus relates all the circumstances, as if he had the most perfect recollection of them.

The account of Mary in the *Protevangelium* is far more minute and circumstantial. In this narrative she is in a miraculous manner promised to her parents, Joachim and Anna, who had long been childless, and mourned and suffered much on that account. When Mary was six months old, her mother put her on the floor to see whether she could stand, and she walked seven steps and then came back to the arms of her mother. In her third year she was brought into the temple attended by a company of pure virgins, and was received by the high priest with the eulogistic words, "Mary, the Lord hath exalted thy name among all generations, and in the last days God will reveal to thee the treasures of his redemption for the sons of Israel." Then the high priest placed her on the third step of the altar, and she sprang upon her feet, and the whole house of Israel loved her. Mary was now brought up like a dove in the temple of the Lord, and received her food from the hand of an angel. By a revelation made to the high priest, at twelve years of age she must be betrothed to an Israelite for her protection, and this her protector must be pointed out by a divine token. All the widowers of the people were to come together with their staves; and he on whose staff the sign appeared was to take her away. A dove flew out from the staff of Joseph, the last one, and rested upon his head; and then, notwithstanding his reluctance, Mary was given to him.

When Mary first went out to draw water, she heard a voice: "Hail, thou favoured one, the Lord is with thee, blessed art thou among women." She looked about her to the right and left to see whence the voice proceeded; and when she returned to the house the angel of the Lord met her, and announced to her that she would be the mother of the Son of God. Joseph, when he some time after returned from his work, was exceedingly shocked at the appearance of Mary, and broke out into the most bitter complaints against her, both on her account and on his own. She resolutely asserted her purity. The affair came to the ears of the high priest, who called them before him and loaded them with reproaches. Mary affirmed that she was pure, and Joseph that he was innocent; and they both passed the ordeal by drinking the water of proof, and with a result so clear that the high priest acquitted them. Soon after, on account of the enrolment, they took their journey to Bethlehem; and on the way, Joseph perceiving that Mary is sometimes sad and sometimes laughing, inquires of her the cause. She an-

swers, "I see two nations before mine eyes, the one sighing and weeping, the other exulting and laughing." When the time of her delivery drew near, Joseph placed her in a cave and went out to seek a nurse. And here for a few sentences we will give the narrative literally as it is contained in this gospel.

"As I was going (said Joseph) I looked up into the air, and I saw the clouds astonished, and the fowls of the air stopping in the midst of their flight. And I looked down towards the earth, and I saw a table spread, and working people sitting around it, but their heads were upon the table and they did not move to eat. They who had meat in their mouths did not eat, they who lifted their hands to the table did not draw them back, and they who lifted them up to their mouths, did not put anything in, but all their faces were fixed upwards. And I beheld there sheep dispersed, and yet the sheep stood still, and the shepherd lifted up his hand to smite them, and his hand continued up. And I looked unto a river, and saw the kids with their mouths close to the water, and touching it, but they did not drink. Then I beheld a woman coming down from the mountains, and she said to me, 'Whither art thou going, O man?' And I said to her, 'I go to inquire for a Hebrew midwife.' She replied to me, 'Where is the woman that is to be delivered?' And I answered, 'In the cave, and she is betrothed to me.' Then said the midwife, 'Is she not thy wife?' Joseph answered, 'It is Mary, who was educated in the holy of holies, in the house of the Lord, and she fell to me by lot, and is not my wife, but hath conceived by the Holy Ghost.' The midwife said, 'Is this true?' He answered, 'Come and see.' And the midwife went along with him and stood in the cave. Then a bright cloud overshadowed the cave, and the midwife said, 'This day my soul is magnified, for mine eyes have seen surprising things, and salvation is brought forth to Israel.' But on a sudden the cloud became a great light in the cave, so that their eyes could not bear it. But the light gradually decreased, until the infant appeared and sucked the breast of his mother Mary. Then the midwife cried out and said, 'How glorious a day is this, wherein mine eyes have seen this extraordinary sight!' And the midwife went out of the cave, and Salome met her. And the midwife said to her, 'Salome, Salome, I will tell you a most surprising thing which I saw. A virgin hath brought forth, which is a thing contrary to nature.' To which Salome replied, 'As the Lord my God liveth, unless I receive particular proof of this matter, I will not believe that a virgin hath brought forth.'"

The narrative proceeds to inform us that Salome entered the cave, and proceeding to examine that she might have demonstration of this wonderful fact, her hand was seized with a blazing

fire and excruciating pain ; and it was only by earnest prayer and the interposition of a miracle, an angel directing her to take the child in her arms, that she was rescued.

The Latin *Gospel of the Birth of Mary* (No. 4) is similar to the preceding, but has some things peculiar to itself. According to this, as many of the greatest and most holy persons were born of mothers before unfruitful, such was the case also with Mary. She was promised to her mother Anna as a special gift of God, by an angel, who also predicted her course of life. In her third year, having been taken by her parents to the temple, without a leader she walked up the steps like an adult ; and hereby the Lord indicated her future destination. During her residence in the temple, she was daily visited by angels and enjoyed the visions of God, whereby she was protected from all evil and filled with all good. In her fourteenth year, by the direction of the priest, she with her companions was to be betrothed. They consented, but Mary resisted, because she had vowed perpetual virginity. The priest in perplexity asked for a divine oracle, and was pointed to Isaiah xi. 1. In order now to espouse her to some one, he called together all the unmarried men of the house of David. They were to appear with their staves ; and he whose staff should blossom, or upon which the spirit of the Lord should rest in the form of a dove, should be affianced to the virgin and take her under his protection. The decision was in favour of Joseph, for a dove came from heaven and seated itself upon his staff. During her residence in the house of Joseph, the angel of the annunciation appeared to her, and she at once recognized him as a heavenly messenger, for she had already become familiar with such appearances. The angel promised to her a son, whom she would conceive and bring into the world without sin and with virginity intact. Mary wished to know how this were possible ; and the angel informed her that it would be without the aid of man, solely by the Holy Ghost and the power of the Most High.

The same general features pervade the other *History of the Nativity of Mary* (No. 5), though with enlargements and additions, and still greater extravagances. According to this, Mary, when three years old, was like an adult ; her face glistened like the snow, so that one could scarcely look at it ; she busied herself with all the labours appropriate to woman, but especially with prayer, in which she continued from early dawn till the third hour of the day, and then again from the ninth hour onward, till there appeared to her the angel of the Lord, from whose hand she received her food, in order that she might daily grow in the love of God. Never was virgin more pious, more pure, more virtuous, more lovely, better instructed in the wisdom

of the divine law; she was firm, always equable, immoveable, constantly increasing in goodness. She took care for her companions, that none of them should fail in word, or laugh aloud, or do anything wrong. She lived only on angelic food; the provisions which she received from the priests in the temple she distributed among the poor. When a sick person touched her, he returned well to his house. Frequently angels were seen waiting upon her and talking with her.

In the choice of a husband for her, three thousand men came together and deposited their staves with the high priest. Joseph, who was highly esteemed as an elder, would not take his staff again; but the high priest Abiathar called after him with a loud voice, and when he received his staff, out of the top of it there came a dove, whiter than snow, and of great beauty, which flew a long time about the pinnacles of the temple, and then soared away to heaven. Joseph took Mary, and also five other virgins to whom the high priest had assigned work, namely, Rebecca, Scephiphora, Susanna, Abigail, and Zabel. Mary obtained by lot the most honourable work, namely, the sewing of purple for curtains of the temple; and on this account the other virgins called her the queen. On the third day, while about her usual employment, an angel of wonderful beauty appeared to her, and made to her the annunciation, &c. &c.

Contrast all this fanfaronade of childishness, superstition, and foolery, with the few brief, simple, and rigidly common-sense notices of Mary, which we find in the four canonical gospels. Can any two kinds of writing be more utterly unlike?

CHRIST.—We next turn our attention to the account which these books give of Christ himself. Here the contrast between them and the canonical gospels appears, if possible, in still stronger colours. There is nothing of the Christ whom we find in the New Testament. All is puerile, bizarre, extravagant. The real dignity, the steady benevolence, the unvarying good sense of the New Testament Christ, are wholly unknown. The periods of life selected, and the topics treated, are wholly different from those of the New Testament.

Infancy and Childhood of Christ.—These topics occur in but two of the canonical gospels, and are there treated very briefly; but they make the great staple of the apocryphal gospels, and are drawn out to a most wearisome length. The most minute and characteristic of these narratives is the *Arabic Gospel of the Childhood of the Redeemer*. According to this book, while the child Jesus was lying in his cradle he said to his mother, "I, whom thou hast brought forth, am Jesus, the Son of God, the Logos, as the angel Gabriel announced to thee; and I am sent by my Father for the salvation of the world." At his birth his

parents are in a cave, amid the splendour of lights which shine more brightly than the light of the sun. The woman called in by Joseph, as soon as she saw that Mary was the mother, exclaimed, "Thou art not like the daughters of Eve;" to which Mary replied, "As none among the children is like my child, so his mother has not her like among women." Mary allows the nurse to lay her hands on the child, and thus are they made clean. The child is circumcised in the cave, and the Hebrew women preserve the foreskin in a vessel of spikenard, the same vessel from which afterwards Mary the sinner anointed the head and feet of the Lord. To the Magi, who came in consequence of a prophecy of Zoroaster, Mary gave one of the swaddling cloths in which the child had been wrapped, and they received it as the choicest treasure. On their return home, they held a festival, and, according to their custom in religious worship, kindled a fire, and into it they threw the bandage, which, however, remained unscorched, as if the fire had not touched it. They kissed it, spread it over their head and eyes, and said, "This is an undoubted truth, verily it is a great thing that the fire cannot destroy it." And they took the bandage, and with great reverence preserved it in their treasury.

Next comes the narrative of the journey into Egypt, and a loose, disconnected story of the strangest and most trivial miracles. The holy family come to a city which is the abode of the most distinguished god in the land; and the moment they take lodgings in a public-house, there is great excitement among the citizens, and they flock to their god to learn the cause. He replies, "An unknown God has arrived here, and he is God in truth; and besides him there is no one worthy to be worshipped, for he is indeed the Son of God." In that same hour the idol fell to pieces, and at his fall came all the inhabitants of Egypt with the other citizens running together; and a son of the priest, three years old, who was possessed with many devils, being seized with his frenzy, ran to the public-house, where Mary was washing and drying her child's linen, one piece of which the demoniac boy caught down and placed upon his head, when immediately the devils came out of his mouth and fled away in the form of rams and snakes.

The holy family, proceeding on their journey, came to a den of robbers; and the robbers hearing a noise, and supposing the king to be approaching with an army, took to flight, leaving behind them their booty and their prisoners. The prisoners stood up and began to break off each other's fetters, and were about to depart with their property, when, seeing the holy family drawing near them, they asked Joseph what king it was whose perceived approach had put the robbers to flight. Joseph

replied, "He is coming behind us." In the city to which they came next, there met them a demoniac woman, who could neither live in a house nor endure clothing; but the very sight of Mary so completely pacified her, that the devil fled from her in the form of a young man. In another city there was a nuptial ceremony, but by the influence of Satan and the magicians, the bride was dumb. She took the Christ-child in her arms, folded him to her bosom and kissed him, when immediately the band of her tongue was loosed. They spent a night in another city, where was a woman whom Satan, in the form of a serpent, was accustomed to overpower and embrace; but she took the child in her arms and kissed him, and was thus delivered from Satan's power. This same woman the next day washed the child Jesus in perfumed water, which she kept. A girl whose body was white with leprosy, being sprinkled with the water, became entirely well. The people said, "Doubtless Joseph and Mary and their child are gods, for they do not seem to be mortals." The maiden who was healed, now attended them, and by the wash-water which had cured her, she now performed many miracles; as, for example, she cured the young son of a prince, who had been leprous from his birth. They came to another city to spend the night, and put up at the house of a man recently married, but, in consequence of some poison in his system, he was unable to consummate his marriage. The presence of the child Jesus entirely cured him of his infirmity, and he constrained them to stop the next day and feast with him.

The holy family then met three ladies in distress for their brother, who by magic had been transformed into a mule, and they were taking care of him very tenderly in this form. Mary placed the child on this mule and said, "O my son, by thy great power restore this mule, and make him what he was before, a rational being;" whereupon the mule immediately became a beautiful young man, and afterwards married the maiden before referred to, who had been dispossessed of the devil, and was then attending them. The following night they came upon an encampment of robbers under two leaders, Titus and Dumachus. The first by a gift restrained the others from attacking the holy family, for which Mary blessed him, and Jesus said, "Thirty years from now the Jews in Jerusalem will crucify me and the two robbers with me, Titus on my right hand and Dumachus on my left; and on that day Titus will go before me into paradise." In the neighbourhood of Matarea, Jesus called forth a fountain in which his mother washed his clothes; and from the perspiration which there fell from Jesus, there sprang up an abundance of balsam. They journeyed to Memphis and visited Pharaoh. They abode in Egypt three

years, and Jesus wrought many miracles, which are recorded neither in this gospel of the Childhood, nor in the *Evangelio perfecto*.

To the above narrative we add some incidents from the Latin *History of the Nativity of Mary and the Infancy of the Saviour* (No. 5). According to this, during the flight to Egypt, the holy family rested near a cave, out of which many dragons suddenly emerged, whereupon Jesus descended from the lap of his mother, and placed himself before the monsters, when they fled, and then turned and worshipped him. Likewise lions and leopards honoured him, and even acted as his guides. Lions mingled with the oxen and other beasts of burden which they had with them; wolves associated with the sheep, and they were all equally peaceful and harmless. A tall palm tree, whose fruit was beyond reach, at the command of the child Jesus, bowed itself down to Mary and allowed her to pluck its fruit; and at a second command it restored itself to its original position. From the roots of this palm Jesus caused to flow a spring of the freshest and purest water. A branch of the same palm, at the command of Jesus, was carried into paradise by the angels, there to be a sign of victory to the soldiers of the Christian warfare. When the wanderers were oppressed by heat, Jesus by his word enabled them in one day to perform a journey of thirty days. It is also related here that when Jesus entered a temple, the idols all tumbled down.

We now return to the Arabic *Gospel of the Childhood* (No. 7), which proceeds to give an account of the return to Bethlehem, and of many miracles wrought by the water in which Jesus had been washed. This sprinkled upon a child enabled it to remain unhurt in a burning oven. A sick child also was healed by being put into the bed of Jesus and covered with his clothes. Mary often distributed his washing-water as a miraculous tincture, and pieces of his clothing as amulets against all kinds of harm. A demoniac boy named Judas was accustomed in his frenzy to bite at those who were near him; and when he was brought near to Jesus he began to snap and strike at him, but Satan soon came out of him in the shape of a mad dog. This was Judas Iscariot, and the same right side on which he struck at Jesus, the Jews afterwards pierced with the lance.

Then follow miracles which belong to his later childhood, and which are distinguished from the preceding in this respect, that they are not only performed by the power which dwelt in Jesus, but with a more definite consciousness and will of his own. Once, in his seventh year, he was playing with other boys, and they were making, with clay, images of oxen, asses, birds, &c.,

and while each was endeavouring to excel the others, the child Jesus said, "The figures which I have made I will command to walk." He did so; and to the astonishment of the other children, the clay images walked off, and returned at his command; he then made sparrows which flew about, obeyed his word, and received food at his hand. At another time, Jesus came into the house of Salem the dyer, and there were clothes there which were to receive different colours. All these Jesus threw into one dye-pot, whereupon the dyer coming in was exceedingly angry; but Jesus said to him, "I will give to each piece of cloth the colour you desire;" and taking them out, each was dyed as the dyer wished. Then the Jews, who saw this sign and wonder, praised God.

Joseph, in his travels to his work, was accustomed to take the boy Jesus with him, and when anything was made too long or too short, too wide or too narrow (for he was but a bungling carpenter), the child stretched his hands over it and brought it all right. Once he had a throne to make for the king in Jerusalem, and worked upon it two years. When it was finished, he found it too small for the place where it must be put, and being much cast down about it, the child Jesus bade him be of good cheer, and each taking hold of an end of the throne, they pulled upon it till it came to the right size. The throne was made of the figured wood which was in use in the time of Solomon. At another time, the boys who were playing with him he turned into little goats, and they hopped about him and honoured him as their shepherd. The women seeing this, cried out, "O our Lord Jesus, son of Mary, thou art indeed the good shepherd of Israel, have mercy on thy handmaidens." Then, at the entreaty of these women, he restored the boys to their proper shape. In the month Adar, Jesus collected the boys together, as their king. With their clothes they spread for him a seat, they made him a crown of flowers, placed themselves around him as his guards, and compelled all who passed by to do him honour. Then came men bearing on a bier a boy who had been bitten by a serpent in the woods. They were compelled to come up and do homage to the little king. Jesus commanded them to take the wounded boy back to the place where he had received the bite, to force the snake from his hole, and compel him to suck out the poison, which was promptly done, and immediately the snake burst asunder. This boy was the Simon Zelotes afterwards mentioned in the gospels.

Once as the boys were playing, one fell from a roof and was killed. The others fled, but Jesus stood by. The relatives coming up accused Jesus of throwing the child down, but he ordered the boy to arise and give testimony, which he did, and

affirmed that it was another who threw him down. Another time Mary sent him for water, but the pitcher, after he had filled it, broke in his hands; so he caught the water in his apron and brought it to his mother. One Sabbath day he was playing with other boys by a brook, and he made sparrows which he placed around a little artificial pool; but a son of the Jew Hannas, enraged at this profanation of the Sabbath, ran and destroyed the pool. Jesus let the sparrows fly, and then said to the boy, "As the water has disappeared from this pool, so will thy life disappear;" and from that moment the child sickened, and soon after died. One evening as Jesus was going home with Joseph, a rough, careless boy ran against him, and he said, "As thou hast overthrown me, so shalt thou be overthrown and not rise again," and immediately the boy fell down and died. Other revengeful acts of the boy Jesus may be found in the *Gospel of Thomas* (No. 2). Joseph at length gives Jesus to understand that they could no longer be tolerated among parents whose children had been slain by his mischievous power; and Jesus answered, "I know those are not my words but thine; nevertheless for thy sake I will be silent, but those who have complained of me shall receive their punishment;" and the complainers were soon struck blind. Jesus subsequently restored them to sight, but no one after that dared provoke him to anger.

The *Gospel of the Childhood* and of *Thomas* have many anecdotes of the schooldays of Jesus and of his being taught to read. A schoolmaster in Jerusalem by the name of Zacheus offered to teach the child; and when his parents brought him, the teacher wrote the alphabet, and told the new scholar to pronounce first *Aleph* and then *Beth*. Jesus said, "Tell me the meaning of *Aleph*, and then I will pronounce *Beth*." The master threatened to punish him for his impudence; but Jesus unfolded the meaning of the letters *Aleph* and *Beth*, and described their different forms and positions in a way the master had never heard of nor read in books; and then he pronounced the whole alphabet. The master then said, "I believe this boy was born before Noah;" and sent him back to his parents because he was more learned than all teachers, and had no need of instruction. It fared worse with another more able teacher, who on a like occasion struck the boy Jesus, and at once his hand was withered and he died; so that Mary said, "We will not any more let him go out of the house, for all who resist him are punished with death." A third teacher, who hoped to gain the boy's affections, was so astonished at his learning and the knowledge of the law which he manifested to all the bystanders, that he entreated Joseph to take him away. Jesus smiled and

praised this teacher, and said he had spoken well ; and on his account he healed the others. When at the age of twelve he was in the temple at Jerusalem, he asked questions on the different sciences ; he explained the law and the mysteries in the prophetic books, the depths of which no created mind can sound ; he explained to an astronomer all the relations and movements of the heavenly bodies, and the rules of astrology which are thence derived ; he showed knowledge of all parts of the human body, the fluids and solids, the bones, nerves and veins—all the faculties of the soul and their relation to each other and to the body ; in short, all kinds of knowledge were entirely familiar to him ; as the narrative expresses it, *the physical and the metaphysical, the hyperphysical and the hypophysical*, so that a learned philosopher present arose and said, " O Lord, from this time onward, I am thy scholar and thy servant."

From this time, Jesus began to withhold the manifestations of his knowledge and his power till his thirtieth year.

The Death of Christ and his Descent to Hades.—The account of these we find in the Greek *Gospel of Nicodemus* (No. 3). Pilate commands an officer to bring Jesus before him, but with gentleness. The officer spreads a cloth before Jesus for him to walk upon. The Jews complain of this ; and Pilate, asking him why he had done it, he replies, that he had witnessed the entrance of Jesus into Jerusalem, and noticed how he was honoured. Jesus was made to advance without the cloth, but as he stepped between the soldiers who held the standards, these eagles themselves bowed down to do him honour. The Jews, observing this, raised their voices in anger against the standard-bearers. Pilate called them before him, and inquired why they had done this ; and they assured him that they, as pagans, knew no reason for honouring Jesus, but the standards had done it of themselves. Then Pilate leaves it to the chief of the Jews to make trial for their own satisfaction, and they select twelve of their strongest and bravest men, and commit the two standards, each to a company of six, to hold them before Pilate. They are threatened with death if they allow the standards to bow. But when the officers bring in Jesus, again the standards bow and worship him. Now the Jews complain of Jesus that he is a magician ; that his birth was attended with infamy ; that he was born in Bethlehem, and was the cause of the massacre there ; that his parents fled to Egypt because they dared not confide in the people ; that he had profaned the Sabbath, &c., &c. During this strife, Pilate asked Jesus, " What is truth ?" Jesus answered, " Truth is from heaven." Pilate again : " Is there not truth on earth also ?" And Jesus answered, " Mark

how those who have the truth on earth, are judged by those who have the power on earth."

Then follows the narrative of the crucifixion and resurrection. After this, Joseph of Arimathea had a vision of Jesus, who appeared to him in a splendid light. Joseph sank down and knew not Jesus, but Jesus raised him up and said, "Fear not, Joseph, see me, who I am." Joseph cried out, "Rabboni, Elias." He replied, "I am not Elias, but Jesus of Nazareth, buried by you." For proof, Jesus led Joseph to the tomb in which his body had lain, and showed him the clothes in which the corpse had been wrapped, and then led him back to his house, and blessing him, separated from him. Joseph of Arimathea afterwards related to Annas and Caiaphas, that Jesus had not risen from the dead alone, but had called several others to life, who had appeared in Jerusalem, among them two sons of the high priest Simeon, who had taken Jesus in his arms when he was a child. They were then living in Arimathea, but were silent as the dead, and engaged wholly in prayer. Joseph, Nicodemus, Annas and Caiaphas went immediately to Arimathea, and found them praying, and brought them reverently into the synagogue at Jerusalem, where, with closed doors, they adjured them to disclose the particulars of their resurrection. Charinus and Lenthius (these were their names), when they heard this, trembled and groaned, and they looked towards heaven, and made the sign of the cross on their tongues. They then demanded writing materials, and when these were brought, they wrote in substance the following narrative:—

"They were with the fathers in the dark abyss, when suddenly a golden sunlight entered and shone around them. Father Adam, the patriarchs and prophets, arose and announced the arrival of the Deliverer; and their father Simeon, who had taken the infant Jesus in his arms, joined in the announcement. The whole multitude of the saints rejoiced; John the Baptist also stepped up and declared what had happened at the baptism, and that he had come there before Jesus to announce his arrival. Then Adam through Seth informed the patriarchs and prophets what he had heard from the archangel Michael, when in his weakness he had sent him to the gates of paradise to get for him some oil from the tree of mercy. Seth related that he was then referred to the coming of Christ on earth; he should bring to believers the oil of mercy, and should also lead father Adam into paradise to the tree of mercy. Satan now commanded hell to arm against Jesus, who had boasted that he was the Son of God, though still a man who was afraid of death; he had himself tempted him while on earth, and excited

against him his ancient people the Jews. Yet hell was afraid, for she had felt the power of Jesus, and could not retain Lazarus against his will. Finally, the Lord of glory arrived in the shape of a man, enlightened the eternal darkness and loosed the perpetual bonds. Death and hell acknowledged themselves conquered, and against their will celebrated the glory of Jesus. Jesus smote death by his majesty, gave over Satan to the power of hell, and took Adam with him into his glory. He called to him all the saints who bore his image and likeness, he took Adam by the right hand and blessed him with his righteous descendants. Adam returned thanks, and all with him bowed the knee to Jesus. Then he marked them with the sign of the cross, and led them out of hell with Adam at their head. David uttered a song of praise, so did Habakkuk, Micah, and the other prophets, all the saints joining in. The Lord then delivered Adam and the saints to the archangel Michael, who led them into paradise. Here they were met by two very old men, who, on being asked who they were, replied that they were Enoch and Elijah; they had not yet tasted death, and were to be kept alive till the coming of anti-christ, with whom they were to fight, and to be slain by him, and then, after three days and a half, they would be taken up into the clouds alive. During this conversation there came along a poor, wretched-looking man, bearing on his shoulder the sign of the cross, and resembling in appearance a robber. On being questioned, he acknowledged that he was the thief whom the Jews had crucified with Christ, that Jesus had sent him into paradise, that the angel of paradise had admitted him on account of the sign of the cross; and had informed him that Adam with his righteous and holy sons would soon arrive.

“These are the divine mysteries which we, even I, Charinus and Lenthius, saw and heard; more we dare not tell, according to the commandment of the archangel Michael. But repent, and make acknowledgment, and give honour to God, that he may have mercy upon you.”

Charinus gave what he had written to Annas, Caiaphas and Gamaliel, and Lenthius gave his manuscript to Nicodemus and Joseph, when suddenly they were transfigured in glory and were no more seen. The two writings, on being compared, were found to correspond exactly, without the difference of a single letter.

Remarks on the Apocryphal Gospels, as compared with the Canonical.

The above is a full and faithful narrative of all that these apocryphal gospels contain; more full perhaps than some may

think necessary or will have patience to read. But as the idea has been seriously advanced by Strauss and enlarged upon by others, that these apocryphal books are of very much the same kind, and got up in very much the same way as the canonical, it is time that the friends of evangelical truth fully understood the matter; and it can be understood only by examination. The books are as yet in but few hands; some of them are published only in foreign and difficult languages, and it is desirable that the abstract, which we give, should be sufficiently full to make a fair and complete representation of what they actually contain. Such a representation we claim to have made, in the preceding pages.

Now let any candid man, with a reasonable share of common sense, carefully read the narratives above given, and compare them with our four gospels, contained in the New Testament, and what will he say to the allegation of Strauss, and those like him? Is there anything to be said, except this, that the clumsiest counterfeit of a bank-note which was ever issued, a counterfeit so gross that the most juvenile clerk of a country store can detect it as well as the most experienced banker, cannot be more unlike the genuine note than these apocryphal gospels are unlike the canonical? In the great mass, there are some very few touches which seem to indicate a tradition above the ordinary level; but as a whole, in every aspect of the case, they present a perfect contrast. So far from possessing any of the excellences of the canonical gospels, there is not resemblance sufficient to make them even caricatures. Instead of simplicity, we have bombast; instead of strong, good sense, silliness; instead of purity, filthiness; instead of manliness, puerility; instead of dignity, meanness; instead of self-forgetfulness, self-exaltation; instead of generosity, spitefulness; instead of elevated, sublime sentiment, poor, degraded nonsense. Indeed, while the genuine gospels are fully equal to and even above the delicacy and true refinement and intellectual and moral elevation of the most cultivated nations and ages, the apocryphal generally fall below almost the lowest, and could scarcely find anywhere a public mean enough to receive and relish them, except in the dark corners of the declining Roman empire, where they first originated, or the equally dark corners of the modern papacy and Mormonism, *et ejus generis omnis*.

Moreover, if the genuine gospels were of the same character as the apocryphal, how could the philosophic historian, from such a beginning, account for the development of such an institution as the Christian church?

The Christian church exists: Hegel himself could not deny that, nor reason the fact into non-existence. The Christian

church has existed for a long time; it has had a history, it has exerted influences, it has had a character; and here are results to be accounted for, events which have had a cause; and is the cause to be sought in such stuff as these apocryphal gospels are made of? Are these results to be accounted for by ascribing them to such persons as are described in these books, or such minds as produced these writings? With even more reason might you attribute the planning and rearing of such edifices as Westminster abbey and St. Paul's church, and the new parliament house, to such characters as Mr. Pickwick and Mr. Jingle, the Artful Dodger and Fagin the Jew. There is reason in all things that are really things; and that which has no reason in it, is nothing (an *Unding*), and neither deserves nor needs an answer.

VI. COMPARISON OF THE CANONICAL GOSPELS WITH THE FRAGMENTS OF GOSPELS SUPPOSED TO BE LOST.

Besides these apocryphal gospels, which a mere inspection and comparison with the genuine show to be worthless and of late origin, there are preserved in ancient writers the names and certain passages of others, which seem nearer the apostolic period and more worthy of notice. That there were written memorials of our Saviour's ministry anterior to some of our canonical gospels, is plain from the declaration of Luke in the prologue to his gospel; and that these memorials were imperfect and unsatisfactory is equally evident from the same authority. To be fully satisfied on this head one need only carefully read the verses referred to, Luke i. 1—4.

It is not probable that Luke had here in mind Matthew and Mark, for *two* could not with propriety be called *many* (πολλοί); and had he referred to these divinely-authorized historians, he could hardly have assigned it as his reason for writing, that Theophilus might know the *certainty* (ἀσφάλειαν) of the things wherein he had been instructed; for so far as the certainty is concerned, it could be as well ascertained from Matthew, or Mark, as from Luke. Luke, when he wrote, might not have known that Matthew and Mark had written before him; and it would seem from his introductory remarks that Theophilus, his friend, had not yet found access to any written account of Christ, except such imperfect and fragmentary notices as had been penned by different men without divine authority. That such notices should have been written is in itself in the highest degree probable; and existing as they must only in manuscript and in private hands, it is also certain that after the authentic gospels were published, they would generally cease to be tran-

scribed, and would finally perish. Yet portions of them would probably remain extant for a considerable period; in certain places and by some persons, they would most likely be preferred to the true gospels; and combined, augmented, and variously fashioned, they might hold their position several generations, before they would finally perish.

The earlier Christian writers, as Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian, make allusions and even quotations, which seem to establish the fact of the existence of such narratives in their time; and when we come down to the time of Origen and Jerome, we find gospels mentioned by name which differ both from the canonical and the apocryphal as we now have them. In the first homily on Luke, published with the works of Origen and ascribed to that author, there is the following statement: "Many undertook to write gospels, but all were not received . . . so that you may know that not four gospels only but many, were written, from which those which we have, were chosen and delivered to the churches . . . The church has four gospels, the heretics many; one of which is inscribed *according to the Egyptians*, another *according to the twelve apostles* . . . I know a certain gospel which is called *according to Thomas*, and *according to Matthias*." The last two of these may properly be called apocryphal, but the first two seem not with strict justice to come under that designation, inasmuch as it seems probable that the first was mainly an Egyptian edition of the gospel of Mark, and the second nearly identical with the Hebrew gospel of Matthew. In his preface to Matthew, Jerome says: "There were many who wrote gospels, . . . which, being edited by different authors, became the sources of diverse heresies, as that *according to the Egyptians*, and *Thomas*, and *Bartholomew*, and also *the twelve apostles*." In his work *De Vir. Illust.* (c. 2), he makes mention of a "gospel which is called *according to the Hebrews*, which was lately translated by me into both the Greek and the Latin languages." This gospel *according to the Hebrews* seems to have been a Hebrew edition, or the Hebrew original, of Matthew's gospel, and also called the *gospel of the twelve apostles*. Eusebius, speaking of the Ebionites (Hist. Ecc. iii. 29), says, "They use only the gospel which is *according to the Hebrews*."

Of those writings, which may be supposed to have some connection with the "many" alluded to by Luke, we will present a translation of some fragments still preserved from that *according to the Hebrews*, from the one *according to the Egyptians*, and the *memorabilia* (ἀπομνημονεύματα) quoted by Justin Martyr. We shall add a brief notice of the Diatessaron of Tatian and of the gospel of Marcion, which last, being for substance an

abridged edition of Luke, has been learnedly and laboriously restored and edited by Aug. Hahn, and published entire by Thilo, in his *Codex Apoc. Nov. Test.* I. 401—486. It is the only one of these gospels which is yet extant.

Gospel according to the Hebrews.—Papias Irenæus, Origen, Epiphanius, Jerome, Eusebius, and most of the ancients, affirm that Matthew originally wrote a gospel for the Hebrews in the Hebrew or Syro-Chaldaic language, that is, the Hebrew of common life in the time of Christ now generally called the Aramæan. Papias: "Matthew set forth his oracles in the Hebrew dialect, which every one interpreted as he was able." (Euseb. Hist. Ecc. III. 39.) Irenæus: "Matthew put forth the writing of the gospel among the Hebrews in their dialect." (Adv. Hær. III. Euseb. Hist. Ecc. V. 8.) Origen: "The first (gospel) was written by Matthew, and, as he published it for those who were converted from Judaism, it was written in Hebrew letters." (Euseb. Hist. Ecc. VI. 25.) Jerome: "Matthew, first in Judea, on account of those from the circumcision who believed, composed the gospel of Christ in Hebrew letters and words." (Catal. c. 4.) "Matthew published a gospel in Judea in the Hebrew language." (Proleg. in Matth.) Eusebius: "Matthew, having first proclaimed his gospel to the Hebrews . . . committed it to writing in his native tongue." (Ecc. Hist. III. 23.) Epiphanius: "They indeed (the Ebionites) receive the gospel according to Matthew; for this both they use and also the Cerinthians. They call it indeed *the gospel according to the Hebrews*; as it is true to say that Matthew alone in the New Testament made the declaration and preaching of the gospel in Hebrew and with Hebrew letters." (Hæres. XXX. 3.)

The very nature of the case, and this abundant and uncontradicted testimony of antiquity, would seem sufficient to establish the fact, that Matthew did write a gospel in Hebrew, in the language spoken by the Jews of Palestine in the time of Christ. This was not the pure, ancient Hebrew, though generally called Hebrew in the New Testament, as in Acts, xxi. 40; xxii. 2. Specimens of the language are given in Matth. xxvii. 46; Mark v. 41; vii. 34; xv. 34; which last passage, being compared with the original of Ps. xxii. 1, will show the very great similarity of this dialect to the ancient Hebrew. Any person acquainted with the one, could very easily and fully understand the other; they were quite as nearly related to each other as the English of Henry VIII.'s time is to the English of the present day. The Jews of Palestine tenaciously held on to this their national tongue, and never used the Greek if they could possibly avoid it. Josephus declares respecting himself, that

though he received the best education, both Hebrew and Greek, which could then be obtained by a Jew, yet he never had been able to pronounce the Greek language correctly, he not having been accustomed to it, on account of the aversion of his countrymen to the learning or teaching or using of foreign languages. (Antiq. XX. 11.)

There is every reason to believe, therefore, that Matthew did write a gospel in the then existing language of Palestine, for the use of Jewish converts; but it being designed only for a local and temporary use, it was soon superseded in the Christian church generally, by the Greek gospel subsequently written by the same apostle. This original Hebrew gospel by Matthew was probably, as will hereafter be apparent, the ground-work of the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, so often referred to by ancient Christian writers. Eusebius often mentions it, but seems not to have read it; for in referring to a passage quoted by Ignatius, he says he "knows not whence the words were taken" (Hist. Ecc. III. 30), while Jerome, when referring to the same text (De Vir. Ill.) says "it comes from the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*." Jerome had not only seen this gospel, but he himself actually translated it into Latin and Greek; he says it is the one which some referred to *the twelve apostles*, but most supposed it to be the original gospel of Matthew. He says (Adv. Pel. III.), "In the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, which is written in the Syro-Chaldaic language, but with Hebrew letters, which the Nazarenes use to this day, as *according to the twelve apostles*, or, as most suppose, *according to Matthew*." Again (De Vir. Ill. 2. 2), "The gospel also which is called *according to the Hebrews*, and which was lately translated by me into the Greek and Latin languages, which also Origen often uses," &c. Once more, says Jerome (De Vir. Ill. c. 3), "Moreover, this very Hebrew (gospel) is kept to this day in the Cæsarean library, which Pamphilus the martyr so diligently collected. The opportunity of copying it came also to me from the Nazarenes who use this volume in Berœa, a city of Syria." He also observes that in this gospel the quotations from the Old Testament follow the Hebrew and not the Septuagint; and give as examples: *out of Egypt have I called my son*; and, *he shall be called a Nazarene*; both which passages are cited by our Matthew, and by no other of the evangelists in the New Testament.

These remarks may be sufficient as an introduction to certain specimens of this *gospel according to the Hebrews*, which are found in various ancient writers. Neither the gospel itself, nor Jerome's translations of it, have for many centuries been seen;

and all the knowledge which we can now obtain of its contents, must be derived from incidental quotations, like those which we herewith translate.

CLEMENS ALEX. (L. II. Strom. p. 380): "In the gospel according to the Hebrews, it is written, *He that hath admired, shall reign; and he that hath reigned, shall have rest.*"

ORIGEN (in Johan. Vol. IV. p. 63): "But if any one will go to the gospel according to the Hebrews, where the Saviour himself saith, *Now my mother, the Holy Ghost, took me by one of my hairs, and brought me to the great mountain, even Tabor.*"

In Matth. xix. 19 (Vol. III. p. 691): "It is written in a certain gospel, which is called according to the Hebrews (if yet it may please any one to take it, not as authority, but as an illustration of the question proposed), and it says, "One of the rich men said to him, Master, doing what good thing shall I live? He said to him, Man, fulfil the law and the prophets. He replied to him, I have done it. He said to him, Go, sell all which thou possessest, and divide among the poor, and come, follow me. But the rich man began to scratch his head, and it did not please him. And the Lord said unto him, How canst thou say I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, when it is written in the law, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself; and behold many of thy brethren, the sons of Abraham, are covered with filth, dying with famine, and thy house is filled with many good things, and nothing almost goes out of it to them? And turning to Simon his disciple, who sat by him, he said, Simon, son of John, it is easier that a camel go through the eye of a needle, than a rich man into the kingdom of heaven."

EPIPHANIUS (Hæres. XXX. 13): "In the gospel with them (the Ebionites) called according to Matthew, yet not entire and pure, but adulterated and . . . they call it the Hebrew (gospel) . . . it is contained thus: There was a certain man, Jesus by name, and he was about thirty years old, who chose us. And going into Capernaum he went into the house of Simon, who is called Peter, and opening his mouth he said, Passing along by the sea of Tiberias, I chose John and James, the sons of Zebedee, and Simon and Andrew and Simon Zelotes, and Judas Iscariot; and thee, O Matthew, sitting at the receipt of custom, I called, and thou didst follow me. Wherefore I will that ye be twelve apostles for a testimony unto Israel. And John was baptizing, and the Pharisees went out to him and were baptized, and all Jerusalem. And John had raiment of camel's hair, and a leathern girdle about his loins. And his food, it says, was wild honey, whose taste was that of manna, as honey-cakes with oil; that thence they may change the word of truth

to a lie, and instead of *locusts* (ἀκρίδων) they may make it *cakes* (ἐγκρίδας) with honey. But the beginning of the gospel with them is this: It came to pass in the days of Herod, the king of Judea, John came baptizing the baptism of repentance in the river Jordan, who was said to be of the race of Aaron the priest, the son of Zachariah and Elisabeth; and all came to him. And after saying many things it goes on, The people being baptized, Jesus also came and was baptized. And when he went up from the water, the heavens were opened, and he saw the Holy Spirit of God in the form of a dove descending and coming to him. And there was a voice from heaven saying, Thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased. And again, I this day have begotten thee. And immediately a great light illumined the place. Which seeing, it says, John said unto him, Who art thou, Lord? And again there was a voice from heaven to him, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. And then it says, John falling down before him, says, I pray thee, O Lord, baptize thou me. But he forbade him, saying, Suffer it, for thus it is becoming that all things be fulfilled."

XXX. 14: "Cutting off the genealogies in Matthew, they begin: To make the beginning, as I said before, saying, It came to pass, it says, in the days of Herod king of Judea, in the high priesthood of Caiaphas, a certain man, John by name, came baptizing the baptism of repentance in the river Jordan, and so on."

XXX. 16: "That which is called the gospel with them, contains this: I have come to destroy the sacrifices, and if ye will not cease to sacrifice, wrath will not cease from you."

JEROME (Contra Pel. III. 2): "In the gospel according to the Hebrews the history narrates, Behold the mother of the Lord and his brethren said to him, John Baptist is baptizing for the remission of sins; let us go and be baptized by him. But he said to them, What have I sinned, that I should go and be baptized by him?"

Comm. in Isa. xi. 1: "According to the gospel which the Nazareans read, the fount of every Holy Spirit shall be upon him. Moreover we find these things written: And it came to pass when the Lord ascended from the water, the fount of every Holy Spirit descended and rested upon him, and said to him, My Son, in all the prophets I was expecting thee, that thou shouldst come, and I should rest upon thee. For thou art my rest, thou art my first-born Son, who shalt reign for ever."

Comm. in Mich. vii. 6: "In which (gospel according to the Hebrews) it is said in the person of the Saviour, My mother, the Holy Spirit, took me lately by one of my hairs."

Comm. in Ephes. v. 3: "Also in the Hebrew gospel we read,

that the Lord, speaking to the disciples, said, You may never rejoice except when you see your brother in charity."

De Vir. Ill. c. 2: "The gospel according to the Hebrews, after the resurrection of the Saviour, reports: But the Lord, when he had given the linen cloth to a servant of the priest, went to James and appeared to him. For James had sworn that he would not eat bread from that hour in which he had drank the cup of the Lord, until he had seen him arise from them that sleep. And again, a little after, The Lord said, Bring a table and bread. And immediately it adds, He took the bread, and blessed and brake, and gave to James the just, and said to him, My brother, eat thy bread, for the Son of man has risen from them that sleep."

Comm. Pel. III. 2: "And in the same volume (gospel of the Hebrews), he says, If thy brother sin against thee in word, and make satisfaction to thee seven times in a day, receive him. Simon, his disciple, said to him, Seven times in a day? The Lord answered and said unto him, Yes, I say unto thee, until seventy times seven! For even in the prophets, after they are anointed with the Holy Ghost, is found matter of sin."

Comm. in Matth. vi. 11: "In the (Hebrew) gospel, the man who had the withered hand, is said to be a brick-layer (*cæmentarius*), and he prayed for help in this manner: I was a brick-layer, earning my living by my hands; I pray thee, O Jesus, that thou wouldst restore health to me, that I may not basely beg my bread."

Ep. 120, ad Hedib.: "In the (Hebrew) gospel we read, not that the veil of the temple was rent, but that the lintel of the temple, of wonderful magnitude, was broken down."

From the above extracts, it is manifest that the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* was vastly superior to the later apocryphal gospels, of which an abstract has already been given; and greatly inferior to the canonical gospels of our New Testament. The ground-work of it would seem to have been the Hebrew gospel of Matthew, in some places mutilated, and in others enlarged by augmentations from a tradition not then remote. There were probably several different recensions of it; and it seems to have been substantially the same with that which was sometimes called the *gospel according to the twelve apostles*.

The gospel according to the Egyptians.—EPIPHANIUS, in speaking of the Sabellians, has the following passage (Hær. L. XXII. 2): "Their whole error, and the power of their error, they derive from certain apocryphal books, especially from one called the *Egyptian gospel*, to which some give this name. For in it are contained many such things, as it were mysteriously in a jumble, from the person of the Saviour, as that he declared to

his disciples that he was the Father, and he the Son, and he the Holy Ghost."

CLEMENS ALEX. (Strom. III. 6. &c. p. 445, 52, 53.): "To Salome, inquiring how long death should have power, the Lord said, As long as you women bear children. . . . Moreover, she saying, I have done well in not bearing children, the Lord answered, saying, Eat every herb, but that which is bitter thou mayest not eat; by which words he signifies, that celibacy or marriage is a matter within our own choice, neither being enforced by any prohibition of the other. This, I suppose, is contained in the *gospel according to the Egyptians*."

CLEMENS ROMANUS.—In the second epistle, ascribed to this author (vi. 12), there are two quotations from a certain gospel, which, when compared with what is said of the *Egyptian gospel* by Clemens Alexandrinus, learned men have inferred to be from that work. The first is as follows: "For the Lord saith, ye shall be as lambs in the midst of wolves. Peter answered and said, What if the wolves shall tear the lambs in pieces? Jesus said unto Peter, Let not the lambs, after they are dead, be afraid of the wolves. And ye also, fear not them that kill you, and are then able to do nothing to you; but fear him who hath power, after that ye are dead, to cast both soul and body into hell-fire." The second passage is this: "Wherefore also he saith thus: Keep the flesh pure and the soul unspotted, that ye may receive eternal life."

The above is nearly all that remains of the *gospel according to the Egyptians*; and it is not absolutely certain that all even of these passages are from that work, for Clemens Alexandrinus only *supposes*, and the source of the quotations of Romanus is wholly conjectural. So far as we are able to judge, this Egyptian gospel was still more faulty than that of the Hebrews.

Besides these, there are mentioned by ancient writers a *gospel of Peter* (Theodoret. Hæret. Fab. II. 2), and a *gospel of Cerinthus* (Epiphan. xxvii. 5, xxx. 14); but no extracts are given from them, and from what is said about them, it would seem that the latter was closely connected with the gospel of the Hebrews, and the former with that of the Egyptians. According to this, the *gospel of Cerinthus* would have some connection with our canonical Matthew, and the *gospel of Peter* with our canonical Mark. (Guerike, Einleit. N. T. 198, 199.)

Memorabilia of Justin Martyr.

This father, in his writings, frequently refers to the deeds and words of Christ, and cites passages from certain apostolic writings, which he calls *memorabilia* or *memoirs*, and also *gospels*.

These writings he affirms were the work of apostles and of the companions of apostles. Two passages from his second Apology may be sufficient to illustrate the manner in which he refers to these authorities. Οἱ γὰρ ἀπόστολοι ἐν τοῖς γενομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων ἃ καλεῖται εὐαγγέλια οὕτως παρέδωκαν, *For the apostles, in the memoirs composed by them, which are called gospels, have thus handed down, &c.* Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασιν ἃ φημι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις παρακολουθησάντων συνετάχθαι, *For in the memoirs which I say were composed by the apostles or by those who accompanied them, &c.*

Some of the passages which Justin quotes, are literal transcripts from our canonical Matthew ; many are quotations, with slight verbal differences, from Matthew and Luke ; some combine the sense of passages found in two or more of the gospels ; and others merely give the meaning of a text without attempting to give the words. There are still others which differ very much from our present gospels, and some few, of which no trace can be found in our canon. Of the two kinds last mentioned we will give a full selection, and specimens of the others.

By comparing all the quotations, it would seem that Justin used mainly our Matthew, and was quite familiar with Luke ; while he makes very little direct use of Mark, and still less of John. He seems also to have had traditionary reports of some passages in the life of Christ not contained in our gospels, and access to some writings not now extant, as perhaps the original Hebrew gospel of Matthew, and some of the "many" referred to by Luke in the introduction to his gospel. All this is very easily accounted for by the fact that Justin was a native and resident of Palestine, where these traditions and the writings from which he draws, originated and were longest preserved ; while, of the two gospels which he passes over almost without notice, the one (Mark) was written and published for the use of the Latins, the other (John) was originally designed for the Greeks of Asia Minor.

We begin our extracts with the sentences which differ most widely from our canonical gospels.

Dial. c. Tryph. : "And then the child, having been born in Bethlehem, since Joseph had not in that village a place to lodge, was lodged in a certain cave near the village. They being there, Mary brought forth the Christ, and laid him in a manger (φάτνη), where the Magi, coming from Arabia, found him."

"Then Jesus came to the river Jordan, where John was baptizing, and when he went down to the water, a fire was kindled in the Jordan ; and while he was ascending from the water, his apostles write, the Holy Ghost like a dove flew upon him . . .

and at the same time a voice came out of the heavens, *Thou art my Son, I this day have begotten thee.*"

(Jesus) "being among men, did carpenter's work, making ploughs, and yokes, by these things even teaching the symbols of righteousness and an industrious life."

"And they, seeing these things take place, said it was a magical fantasy, for they dared to call him a magician and a deceiver of the people."

"Christ said, In what things I apprehend you, in those also I shall judge you."

The matters in the above statements, to which there is nothing corresponding in our canonical gospels, are evidently traditionary notices; and some of them very closely resemble what the fathers quote from the gospel according to the Hebrews.

We proceed to give extracts, of which the sense is found in the canonical gospels, though not always in one passage nor in the same words.

Apol. II.: "Be not anxious as to what ye shall eat, or wherewith ye shall be clothed. Are ye not better than birds and beasts? yet God feedeth them. Be not anxious, then, as to what ye shall eat, or wherewith ye shall be clothed; for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of these things; but seek ye the kingdom of heaven, and all these things shall be added unto you; for where the treasure is, there is also the mind of the man."

"Many will say to me, Lord, Lord, have we not eaten and drank in thy name, and wrought miracles? and then I will say to them, Depart from me ye workers of iniquity. There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, when the righteous shall shine like the sun, and the wicked shall be sent into eternal fire. For many shall come in my name, being clothed outwardly with the skins of sheep, but inwardly are ravening wolves. By their works ye shall know them. Every tree not bearing good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire."

"Be not afraid of those who destroy you, and after that are not able to do anything; but fear him who after death, is able to cast both soul and body into hell."

These extracts all have the appearance of being quoted from memory out of different parts of the canonical Matthew and Luke, without reference to the particular place, or any attempt at verbal accuracy.

Apol. II.: "Whosoever is angry, shall be obnoxious to the fire."

"For whosoever heareth me and doeth what I say, heareth him that sent me."

"Woe to you, scribes and pharisees, hypocrites; for ye tythe seasoning and rue; but consider not the love of God and the judgment."

"Many false Christs and false apostles shall arise, and shall lead astray many of the faithful."

"For Christ also said, Except ye be born again, ye cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. But it is plain to all, that it is impossible for those who have once been born, to enter again into the womb of those that bare them."

Dial. c. Tryph.: "A certain one saying to him, Good Master, he answered, Why callest thou me good? there is one good, my Father who is in heaven."

These are the quotations by Justin which differ most widely from the text of our canon. He quotes very often, generally without any variation in sense, and frequently with literal exactness. Very many verses of the New Testament are found complete in his writings. It is evident, on comparison of the whole, that his *memorabilia* or *memoirs* were the same gospels which we now have, with perhaps the addition of a Hebrew Matthew; and when he gives what is not in our gospels, he copies from the traditions of his own times, either oral or written, or both.

Diatessaron of Tatian.

Tatian is described by Eusebius (Hist. Ecc. IV. 29) as once a hearer of Justin Martyr, in good repute among Christians; but after the death of Justin, he became an ascetic Encratite, abstaining from flesh and wine, and denying the lawfulness of marriage. He wrote against the gentiles a book which Eusebius commends, the object of which was to prove the superior antiquity of Moses and the prophets to the sages of Greece and Rome. He also wrote the *Diatessaron* (διὰ τεσσάρων), an abridgment and harmony of the four gospels; and of this Eusebius speaks disparagingly.

Theodoret (Hær. Fab. I. 20) informs us that Tatian cut off the genealogies of Jesus and the account of his birth; and Bar-Salibi, an oriental writer (Asseman. Bibl. Or. I. 57), says his *Diatessaron* began with the first words of John's gospel, Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος.

Epiphanius (Hær. XLVI. 1) says, that some called his τὸ διὰ τεσσάρων εὐαγγέλιον the gospel according to the Hebrews.

This, I believe, is all the reliable information we have respecting this work of Tatian, which some modern critics, as Eichhorn and Schmidt, would have to be a biography of Jesus, independent of our canon. There is not the least evidence of any such thing, but of the exact reverse. The most probable sup-

position is, that it was a harmony of our four canonical gospels, somewhat mutilated and modified to suit his Encratite views, and based mainly on the Hebrew Matthew; as Tatian, it seems, was taught Christianity in Palestine, and by Justin Martyr. In any event, certainly, nothing can be made out of it to the disparagement of our canonical gospels.

Gospel of Marcion.

Marcion, an anti-Judaizing Gnostic, according to the uncontradicted testimony of antiquity, published for his followers a gospel, which was simply the gospel of Luke, mutilated and changed to suit his own views. This is the testimony of both Tertullian and Epiphanius (adv. Marc. IV. 2, 6. Hær. XLII. 11). Some of the important parts omitted are Cap. I. II. and III. 1—9, 29—35. XV. 11—32. XIX. 29—46. XX. 9—18, 37, 38. XXII. 35—38, 42—44. Guerike, Einleit. N. T. 206.

The beginning of Marcion's gospel, according to the edition of Hahn, is as follows: "In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, God came down to Capernaum, a city of Galilee, and was teaching on the Sabbath days. And they were astonished at his doctrine, for his word was with power. And there was in the synagogue a man, having a spirit of an unclean devil, and he cried out with a loud voice, saying:" and so on, word for word, according to Luke iii. 1; iv. 31—33, &c. In accordance with the above representation of the first appearance of Christ in Galilee, an ancient writer informs us that "the Marcionites frequently affirm, that the good God suddenly appeared and came down immediately from heaven into the synagogue." (Pseudo-Orig. Dial. p. 823. Thilo. Codex. Apoc. N. T. I. 403.)

The extract given above may be considered a fair specimen of the book, and of the manner in which it compares with the canonical Luke. It is perfectly plain from the testimony of the ancients, and from an inspection of the work itself, that it is in no sense a rival of our canonical gospels, nor derived from any sources independent of them.

Of the other early gospels, sometimes alluded to, that of Bartholomew, according to the testimony of Eusebius (Hist. Ecc. V. 10.) and Jerome (De Vir. Ill. c. 36.), was nothing else than the Hebrew gospel of Matthew. Of those ascribed to Matthias and Thomas, no authentic trace remains; and there is not the shadow of evidence that either of those apostles ever wrote a gospel. Those ascribed to Apelles and Basilides were nothing more than extracts from the canonical gospels, variously mutilated and interpolated. None of these, certainly, are fit to

hold any rivalry with our four which are contained in the New Testament.

Arabia has been prolific in the apocryphal literature of the New Testament; several of the apocryphal gospels have been preserved to us through the Arabic language; and Mohammed was much indebted to this source for his materials in the construction of the Koran. Chapters III. and XIX. of that strange book are well worthy the perusal of every Christian, for they contain a minute account of the families of Christ and John, and all the wonderful circumstances attending their birth, in the true Arabic fashion.

In drawing up the preceding account of the gospel fragments of the early age, we have been largely indebted to De Wette's learned and vigorous Introduction to the New Testament. The German unbelief cannot now be successfully encountered without the help of the German learning. The antidote is scarcely to be found except where the poison grows. The climes which yield the most noxious plants, are the very climes which produce the most effective medicines, the sweetest fruits, the most luxurious vegetation.

[To be concluded.]

ART. IV.—THE KINGDOM OF CONGO AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES.

BY REV. JOHN LEIGHTON WILSON, MISSIONARY IN WESTERN AFRICA.

No part of Western Africa is so well known to history as the kingdom of Congo. For this distinction, however, it is not so much indebted to any importance which it ever possessed itself, as to other causes of an incidental nature. It borders upon, and has given its name to, one of the finest rivers on the continent of Africa, and is, therefore, somewhat known merely from its geographical position. And the circumstance that has contributed to its notoriety, but not to its honour as a nation, is the fact, that from the earliest period of its discovery by the Portuguese up to the present moment, it has always borne the lead in the foreign slave-trade, and in all probability has furnished a larger number of victims for the markets of the new world than any other region of Africa whatever. Congos, or their descendants, may still be identified in many parts of the United States, throughout the West India islands, and in large numbers

in Brazil, where they have not yet laid aside their vernacular tongue.

But the circumstance which, above all others, has contributed to give it interest in the eyes of the civilized world, is the fact, that it has been the stage upon which has been achieved one of the most successful experiments ever made by the church of Rome to reclaim a pagan people from idolatry. For more than two centuries, the kingdom of Congo, according to the showing of the missionaries themselves, was as completely under the influence of Rome as any sister kingdom in Europe, so that if the inhabitants of that country are not now, in point of civilization and Christianity, what Rome would have them to be, or all that a pagan people are capable of being made under her training, the fault lies at her own door. In relation to the missions which she planted about the same time in India, China, and other parts of the world, it has been alleged with some degree of justice, that her designs were thwarted in consequence of political changes in Europe, which placed Protestant nations in the ascendant, and gave them a preponderant influence in those countries where her missions had been established. With no less justice it has been urged, that the failure of her efforts among the Indian tribes, both of North and South America, ought to be ascribed to the fact, that these tribes have been overshadowed and borne down by the presence of more powerful races, without allowing sufficient time for the full development of her peculiar principles. But whether these things can be regarded as satisfactory explanations of the causes of failure in other parts of the world or not, nothing of the kind can be urged in relation to her missions in Congo. Here she has always had the field to herself, and for more than two centuries enjoyed facilities and advantages for propagating her religion among this people which she can scarcely ever expect to have again in any future efforts of the kind that she may make.

It is our intention in the present article to examine the character and results of this mission. But in order to render our views intelligible, we must give a hasty sketch of the civil as well as the religious history of the country before entering upon the proposed investigation.

The kingdom of Congo, as also the great river of the same name, was discovered by the Portuguese about the year 1485.* It was not a new or isolated discovery, but an extension of those they had made some years previously higher up the coast. At the time, however, it was regarded as immensely valuable, and it

* By the natives of the country the river is called the *Zaire*, a name that is adopted also by most modern geographers.

awakened an interest in Portugal in behalf of this people and country that has not entirely subsided after the lapse of more than three centuries.

The kingdom of Congo lies entirely on the south side of the river, which forms its northern boundary, while on the south it is bounded by the Portuguese province of Angola, on the west by the Atlantic, and on the east by the mountains of Matamba, which separate it from the country of the savage and warlike Giaghis. It is of an oblong figure, extending along the sea coast about 250 miles, and interiorwards about 350. At the time of its discovery, or very soon afterwards, it was divided into six provinces—viz., Sogno, Bamba, Pemba, Batta, Pango, and Sundi, to the chiefs of which the Portuguese gave the names of dukes, counts, and marquises, which they ever after retained. Of these provinces, Sogno and Bamba were the largest and altogether the most important. Bamba was said to have been about as large as Sicily or Naples, and bordered on the province of Angola. Sogno was still larger, and not only formed the frontier of the whole kingdom, but commanded the entrance of the river, and therefore acquired importance proportioned to the amount of commerce carried on with the civilized world. San Salvador, the capital and metropolis of the whole kingdom, was situated in the province of Pemba, about 50 Italian miles south-east of the mouth of the Congo, and about 140 north-east of Loando St. Paul, the capital of Angola. It was situated upon the summit of a high mountain, and not only enjoyed a magnificent prospect of the surrounding country, but was reputed healthful even for Europeans. It was not only the residence of the king, but was the head-quarters of the missionaries, as also for a large number of Portuguese merchants, who resorted thither on account of the facilities it offered for trade. At the time of its greatest prosperity, which was probably the early part of the seventeenth century, it is said to have contained about 40,000 inhabitants. The palace was a large wooden building, surrounded in part by a stone wall, and was constructed no doubt under the direction of the Portuguese residents, and probably at the expense of the king of Portugal. For many years, a bishop and his chapter, a college of Jesuits, and a monastery of Capuchins, were supported in San Salvador at the expense of the Portuguese Government. Besides a cathedral of large dimensions, there were ten smaller churches, to which the ordinary names of St. John, St. James, St. Michael, St. Anthony, &c., were given, all of which contributed materially to beautify this otherwise barbaric city. It was accessible to the whites by the way of the river, but the more common route to the sea coast was through the province of Bamba to Loando

St. Paul. There were several fortified posts along this route, but none of them were places of strength or importance. The only other towns of any considerable importance were the capitals of Sogno and Bamba ; neither of which, however, is supposed to have contained more than six or eight hundred houses. In both of these there were monasteries of Capuchins, and in Sony, the capital of Sogno, there were six churches, the largest of which could contain five or six hundred people. Sony was situated upon a small creek, that emptied into the Congo a few miles from its mouth, and was the great seaport of the kingdom.

The history of Congo, civil as well as religious, commences with its discovery by the Portuguese, as little or nothing is known about it previously.

Diego Cam, the original discoverer, having entered the river, and learned by signs from natives whom he found upon its banks that there was a great kingdom in the interior by the name of Congo, was so much elated by the discovery that he took very little time to verify these equivocal proofs, but made all speed back to Portugal to report his success. The interest which this discovery awakened in the mind of the king and people of Portugal was scarcely less than that felt by Diego Cam himself, and he was sent back almost immediately with three Dominican friars. On his second arrival, he had an interview with the king, and was treated with the utmost kindness and courtesy. Two of the friars that accompanied him died soon after their arrival, probably of the effects of the climate, and the third was killed some years after by the Giaghis, while acting as chaplain to the Congolan army.

On his third voyage to Congo, Diego Cam took with him twelve missionaries more, of the Franciscan order, who are regarded as the founders of the Christian religion in the kingdom of Congo. The Count of Sogno and the king of Congo, his nephew, were among the first converts to Christianity. For a time the latter showed great zeal in promoting the new religion among his subjects, but as soon as he found that he was required to give up the multitude of wives and concubines with which he was surrounded, and be married to a single wife, he renounced it, and returned to the religion of his fathers. His son and successor, Don Alphonso the First, felt no such difficulty. He not only embraced Christianity himself, but did all he could to promote its interests throughout his realms. His brother Pasanguitama was a man of a very different spirit, and finding there was quite a popular dislike to the new religion, availed himself of it to raise a rebellion against his brother. The armies of the two brothers had scarcely engaged in battle,

when St. James was distinctly seen fighting on the side of the king, and victory of course soon turned in his favour. Pasanguitama was not only beaten, but was made a prisoner. He refused to ransom his life by embracing Christianity, and was accordingly executed. It fared differently with his general, who was pardoned on the condition of becoming a Christian, but had to do penance in the way of bringing water for all who were baptized in the capital. Soon after this signal victory in behalf of Christianity, a large reinforcement of missionaries was sent out by the Society *de Propaganda Fide*, most of whom were from the Italian states, and in the course of fifteen or twenty years, the entire population of Congo was gathered into the pale of the Roman Catholic church.

About the middle of the sixteenth century, however, the labours of the missionaries met with a serious interruption in consequence of an invasion of the country by hordes of the warlike Giaghis. The Congolan army, though large and well disciplined, was scattered like chaff before these savage invaders. San Salvador was burnt to the ground, and the king and his people had to betake themselves to the "isle of horses," on the Zaire, for safety. In this extremity, the king of Congo appealed to Don Sebastian, king of Portugal, for help, which was promptly granted. Don Francis Gouvea was despatched with six or eight hundred Portuguese troops, and after having been reinforced by two or three hundred more from Angola, he gave battle to the invaders in the heart of the kingdom. After several engagements, in which the Giaghis showed great bravery, he succeeded in driving them from the country, and restored the king to his throne. Don Alvaro the First, the king at the time, out of gratitude, engaged to make the King of Portugal an annual present of slaves, and offered to acknowledge him as his sovereign. This latter proposition the King of Portugal generously declined, preferring to regard Don Alvaro as a brother king. Don Francis remained in the country with a part of his troops three or four years, for the purpose of restoring order, and to prevent another invasion of the Giaghis.

The missionaries, who it is supposed retired to Angola during these strifes, returned to their labours, and having been reinforced by new recruits from Europe, not only re-established the Catholic worship in all the provinces of Congo, but extended their labours into neighbouring districts over which the king of Congo had no jurisdiction. They crossed the Zaire, and were nearly as successful in making converts in Loango and Kakongo as they had been in Congo. In the meantime, San Salvador was rebuilt, commerce was resumed on a more extended scale, and the country soon attained to a degree of prosperity and

power quite beyond anything it had previously known. This period of peace and prosperity, however, was not of more than forty or fifty years' continuance.

In the year 1636, a civil war broke out between the king of Congo and the count of Sogno. The occasion of this war arose from an unjustifiable attempt on the part of the king to transfer the province of Sogno to the crown of Portugal. Having had need of the aid of the Portuguese of Angola to effect his coronation, he engaged to give them for their assistance two gold mines and the country of Sogno. For some time previously, the Portuguese had entertained the belief that there were valuable and extensive gold mines in the country back of San Salvador. The natives of the country, either from motives of policy or from that inherent love of the marvellous which characterizes the race, had studiously encouraged this belief, without, however, furnishing any information by which the Portuguese could identify the particular region in which they were to be found. At the same time it was quite obvious that these mines could be of no special value to the Portuguese, unless they could get possession of Sogno, which commands the entrance of the river, and prevent other foreigners from participating in the advantages of their discovery. To couple these two things, therefore, for the purpose of securing the assistance and co-operation of the Portuguese, showed great shrewdness on the part of the king; but so far as it concerned the welfare of the country generally and the stability of his own throne, it showed great weakness, as well as want of foresight. The proposition, as might have been foreseen, roused the indignation of the people as well as the count, to the highest pitch, and they soon placed themselves in an attitude of defiance. The count denied the sovereignty of the king of Congo, and not only charged the Portuguese with fraud in accepting what he had no right to give, but reproached them bitterly with ingratitude, inasmuch as only a few years before, when they were driven out of Loando St. Paul by the Dutch, he had given them shelter in his country and extended to them pardon that had never been requited.

The king of Congo raised a large army, and having been joined by about eighty Portuguese, he determined to force the count into submission. In the first engagement the Sognoese army was beaten and the count himself was slain. His son and successor, who was a man of equal energy and bravery, resumed the war, and in the first engagement the royal army was not only defeated, but the king himself and a large number of his Portuguese allies were made prisoners. The latter had the alternative of death or slavery submitted to them, and preferring

the former they were immediately executed. The king, Don Alvaro the Second, obtained his own liberation by acknowledging the independence of the count and ceding to him an additional district of the country. It was not long, however, before this treaty was denounced and hostilities were recommenced by the king, but with no better success. Finding it impossible to reduce the count to subjection, the king despatched an embassy with valuable presents to Prince Maurice, who at that time was acting as agent for the Dutch in Brazil, to ask his aid. The count sent another at the same time and probably by the same vessel, and with presents equally valuable, to beg his non-interference. The prince determined not to interfere, and wrote to the governor of Angola to take no part in the quarrel, as he would prefer to regard both parties in the light of friends. For a time hostilities were suspended, but the country of Sogno was never afterwards united to the crown of Congo. The part which the Portuguese had taken at the commencement of these troubles, made them ever afterwards intolerably odious to the Sognoese. The count indulged his resentment by persecuting the missionaries in his country. Several of them were ignominiously dragged out of his dominions, and thrown among the savages on the opposite side of the river, where it was thought they would be put to death. It was not long, however, according to the statements of the missionaries, before this deed of violence recoiled with redoubled force upon the count's own head. The love which the people bore to their religious teachers, and the apprehension of some dreadful calamity from heaven, roused them to a state of phrenzy, and the count in turn was seized and drowned in the Zaire, near the spot where he had perpetrated this deed of cruelty against the missionaries. A more devout successor ascended his throne, and the missionaries were recalled to exercise more absolute authority than they had ever done before.

About the same time, Don Alvaro the Second, sent to Pope Urban the Eighth, for a new recruit of missionaries. In compliance with this request, twelve Capuchins were sent; but having been detained on account of the war with Spain, they did not reach Congo until after this king's death. A part of this company remained with the count of Sogno, and the others found their way to San Salvador, where they were kindly received by Don Garcia the Second, the son and successor of Don Alvaro. The reign of Don Garcia was short, and he was succeeded by Don Antonio the First, who by his unparalleled wickedness and brutality, not only threw his whole kingdom into disorder and anarchy, but had nearly extirpated every trace of Christianity from the land. He not only behaved in the most despotic and brutal manner to his own subjects, but treated the Portuguese

residents and the missionaries with so much indignity that they were compelled to fly from his realms. It was not long, however, before the Portuguese of Angola determined to resent these indignities. An army of one or two thousand natives and four hundred Portuguese soldiers was raised, and they determined to give this impudent king battle in the heart of his own country. On this occasion, it is confidently stated by the missionaries that Don Antonio raised the incredibly large army of 900,000 men. They say very little, however, for the bravery or discipline of this immense army, when they add that the main division of it was entirely routed by four hundred Portuguese musketeers. Don Antonio himself was killed, and his crown was taken to Loando St. Paul. Had the Portuguese been so disposed, they might have turned this victory to good account by subjecting the whole kingdom to the Portuguese crown. But this seems never to have been desired. The existence of gold mines was then known to have been a mere fabrication, and as they enjoyed a monopoly of the trade of the country, there was no object in making it a dependency of the crown of Portugal. There was also, it is probable, a religious motive which prevented the Portuguese from seizing upon the country. Congo had received the Catholic religion at a very early period after its discovery, and its sovereigns, with one or two exceptions, had always shown as much deference for the authority of Rome, as those of Portugal itself. All of her kings had been crowned according to the Catholic ceremonial, and the crown itself had been bestowed by the pope as a testimony of their loyalty.

After the signal defeat just mentioned, the country was left to recover from its disorders as best it could. It was not long, however, before order was restored and another king placed on the throne of Don Antonio, but who he was we are not informed. He signalized his reign by an unsuccessful effort to reunite the province of Sogno to the crown of Congo. Father Carli, in 1667, saw the great duke of Bamba, who was always the leader of the royal forces, just after he had disbanded an army of 150,000, with which he had in vain attempted the subjugation of the count of Sogno. Twenty years later, and the great Duke himself had renounced his allegiance to the king, and cut off all intercourse between the capital and Loando St. Paul. The close of the seventeenth century may therefore be regarded as the termination of the national existence of the kingdom of Congo. From the moment that the Count of Sogno and the grand Duke of Bamba, through whose territories alone the inhabitants of San Salvador could have any intercourse with the civilized world, renounced their allegiance to the king, the capital lost all of its commercial importance, and the king himself must have

sunk down to an equality with the merest petty chief in the country. As far back as 1668, San Salvador had become a wilderness, and a pretender to the crown of the ancient realm, as a last resort, had applied once more to the Portuguese for assistance to place him upon his throne and reduce his revolted provinces to subjection. At that time, however, Portugal had enough to do to attend to her own affairs, and we hear no more of the kingdom of Congo.

The missionaries continued their labours in some parts of the country, especially in the province of Sogno, some time after the dissolution of the government. During the earlier part of the eighteenth century their authority in Sogno was nearly as great as it had ever been; so much so, that English vessels could not buy slaves in the port of Sony without first conciliating their good will. At what time precisely, or from what causes, they finally abandoned the country altogether, we are not certainly informed, and can therefore only conjecture.

Before the close of the eighteenth century, indeed, for anything we know to the contrary, before the middle of it, not only all their former civilization, but almost every trace of Christianity had disappeared from the land, and the whole country had fallen back into the deepest ignorance and heathenism, and into greater weakness and poverty than had ever been experienced even before its discovery.

According to Malte Brun, a company of missionaries left Nantes in 1768, and endeavoured to re-establish the Catholic religion north of the Zaire, but on account of sickness, or some other untoward cause, they failed to accomplish anything. The effort was renewed by another set of missionaries from the same place five years afterwards, but with no better success. In 1777, according to Grandpere, four Italian priests embarked at Rochelle for the purpose of re-establishing the Catholic faith in Sogno. They took with them large presents for the chiefs, and adopted every precaution to render their mission successful; but they found that the inhabitants had sunk down to the lowest grade of paganism, and were so savage withal, that they could not travel in safety among them. Two of the four died soon after their arrival, as it was supposed by the survivors, from the effects of poison. The other two, finding their lives in great peril, had recourse to stratagem to extricate themselves from the country. Capt. Tuckey, who was sent by the English government, in 1816, to explore the Congo river, states that three years previously, some missionaries had been murdered in Sogno, and that a Portuguese pinnacle had been cut off by the natives at the same time. Who these missionaries were, or how many there were, we do not know, but they were no doubt

agents of the *de Propaganda Fide*. During his sojourn in the country, he found no traces of Catholicism, except a few crucifixes and relics strangely mixed up with the charms and *feteiches* of the country, and were no doubt distributed by Portuguese slave-traders, who still frequented the river. One man introduced himself on board as a priest, and said he had a diploma from the college of Capuchins at Angola, but was without education, and so ignorant of the usages of the church which he represented, that he unblushingly acknowledged that he had a wife and five concubines. At the present time, not even these fragments of Romanism can be found, except it be the crucifixes and pictures which the Portuguese and Spanish slave traders still continue to distribute; and so far as civilization, order and industry are concerned, we scarcely know another community on the whole coast of Africa, that will not compare to advantage with the poor, miserable and degraded inhabitants to be found along the banks of the Congo at the present day.

It is not easy to say how much civilization there was in Congo in the days of its greatest prosperity. The statements of the missionaries, upon which we are in a great measure dependent for all the information we can get, are so deeply tinged with the marvellous, and are so grossly exaggerated withal, that they cannot be received without great abatement. They use language that would indicate great commercial prosperity, and an amount of civilization of no ordinary grade for that age of the world. Father Carli states that when he arrived in Bamba about the year 1667, the great duke had just disbanded an army of 150,000, with which he had in vain tried to effect the subjugation of the count of Sogno. Professor Ritter, who had advantages for examining all that was written by the missionaries in relation to the kingdom of Congo, states upon their authority, that the great duke of Bamba could at any time raise in his own province alone 400,000 troops. The statement is not only made, but endorsed by several of the most intelligent and respectable missionaries, that one of the kings of Congo, who was no doubt Antonio the First, had raised an army of 900,000. But there is not one of the statements that does not strike us as utterly incredible. We seriously doubt whether the king of Congo ever did raise, or ever could have raised, an army of more than 20,000. To raise, equip, provision and direct an army of 900,000, implies an amount of population and a degree of civilization, of which there are no traces whatever at the present time, and which is at variance with innumerable other statements incidentally scattered over the pages of the missionary journals. The system of government orga-

nization, too, which seems to have been a sort of an elective monarchy, to which the provincial chiefs were tributaries, bears strong marks of having been formed by the missionaries or Portuguese residents, and had but little stability of its own. And as the result proved, it stuck together and was rendered effective only so long as foreigners exercised a controlling influence in the administration of its affairs. The missionaries and the Portuguese residents no doubt did something to change the general aspect of the country. Wherever they went, they planted gardens, cultivated fruit-trees, and built substantial houses both for private dwellings and places of public worship. The king and some of the chiefs followed their example; but the great mass of the people continued to live in the same kind of bamboo huts as their fathers had done; they cultivated only the indigenous vegetables of the country, and were always clad with the scantiest apparel, while there were vast hordes of the poorer people who had no clothing whatever. They had no roads except the merest footpaths. The highway from the capital to Loando St. Paul was of this description, and so infested with wild beasts that it could not be travelled in safety without an escort of fifty or sixty armed men. They had no beasts of burden, no carriages of any kind; and their commerce, exclusive of the slave-trade, which was somewhat considerable, was confined to a small quantity of ivory, copper ore and civet cats—less in amount perhaps than it is at the present day, which we suppose scarcely exceeds 100,000 dollars.

It will no doubt occasion surprise, that the natives of Congo showed so little disposition to conform to the specimens of civilization that were set before them. But this is only another of the innumerable proofs that might be adduced to show that something more is necessary to secure the civilization of a heathen country than merely to set before them specimens of civilized life. The idea, that such would be the case, is natural enough, but is wholly unphilosophical. It implies the belief that the only hindrance to the improvement of a heathen people is ignorance; whereas the very essence of heathenism consists in indolence and an aversion to the exercise of those energies, which alone can secure the prosperity of any people. We look in vain for any upward tendencies in a pagan community, until their moral and intellectual natures are awakened; and as Roman Catholicism has no power to do this, we are not surprised to find that there are so few traces of civilization among the people of Congo.

But whatever may have been the character of the civilization of Congo, there is no doubt but Roman Catholicism was, for a period of at least two centuries, the ostensible acknowledged

religion of the realm. Paganism was interdicted by law; and the severest penalties were inflicted upon those who were known to participate in the observances of any of its rites. There were periods, too, in the history of the country, when it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to find one adult in the whole kingdom who had not in infancy, or afterwards, been introduced by baptism into the church. It is impossible to say how many missionaries at different times were sent to Congo. Father Merolla incidentally mentions at least one hundred, among whom were Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans, Capuchins, St. Augustins, Bernardians, Carmelites, and those of almost every other order in the church. The number of churches and other places of public worship was very considerable. In San Salvador there were eleven; in Sony, the capital of Sogno, there were six; and in the whole province eighteen. In the entire kingdom, it is probable, there were not less than one hundred consecrated churches, and perhaps two or three times as many other places where the priests were in the habit of performing baptism and celebrating the mass. The king and his chiefs always vied with each other in their attendance upon mass, and there was scarcely a single outward ceremony of the church, which they did not scrupulously perform. Wherever the priests went, it was the duty of the chief to send a messenger around the village to notify the people of his arrival, and direct them to come and have their spiritual wants attended to. If he failed to perform this duty, he was displaced from office, or compelled to do penance. Nor were the common people behind their chiefs in outward zeal for their adopted religion. They might be seen in long trains bearing logs of wood to the convents, or scourging themselves with unrelenting severity in the churches, as acts of penance. One of the missionaries states that the women, in one of the villages he entered, rushed upon him "like mad women" to have their children baptized. Another expressed great surprise when an adult woman presented herself for baptism, that there was one in the country who had neglected the ordinance so long; and at the same time he complained that he could find no children to baptize, because he had been preceded by a fellow missionary, who had done the work up so effectually that nothing was left for him to do. The authority of the priests, too, in matters political as well as ecclesiastical, was established on the firmest basis. There were no acts of penance or humiliation inflicted upon the sovereigns of Europe, when Rome was at the zenith of her power, that these missionaries had not the satisfaction of seeing the humbler chiefs of Congo subjected to. And one can readily imagine with what awe it must have struck the simple-minded Africans, to see the count

of Sogno, the most powerful chief of the kingdom, prostrated at the church door clothed in sackcloth, with a crown of thorns on his head, a crucifix in his hand, and a rope about his neck, while his courtiers were looking on, clothed in their most brilliant robes.

Nor was papacy established in Congo in a hasty or superficial manner. It was a work at which successive companies of missionaries laboured with untiring assiduity for two centuries. Among these were some of the most learned and able men that Rome ever sent forth to the pagan world. It was a cause, too, that always lay near the heart of the kings of Portugal, when that nation was at the climax of power and wealth. The royal sword was ever ready to be unsheathed for its defence, and her treasures were poured out for its support without stint.

But what has become of this church, with all its resources and power? Where are the results of this spiritual conquest that cost so much, and of which Rome had boasted in such unmeasured terms of exultation? To answer these questions impartially, the friends of Rome must acknowledge, that they constructed a spiritual edifice in the heart of this pagan empire that could not stand in its own strength; the moment the hand which reared and for a time upheld it, was taken away, it fell to pieces. Nay more, to acknowledge the whole truth, not only has this great spiritual edifice crumbled to the dust, but it has left the unfortunate inhabitants of that country in as deep ignorance and superstition, and perhaps in greater poverty and degradation, than they would have been if Roman Catholicism had never been proclaimed among them. One thing at least may be affirmed without the fear of contradiction, that in point of industry, intelligence and outward comfort, the people of Congo, at the present day, cannot compare with thousands and millions of other natives along the coast of Africa, whose forefathers never heard even the name of the Christian religion.

But how is all this to be accounted for? Has Romanism too little spirituality to bear transplanting to a pagan soil? Or is the African race incapable of being Christianized or raised to any considerable degree of civilization? These are questions in which others besides Roman Catholics are interested. The friends of Protestant missions may well despair of the evangelization of the world, if their labours are to be as protracted and to be attended with as few permanent good results.

In accounting for this failure there is no necessity to suppose that it arose either from the want of vitality in Romanism itself, or from the want of religious susceptibilities on the part of the negro race. To maintain the latter assumption, would not only

be at variance with abundant proofs to the contrary, but would be a serious impeachment of the power and sovereignty of Divine grace itself. It would be equally preposterous to say that Romanism has no vitality whatever. However much it may be encumbered with error and superstition, it has, nevertheless, vitality enough to maintain its own existence, as its own past history abundantly proves. Whether it has power to propagate itself among the pagan nations of the earth in the present age of the world, is a question that admits of serious doubt, and will become a subject of discussion in a subsequent part of this article.

In accounting for the downfall of Romanism in Congo, something no doubt is to be ascribed to the decline of Portuguese power. It was under her fostering hand that the church of Congo first rose to power and importance. She had been called upon in every emergency, and she was never called upon in vain. The time came, however, when Portugal had no more treasures to bestow upon the church, and as little power to control the political affairs of the State. Her sympathies were still with the church and the people; but something more substantial than mere sympathies was necessary to keep up an interest in the church, or to enforce order in political matters. Besides which it may be justly said, that if the church and government could not sustain themselves after two centuries of faithful and indulgent guardianship, there was no probability that they ever would; and it would be but a foolish waste of time and money to try to prop them up by artificial supports.

The insalubrity of the climate has sometimes been alleged as one of the chief causes which led to the suspension and overthrow of this mission. But we hear no complaints on this score by the missionaries themselves, and the fact that the mission was maintained in vigorous operation for two centuries, proves conclusively, that this was never regarded as an insurmountable obstacle to the establishment of Christianity in the country. The missionaries undoubtedly suffered from the effects of the climate, and not a few of them made their graves in that land, because they chose to die in the scene of their labours. The sufferings which they endured, however, did not arise so much from the virulence of the acclimating fever, as the injudicious and extravagant mode in which it was treated. Their theory of acclimation was, that there could be no permanent health until all the blood which they brought with them from Europe was taken away and replaced by other blood, formed from the indigenous products of the country. The lancet was almost the only prescription, and the freedom with which it was used would make a modern practitioner stand aghast. Father Angello died

after fifteen bleedings. His associate, who was not a physician, fearing that he had overdone the matter, reported the case to a doctor in Angola, who replied, that if he had been bled thirty times, he would probably have recovered. Father Carlie, during his first attack of fever, was bled twice a-day for twenty days in succession. He was taken to Angola in a state of great exhaustion, and was bled twenty-four times more by way of *revulsion*. During three years' residence in the country, he was bled ninety-three times, besides copious effusions of blood from his nose, mouth, and ears.

But whatever blame may be attached to the unhealthiness of climate, there is one fact of an opposite character, which cannot be thrown aside by those who bring the argument forward. It is, that the number of foreigners who have continued to reside on the borders of Congo, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the missionaries, even up to the present day, is much greater than the number of missionaries that were employed there at any one time. And it may be said in relation to this, as has just been said in relation to the patronage of the government of Portugal, if the church of Congo could not live after having been nursed for two hundred years, there was no probability that it ever would.

One of the real causes, as we believe, which contributed to the extinction of the Roman Catholic religion in Congo, was the countenance which it always extended to the foreign slave-trade. We offer no discussion of the general subject of slaveholding—whether it be compatible or not with the practice of enlightened Christianity; in Africa, where men are seized for the first time, and converted into property for the purpose of gratifying the avarice of their fellow-men, it assumes a character of aggravation, which it does in no other part of the world; and no enlightened man of the present day, who has had an opportunity to witness its degrading and disorganizing influence, will hazard his reputation for common sense or humanity so far as to attempt its justification, on any principles whatever. In the earlier stages of this traffic, its victims were procured in wholesale numbers by war and violence; villages were surprised and the entire population seized and sold into slavery by their more powerful neighbours. But this system, in the very nature of the case, could not last long; and it soon gave place to another, which, though not attended with the same outward violence and bloodshed, has nevertheless proved more injurious to the country, in the course of time, than the one it supplanted. Few are now taken to the markets kept open along the coast, except those charged with some crime; and the most prolific source of accusation is the charge of witchcraft, a thing so subtle and indefinite

that it may always be substantiated on the most precarious evidence, and so pliable, at the same time, that it may be made to cover the most barefaced acts of injustice and cruelty. The writer has more than once known a company of men, on the mere suspicion of witchcraft, to seize upon one of their own number, sell him to a slave-dealer, and divide the proceeds among themselves, when it was not only obvious to others, but acknowledged by themselves, that there was a strong probability that they would all within a short period be disposed of in the same way. And yet such is the insensibility engendered by this cruel traffic, that men can acknowledge and think of such a liability without emotion. He has known two friends (professedly so at least) come to a slave-factory, on a mere pleasure excursion, and while one was secretly negotiating for the sale of his companion, the intended victim has had the adroitness to escape with the money and leave the other to atone for his duplicity by a life of foreign servitude. These are not rare cases, but common occurrences in the vicinity of every slave-factory on the coast of Africa; and it must be seen, at once, that where such deeds of injustice are perpetrated with impunity, there can be no order, no morality, and no sound religion whatever. And yet these or similar deeds of villany must have passed under the notice of the missionaries of Congo almost every day of their lives; and as the whole nation was included in the pale of the Catholic church, these deeds were perpetrated by those over whom they claimed to exercise spiritual jurisdiction; and we have often wondered what kind of morality they must have inculcated, or what system of church discipline they must have enforced, to allow such enormities.

But the missionaries are chargeable with more than the mere toleration of these things. They participated in this traffic themselves; and if not from the same motives of avarice which influenced the mass of the people around them, they at least gave the full force of their example to countenance all the enormities which are inseparably connected with it. By an arrangement with the civil authorities, all persons convicted of celebrating the rites of the ancient religion were delivered up to the missionaries, and by them sold to the first slave-vessel which entered the river, and the proceeds were distributed to the poor. The number of individuals thus convicted was very considerable; so that vessels engaged in transporting slaves to Brazil could always depend upon the missionaries to give them material aid in making up their complement of slaves. The missionaries, too, seemed to have no scruples in occasionally presenting a few of their domestic slaves to such captains or supercargoes as had done them favours. Father Merolla men-

tions that he had once given a slave to a Portuguese captain in consideration of a flask of wine that he had given him to celebrate the sacrament. Indeed, the missionaries seem to have felt that there was no serious harm in consigning any number of the inhabitants of the country to foreign servitude, provided only that they were baptized and were not permitted to fall into the hands of heretics. Allowances are to be made, of course, for the age in which these missionaries lived. The whole Christian world, Protestant as well as Papal, stands implicated in the charge of having countenanced this trade, which is now so universally denounced. Still, however, it may be said in extenuation of the conduct of the great mass of the Christian world, that they never saw the worst side of the picture. They have contemplated the evils of the slave system only in countries comparatively enlightened, and where it has always been regulated less or more by Christian principle. Of its baneful and desolating influence upon society in Africa, they have known little or nothing, except as a matter of conjecture, or what they have learned from the reports of others. But the missionaries were eye-witnesses of the worst results of this traffic, and we are more than surprised that they did not interpose all their influence to save the inhabitants of Congo from its destructive tendencies. They ought, from the circumstances of the case, to have been in advance of the rest of the Christian world in denouncing it, whereas they were greatly behind their own Church when public sentiment began to set in an opposite direction. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, Cardinal Cibo, on the part of the sacred college, wrote to the missionaries, complaining that the "pernicious and abominable abuse of selling slaves was still continued," and exhorted them to use all their influence to put it down. The missionaries assembled to consider this letter, but concluded that the advice was impracticable, inasmuch as the people of Congo had little or no trade, except in slaves and ivory. They resolved, however, to do all they could to prevent them from selling slaves to the heretics, by whom were meant the Dutch and English, but more particularly the latter. This one-sided morality did more harm than good. The people had too little discernment to see any essential difference in the case; and as the English always gave better prices, and furnished them with guns and ammunition, which the Portuguese, from motives of policy, would not, they always preferred the English trade. The attempt on the part of the missionaries to enforce this resolution brought them on several occasions in conflict with the authority of the count of Sogno, and more than once they had nearly secured their own expulsion from the country. They ultimately succeeded, how-

ever, in securing to the Portuguese traders a sort of monopoly of the trade, and much the greatest proportion of slaves shipped from Congo were taken to Brazil ; so that, if any praise is due for keeping them out of the hands of heretics, the missionaries are entitled to the whole ; but in the same proportion are they responsible for the ruin of that country, to whose welfare they had consecrated their lives.

There were other causes, however, which contributed still more efficiently to the overthrow of Christianity in Congo than the foreign slave-trade. Had this been left to itself, and allowed sufficient time to work out its own natural results, it would, with the utmost certainty, have obliterated every trace of civilization and Christianity. But there were other causes that intervened and did the work more summarily. We allude to the character of the religion the missionaries introduced into Congo ; the manner in which that religion was propagated, and the unjustifiable measures that were adopted to uphold it after it became the established religion of the country.

One would naturally suppose that, going among a people so deeply debased, and so utterly ignorant, of course, of everything pertaining to Christianity, as the inhabitants of Congo must have been when they were first discovered by the Portuguese, the missionaries would have taken special pains to instruct them in the principles of the Catholic religion before introducing them into the Church. It is but natural to suppose that they would have translated the Word of God into their language, established schools for the instruction of the youth, and employed all the ordinary means for diffusing Christian knowledge among the people, in connection with the preaching of the Gospel. But the world knows that such a course is no part of the policy of Rome. In all parts of the world where they have attempted to establish their religion, whether in earlier or later times, the baptismal seal has been looked upon as the only thing necessary to convert any heathen into a *bonâ fide* member of the Romish Church. They pretended, it is true, to catechize their candidates for baptism, but the ordinance, according to their own statements, was administered with so much rapidity and in such wholesale style, as utterly to preclude the idea of anything like thorough catechetical instruction. None but those who have had some experience in training the heathen mind can understand how slow it is to receive religious instruction. The Divinely appointed mode of "giving line upon line, and precept upon precept," and this persevered in for a long period, is indispensably necessary to impart to their minds the first and the simplest principles of revealed religion. But the Congo missionaries made no allowances whatever for the sluggishness of

the heathen mind. They either misapprehended its true character, or regarded religious knowledge as a matter of only secondary importance. Their chief ambition seems to have been, to drag as many into the Church as possible, and if their merit is to be measured by the number of their converts, they are the most meritorious and praiseworthy men that ever lived. Father Carli states that, during his residence in the capital of Bamba, he seldom baptized less than eight or ten children a-day, and not unfrequently fifteen or twenty. During a residence of two years he baptized 2,700. One missionary in Chiovachianza is reported to have baptized 5,000 children in a few days. Another missionary baptized 12,000 persons in Sogno in less than a year. Father Merolla states that he had baptized as many as 272 in one day, and in less than five years he had baptized more than 13,000. He mentions the case of a brother missionary who had baptized 50,000; and of another who, during a residence of twenty years, had baptized more than 100,000.

The missionaries, however, did not confine themselves to the single ordinance of baptism. They introduced, as far as they could, all the rites and ceremonies of the Romish Church. The mass was celebrated with all due pomp; the confessional was erected in almost every village; penances of all grades and kinds were imposed; children and adults alike were required to perform the rosary, and the people *en masse* soon learned to make the sign of the cross, and most readily did they fall into the habit of wearing crucifixes, medals, and relics. There were certain heathenish customs, however, which the missionary fathers found much difficulty in inducing the people to abandon; and they were never entirely successful until they substituted others of a similar character, which the natives regarded as a sort of equivalent for those they were required to give up. One of the missionary fathers has very ingenuously placed the customs which were abolished, and those which were substituted in their place, side by side in his journal, little imagining how forcibly others would be struck by the family likeness of the two. The limits of this article will not allow us to extract extensively from his journal, but a brief reference to a few of these customs will be quite sufficient to justify the remark just made. It was a custom of the country, for example, to bind a cord of some kind around the body of every new-born infant, to which were fastened the bones and teeth of certain kinds of wild animals, which was regarded as a sort of a charm to preserve the health and life of the child. This practice was regarded by the missionaries as an offence of high grade, and the mother who had the temerity to present her child for baptism with one of these heathenish cords about it, was

scourged in public, and in the severest manner. In the place of this, the missionaries enjoined, "that all mothers should make the cords with which they bound their infants, of palm-leaves that had been consecrated on Palm Sunday; and moreover guard them well with other such relics as we are accustomed to use at the time of baptism."

Another custom that was regarded as not less objectionable by the missionaries was the practice of handing over every newborn infant to a native priest or sorcerer to tell its fortune, which they pretended to be able to do by examining its form, its limbs, and countenance. In the place of this, they enjoined "that all mothers, after the birth of their first-born, should carry it to the church, and perform the ceremony of entering into the holy place, and if it be sick, we order its mother to recommend it to the Lord, together with some sort of a vow."*

Another custom in Congo, which excited the displeasure of the missionaries, was the habit of interdicting to every person at their birth some one article of food, which they were not, through life, upon any consideration, to put into their mouths. This practice was regarded as specially heathenish, and was unconditionally interdicted. In the place of it, however, they commanded "that the parents should enjoin their children to observe some particular devotion, such as to repeat many times a day the rosary or the *crown*, in honour of the Blessed Virgin, to fast on Saturdays, to eat no flesh on Wednesdays, and such other things as are used among Christians."

Another custom of the country, at the root of which the axe was laid, was that of guarding their fruit-trees and patches of grain with *feteiches*, which were supposed to possess themselves the power of punishing all trespassers. The practice was interdicted, but the people at the same time were recommended "to use consecrated palm branches, and here and there in their patches of corn to set up the sign of the cross." These details might be extended to almost any length, if it were necessary. A Roman Catholic of discernment may possibly see an essential difference between these heathenish customs that were abolished and those that were substituted in their place; but we seriously doubt whether the simple-minded people of Congo were ever conscious of any material change in their code of superstitious rites, or derived any essential advantage by the exchange. At the same time, wiser heads may well be excused for doubting whether the one is more conformed to the spirit of enlightened Christianity than the other, or whether it is worth the trouble

* The vow in all such cases was an engagement on the part of the mother, that the child, for a specified time, should not eat a certain kind of food, wear clothes of a certain colour—or something of a similar character.

and expense of sending the Gospel to the pagan nations of the earth, if it produces no better results, or lays no surer foundation for salvation. It was the great error of the missionaries, perhaps we should say the grand defect of Romanism, that they presented the benighted inhabitants of Congo with a system of superstitious observances so nearly allied, both in spirit and form, to the one which they aimed to extirpate. It was utterly impossible that one of two systems so nearly related could ever have supplanted the other, and all, therefore, for which the inhabitants of Congo were ever indebted to the missionaries was for a burdensome accession to those superstitious ceremonies that had already crushed them almost into the dust. The new religion had no more to do with their moral and intellectual natures than the old one. It imparted to them no clear views of the sublime truths of the Gospel, and left them in as great ignorance of the true gospel plan of salvation as it found them. It limited their attention almost entirely to a few drivelling expedients to preserve themselves from the evils and accidents of life without attempting to impart any glimpses of that glorious immortality, brought to light in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Instead of relaxing the cords of superstition and conducting them into a wider space and greater freedom, it only drew them the more closely, and chained them down to a heavier burden of idolatrous rites than they or their fathers had ever known. Knowing this to be the case, we are not surprised that this corrupted religion found no permanent lodgment in their hearts, and produced so few beneficial changes in the state of society.

The fact that the people occasionally showed great zeal for the outward observances of their adopted religion is no proof whatever that they ever possessed any sincere attachment for it, or that they had in the least relaxed their hold upon the old. It was their interest, or they thought it their interest, to make a display of zeal. It was important for them to enjoy the favour of the missionaries, and they had no fears that their own religion would be contaminated by contact with Romanism, and no danger of its being lost from occupying a subordinate or less conspicuous position. If they showed all due reverence for the rites and ceremonies of the Romish church in the presence of the missionaries, they were not less punctilious in performing the rites of their own in their absence. As but few of the missionaries ever made themselves acquainted with the language of the country, the natives had special advantages for playing off this double game. If the missionaries had studied the character of the people more thoroughly, and adapted their instruction to their wants, instead of endeavouring to make everything bend

to the lifeless and frigid demands of Romanism, the probability is that they would have done them real good, and would not themselves have been so easily duped by their dissimulation. The natives were perfectly aware of their ignorance in this respect, and they did not hesitate to turn it to good account, in acting out one of the most remarkable farces that has ever been recorded. It cost them no effort to appear easy and natural in a character foreign to their own—to maintain their own private views and principles inviolate, in strict consistency with the outward exhibition of views and principles of the very opposite character—in other words, to appear to be zealous Roman Catholics, when in reality they were but the most besotted pagans on the face of the earth. The missionaries themselves seem occasionally to have some misgivings about the sincerity of their converts; they repeatedly expressed apprehensions that they might, at some time, revert to the pagan worship of their forefathers.

The attempt which they made to brace up their authority and enforce the demands of Romanism, by practising upon the credulity of the people, did not tend materially to avert this dreaded result. They naturally supposed they were in possession of a field wonderfully promising for the exercise of miraculous powers. What they could not effect by the bare exercise of authority, or by the ordinary powers of persuasion, they hoped to accomplish by the exercise of their pretended miraculous gifts, and great were the marvels they performed in this hidden corner of the world. Devils fled at their approach, trees withered away under their rebuke, the rains descended or held back as they wished, sorcerers fell down dead at their feet in consequence of taking a false oath upon the mass-book; if a comet appeared in the heavens, it was there in obedience to their call, and all were threatened with immediate destruction who would not obey the priests; if the small-pox made its appearance among the people, it was sent to chastise the obstinacy of their chiefs, and great would be the clamour if they did not at once perform the appointed penance; if the eloquence of a holy father was insufficient to draw tears from the eyes of his audience or wring from them expressions of sorrow for their sins, a curtain is suddenly drawn aside, and an image of the Virgin in *relievo*, with a dagger thrust through her breast, is revealed to their wondering gaze.

These things, doubtless, had a momentary effect upon the minds of the people, but they exerted no lasting influence. The missionaries forgot that the sorcerers, whom they persecuted with so much virulence, not only pretended to work the same kind of miracles, but others so much more wonderful, that their

own would appear exceedingly tame by the side of them, and at the same time supported by proofs quite as good as any that the missionaries could adduce. In fact, the imagination is such a predominant element in the mental constitution of the negro, that he cares very little about proofs in such matters; he will more readily accredit a pretended miracle by one of his own countrymen, provided only that it is sufficiently gorgeous to suit his taste, than he would one by the missionaries, which must always have some decent reference to credibility and truth.

The negro feels that in energy of character, in scope of understanding, in the exercise of mechanical skill, and in the practice of all the useful arts of life, he is hopelessly distanced by the white man. Any suggestions of rivalry here never fail to provoke his unbounded mirth. But whenever you enter the precincts of the unknown and the mysterious, the realms where the imagination alone can travel, there is no place where he feels more at home, and the endless variety of fantastic images which he brings forth from these mysterious regions, shows that here he has no rival. The missionaries, therefore, when they addressed themselves to the task of working miracles, little knew how egregiously they were to be outstripped, and perhaps they could not possibly have adopted any course that would more certainly bring themselves and their religion into contempt.

But notwithstanding the multiplied ceremonies imposed upon the people of Congo by the church of Rome, for a time and to a certain extent they did not feel it to be burdensome. So long as its requirements were confined to the ordinance of baptism, to saying the rosary, wearing crucifixes and doing trivial acts of penance, they submitted to it without any symptoms of serious discontent. But in the course of time, when the missionaries set themselves more earnestly to work to root out all traces of the old religion; when they commenced a more vigorous persecution of the priests of that religion; and above all, when they determined to abolish polygamy throughout the land, they assailed heathenism in its strong hold, and aroused hatred and opposition which astounded themselves. In this emergency, when priestly authority and miraculous gifts were of no more avail, they had recourse for aid to the civil arm, that never-failing resource of Rome. And this they could command without any difficulty. The king and the chiefs, who were indebted to the missionaries for alms and all the power they possessed, could well afford to exert that power in enforcing the commands of the church. The missionaries could any time pledge the assistance of the king of Portugal to maintain them in authority, and it was as

little as they could do in turn to support the spiritual authority of the missionary fathers. And from the moment the missionaries had recourse to the civil arm for aid, they threw aside every other means of promoting the interests of religion. The severest laws were enacted against polygamy; the old pagan religion, in all its forms and details, was declared illegal, and the heaviest penalties denounced against all who were known to participate in celebrating its rites; sorcerers and wizards, by whom were meant the priests of the pagan religion, were declared outlaws; at first the penalty denounced against them was decapitation or the flames, but it was afterwards commuted to foreign slavery. For a time the missionaries entrusted the execution of the laws to the king and his chiefs. But if they showed the least dilatoriness or reluctance to punish their subjects, they took the law into their own hands and administered it with unsparing severity. The count of Sogno was required on one occasion, as an act of penance, to compel three hundred of his subjects to be married after the Christian manner; and it is mentioned as a proof of the sincerity of his piety, as well as the excellence of the ordinance, that he became so zealous in the cause of the church, that he did not stop until he had compelled six hundred. Corporeal punishment was the favourite instrument of discipline, and it was administered without restraint. The slightest deviation from the prescribed rules of the church was punished by public flogging, and it was not uncommon for females, and even mothers, to be stripped and whipped in public. Sometimes these castigations were inflicted by the missionaries themselves. Father Merolla relates with no little glee, how he had once belaboured a wizard with the *cord of his order*, calling upon St. Michael and all the rest of the saints to participate in the sport. He mentions the case of a Father Superior who had boxed the ears of one of the magnates of the land for having expressed some doubts about the efficacy of baptismal regeneration. This had nearly proved a serious matter, however, and it required all the sophistry that Merolla could command, to convince the chief that it had been done in love, and was intended only to rescue him from the snares of the devil.

These acts of tyranny could not fail to awaken hatred and resentment in the minds of the people against their religious teachers, and especially so, as it was done to enforce the observance of a religion for which they felt no attachment. These wrongs were endured, however, with wonderful forbearance, so long as it was apparent that the authority of the missionaries could not be resisted with impunity. But as soon as it became manifest that Portugal could no longer interfere with the internal affairs of the kingdom, the true state of feeling, both among the

chiefs and the common people, began to show itself; and it was not long before the tide of persecution began to set in the opposite direction. The count of Sogno was among the first to resent the indignities that had been heaped upon him, by persecuting the missionaries in the most shameless manner. The common people revenged themselves in several instances by abandoning the missionaries, with whom they were travelling, in the gloomiest woods, with the expectation that they would be devoured by wild beasts. In several instances of severe sickness, the people refused to let them have anything that would administer to their relief. In the province of Bamba, once one of the strongest holds of Christianity, six Capuchin missionaries were poisoned at one time; and an unsuccessful attempt of the same kind was made upon the life of another missionary who was sent there to get the effects of the deceased brethren. Philip da Salesia, another of the missionary brotherhood, fell into the hands of banditti in the character of sorcerers, and by them was killed and devoured. Father Joseph Mariæ da Sestu was poisoned, and Merolla himself was brought to the verge of the grave in the same way. Indeed, the apprehensions of the missionaries became so much excited in this way, that they seldom travelled without having an antidote for poison. And it was not long before they had to abandon travelling altogether, and confine themselves to a few localities where the people were more friendly. Ultimately they had to leave the country altogether, and we need be at no loss to account for the almost simultaneous disappearance of all the religion they had propagated in the country. We have no certain information of the process by which it ceased to be the religion of the country. It is not probable, however, that it was abolished in any of the provinces by a formal enactment of government. It is pretty certain that it did not require the force of a political revolution to overturn it. It is quite as improbable that it was rooted out by persecution, for there were none that loved it enough to be persecuted for its sake. We can only compare it to a magnificent edifice that fell to pieces because it had no foundation upon which to rest; or to a beautiful exotic that withered away because it had taken no root in the soil of the country.

ART. V.—HEBREW CRITICISMS.

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No. I.—A WORD MORE ON PSALM xxii. 17.

WHAT more can be said, or needs to be said? are questions which may very naturally be asked, by any one who knows that a little library of books has already been written, on the controverted clause of the text in question. And after all, the matter has not, as our cousin-Germans express it, *come into the clear*. Doubt and division of opinion remain; and not only as it regards the readers in general of the original Scriptures, but also among the most learned Hebrew scholars now living.

These grounds of doubt and difficulty cannot be felt, or duly appreciated, by the mere English reader. They rest almost wholly on the *form* of a single Hebrew word, viz. כְּאַרְיֵה, as now

presented in our commonly-received Hebrew text. The English reader finds the verse in question apparently very plain. It runs thus: "For dogs have compassed me; the assembly of the wicked have enclosed me; *they pierced my hands and my feet.*" The word *dogs* will, of course, be tropically understood by every intelligent reader; just as it is in the New Testament, when the Apostle says, "Beware of dogs" (Phil. iii. 2), and again, when the Apocalyptist says, "Without are dogs" (Rev. xxii. 15). In all these three cases, degraded, vile, ravenous, and shameless men are tropically designated.

The second clause of Ps. xxii. 17 (Eng. version, v. 16), employs a more literal diction, instead of this figurative one. Its words are: *The Assembly of the wicked*; which is an equivalent of the preceding word *dogs*, such as is common in Hebrew parallelisms. All then appears to be plain. The meaning thus far seems to be simply, that many base and mischievous persons have surrounded the complainant, and with an intent to injure him.

The last clause only of the verse might suggest some doubts to the mind of a practised reader of the Bible. To speak of *piercing my hands and my feet*, instead of saying *me*, or *my person*, or *my body*, is at least very unusual, and therefore seems somewhat strange. Indeed, the particularity of it is such, as to excite something of wonder, at first view, if not a suspicion that the original text has somehow been disturbed. Yet a little further investigation will serve to allay this feeling, in a good

measure, since we shall find other very striking and unusual particulars, disclosed by the language of the sufferer. For example, v. 19th: "They part my garments among them, and cast lots upon my vesture;" and again: "They shake the head, saying, He trusted in the Lord, that he would deliver him; let him deliver him, seeing he delighted in him!" vs. 7, 8. This last is uttered in the way of mockery and insult at the sufferer's helplessness. But both passages are peculiar for their *speciality*, and their remoteness from the usual modes of describing persecution. And so with the last clause of v. 17. *The wounding of the hands and the feet* are circumstances not elsewhere to be found, in such descriptions. This may serve to awaken inquiry in respect to the expression as a whole; but the simple meaning of the words by themselves, in English, is entirely plain and obvious to every one. Of course, no one would hesitate about the general meaning of the verse, provided it could be shown that our English version is correct. The difficulty of showing this, is what perplexes the commentators; and not without some reason.

All the real difficulty of the passage is concentrated in the single word פָּנִי, which is translated *pierced*. But apparently

the very same word elsewhere, in four cases, means, and is on all hands translated, *As a lion*, viz., Is. xxxviii. 13; Num. xxiii. 24; xxiv. 9; and Ezek. xxii. 25. The only discrepancy in these cases, as to the form of the word, is this, viz., that in the last three cases, it is pointed פָּנִי, that is, it has a *Patah* under the

פ, instead of a *Qamets* as in the other two cases. But this is a thing which does not at all affect the real and essential meaning of the word. It is simply *the absence of the article* from the noun, in the last three instances, which occasions its special vowel-point, *Patah*. But in the first two cases, the article belongs to the noun; and this article being elided by the prefix particle ב, its vowel (*Qamets*) is thrown under the פ, according to general usage. Hence we have פָּנִי, instead of

פָּנִי. Of course every one sees, that it makes no more differ-

ence with the main word itself, in Hebrew, than it does in English, whether we say *as the lion*, or *as a lion*. Both are good, in English and in Hebrew. Both mean, or at least may mean, the same identical thing. All the difference is, that in the first case, the article *the* tacitly distinguishes *the lion* from other beasts; and in the second case, the omission of *the* makes the word mean *a lion*, that is, *any lion*. In other words, a shade of distinctiveness appears in the first case, which is omitted in the second; but

without the least change in the essential meaning of the word. In the Hebrew, the $\aleph$ of comparison is perhaps more often fol-

lowed by the article, expressed or implied ; but this usage has almost as many exceptions as examples. Of course, both methods are good usage.

Here, then, is ample vindication of the meaning of $\aleph$, if we follow the analogy of the other four cases : for in all four of them there is not a spark of doubt, that the meaning is simply *as the lion*, or *as a lion*. Why not follow this analogy in our text ?

The answer is, that " such a rendering in the clause before us would make no intelligible meaning." *As a lion, my hands and my feet*—what sense is there in this ? Certainly there is, I concede, no tolerable sense, unless the construction is *elliptical*, and we introduce some verb to govern and make significant the last two nouns.

But here we are met with the allegation, that a verb cannot be brought over, in this instance, from the preceding clause ; although every one is forced to concede, that in a great number of instances, where a preceding verb is appropriate, it is thus *mentally* carried forward, instead of being again repeated in the text. Indeed, nothing is more common than this, in Hebrew poetry. But while the general principle is conceded, as here laid down—a principle which breviloquence and energy of diction fully justify—yet the allegation in the present case is, that the verb would be wholly *inappropriate*. The Rev. Mr. Landis, in the preceding number of this Review, has fully and even sarcastically exposed the incongruity of supplying the verb $\aleph$,

if translated (as he insists it must be) by our verb *surrounded*. He asks, and not without reason, how we can conceive, imagine, or paint, *a lion as surrounding* the hands and feet of a man. He tells us that such an expression could come only from a " son of the Emerald Isle ;" whom, in fact he introduces as using it, or at least the like of it. This is all well enough, at any rate plain enough, provided we must translate the Hebrew verb $\aleph$ as he does, viz. *surround*. But what if this same verb may

mean *stab*, *pierce*, *transfix* ? Why then, all is plain enough. *As a lion* [they pierce] *my hands and my feet*, is surely good sense, and has no *Hibernianism* in it. *Hands and feet* are the instruments of defence or of flight, in case of an attack by a lion. The hands are spontaneously stretched out to defend the body ; or, in case of flight, the feet are specially employed. To cripple these is the first effort of the lion ; and this he does, by

seizing them with his teeth, and piercing them through. The victim is then maimed, so as to be incapable of resistance or escape ; and so, the comparison is pregnant with meaning. What hinders our interpreting the passage thus ?

Not the verb *פָּרַץ*, in the preceding clause. This may have, and not improbably here has, the meaning required. The verb *פָּרַץ*, which is the root, originally means *to pierce, strike through,*

transfix, to fasten with nails, &c. This meaning of the verb is fully confirmed by both the Chaldee and the Arabic, where this same verb has such a sense. In Kal, the verb is employed but once in the Hebrew Scriptures. But in Piel, it twice appears, and with the meaning above given intensified, e. g., in Isa. x. 34, and in Job xix. 26, with the meaning (in the latter case) a little generalized, being = *פָּרַץ*, and meaning *to destroy*. But in the

text before us we have a *Hiphil* form, which generally has a derived or secondary meaning, viz. *to go round, to encircle, to surround* ; as may be seen in the lexicon. But it does not follow from this, that *Hiphil* has, or can have, no other shade of meaning than this secondary one. A great multitude of verbs have, in this passage or in that, a meaning *sui generis* in *Hiphil* ; as every one familiar with Hebrew must know. It is the *context*, which must dictate the shade of meaning, not only of verbs, but very often also of nouns. Take for example the very plain and simple word *ἐξουσία*, and ask whether any of its evident and familiar meanings will apply to 1 Cor. xi. 10, where the Apostle says, "For this cause ought the woman to have *power* (*ἐξουσίαν*) on her head, because of the angels." What downright nonsense would any of the usual meanings of *ἐξουσία* make here ! We are forced to explain it as meaning *symbol of power* ; and probably it was the local and current name of the *veil* worn by *married* women ; and, viewed in this light, it was moreover a very significant name. Now, why do we depart from the usual meaning of *ἐξουσία* here ? The answer is, Simply because the context demands it. We take it for granted, that the author wrote *sense* ; and, therefore, we feel obliged so to interpret his words as to make sense.

Even so, in the case before us. If the verb in question has most clearly the sense demanded in order to be carried forward with propriety, and this in all cases of its use out of *Hiphil* in Hebrew, and also has the same meaning in the cognate languages, what violence is done to the common principles of exegesis, by adopting this appropriate meaning in the present case ? Surely none. One needs to consult only a few verbs in the Hebrew Lexicon, in order to satisfy himself that the *Hiphil*

form often has the same sense as some one of the meanings in Kal or Piel; see Roed. Heb. Grammar, § 52. 2. If then the context invites us here to give the verb such an interpretation as that named above, why are we not at liberty to do so? I know of nothing which forbids it. The fact that the Hiphil of נָקַר elsewhere means *go round, surround, &c.*, is by no means

conclusive against the present proposed meaning. Let any one take his lexicon, and search out the Hiphil forms, and he will soon see, that cases enough may be found, where only one single passage exhibits a *sui generis* meaning, while all the other examples of usage differ from it. Specially do Hiphil and Piel often convey the same meaning, e. g. הָאֵבֶר, הָאֵבֶר, *he destroyed*.

This is all we need in the present case. All the cases of נָקַר in Piel mean *to pierce or wound*; why may not

some of the examples in Hiphil preserve and exhibit the same meaning? Most clearly no grammatical or lexical difficulty stands in the way of this, provided the context demands it. It would be easy to show this, by a multitude of examples of the like nature, both as to Kal and Hiphil, and as to Piel and Hiphil; e. g. as to the first class, viz. Kal and Hiph., we have אָסַף, Kal and Hiph., *clausit*; אָרַךְ, Kal and Hiph., *longum fecit*;

בָּרַךְ, Kal and Hiph., *sprevit*; בִּין, Kal. and Hiph., *percepit*,

(only in *one* case, Isa. xxviii. 19, while a multitude of other examples in Hiph. are of a different shade); בָּקַע, Kal and

Hiph., *aperuit*; and so *sexcenties*, and even more. In regard to Piel and Hiphil, the cases are more numerous still: e. g. בָּן, Piel and Hiph., *statuit*; כָּבַד, Piel and Hiph., *occultavit*; כָּעַס,

Piel and Hiph., *irritavit*; כָּתַר, Piel and Hiph., *cinxit*; מָלַט,

Piel and Hiph., *liberavit*; מָרַר, Piel and Hiph., *acerbum fecit*;

and the same in cases without number. The only question that remains, therefore, is, Whether, in the present case, the verb in Hiph. demands the same meaning which it has in Piel?

If now the last clause of the verse were wanting, we might say with confidence, that דִּקְיָפִי should be rendered *surround*, because the preceding clause has apparently a parallel in סָבְבוּ,

encircle or surround. In such a case, the two members of the parallelism are simply *synonymous*. The case would indeed, when thus circumstanced, be too plain to admit of any doubt.

But the addition of the third clause of the verse (on the ground that **לִנְדָּב** means *as the lion*), renders absolutely necessary the supply

of some verb; and in a case like this, (which does not exhibit any of the commonly abridged and breviloquent expressions made plain by their frequency,) we should of course expect the necessary verb to be supplied by the context. My belief is, that it is supplied in this way, in the present instance. We have seen that no grammatical or lexical principles hinder our giving to the Hiph. form the same meaning which the Piel has. The demand for this indeed is imperious, on the ground that **לִנְדָּב**

is taken as a *noun*. The context must give us a clue to the verb, or else we must *guess* at the ellipsis, and supply it at our own will; a principle which is inadmissible, in respect to any writing designed to be intelligible. And if the context does in the present case supply the ellipsis, then the meaning of *pierced, transfixed*, must be given to **וְקִפּוֹ**, because *surround*

would make little short of sheer nonsense.

I venture then on giving to this last verb the meaning here designated. Piel has it (*Kal* of this verb is not common in Hebrew use, so far as we know); the kindred dialects exhibit it; usage, in cases without number, permits the employing of a verb in the same sense both in Piel and Hiphil; and the context (if **לִנְדָּב** be a *noun*) absolutely demands it.

It is no good answer to this, to aver that the first clause of the verse controls the meaning of the second throughout. There are indeed many cases of strictly synonymous parallelism; but these are fewer than those in which an *advance* is made in the second clause. *Climactic*, in a measure, are unnumbered cases of parallels; indeed this is almost normal. The second has a stronger verb, or noun, than the first. This is in accordance with the natural taste and feeling of every reader; and examples without end could easily be adduced, but they are unnecessary for any well-informed reader, since he may find them on every page of Hebrew poetry.

I have already said, that if the third clause of the verse before us were omitted, then I should take the first two clauses as a clear example of the strict *synonymous* parallelism. But since the third clause is added, if **לִנְדָּב** has its normal meaning (i. e.

as the lion), then must we give to **וְקִפּוֹ** a *climactic* sense, (of which indeed, as we have seen, it is altogether capable,) and translate it *pierced* or *transfixed*. So then, in this way, we have the idea, in the first clause, that the enemies of the sufferer

gather in numbers around him, and with a hostile intention ; in the second, that these evil men *assault and wound him* ; and in the third, we have a peculiar specification of the manner of the wounding, viz. the piercing of *the hands and the feet*. Of itself this seems to indicate, that the sufferer in question is *peculiar*, or at all events that he is wounded in a peculiar manner ; for in general such descriptions deal not in minute particulars. If now the holy Redeemer was actually wounded in the way here indicated, (as in fact he was,) then here is a description of his sufferings both *unique and appropriate*. This tells well for the meaning of the passage ; for the Psalm is, at least in my view, clearly *Messianic*, and certainly not applicable to David, the writer, in any appropriate sense.

The assertion by Mr. Landis, that a root יקף must be taken as the ground form of הקיפי (p. 360), I must regard as not well grounded, and certainly as unnecessary. Gesenius and Fuerst both consider such a root as merely *fictitious* ; and although verbs Pe Yodh, of Class III. may in a few cases take such a form in Hiphil, yet there are no vestiges of such a *root*, either in Hebrew or the kindred languages with such a meaning. Mr. L. calls the derivation of הקיפי from a verb Pe Nun, a *far fetched* construction (ib.) ; why, I know not, for surely this is an ordinary form of such verbs Pe Nun in Hiphil ; whereas this form, if from יקף, is to be reckoned only among the unfrequent and somewhat rare forms.

Mr. L. has twice asserted (pp. 360, 362), that the Athnach under הקיפי “ shows that it [the verb] has no connection with the following words, and is not to be joined to them.” This is a mistake which may be corrected by referring to the first verse of the Hebrew Bible. There the Athnach rests on אלהים ; and if his position be true, then the verb ברא which precedes this, terminates its influence with the first clause, and we are of course obliged to translate thus : “ In the beginning, one created God.” This conclusion is inevitable on the ground which he assumes. The like would often take place, in all parts of the Bible, in cases almost without number. The simple truth is, that none of the Hebrew accents are safe guides always, in the matter of sense or connection. They often regulate merely the *cantillation* of the Scriptures, and are not always *distinctives* as to the sense ; as might easily be shown by a cloud of witnesses.

Dr. Nordheimer says, very justly, in his Hebrew Grammar (II. p. 314), that "very often a verb expressed in the first clause of a poetic parallelism, is left *to be understood* in the second;" of which he gives plain and striking examples. Now in all, or nearly all, of these cases, the Athnach stands on the last word of the first clause; but this never hinders the continuance of the power of the verb, and its extension to the second clause. Many other examples he gives of the like merely *mental* transfers of words from the first clause to the second, and some even *vice versa*. This is a matter so obvious in Hebrew poetry, that there is scarcely room for a mistake.

It is in this way that I arrive at a satisfactory view of the meaning of the contested clause. It is true, I arrive at the same goal as Mr. L., and as Dr. Alexander also, in respect to the substance of his opinion. The clause respects the REDEEMER, and designates his peculiar sufferings on the cross. But I arrive at the goal, by travelling in a road somewhat different from that which either of these gentlemen have travelled—in a way which seems to me plain, facile, and offending neither grammar nor lexicon, nor demanding any change in the Hebrew text. And if I am right in my views of this way, it is surely preferable to one which demands laceration of the text, or even of its vowels, in order to bring about a desired meaning.

That the ancient versions and most of the later commentators have translated סָבִיב by *surround*, can be easily accounted for

on the ground of the ready parallelism which this makes with the preceding clause. Having thus translated, and seeing that *surround* would be preposterous as applied to *my hands and my feet*, they of course felt constrained to make סָבִיב into a verb,

or into its equivalent, i. e. a participle. But they are not all agreed as to the meaning of the verb, as Mr. L. has himself shown. Had they looked at the third clause, as governed by the second, they would then have been directed to a more easy and obvious solution, than that which they have chosen. But still no one need be surprised at this. The careful interpreter will often meet with passages which have come down to us in a traditional garb that does not fit them, and which recent and more exact criticism is obliged to strip off. Nor need we hesitate to do this, when a better and more facile meaning can be brought out in this way. Even the vowel points are not binding, since they came in nearly a thousand years after the writing of the Old Testament was completed. They are indeed an *elucidation* of the text—one so admirable and appropriate in general, that no one should ever depart from them except for a good and ob-

vious reason. But when such a reason does occur, who can scruple to follow a better sense than they give? Yet this matter is never to be engaged in lightly, or without sober and adequate consideration. But surely it is not every reader who can judge skilfully, whether the reason for the departure is a good and valid one. It is best here to "make haste slowly." A minute knowledge of grammar and idiom are necessary, in order to judge well.

Mr. L. has expressed his wonder at the unwillingness of Dr. A. to adopt the reading of the Qeri here, or rather of the Masora parva on Num. xxiv. 9; which, instead of the כְּאֵרִי

in Ps. xxii. 17, suggests, in remarks on the former passage, that the *text* in the Psalms reads כְּאֵרִי. This perhaps is to be read כְּאֵרִי; I say *perhaps*, for we are not certain that the

Masorites did read thus. They may have read כְּאֵרִי, and thus

have made the word a derivate from כָּרַר, 3 plur. Perf. written with a superfluous נ after the first vowel; as it is, in like manner, in a very few other cases, e.g., קָאם for קָם in

Hos. x. 14, רָאמָה for רָמָה in Zech. xiv. 10; and thus in a few

other cases. The נ here in such a case, is merely a *mater lectionis*, a *fulcrum*, or at most is only intended to give emphasis to the preceding vowel. That in fact the Masorites must have so read the word in question (i. e. read it כְּאֵרִי), seems quite

probable if not certain. As to the word כְּאֵרִי, it has no basis.

A root כְּאֵר is a nullity, so far as I can discover, a real Hebrew

Unding; and if so, of course we must suppose the Masorites to have read the word as כְּאֵרִי from כָּרַר.

It becomes interesting to inquire here, whether the Masora has given a consistent testimony, in regard to the controverted word כְּאֵרִי. So far as it respects the ancient text, the Masora

is the only *critical* commentary and guide which we have, in regard to nearly all the ancient various readings of the Hebrew manuscripts. All the ancient translators have dealt more or less freely with the text, in giving, every now and then, paraphrastic versions; so that in a case of nicety as to what was a Hebrew reading, they are rarely to be depended on. The Masora has given us a pretty ample list of various readings, which existed at the time when it was written. We, of course, are entitled to choose between them, and are not at all bound

to follow the *Qeri*, which bids us read so and so, in a way different from the received text or *Kethibh*. But although we have a right to call in question the authority of the *Qeri*, and half the time, or in some books (e. g. Daniel and Coheleth) more than half, feel obliged to follow the *Kethibh* as the better reading of the two, yet the Masora is a highly important means of ascertaining what the ancient readings of different Codices were; and some of its readings are of high, if not of essential, value.

Is the Masora consistent, now, in the case before us? On Num. xxiv. 9, it says, as we have seen, that the *Kethibh* of Ps. xxii. 17 is כָּאֲרִי (probably read כָּאֲרִי). But we must

observe, that in the very same passage of the Masora, the statement is made that כָּאֲרִי occurs twice with Qamets [viz. Ps. xxii. 17. Is. xxxviii. 13], and twice with Pattah [Num. xxiii. 24. Ezek. xxii. 25]. I understand this as meaning so many times, in other passages besides the text in Num. xxiv. 9, because such is the fact. In other words, אֲרִי

with a כ before it occurs five times in the whole, twice where כ has Qamets (i. e. the vowel of the article), and three times if we include (as we must) Num. xxiv. 9, with a Pattah under the כ, which merely shows that the *article* is not here employed. The word and its combinations (with כ) are the same in all these cases, as we have seen above, p. 107. Now these are all the instances in which a word of this form and combination appears in the Old Testament. And as the Masora includes all these under its remark on כָּאֲרִי in Num. xxiv. 9, and as

these are all the forms of this kind in the Old Testament, in what light can we consider the suggestion of the Masora in this place, that the *Kethibh* or text has the form of כָּאֲרִי? The note is plainly contradictory of itself here; yet from other quarters, much later ones, we know that some Codices have read כָּאֲרִי; see Bib. Sac., vol. ii. p. 368. Indeed, the last remark of the Masora in Num. xxiv. 9, viz. כָּאֲרִי כְתִיב, evidently bears the stamp of being supposititious, or in other words, of having been subsequently inserted, when כָּאֲרִי had crept into some of the Codices.

The *Masora magna* confirms my statement. In the last chapter, which treats of words which are the same as to *form*, but which differ in their *signification*, it enumerates among these כָּאֲרִי, and assigns this form to Ps. xxii. 17, and Isa.

xxxviii. 13. Here then is full proof against כָּאֲרִי in the text of Ps. xxii. 17. That the Masora magna assigns a different

meaning to the same word as to form, in the two cases, doubtless arose from the perplexity in which the writers were about the meaning and connection of the third clause in the verse before us. In the Masora textual on Ps. xxii. 17, the remark is also made, that the two cases of כָּאֵרִי have a different

meaning. Here both the Masoras agree, not only in respect to the *same form*, but also in the opinion that the two cases *differ in meaning*. No one ever doubted the meaning *as the lion* in one of them, viz., in Isa. xxxviii. 13; and it follows, therefore, that the Masorites made out a different meaning of כָּאֵרִי

in Ps. xxii. 17. But what that meaning is or was, we have no means of ascertaining. Doubtless the difficulty of the passage which would here result from the translation by the words *as the lion*, pressed them with the seeming necessity of another signification; just as it has led most critics to give another, even down to the present time. But as the Masorites are not *authoritative*, we are at liberty to depart from their opinion, whenever we can find "a more excellent way."

Taking, then, the whole of the Masoretic testimony together, it is quite clear that it stands for כָּאֵרִי as the reading in our

text. The one clause in the Masora on Num. xxiv. 9, viz. כָּאֵרִי כָּתִיב, i. e. *the text has כָּאֵרִי*, is plainly contradictory of all the rest in the Masora, and bears on its face the marks of being a later addition. Hengstenberg (in loc.) says, that only two unsuspected Jewish manuscripts have this reading in the Kethibh.

We have only one other reading, then, which competes with כָּאֵרִי. This is פָּרִי, which would be the 3 pl. either of פָּרָה or of פָּרַה. As to this reading, it is found only in one primary, and

in a few copied, Jewish manuscripts. And since all the manuscripts, with the insignificant exceptions above noted, are on the side of the received text, as also the Masora, I should say (with Hengstenberg in loc.), "It would be to abandon everything like certainty in criticism, and along with this, criticism itself, were we to reject this reading" for another.

So much for *text-readings*. Our main question remains: How can the meaning, *they pierced*, be made out from כָּאֵרִי?

We have seen above, that this word occurs elsewhere only *four times*, viz. in Isa. xxxviii. 13. Num. xxiii. 24; xxiv. 9. Ezek. xxii. 25. It is agreed, on all hands, that in all these cases it means, with the article, *as the lion*; without it, *as a lion*. This constitutes ground for a strong presumption in respect to the

case before us, to say the least. To rebut it, we must have some plain and practicable way of making out such a meaning as *they pierced*, from כָּאֲרִי. Plain the way is not. If the root, as is usually alleged, be כָּוַר, then the whole matter at once becomes doubtful. Gesenius well says, this root is "*of dubious authority*:" and Fuerst (Concord.) says, that *it is not used*. Then, moreover, there seems to be a pretty strong probability against it, since we have already in Hebrew use, כָּוַר, אָכַר, נָקַר, דָּקַר, all of the like signification. But admitting כָּוַר as a root, how then are we to get כָּאֲרִי from it? The normal Part. plur. of כָּוַר is כְּוָרִים. In all the Hebrew Scriptures, there are only three cases, so far as I have been enabled to discover, where an א is inserted after the first radical of a verb עָ, viz. קָאם in Hos. x. 14 (a verb); רָאמֹת in Prov. xxiv. 7; and שָׁאמִים in Ezek. xxviii. 14, the last two being *participles*. So

Alting, in his best of all books, on the anomalies and rare forms of the Hebrew, the *Fundamenta Punctat. Heb.* Francof. 1717. If there be more, they could hardly have escaped such an indefatigable and discerning investigator as he was. But these cases are all so plain in their form and meaning, as to leave no reason for doubting that the א is here a mere *fulcrum* or *mater lectionis*. They have no other anomalies but this, and no doubtful meaning to perplex the interpreter.

Different is the case before us. Here the intruder א has a *vocal composite Sheva* under it; in the other cases there is no vowel, because the letter is *otiant* or a mere *fulcrum*. The analogy fails us, then, in a very important point; so important, that we may truly say, the Hebrew has nowhere else an analogous

pointing for a participle from a verb עָ. The example before us is a perfect ἀπαξ λεγόμενον.

But this is not all. We are told that כָּאֲרִי stands for the plural כְּוָרִים, by virtue of an old plur. form in י־ for יִם-.

But this plural itself is, to say the least, a doubtful one. Hengstenberg (in loc.) asserts, that "it occurs in only one single, well-ascertained instance." Gesenius and Roediger (in Gramm., § 86) say, that the plur. ending "in several places [to which appeal is usually made] is doubted by many." Ewald, in the last edition of his Grammar, says that "there are only two cases in which such a plural has any certainty;" and these are

עָפִי in 2 Sam. xxxii. 44. Ps. cxliv. 2, and רָמִי in Cant. viii. 2. He adds, that “perhaps מָנִי, in Ps. xlv. 9, belongs to this category.” He expressly excludes פָּאֲרִי from it. Altling has wholly omitted any such plural. This is a strong array against extending such a plural, when it cannot be clearly and necessarily made out; which surely is the case in the verse before us. It is only when we are forced to receive it in order to make any tolerable sense, that such a plural is admissible. The usual examples of it that are brought forward, besides those mentioned above, are all capable of another and an easier solution.

But we have not yet done with our difficulties. In order to account for נִ with a vowel, in פָּאֲרִי, we are obliged to resort to the *Chaldee* mode of pointing the participle, in the cases of a root ע. Here קָם, for example, makes Part. קָמִי, and plur. קָמִי.

But what other instance, in all the Bible, is there of such a Chaldaism? The other examples with inserted נ, as produced above, present no case of such an inserted נ with a vowel of its own. Of course, then, they have no analogy. The case before us stands *solus cum solo*.

To recapitulate for a moment; we have the following reasons against making the word before us a plur. participle of פָּרַ: (1) Such a root as פָּרַ is altogether doubtful; the probability is much against it. (2) The insertion of נ, in such a case, has only two or three examples to support it. (3) The punctuation of such an נ with a vowel of its own, is without any example in Hebrew; and if referred to Chaldaism, there is nothing like it elsewhere in the whole Hebrew Bible. (4) The plur. ending in י is at least highly improbable here, if indeed it

is ever admissible; and therefore it should not be admitted without a necessity. Putting now all these things together, and adding to the whole the consideration, that the sense of the last clause may easily and lawfully be made out in another way, without any change of the text, or any violation of the laws of grammar or of the lexicon, and without a change in any word of even a vowel point—the case becomes, at least in my view, all but one of downright and absolute certainty. It is impossible to defend פָּאֲרִי, either as a verb or a participle, on any

grounds of considerate regard to the grammar and the structure of the language. On this point I must sympathize with Dr.

Alexander; although I feel much more decided in regard to it than he has expressed himself to be. But his solution of the whole passage I cannot well adopt. He says, "The sense would then be, 'they surround my hands and my feet as they would a lion,' i. e. with the strength and fierceness of a lion." He admits ingenuously, that there is a *strangeness* in this, and doubtless he has some serious difficulty in his own mind, about receiving such an interpretation. I cannot for a moment hesitate to reject it. It is in vain to contend against the certain and established laws of grammar and idiom.

Dr. Alexander, in his Commentary, has given us but partially the views of Dr. Hengstenberg. He has perhaps chosen the most prudent course, since he has not obligated himself to follow that commentator in everything. But since Dr. Hengstenberg's work has been translated and published in England, and since he has acquired so high a reputation among us, it has become important to our religious public, that they should distinctly see where this able and learned writer now stands, as to his theory of exegesis in regard to Ps. xxii., and also in regard to other Messianic Psalms.

In his *Christology*, Dr. H. has warmly defended the personal and individual application of this Psalm to the Messiah, Vol. I. p. 172 seq. In speaking of such an application (p. 175 of *Christol.* in German) he says, that he "decidedly agrees with it." He then proceeds (p. 176) to detail all the specialities of description in the Psalm, and repeatedly asserts that they can be applied to no one but to the suffering and crucified Messiah. His language is very strong, and somewhat stringent, in respect to the opinion of his neological opponents. Among other things, he adopts unhesitatingly the word פְּאָרִי as a *plural* form of the participle from פָּרַר; and he appeals to קָאם and שְׂמִים (cited

above on p. 117), as justifying the redundant א. But he never notices the essential difference between the א *otiant* here, and the א with a vowel in פְּאָרִי, which is fatal to his solution.

Thus much, however, for the tone and tenour of the *Christology*; and these are such as meet my hearty approbation, and (the grammatical *faux pas* excepted) I could heartily subscribe to all the distinctive and important parts of his original comment on Ps. xxii. 17.

In his recent and formal commentary on the Psalms, Dr. H. has departed far enough from his prior views, and in speaking of them apologetically, he says, that he did the best he could at the time, for then "he had as yet advanced but a little way on an independent footing into the depths of the Old Testament,"

p. 362, Eng. translation. At the present time, he says, that "if we consider the Psalm as referring to the *ideal person of the Righteous One* . . . nothing but ignorance (sic !) can object to this interpretation," p. 364. He says, moreover, that "this character is introduced throughout the Psalms more frequently than any other." It would seem, then, that the *ignorance* in question has scarcely any apology for itself, if such be indeed the case.

It may be so ; but after devoting a somewhat long life to the study of the Scriptures, I have never yet been able to form in my mind any definite conception as to who or what sort of a person this *ideal person of the Righteous One* is, separate from the character and person of Christ. Dr. H. says, that "*every particular righteous man* might appropriate to himself the consolations of this Psalm . . . so far as he embodied in his own person the *ideal righteous man*," p. 364. Of course, as he argues, every such man may appropriate to himself the sufferings depicted in it. The inference, he says, is clear, that the Messiah, as a righteous person, must be a sufferer. And inasmuch as *suffering* and *righteousness* have a consummation in him, we in this way may come at last to see how it is applicable to the Messiah (not, as it would seem, to him as a *unum PRO omnibus*, but merely as a *unum INTER omnes*).

On v. 16 (Heb. xvii.), he says, in reference to a *special* application to Christ, that "the grounds adduced in his introduction [to this chapter] make it evident that the Psalm has reference to him [Christ] only as embodying the perfect idea of the *righteous man*," p. 386 seq.

The Psalmist, then, has merely drawn a picture of an *ideal good man* first as suffering, then as rewarded. The description in Psalm xxii. is true, and applies to the Saviour, only *par excellence*, as being a more distinguished good man ; and all the special and peculiar traits of suffering here described become, in his view, only specialities which intensify the light and shade of the general picture. *Quantum mutatus ab illo !*

I shall enter into no defence here of the views diverse from these entertained by evangelical interpreters, although this were an easy task. I would only say, that such a claro-obscure picture of the predicted Messiah has no point of attraction for me. What could the Jewish people at large understand about a mythical or philosophical *ideal* or *abstraction* of a good man, such as this is ? Some living and real exemplar they might contemplate, and learn to copy. But it required more of transcendental philosophy to realize such a generalization, and to connect it specially with the Messiah, than any Hebrew of that day ever learned.

Doubtless, if Dr. H. is consistent with himself, we shall next hear that he has applied Isa. liii. to the *abstract genus* of righteous sufferers, and not to the Messiah in particular. Knobel himself (Comm. s. 365) is not unwilling to admit such a qualified Messianic exegesis as this; and De Wette would doubtless have acceded to it.

But, in truth, the so-called *Messianic Psalms* would be of little worth or force to us when looked at through such a medium. We can easily understand simple predictions, that the righteous will suffer, and will be rewarded. But in what way a *mere ideal* is to suffer and be rewarded, and how all righteous men are made to participate in him, and so far suffer and enjoy as they are parts of this *ideal*, and what special bearing any or all of this can have on the true Messiah, we wot not. We cannot see objects distinctly when surrounded with such a silver fog. It may be *Dummheit* or *Unkundigkeit* (as Dr. H. suggests) which prevents our seeing. But after all, it does need unusually sharp optics to see palpably a mere abstraction.

With unfeigned regret we make these remarks. Dr. H. has stood long before the world as the dauntless champion of evangelical views in Germany. Dr. Alexander has (perhaps wisely) foreborne to bring these things out in his Commentary. Our views of duty to the church constrain us to give to our religious public an account of these matters as they really are. Our young men especially, who are most exposed to be led away by distinguished names, should have the paths laid open before them in which such visionary exegesis bids us to go.

After so much of this nature, it will cease to create surprise when we learn that Dr. H. has given up the definite Messianic interpretation of the Psalms usually deemed Messianic nearly throughout the whole book. Ps. viii. belongs to the *ideal man*. So does Ps. xvi., Ps. xxii. (as we have seen), and also Ps. xl. On this last, Dr. H. makes a remark worth quoting: "The views given by the author himself [viz. the author of this Comm.], in the beginning of his course, have *lost all significance*, since he has attained to a deeper insight of the way and manner of the New Testament, and specially of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in handling the declarations of the Old Testament." (Introd. to Ps. xl.) Formerly, he had stringently urged the consideration, that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews had made a plain and palpable application of this Psalm to the Messiah, "which is decisive as to all who believe in the divine authority of this epistle." But now his *deeper insight* into the nature and extent of the *abstract, ideal, good man*, has shown him that there is no weight to be attached to this argument. Ps. ii. and Ps. xlv., however, are so difficult to manage, by way of application to

the *ideal man* (since divinity and supremacy are here assigned to the subject of these Psalms), that he allows them to pass as Messianic, yet with less of strenuousness than formerly.

But to other Psalms, generally deemed by most to be Messianic, he has applied again that universal solvent—the *ideal good man*. Upon the whole, he has given us much reason to exclaim, with desponding Mary at the sepulchre, “They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him!” John xxii. 13. To stop with Ps. ii. and xlv., and represent all the rest as transcendental speculation on the *abstract and ideal good man*, is a stride in exegesis, which I would hope in God our countrymen may never be prepared to make.

All this, by the way, helps to show that it is far from being desirable to be cast on German commentary alone for the elucidation of the true spirit of the Scriptures. All that pertains to mere philology and criticism of a literary kind, the Germans have done more effectually in general than any other writers whatever. But on this point of all points, the real *Christology* of the Bible, it seems to me very unsafe to follow them. Even such learned and excellent men as Drs. Nitsch, Neander, Tholuck, and Müller, in their new *Deutsche Zeitschrift*, deliberately and designedly call in question the *inspiration* of the Bible, as we hold it. They acknowledge errors of fact, of science, and of other minor things; they admit discrepancy and contradiction among the various writers of the Scriptures, and attribute these last to individual writers, in respect to their own works. If any one wishes for the proof, let him read Tholuck’s Essay on *Inspiration*, in the said *Zeitschrift*, and Dr. Neander’s Letter to the translators of his *Leben Jesu*, given in the Preface of the Translators. Is it not time for American theologians to be on the look out for such things? And above all, should we not provide for raising up our own critics and interpreters? Is there not talent enough in our American youth, if duly called out, to equal, yea surpass, the Germans themselves in such matters? I cannot doubt it for a moment. But, alas! how are our churches to be roused up to a proper sense of their present duty and their danger? How are they to be persuaded that we should not be dependent on foreign countries for our sacred literature? And when will adequate provision be made to secure a corps of life-guards for the church and the Bible by an arrangement which shall establish and make permanent at least a small body of them, who are competent to meet and repel every invading foe?

No person who has an adequate and enlightened view of the present state and dangers of the Christian church in this country, when we are becoming flooded with foreign books of all kinds in respect to sacred philology, doctrinal theology, dogmatic

and church history (not to speak of Rationalism and atheistic philosophy),—I say no one can refrain from the most sincere and ardent wish that some wealthy and noble-hearted Christians would make themselves immortal in the churches of God by founding and establishing a seminary, on an adequate pecuniary basis, the sole object of which should be to teach, to explain, and to defend the Bible. There should be in it at least four professors—one for the elementary studies in the Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, and Arabic; one for the higher exegesis of the Old Testament on critical grounds; one for Hellenistic Greek, including the Septuagint, the New Testament, the Apocrypha, and the apostolic and early Fathers, with the early New Testament apocryphal writers; and one for New Testament critical exegesis.

An *appendage* of this critical Bible school (into which last laymen, if they desire it, as well as theological students, should be admitted) should be another department, with at least two competent teachers to fit youth, male and female, *for the great business of Sabbath schools*. A residence at this department should be at the election of the pupil as to length of time beyond a half-year's course; but none should be admitted for less time than six months. Both institutions should be so endowed and furnished that a residence there would cost but quite but a small sum, and thus they would be thrown open to all ranks, on condition of satisfactory character and attainments.

Such an institution would interfere with no other in the land. In the higher branches, *a three years' curriculum* should be the normal demand. Then the pupils who choose can go into the seminaries where doctrine, church history and homiletics are taught, and go through the ordinary course, languages excepted. With such prescriptions, only younger students would be likely to attend the Bible College, and the number who would frequent our already established seminaries would not probably be diminished sensibly, in the end, by such an institution.

Are these *airy* visions? I am afraid they may prove to be so. But how easy it would be for some half-a-dozen men in Boston or New York to do all that such a plan requires, even without sensibly diminishing their wealth, and certainly with great augmentation of their happiness. Our statesmen soon find out how their country can be best and most effectually defended. They provide for manning the militia, when called out, with officers trained up in all military science at West Point. Two wars have effectually demonstrated the cleverness of these tactics. Why should "the children of light" be less wary and wise than statesmen? *Our all is at stake in the Bible*. As

surely as its *inspiration* is set aside, and our people are taught that enlightened views demand them to give it up, so surely is there an end to all evangelical religion among the mass, and all the *authoritative* power of the Bible will cease thenceforth to be recognised. Then we shall be where France is, or (which is not much better in respect to piety among the mass of men) where the Germans are, having, on the Sabbath, some twenty, or it may be thirty, but rarely fifty, persons, to attend a brief public worship in their large towns and villages, and most of that brief time of worship occupied with music. If we are not to come to this, then may God put it into the hearts of wealthy and enlightened men among us to raise up, here and there at least, Bible Colleges, *Sacred West Points*, where officers will be trained up who are able and willing to defend, to the last extremity and triumphantly, that holy citadel of Christianity, THE SCRIPTURES GIVEN BY INSPIRATION OF GOD.

Having, in a preceding paragraph, ventured to speak plainly concerning the views of some men greatly respected and honoured, I must not do myself, or the distinguished writers abovenamed, the injustice of an exposure to be misunderstood. I would say, therefore, explicitly, that I do not think there is any good reason to doubt the personal piety of any of the gentlemen whom I have thus named, certainly none to doubt their highly distinguished talents and learning. I have, as I think, very good reason to believe that each of them regards *the whole soul and essence of Christianity as centering in the person of Christ*, and that without him is neither true religion nor Christian salvation. They receive and regard him as their Saviour in an appropriate sense. But their education and modes of reasoning have led them to think less of what they would name the costume or non-essentials of the Scriptures than we are accustomed to do. They separate facts and incidents, and what they regard as Jewish opinions and views, from what they would name *the moral and spiritual essence of the religion set forth in the Bible*; and while they are in a measure indifferent to the exactness of the truth and consistency of the former, they believe and receive the latter. Their refined education and their great powers of discrimination enable them, in some measure, to separate between costume and person, and while they are not solicitous about the first, they seem readily to admit for substance the last. Endowed with such powers and such learning, *they* may, perhaps, do all this without hazard to their own personal salvation. Who can doubt of the late Neander's personal piety? And so one might speak of Tholuck, of Müller, and of Nitzsch. But while they may make such discriminations as the above, perhaps *salsa fide* in a personal sense,

could their positions in regard to the Scriptures be received by the indiscriminating multitude of men, both learned and unlearned, without the most absolute hazard of all belief in the Bible as divinely authoritative, of all belief in its doctrines, its precepts, and its facts? Impossible, altogether impossible. The ground once abandoned, which Paul has taken, that ALL SCRIPTURE IS GIVEN BY INSPIRATION OF GOD, every man of common attainments will feel at liberty to say whatever his own subjective feelings may dictate, to say, 'This is unimportant, that is unessential; this is a doubtful narration, that is a contradictory one; this is in opposition to science, and that to reason; this may be pruned, and that lopped off, while the tree may still remain as good as ever.' In a word, every one is left, wholly and without any check, to be his own judge in the case, how much of the Bible is consonant with his own reason and subjective feelings, and how much is not, and these feelings are of course the high court of appeal. What now has become of the book of God, true, authoritative, decisive of all duty and all matters of faith? Gone, absolutely gone, irretrievably gone, as to the mass of men who are not philosophizers in casuistry and in the theory of religion. And if any doubt remains as to the effect of such doctrine, I appeal again to the religious state of the great German community—to their Sabbaths, to their lonely sanctuaries, to their lack of missionary spirit, and to their general indifference as to revivals of religion, such as produce and foster warm-hearted piety. The *Pietists* (as in the way of scorn they name all warm-hearted and practical religious men) are merely "a smoke in the nostrils" of their scholars and their statesmen. No man can rebut the force of this appeal, for the truth of it is too palpable. The worst of all is, that the mass of the Germans look with secret scorn on a man who claims that a practically godly, prayerful, humble life, is essential to religion. One question sums up the account. Where is the *family altar* for prayer and praise in the German community? Even in the so-called *religious* community? If what I have often heard be true, such altars are not more numerous among them than were the righteous, whom Abraham was requested to find in a devoted city of old. I do not say there can be no piety where this is the case. There may be some sevens of thousands, I hope there are, who do not "bow the knee to Baal," and doubtless the Redeemer has sincere followers and friends there. But that active spirit of piety which fills the church and the conference room with humble and anxious inquirers after the way of salvation, which sanctifies the Sabbath, which builds up religious schools, which sends the Gospel to the destitute in one's own country, and raises up missionaries and causes them to go

forth unto the ends of the earth, that "the dead may hear the voice of the Son of God and live"—such a spirit cannot breathe strongly and freely where there are no family altars, and no Sabbath.

To the same position or state, or one much like it, must we also come, ere long, unless this tide can be averted from us. But this must be done, if it can be accomplished. On the present generation in our country it rests, to decide the question whether we shall follow in the footsteps of Germany. The spirit of every Christian pastor in the land, and of every private Christian too, ought to be roused up to meet this great exigency; and the churches should at once concert and adopt measures to establish such an Institution as has been described above, or something equivalent to it. NEW TIMES AND NEW DANGERS CALL FOR NEW AND ADEQUATE DEFENCES. We should train our own men; so that they may rush with skill and power into the thickest of the battle, so often as the portentous contest arises. Alas! How will our churches rue the day (when they have become prostrate in energy and insignificant in numbers) in which they have neglected to furnish a *corps of holy officers*, who are adequate to guide in every contest and on every occasion!

But I sat out to descant on a short Hebrew text, and have made a long, a very long, excursus; and yet I would hope, not one that will be useless; for I am sure that it is not uncalled for. A few words more, in returning to our text, and I have done.

It is clear from what I have said above, that Dr. Alexander, Mr. Landis, and myself, perfectly agree as to the applicability of that text in Ps. xxii. 17, to a *crucified Saviour*. We differ only in the mode of arriving at the conclusion. I must confess that I see nothing to take alarm at in Dr. A.'s opinion about it. Mr. L., too, is clearly and entirely orthodox as to principle; and besides all this, he has managed his discussion with much acuteness and ability. If he has made some small slips in regard to the grammatical nature and power of Hebrew forms and accents, he can appeal to a long line of critics who have done the same thing before him, in respect to the passage now in view. He has the consolation at least of being found in very respectable company. He will doubtless do me the justice to say, that I have shown him no disrespect; at least, if I have, I am unconscious of it, and it certainly was not intended. A man who can write as he does, need not anticipate disrespect from any sensible reader.

To conclude; I have not advanced my own solution of the controverted passage in question, with any intended assumption

of certainty on my part, or made any efforts to cast on other opinions differing from mine any contumely, or to hold them up to disrespect. I have merely proposed a way of interpreting the controverted verse before us, in a manner simple, normal, without offence to grammatical or lexical usage, and without changing any one either of the letters or of the vowels of the text. I am no stickler for the *Kethibh* or for the *Qeri*, but I adopt either, when the sense seems to me to demand it. And as to the *vowel-points*, since they are notoriously no older than the sixth century of our era, we are clearly not bound by them. Yet no good Hebrew scholar can say, that they are not a masterly, and almost always a true, exposition of the meaning of the Hebrew text. It follows, of course, that when we depart from them, there should be an *exegetical necessity*, or at least an *evident advantage*, in doing so, as to the meaning of the text. That we *may* depart from them, is with me one of the orthodox critical canons; that we *should* depart from them, except for reasons such as have been suggested, I deem little short of downright heresy in criticism.

Since the preceding pages were in type, a copy of Lengerke's recent Commentary on the Psalms has come into my hands. He has made some remarks that are worthy of attention, on the passage which has been before us, and which go far toward showing the possibility of retaining הִפְּחִיל in its usual *Hiphil* sense, with only some little modification.

That the original meaning of הִפְּחִיל is to *smite, beat (schlagen)*, both Gesenius and Lengerke assert; and this is fully borne out by the kindred languages. But there is an *accessory* idea attached to it, in most if not all cases. This is that of *smiting around a thing*, and sometimes so as to *enclose, clamp, clasp or clinch* it. So in Isa. xvii. 6; xxiv. 13, הִפְּחִיל means *the beating around*, i. e. of a fig-tree, in order to knock off its fruit. From this is easily deduced the secondary and common meaning in Hiph., viz. *to surround, enclose*; as in 1 Kings vii. 24. Isa. xv. 8. 2 Kings vi. 14; xi. 8. Ps. xvii. 9; lxxviii. 18. It is not confined to *persons*; it may extend to *things*, as in Job xix. 6, "*He has thrown around* (הִפְּחִיל) *me his net.*" So tropically, in Lam. iii. 5. The idea is, that the net *grasps* or *surrounds* him, so that he is helpless. Easily deduced from this shade of meaning, is that of *going round in a continuous circle*; like the revolution of the stated feasts, Isa. xxix. 1. Job i. 5.

Yet the verb has clearly another shade of meaning, which attaches itself mostly to the simple idea of *smiting* or *beating*; e. g., Isa. x. 34 (Piel), where it is applied to *smiting down* a forest, viz., with the blows of the axe. So in Job xix. 26; where (in Piel) it is used for *smiting* the skin of Job with grievous ulcers so as to *destroy* it. (Comp. Job ii. 7, "And Satan . . . smote (ךָּסַף) Job with sore boils," &c.) A *destructive*

smiting is implied in both these cases, by the tenor of the sense. On this may be easily grafted the *smiting* or *wounding of the hands and the feet*; as I have interpreted the passage above. But Lengerke chooses the other shade of sentiment, and renders thus: ["*They have clasped or clinched*] *lion-like, my hands and my feet.*" This he refers to the clinching of the hands and feet by the claws of the lion, who thus prevents his prey from defending himself or escaping. The meaning is, that the claws surround the limbs, so as to constrict them; and thus the victim has no means of escape. Of course he carries forward רָקִיפִי of the second clause, to the third, as shown above in the

version, and takes פָּאֲרִי in the same sense as that which I have endeavoured to defend.

Certainly this is an ingenious and not unnatural interpretation. Conceding it, all the absurdity which Mr. Landis and others find in *surround*, as applied to *hands and feet*, falls away; and the image seems to be taken from nature. Yet I have a doubt remaining; and this is, whether the lion does not always employ his *teeth* first, in assaulting his victim, and his *claws* merely in holding him fast, and helping to tear him in pieces. If so, then *piercing* or *wounding* is the more probable sense of רָקִיפִי, because the most appropriate. In either way, this verb suits well the last clause, and doubtless ought to be transferred to it.

[NOTE.—I add a word, in respect to the *English Translation* of Hengstenberg's Commentary. I have, in reading some of it, not unfrequently found myself obliged to resort to the *original*, in order to be sure of the meaning. For example, we have a version of the Hebrew (II. p. 39, German) by Dr. H., which runs thus: "Sie umgeben mich Löwengleich nach Händen und Füßen; Eng. Translation, "*They beset me, lion-like, on my hands and my feet.*" If I rightly understand the German, it means, "They surround me lion-like, as to my hands and my feet," the two latter nouns in Hebrew being the *Acc. of manner*. To *beset* any one, is plain and good English; but to *beset on*, sounds strange to us in these western ends of the earth. To *set on*, is familiar enough; but to *beset on*, I cannot get at, without going to the German. I would by no means characterize the Translation in general as unfaithful; but it needs revision and more pains-taking in passages of critical nicety.]

NO. II. SUGGESTIONS RESPECTING THE MUCH CONTROVERTED
תָּנַן OF PSALM VIII. 2.

This word still remains an *offendiculum criticorum*. Hengstenberg insists, that it is the *Inf. const.* form of the verb תָּנַן, *to give, put, place, &c.*, although he takes the liberty, in his version of it in the Commentary, to translate it *gekrönt*, [hast] *crowned*. Hoffmann, in his striking work on *Prophecy and its Fulfilment*, makes it an *Imper.* of תָּנַן; on which no comment is

needed. De Wette renders the clause thus : "Who *exaltest* thy praise to heaven." Ewald (Psalmen) renders thus : "Thou whose glory is *exalted* above the heavens." All of these translations are rather *metaphrases* of the word תָּנַן, than a literal version. The sense which they give is a good one in itself; but our question now is: Whether it is *true* to the original?

Most of the expositors and grammarians have assigned תָּנַן as Hengstenberg does, to the const. Inf. of תָּנַן. The latter strenuously maintains, that it can be made nowhere else. My question, and the first one, is: Whether it can with any probability, be made here?

(1) All analogy in the alleged verb (תָּנַן) is against it. Examples of the Inf. forms of this verb are very numerous. Two of them are normal, like תָּנַן. All the rest excepting the case before us, are either תָּנַנְת (a usual Inf. fem. form in verbs פָּנַן), or else a contraction of this form, viz. תָּנַת. The examples of these amount to some 140. As to the Inf. form of תָּנַן, if it is one it stands alone.

(2) No other verbs Pe Nun form such an Inf. All that are not normal, follow the model of תָּנַת (תָּנַת).

(3) Verbs Pe Yodh, like those Pe Nun, do many of them drop their first radical in the Inf.; e. g. יָלַד, Inf. יָלִידָה. In a very few cases here, there are forms like יָלִידָה, i. e. with a *long* vowel on the first syllable; but only one has a *Sheva* under the first letter (like יָלִידָה); and this is in Gen. xlv. 3. The word in question is מְרִידָה, which is said to be יָרִידָה with a מְ prefix

preposition. But this formation I doubt, because there is not another like it in all the fem. Infinitives of verbs Pe Yodh. It is said, that the verb which precedes this word, viz. תִּירָא, requires ל prep. to follow it. But this is not so always. This verb does indeed admit a ל prep. after it; but by far the greater number of nouns which follow it, are in the simple Acc. without the ל. Then it is easy to suppose a *noun-form* in מִרְדָּה (*descent*), such as is formed in the second class of verbs Pe Yodh, e. g. such as מִיָּטַב from יָטַב, only that in the case before us, the Yodh *quiescent* is omitted in the writing, which is very common everywhere. The sense of the passage is the same by using the noun, as if we employ the supposed Infinitive.

Where can we find, then, in the hundreds of cases in verbs Pe Nun and Pe Yodh, an established fem. Inf. form, which is like תִּנָּה? Not even one can be found. It is therefore very hard to believe, against such united and universal testimony as all this. It must be the most extreme necessity, which would justify us in admitting תִּנָּה under the category of Infinitives.

Is there such a necessity in the present case? Plainly not. In fact the clause אֲשֶׁר תִּנָּה הוֹדֵךְ עַל־הַשָּׁמַיִם, in v. 2, seems to forbid an Inf. here. Dr. H. translates thus, in his Notes: "Thou, in respect to whom the giving thy glory over the heaven." Is there not something strange and seemingly lame in this? אֲשֶׁר is rendered *thou in respect to whom*. Literally

the Hebrew runs thus: *Thou in respect to whom to give thy glory, &c.* This is enigmatic enough; and I must believe this to be a connection and position of an Inf. without any parallel.

To me it seems quite probable, almost certain indeed, that the תִּנָּה here is either a *verb* Præter, from the root תִּנָּה, and should be so pointed; or else (which appears more probable), it is the Pres. Part. of the same verb, and to be pointed תִּנֶּה.

Nothing is easier, in either of these cases, than the grammatical construction. The relative pronoun אֲשֶׁר can be combined in sense with the ה in הוֹדֵךְ, i. e. it can be combined with the second, or even the first pers. of a pronoun; just as we can say, "He who, thou who, I who; Heb. Gramm. § 121. l. n. l. But

the last two combinations are somewhat rare ; yet not so much so as to be doubtful. Naturally the pronoun אֲשֶׁר relates more often to the third pers., and to make a different reference without necessity, is undesirable. But if it be taken as the third pers. here, it would disagree with the suffix ךְּ.

But what now is the meaning of the proposed construction above ? I answer, that the verb הִתְנַחֵם is no stranger in Hebrew.

It occurs in Hos. viii. 9, 10, in the sense of *distributing* or *diffusing*. Its original meaning is *to extend* or *stretch out*. Abundant pledges of this are given in its correlates. In Greek we have *τείνω*, *to extend, stretch out*. In the Indo-Germanic, *tan* is of the same meaning. In Ethiopic, *tin* = *expanse*. In our English word *ex-tend*, we have the same etymon at the basis. Indeed this sense is quite plain, and well established, in the original root.

Besides this, if there be any meaning in the root הִתְנַחֵם, *to give*, which is here necessary, the same is also to be found in הִתְנַחֵם, for one of its meanings is, *to give, to distribute*, as it evidently stands related to הִתְנַחֵם. But clearly the former sense of *diffusing*

or *expanding* is altogether appropriate in the verse before us, which speaks of *glory expanded abroad over the whole heavens*. What that *glory* is, the fourth verse has disclosed, viz. *the moon and the stars*, which, as a combined whole, are spread over the entire face of the sky.

We seem, then, to have arrived near our goal. We can now translate, *Thou who diffusest abroad thy glory over the heavens* ; thus taking אֲשֶׁר as related to the second person, in connection

with the pronoun ךְּ. We point the controverted word, in this case, *participially*, viz. הִתְנַחֵם. Participles have no distinction of *person*, but only of gender and number ; and they may, therefore, be used, with equal propriety, with either the first, second, or third person. All on this ground is plain, proper and appropriately significant. We merely supply the appropriate vowel-points ; and the liberty to do this, when the exigency of the passage demands it, has already been vindicated in the preceding No. I. That there is an *exigency* here, seems to me plain ; for we cannot, against the universal testimony of all verbs Pe Nun and Pe Yodh, make an Inf. form out of הִתְנַחֵם from הִתְנַחֵם.

If it is not a monstrosity, it is at least in opposition to all

normal forms of abridged fem. Infinitives. We obtain as good a sense, even a better one, out of תִּגְּבֹהַ, than out of תִּגְּבֹהֶיךָ.

But there is another way of resolving the difficulty, viz., by taking the word תִּגְּבֹהַ as a verb in the Præterite, and pointing it תִּגְּבֹהַ. It would then have הוּא for its subject, and we must

translate thus: *Thou whose glory extends abroad over the heavens.* This is favoured by Ewald; and for substance it gives the same sense as the other method of pointing, although the structure is not so facile, when we point it as a verb. The noun הוּא is masc., and, therefore, requires the masc. verb; and such is תִּגְּבֹהַ.

Thus we save all the grammatical difficulty of an Infin. form, which is against usage and without a single parallel in the language. Thus, too, we obtain even a better sense than תִּגְּבֹהֶיךָ

gives. And as the verb, when pointed as above (i. e. either תִּגְּבֹהַ or תִּגְּבֹהַ), is no stranger in the older Hebrew, and has ex-

tensive off-shoots in other languages, I can see no valid objection to admitting it here. The objection, that such a verb is not *frequent* in the Hebrew, if urged against any particular word in this passage or in that, would, if admitted, exclude a great many well-established words: e. g. בֶּרֶךְ (*son*) in Ps. ii. 12,

stands quite alone in Hebrew, if we except the three examples of it in the brief composition of Lemuel, contained in Prov. xxxi. But who doubts the reality of the reading? So שְׂרָדָה (*wife*) in Ecc. ii. 8, stands entirely alone in all the Bible;

yet that is no good reason for rejecting the word. And so of a multitude of other words. It is quite as probable that David should use the verb תִּגְּבֹהַ, elsewhere also employed, as that he should use בֶּרֶךְ in Ps. ii. 12. The only fair question is: Whe-

ther the verb is usable and appropriate? We reply by affirming both; and we have given our reasons for such a reply.

My object was merely a special one in the preceding remarks, viz. to investigate the apparently strange form of the word תִּגְּבֹהַ, as coming from תִּגְּבֹהַ. We have found an easy and obvious

solution, in supposing a different root in actual use. In this case, we change only the vowel-points; and if we can thus avoid trespassing the laws of grammar as to the fem. Inf. forms of verbs Pe Nun, and make even a more appropriate sense by

adopting another root, I do not see why any serious objection should be made against the view of the subject which has been taken above.

I merely remark, at the close, that in my apprehension, Ps. viii. needs, and ought to receive, a very different exposition from that which Dr. H. has made out. The *abstract ideal man* accomplishes very little here, in the way of satisfying the demands of the Epistle to the Hebrews, ii. 6—9, and several other passages. It seems to me quite certain, that the author of that epistle verily believed that the Messiah is to be found in Ps. viii. My views of his authority are such, that, in my mind, this settles the question, whether Christ is to be found there, in the affirmative. But time and space forbid entering on a discussion of the Psalm, although one is much needed.

ART. VI.—THE THEOLOGY OF RICHARD BAXTER.

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No one of the eminent English divines of the seventeenth century is more widely known than Richard Baxter. There are many who prize the accuracy and learning of Owen, and many who admire the calm strength and fertile imagination of John Howe; while dissenters as well as churchmen render homage to the genius of South, of Barrow, and of Jeremy Taylor. But neither of these, and indeed few of the illustrious persons of that age, prolific of great men, can claim a reputation so extensive as that of the Pastor of Kidderminster. And yet it is not as a theologian that Baxter is chiefly known. He is least indebted for his reputation to those works on which he most relied for fame. The volumes which are the fruits of his most severe toil, and were written "chiefly for posterity," repose, in dust and silence, on the shelves of antiquaries; while the "Call to the Unconverted" and the "Saint's Rest" are found with the Pilgrim of Bunyan, wherever our language is spoken. The explanation of this fact must be sought both in the peculiar character of the man and of the times in which he lived.

The lot of Baxter was cast in a period when the English mind was roused to an unexampled activity, and the old institutions of church and state were shaken from their foundations, to be reconstructed according to the views of a new age. The contest of Prerogative and Privilege, of hereditary authority against individual rights, had come to the crisis to which it had been for centuries approaching, and men were leaving the halls of

debate for the field of battle. The Reformation, by working out its natural results, had generated a spirit of earnest and fearless inquiry upon the subjects of religion. And the Puritans, with whom politics was a secondary interest, from small beginnings had grown into a powerful and organized party, which was endeavouring not only to resist the advance but to cripple the power of the hierarchal churches.

That Baxter was well fitted, in many respects, to mingle in the strifes of a troublous age, is sufficiently evinced by his life. The ardour and energy of his character, his courage, the acuteness and vigour of his mind, his stores of learning and ample knowledge of the various parties, gave him signal advantages. More than all, his piety, chastened by intense and protracted suffering and confirmed by prayer and self-denial, was fervid and constant. The number is small, in any communion, who have cherished more holy aims, or have proved their fidelity to the Redeemer under stronger temptations. At the same time, it will be readily allowed by all, who are familiar with the story of his life, that he wanted the practical wisdom which adapts means to ends. Hence his tireless energy and multifarious knowledge were too often wasted in unpractical labours. It was his ruling desire to bring about a peace among all the parties in church and state. Especially did he wish to unite, on a common platform, the Calvinistic and Arminian theologians. The mode which he chose to attain this desirable end, was the publication of voluminous and subtle disputations. In this attempt to secure a peace, he excited more contention than he quelled, and a great part of his life was spent in the controversies of which he was himself the author. In his own candid and pathetic review of his course, he says: "Concerning almost all my writings, I must confess that my own judgment is, that fewer, well studied and polished, had been better; but the reader, who can safely censure the books, is not fit to censure the author, unless he had been in the place and acquainted with all the occasions and circumstances." He speaks of the zeal with which he had started controversies for the correction of error, and tersely remarks: "Men are so loth to be drenched with the truth, that I am no more for going that way to work." It is certain that his eagerness fully to explain and defend his opinions led him to compose disquisitions so long and intricate, that they have repelled the mass of readers.

Yet the theological character of Baxter entitles him to respectful attention. As a man of intellect, he is a marvel. Although he had not the advantage of an academical training, he stored his mind with patristic and mediæval lore, and gained an acuteness, as a metaphysician, which few men have ever

attained. His strong conviction of the evils of ambiguity impels him often to mourn over the deceitfulness of words, and in the analysis of many of the vexed terms of theology, he has anticipated the work of later writers. His diligence is not less rare than his candour and erudition. "Never," it has been said, "was the alliance of soul and body formed on terms of greater inequality than in Baxter's person:" and yet there was never a body which had so small success in impeding the work of the soul. He is the author of one hundred and sixty-eight treatises, most of which are filled with valuable truth, and almost all breathe the spirit of piety. While his English style is often inaccurate and the style of his Latin works is beneath criticism, he abounds in passages which justify the encomium of Doddridge, who looked on him "as one of the greatest orators, both with regard to copiousness, acuteness, and energy, that the English nation has produced." He is, moreover, dear to the heart of the church, as a minister of Christ, who loved conscience better than preferment. He was defamed and persecuted, and has formally submitted his opinions, as well as conduct, to the judgment of succeeding times. We attach a peculiar interest to the thoughts of a man who toiled on amidst almost unparalleled difficulties through seventy-five years, with the single design of extending the kingdom of his Master.*

The theological views of Baxter cannot be ascertained from his earlier doctrinal works, since, after their publication, his views underwent important changes. About fifteen years before the close of his life, he published the "Catholic Theologie,"† an English folio of seven hundred pages. Only six years afterwards he published his one hundred and eighteenth volume, the

* Baxter was roughly treated by his opponents. The following are the significant titles of some of the books which were written against him: "Baxterianism Barefaced;" "A Vindication of that Prudent and Honourable Knight, Sir Henry Vane, from the Lies and Calumnies of Mr. Richard Baxter, in a Monitory Letter to the said Mr. B.;" "Rebel's Plea examined; or Mr. Baxter's Judgment concerning the late War." A book, in which passages of his writings are arrayed against each other, bears this droll name: "The Casuist Uncased, in a dialogue betwixt Richard and Baxter, with a Moderator between them, for Quietness' sake." Atrocious crimes were laid to his charge. (See Orme's Baxter, p. 55.) Scurrilous epitaphs were composed for him during his lifetime. (Neal's History of the Puritans, Vol. II. p. 219.) After the restoration of Charles II., Baxter endured the persecution of prelates and the gibes of buffoons, who shared together the honours of a dissolute court. "Dr. Dubious" was his *sobriquet* among the wits of the time. His treatment by the notorious Jeffries and his cruel imprisonments are well known.

† "Richard Baxter's CATHOLIC THEOLOGIE: plain, pure, peaceable: for PACIFICATION of the dogmatical WORD-WARRIOURS, who, 1. By contending about *things unrevealed* or not understood; 2. and by taking VERBAL differences for REAL, and their arbitrary notions for necessary sacred truths, deceived and deceiving by *Ambiguous, unexplained words*, have long been the shame of the Christian religion, a scandal and hardening to unbelievers, the incendiaries, dividers and distracters of the church, the occasion of State discords and wars, the corrupters of the Christian Faith, and the

"*Methodus Theologiæ*,"* a Latin folio of sixteen hundred pages, which exhibits his complete theological system. These two works undoubtedly contain the mature opinions, which were the results of his long and varied study. In the following exhibition of his Theology, only such references will be made to his other works as may explain or confirm the doctrines of these treatises. When it is remembered that Baxter gave little if any time to the revisal of his productions, and that his complicate discussions go through almost every branch of theological science, it will not be expected that he should be free from contradictions. The subsequent selections are believed to represent faithfully his predominant views. We will, in the first place, endeavour to ascertain his opinions on the doctrines of Anthropology.

§ 1. SIN.

WHAT IS THE CAUSE OF SIN?—*God cannot properly be said to be the cause of sin.*

"God is truly the first cause of the [moral] act by giving the power, and doing all that belongeth to the *fons naturæ* to the exercise. And he is the first cause of our liberty, in making us free agents, and he is the first cause of the moral goodness of our actions, by all that he doth by his law, providence and grace to make them. But he is in no way the first cause of them as evil." (Cath. Theol. B. I. Pars I. p. 165.)

— "there is a great difference between God's *permitting* sin (after great means against it) and his *causing* it; between the making of a free agent and the putting of life or death in his choice; and his causing men unavoidably to sin, and then to damn them for it. The holiness of God's nature will stand with the being of sin, by man's causing; but not with God's causing it." (Cath. Theol. B. I. Pars I. p. 573.)

"And it must be remembered that God is far from a *total permission* or *non-impedition* of sin. He always *hindereth* it, so far as to *forbid it*, to *threaten* damnation to affright men from it, to *promise* salvation and all felicity to draw men from it. He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it.

subverters of their own souls and their followers, calling them to a blind zeal and wrathful warfare, against true piety, love and peace, and teaching them to censure, backbite, slander and prate against each other, for things which they never understood," &c. &c. "Written chiefly for posterity, when sad experience hath taught men to hate theological wars, and to love, and seek, and call for peace. (Ex Bello Pax.)"

* "*Methodus Theologiæ Christianæ*"

1. Naturæ Rerum	} Congrua Conformis Adaptata,
2. Sacræ Scripturæ	
3. Praxi	

&c. "Dicata per Richardum Baxterum, Philotheologum."

And his daily mercies and corrections should withhold men from it. Only by *doing no more*, and not *effectually changing* or *restraining* sinners, but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral, restraining means, he *permitteth* sin." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. p. 153.)

"Permission is nothing else than not *efficiently* to hinder." "It must therefore be said that God *foreknows* sin, as a future event, while he *not at all chooses*, nor *absolutely refuses* its existence; but prohibits and in very many ways hinders it, yet not *effectually*; and as an event, He *permits* it." (Meth. Pars I. cap. 2, p. 70.) See also Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. 87, 140, 157, 165, 529, 708. Part III. p. 106. B. II. p. 36, p. 151 note.

"The devil and man cause sin, and God uses it well. [*Deus causato benè utitur.*]" (Meth. Pars III. c. 25. 2. 22.) "The devil himself was the first cause of his own pravity; God made him not evil, but he made himself so." (Pract. Works, Vol. XX. p. 433.)

Why has God made men capable of sinning?—"We may say that the variety of the Divine Works is beautiful, and that every one has its fitness for a proper work; but the question is for the most part inscrutable to us. And, indeed, this liberty of the will and natural indetermination with the power of freely determining itself, is adapted to the business of this life, which is preparatory to everlasting rewards. He who can say why God has not made all animals rational, or men angels, or stones suns, can solve this question." (Meth. Pars III. c. 25, p. 273.) See also Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 138.

"We know that God will be no loser by it [by making men defectible], but equally glorified and pleased in the way of recovering grace." (Pract. Works, Vol. XIX. p. 583.)

IS SIN THE MEANS OF GOOD?—"Unless I am mistaken, the strife is about a word. That sin is an *occasion* of good, is conceded by all. But whether *occasion* should be called *means*, is to be decided by an explanation of the latter term. If by *means* is denoted any *true causality*, then sin is not the *means* of good; but if by *means* is only meant an *antecedent* sine quâ non, I have no disposition to contend. But that the matter may be understood, it should be confessed that sin has the same relation to the Divine Glory, as a rebellion or treason has to a king who pardons it, or as a disease has to a physician. If there had been no disease, the skill of the physician would have been less conspicuous. But truly the disease has no *causal power* to produce the glory of the physician [*causalitatem ad medici gloriam*]. And indeed the term *means* signifies strictly what, in some way, positively and really *conduces* to the end; and in this sense, sin cannot be called the *means*; just as death is not the means of resur-

rection; night is not the *means* of morning. Winter is not the *means* of Spring; ignorance is not the *means* of learning, or of the glory of the teacher; but only the *occasion* or the *evil removed*. But if the term *means* is to be taken more widely, for something or nothing which is interposed, or for the terminus a quô, it is to be demanded of those who choose to speak foolishly, that they do not coin their nonsense into articles of faith, or by disputing sacrifice the peace of the church. Good from the occasion of sin is in no wise the good of sin. The *good* which *God himself* does *against* sin and by sin, as an occasion, is indeed chosen by God. To choose health after disease, is not to choose disease; to choose resurrection, is not to choose death. To choose to give money to the poor, is not to choose their poverty; and to choose to pardon a sinner, to justify, to sanctify, to save him, is not to choose sin." (Meth. Pars I. c. 2, pp. 64, 65.)

"It is still false that sin is any medium to God's glory, or desirable, or hath any good." "God's glory is our end, and to forbear things prohibited is not the means. If sin conduce as much as *Christ* and *holiness* to God's glory, why may we not desire it, *sub ratione medii*, though not as *preceptum*?" (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. 610.) "It is the destroying of sin that God is glorified by." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. III. p. 59, note.)

"He [his opponent] saith that *the Universe would not be perfect, if there were perfect holiness and no sin, and so no pardon or punishment*; but he giveth us no proof, but confident assertion, at all. I need not say, *that it would be more perfect if there were no sin*: it sufficeth me to say, *that it would be as perfect*; and so that it is not necessary to the world's perfection, that there be sin or hell." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. 621.)

"It is a horrible injury against God to entitle him [i. e. to ascribe to him] sin, and make it seem necessary to his ends and honour. Good ends will not justify evil actions." (Pract. Works, Vol. II. p. 300.) See also Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. 536. 655 note. B. II. p. 30.

IS SIN VOLUNTARY?—"So great is the dominion of the will in human actions, it may be truly said that what is not voluntary is not sin or merit." "An *omission of choice* is called voluntary, when one does not choose what he could choose." "The will is culpable, because he either does not use his power when he ought, or abuses it [male utitur]." "The beginning of sin is an abuse of freewill; or not to choose, when one could have chosen." (Meth. Pars I. c. 8, p. 214.)

"*Morality* consisteth formally and primarily in the will or *voluntary*." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 94.)

"Sin is (formally) the violation of the perfect, holy and righteous law of God." "It is all willingly done and chosen

by a free agent that could not be constrained to it." "Voluntarium est omne peccatum." (Practical Works, II. pp. 244, 246.)

"Human nature has taught all nations of all ages to speak of *human* actions as voluntary actions, and to ascribe to the will the final praise or blame, the merit or fault, of persons and of actions; and in public as well as private judgments to excuse or absolve him who involuntarily does an injury, but to condemn him who voluntarily does an injury." (Meth. Pars I. c. 7, p. 216.)

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE VOLUNTARINESS OF SIN?—*Has the sinful agent the power of contrary choice?*

"The natural freedom of the will consists in the three things enumerated in the following table: viz. 1. and principally, that the will, as a part of the natural Divine image, is a kind of first cause (dependent and subordinate to God) of its own acts; on which it is implied that it is a power to do an act *not* yet determined." 2. "That it has the power of commanding the other faculties; but in different ways, according to the nature of the faculties commanded. 3. That absolutely, directly and properly, it is so subject to no created power, that by physical motion it can be efficiently determined, or receive the necessity of determining itself."* "To the evil of sin God predetermined the will of no man; because this is against the perfection of the Divine nature; and it would be against the liberty of *the person* to be so predetermined to sin." "Good angels, the solicitations of the Devil, tyrants or friends," can persuade "but cannot determine the will by causal necessity." "An object can be the occasion of the determination, and is sometimes such and so presented, that the will, in such circumstances, is *always and infallibly* determined to it;" but neither the object nor the intellect which apprehends it, "by a causal necessity determine the will." (Meth. Pars I. c. 7, p. 208.) "Whether, *de facto*, men equally *enabled, predisposed*, helped and hindered, do yet without any cause but their own *freewill itself*, act or will act variously, is a question that these controversies need not come to. That such (were there such in the

* It is proper to remark that the self-determining power of the will which Baxter maintains is not the theory that the will "determines its own acts by choosing its own acts," which is refuted by President Edwards. (Treatise on the Will, Part II. Sect. 1.) Baxter simply teaches, as an ultimate fact of human nature, that, in the circumstances which are requisite for a volition, the mind has the power of choosing or refusing the object. (Meth. Pars I. c. 8, p. 213.) If he inadvertently uses language which implies the absurdity of an infinite series of choices, it is no more than has been occasionally done by the best writers upon the subject, including Edwards himself. Baxter also opposes the liberty of indifference or the theory that the will is determined, uninfluenced by involuntary inclinations (which is refuted in the same section of Edwards's treatise). He only denies their necessitating power. (See Meth. Pars I. c. 8, p. 207. Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 75 et passim.)

world) *could do it*, I take for granted ; whatever they [actually] do." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 151.)

"The understanding *guideth*, but doth not *necessitate*. (B. II. p. 153.)

"All pretended middle ways between Hobbes, his necessitation, physical, and true freewill, are but fancies, as far as I can perceive." "I have great reason to think freewill a part of his [man's] natural image;" "and that as God is a *causa prima entium*, so freewill may be a kind of *causa prima* (not of the action, as such), but of the comparative moral species of its own acts." "I say therefore that here is no effect without a cause. *Freewill* may be the cause of various effects, without a various predisposition." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 152.)

"I doubt some think so much of strength or power alone, as if they thought God were glorified by nothing else ; or more in an ox or horse than in a man. And whatever is ascribed to God's sapiential operation, they contemptuously call a *moral causing*, and not a physical ; as if God must move men, as he doth the air, the water, or a stone." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 195.)

"They who place the will under a caused or imposed necessity of sinning (either from above or without) either actually deny all sin, or resolve the sin and misery of the damned into the Divine will." "It does not matter whether this is done by the necessitating physical predetermination of the Dominicans, or, according to the great Camero and others, by the necessitating predetermination of the will, through objects apprehended by the intellect ; while God is the cause of the law, of the will, of the intellect, and of the object. In either way, the doctrine of the infidel Hobbes, concerning the necessity of every volition, is asserted." (Meth. Theol. Pars I. c. 8, p. 215.)

"*By the necessity of existence* [i. e., by the necessity of incompatibility], indeed, the contrary act may be impossible. Whatever exists, when it exists, exists by necessity [i. e., it cannot exist and not exist at the same time] ; and so its contrary, by necessity, is non-existent. But sufficiency of power to the contrary, even, at the instant before [the choice], *formal* power to the contrary is not inconsistent [with the actual occurrence of the choice]." (Meth. Pars III. c. 25, p. 272.) "Whoever says that God is *not able* to make a creature with power to determine one volition of its own without His efficient physical predetermination aforesaid, sayeth more against God's *omnipotency* (though on pretence of a contradiction) than I dare say or think."* (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. III. p. 86.)

* The course of Baxter's reasoning leads him to conclude that man is free, if God could make him free ; and that to doubt the possibility of making him free is impious. Bishop Berkeley, on the other hand, in his celebrated argument for the freedom of

"Do you think, 1. That it will be the way of glorifying the justice of God in judgment, to have the world know that he condemneth the world, merely because He will condemn them, for that which they never had any more true power to avoid than to make a world? 2. Or will their conscience in hell accuse them or torment them for that which they then know was naturally impossible and caused by God?" (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 140. See also B. I. p. 40.)

IS THE GUILT OF THE SINNER LIMITED BY THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE?

"Those who are made, capable only of *doing wrong*, cannot do wrong; it is a contradiction. For it is not sin never to have done that, for doing which, we have never received mediate or immediate power from God; just as we do not sin in not flying, like birds, or shining, like the sun. It is not sin to do the only thing we *can* do; [and this] by the irresistible will of the Creator." (Meth. Pars III. c. 25, p. 265.)

Accordingly I judge of *guilt* and *shame* and *accusation*; which will not be a bare discerning of what God made us do or be; but what we voluntarily *did* or *were*, when we could do [or be] otherwise." (Cath. Theol. B. I. Part II. p. 115.)

"The obligation of law ceaseth, when the thing commanded becometh *impossible* without the subject's fault." "A necessity contracted by our own fault (as by drunkenness leading to madness) excuseth not from guilt." "This is a sin (and the consequent acts and omissions), not simply in itself considered, but *secundum quid* and participatively, as it partaketh of the first sin, which is described itself to be 'a *voluntary forbidden act, disabling us to future duty, and virtually containing a sinful life to the end.*'" When such a physical disability is incurred, "strictly and properly God is not said after to oblige him by that law, because he is not *receptive* and *capable* of such *new obligations*. And yet he is not disobliged as to his benefit. For no man getteth

the will (Minute Philosopher, Dial. VII.), starts with the admission of his opponent, that God can make a creature free, and proves that man has the qualities which, it is expected, will characterize a free creature. Indeed, the gravest objections, which are offered to the doctrine of human freedom, appear to resolve themselves into the question: 'Is the creation of a free agent within the compass of Infinite power?' And it is worthy of notice that the opposer and advocate of freedom confront each other with the same objection. 'You disparage the Divine Omnipotence,' says the former, 'when you assert that a creature can be free to choose his own course.' 'You disparage the Divine Omnipotence,' says the latter, 'when you assert that a creature *cannot be made*, who is free to choose his own course.' Baxter refutes the objection to freedom, derived solely from the prescience of God, by distinguishing between certainty and necessity, and between the *logical* necessity that *an event will be which will be*, and the *real* necessity which would constrain the agent. The foresight no more than the retrospection, of an act, causes the *act* to be truly unavoidable. Baxter also frequently answers the objections to his doctrine by showing that they apply with as much force to the acts of the Deity as to those of man.

a right to any benefits by his fault." (Cath. Theol. B. I. Part I. p. 39.)

"We may answer the old question, 'Whence is evil?' For as sin is a moral thing, &c., unbounded wisdom and goodness having laid our endless happiness as a reward for obedience, and endless wretchedness as punishment for sin. Without this obedience, there could be no heaven; without sin, no hell. And without a power not to do in both, there could be neither. So then, that God may have leave to make man happy for holiness, man must needs have power to make himself wretched for sin." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 151 note.) See also Cath. Theol. B. I. § IX. 229. In answer to the question, "What is the use of such power [of contrary choice]," he says, "1. If they [men] had power to do good, they could have done it; for what else is power, but that by which I *can* do the act? 2. The power given was a proportionable demonstration of *God's* power, wisdom and mercy, and therefore *it did good*. 3. That it was not used to their *own salvation*, was their own fault, for which they suffer." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 23.) See also Cath. Theol. B. I. § X. 229.

WHAT IS ORIGINAL SIN?—In conformity with the foregoing views Baxter develops his doctrine of Original Sin. Adam's powers, at the beginning of his existence, were in a right state. This righteousness was not superadded after his creation, and yet it was not an essential attribute of his mind (Meth. Pars I. c. 15, p. 354.) For he sinned and fell, when he had, not "the hypothetical or conditional," but the *true* power to stand. (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 113.) In Adam, original sin "was the forbidden act, and the depraved disposition which followed it." In us, it is *fundamentally* the imputation of Adam's sin; it consists (materially) in "the destitution of righteousness, and in positive corruption." Whether Baxter is self-consistent, therefore, depends on his doctrine of Imputation; or on his answer to the following question:

WHY ARE THE POSTERITY OF ADAM CHARGED WITH HIS SIN?

Baxter speaks of persons who have excited opposition to the doctrine of Original Sin "by feigning an unproved, arbitrary covenant of God, made with Adam and his posterity, which was no law of nature, nor was made [or adjusted] to any other since (according to the change of the covenant), and by which God imputeth Adam's sin to us, not because we were in his loins, (for then it would extend to others,) but because it was *His will* to do so; as if it had been God and not Adam that defiled our natures and made us all sinners, by an unnecessary, if not ungrounded imputation." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 105.)

“My thoughts are these: 1. That we were *seminally* and *virtually* really in *Adam*; having the very essence of our souls derived from him; not being in him, as the *house* is in the head of the *architect*, but as an *essential form* is in the *generater*; though we call both *esse in causa*. 2. That we were not personally in *Adam* (though *seminally*); that is, we were not *natural persons* in him, when he sinned. 3. God supposeth no man to be what he is not, or to have *done what he did not*; for he erreth not. 4. God is not the author of sin; therefore He doth not by arbitrary imputing of *Adam's act*, and reputing us to have done what we did not, make all men sinners, which *Adam* could not do. 5. But God doth truly repute us to have been *seminally* in *Adam*, and to have no essence but what is really derived from his essence; and as when a man is guilty, no part of him is innocent, neque semen, neque sanguis, though they have not a distinct guilt, but *participative*, qua partes rei; so we were sinners in that act, and guilty of that act, so far as we were *partes Adami*, and in him. 6. This was not to be at *that time* guilty, as distinct persons; for we were not such. 7. But we, that were then only *seminally* existent, after became real distinct persons, and then that *guilt* even of *Adam's act*, adhering still to us, became *guilt of persons*, because the subjects of it are persons. Even as if *Eve* had been made *after* the fall, of *Adam's rib*, that rib at first was guilty, not by *another*, but the same *numerical* guilt that *Adam* was, as part of a sinner; for it was a capable subject of no more! But when that same rib was made a *person*, it would be a guilty person; for it lost not the guilt by that change. But then it is not only or chiefly our bodies that are from *Adam*, (which are from the elements in our daily food,) but our *souls*; and therefore the adherence of the guilt to a rational spirit essentially flowing from another's essence, is more easily understood and defended than that of the corporal rib could be. 8. I do (contrary to excellent *Jos. Placeus*) suppose that in *primo instanti*, this, our participation in *Adam's guilt*, is in order before our qualitative pravity; and that God doth therefore deny us His Spirit first, to make us originally holy, not only because *Adam*, but because we *in Adam* (as aforesaid) did forfeit and expel it. 9. I think that some men's assertion of a decree or covenant of God, that if *Adam* fell, any more should be imputed to his offspring than they were thus *really guilty* of themselves, is the bold addition of men's invention, of greater audacity than the addition of ceremonies to the worship of God, which yet some are more sensible of. 10. I think if *Adam* had not sinned that same first sin, but had sinned another sin in the next hour, or day, or month, or year, or any

time before generation, it would have been equally ours, as this first was, because we were *equally in him*, and no Scripture-covenant makes a difference." 12. "I doubt not but if Adam had never sinned, yet (supposing the same covenant [i. e. legal dispensation] to stand), if his sons after him had sinned, we should have been guilty of it as we are of his sin; yea, had it been but our nearest parents. 13. I doubt not but that we are still so guilty of our nearer parents' sins,* further than as the introduction of the new pardoning covenant, and the oft pardons by it, and the incapacity of nature to bear any more punishment may make a difference." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 111.)

"When Adam sinned, every part of his body participated in his guilt (*ejus reatum participavit*). And if a leg or an arm had been cut off, one would not at all attribute innocence to this limb; but at the Resurrection it would bring back its part of the guilt." "But when we were *parts*, we were not innocent (not more than an amputated foot is innocent)." "That the will is the primary seat of moral good and evil, we grant. But from it, the whole body becomes participant of the guilt (*reatus participes*)." (Meth. Pars I. c. 15, p. 370.)

To the objection, "What is involuntary is not sin, original depravity is not voluntary, and therefore is not sin," he replies by denying the *minor* premise; and avers that original sin is voluntary, "since it proceeds from the act of him, from whom our essence proceeds." (Meth. Pars I. c. 15, p. 376.) "Why am I guilty of what Adam did, but because I have a nature that was seminally in him; and was it not proximately in my nearer parents?" (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 105.)

"God is the author of no man's sin, but the Creator of his nature, which voluntarily sinned, when it had power not to sin; and by his own will *man* subjected himself to the deceiver." (Cath. Theol. B. I. § XX. p. 118.) See also B. I. Pars III. p. 101. B. II. p. 128.

Baxter endeavours to relieve himself from the charge of materialism by a physiological disquisition, in which he attempts to

* Baxter held that the original sin of infants is pardoned at their baptism; and even when the rite is, for a good reason, omitted, the offspring of pious parents are saved. They are regarded as parts of their parents, and are therefore members of the church and heirs of the kingdom of heaven. The Holy Spirit renews their heart from their infancy, and they are to grow up in the exercise of holy faith. The supposed fact that the children of pious parents sometimes lead unholy lives, when no marked fault can be charged on their parents, was one cause of Baxter's difficulties on the subject of "Perseverance." It seemed to him not an unreasonable hypothesis that, when once converted, they may actually fall away. (See Meth. Pars III. c. 9, p. 98, et passim.)

combine the theories of Traducianism and Creationism. (Meth. Pars I. c. 15, p. 371.)*

* Baxter's doctrine of original sin unquestionably develops the ancient doctrine of Imputation. It is taught by the earliest Christian writers. Origen (of the third century) held that men were tainted with sins committed in a former state. It was the opinion of Tertullian and the Traduciani, "that the souls of children have existed in reality or at least potentially, in their parents, and this as far back as Adam; and that in this way the souls of all his posterity participated in the actions done in his person, although they themselves were never after conscious of such an action." (Knapp's Theology, p. 275.) The doctrine of Ambrose and Augustine may be learned from the clear and indisputable statements of Neander. Ambrose "says: 'We have all sinned in the first man; and, with the propagation of the nature, the propagation of the guilt also has passed from one to all. In him *human nature* sinned.' In one aspect, the corruption which passed from the first parent to all his posterity, seems to be derived from the law of natural propagation; in another, a certain inherent connection seems to be supposed between the first member of the human race, as one in whom *the whole kind was already contained in the germ, and all the later members of the race*; as indeed Ambrose was already led to this view by the phrase 'in quo' in the Latin version of Rom. v. 12; which expression was referred to Adam. This idea was afterwards more fully developed by the Philosophical Realism of Augustine." (Neander's Church History, Vol. I. pp. 562, 563.) The "participation of all in Adam's transgression, Augustine made clear to his own mind in this way: Adam was the representative of the whole race, and bore in himself *the entire human nature* and kind, in the germ, since it was from him it unfolded itself. And this theory could easily blend with Augustine's speculative form of thought, as he had appropriated to himself the Platonico-Aristotelian Realism in the doctrine of general conceptions, and conceived of general conceptions as the original types of the kind, realized in individual things. Furthermore, his slight acquaintance with the Greek language and his habit of reading the Holy Scriptures in the Latin translation, led him to find a confirmation of his theory in a falsely-translated passage of the Epistle to Romans, v. 12." (Neander's Ch. Hist., Vol. I. p. 609.) That this was the doctrine of Augustine is also shown by Bretschneider and Döderlein. "In Adam all sinned; in the loins of Adam was the human race; in him, we were all one man," is the language of this father. "In Adam omnes peccarunt; in lumbis Adami erat genus humanum;" "omnes eramus unus ille homo." Augustine, while he did not formally admit, yet did not deny, the doctrine of Traducianism. The theory of Augustine "was the prevailing theory among the schoolmen, and even throughout the sixteenth century and until about the middle of the seventeenth, when it was contested by the French reformed theologians, Joshua Placcus and Moses Amyræus, who, however, were violently opposed." (Knapp's Theology, p. 276.) It is the doctrine of Anselm of Canterbury. (Neander's Ch. Hist., Vol. IV. p. 492.) The influence of Augustine stamped this doctrine upon the theology of Anselm and contemporary schoolmen of the same philosophic sect, as well as upon the systems of modern theologians. (Neander, Vol. IV. p. 492.)

We "sinned *in* him and fell *with* him *in* his first transgression," is the phrase of the Westminster Assembly.

The same doctrine is taught by President Edwards in his Treatise on Original Sin. "Therefore I am humbly of opinion," he says, "that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a double guilt, one the guilt of Adam's sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well conceived of the matter. The guilt a man has on his soul at his first existence, is one and simple, viz. the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by which *the species first rebelled against God*." (Edwards on Original Sin, Ch. III.) He also says: "The sin of the apostasy is not theirs [i. e. ours] merely because God imputes it to them. But it is *TRULY AND PROPERLY THEIRS, and on that ground God imputes it to them*." (Ib. Ch. III.) If it be true that Edwards in his argument for the doctrine of original sin, as the Princeton Essayist (Princeton Theol. Essays, 1st series, p. 139) has said, "philosophizes on the nature of unity until he confounds all notions of personal identity," the fact serves to show how his great mind toiled to avoid the

WHAT CONTROL HAS GOD OVER SIN?—*God foreknew sin.*—It is important to observe, in this place, the peculiar doctrine of Baxter with respect to the divine foreknowledge. He rejected the theory that the foreknowledge of God depends on his purposes, or that his purposes depend on his foreknowledge; and held that foreknowledge is an independent attribute or a part of the Divine omniscience.

necessity of making God impute to men a sin which is not, previously, "truly and properly" their own.

The Calvinistic or Augustinian doctrine of Imputation may be thus stated: Man, or human nature, or the human race, was IN Adam and constituted ONE PERSON; and in consequence of their *real* (though not individual) participation in his offence, men are, when they are born or become *distinct* persons, guilty of the sin which they *really* committed in their progenitor, and are condemned on account of it. This is Calvinism; but this doctrine of Calvinism is now very often abandoned.

There is, however, another doctrine, which has borrowed from Calvinism the name of "Imputation," and may be thus stated: The human race were not in Adam and did not really participate in his sin; but God imputes or ascribes the sin of their progenitor to all men, and, on the ground of this imputation, judicially condemns and punishes them.

Between the Calvinistic and the latter doctrine there is a radical and irreconcilable difference. The Calvinistic doctrine imputes to men what is truly and properly their own; while the latter doctrine imputes to them what is *not* truly or properly their own. The Calvinistic doctrine makes men *guilty* in the sense of sinful, for the sin of Adam; but the latter calls them guilty only in the sense of "exposed to punishment." The Calvinistic doctrine makes the punishment of men for Adam's sin an infliction of evil for their own share in his sinful act; and the latter doctrine makes it a judicial infliction of evil for an act in which they had *no* real participation. It should be added that those theologians who are adduced to sustain the latter doctrine, make the secondary or covenant imputation of Adam's sin to his descendants to rest primarily on the existence of the race in him at the time of his sin, or on the Realistic conception of Augustine. They are especially earnest in this view when they are answering objections. Owen, for example, in his "Display of Arminianism," says that the first ground of the imputation of Adam's sin is, that "we were *then* in him and parts of him." (Owen's Works, Vol. V. p. 130.) He, not less than Baxter, distinguishes between the ground of the imputation of Christ's righteousness and of Adam's sin. "Sin and punishment," he says, "though they are sometimes separated by his (God's) mercy, pardoning the one, and so not inflicting the other, yet *never* by his justice inflicting the latter where the former is not; sin imputed by itself alone without an inherent guilt, was never punished in any but Christ; the unsearchableness of God's love and justice, in laying the iniquity of us all upon Him who had no sin, is an exception to that general rule He walketh by, in His dealing with the posterity of Adam." (Ib. p. 127.) The plain sense of the term "guilt" in this passage is enough to show the groundlessness of the statement that its uniform and established meaning in theology is "exposedness to punishment." He says, and quotes Augustine to confirm him, that when Adam sinned "we were then all one man, we were all in Him, and had no other will but His; so that, though that be extrinsic unto us, considered as particular persons, yet it is *intrinsic*, as we are all parts of one common nature; as in Him we sinned, so in Him we had a will of sinning." (Ib. p. 127.) He says that if, without any sinfulness of our own, "God should impute the sin of Adam unto us," it could not be "reconciled with that rule of his proceeding in justice with the sons of men, 'the soul that sinneth, it shall die;' which clearly granteth an impunity to all not tainted with sin." (Ib. p. 129.)

From these historical facts it follows that the new doctrine of Imputation cannot derive support from Augustine, or many of the other eminent theologians of the Church, and must stand or fall, as common sense may decide it to consist or not to consist with the teachings of the Bible and the rectitude of the Divine character.

"God, knowing that He will make the free agent, knoweth also that this agent *will freely* sin; in all which the futurity is nothing, nor is any existent cause [*i. e.*, existent, when the event of sin was foreknown] necessary; but only the truth of the proposition would result from the infinite perfection of God's knowledge." (Cath. Theol. B. I. p. 83.)

Man is not made independent of God.—"Much less do we take the will from under the power and government of God; for—1. It could have no self-determining power but of God, one moment. 2. He giveth us governing laws accordingly. 3. And he attaineth all His ends, and fulfilleth all His will, as perfectly in consistence with our power and freedom, as if we had none such at all." (Cath. Theol. B. I. p. 565.)

"This rank and state of free agents is God's own wisely-chosen work in which He is delighted." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. III. p. 116.)

God can cause the certainty of events without impigning on human freedom.—Although Baxter commonly vindicates the doctrine that God can control the existence of sin, by referring to his foreknowledge, there are still several passages in which he asserts that God has caused the *certainty* of events, without causing their *necessity*.

"It is not right to doubt but that God can render the occurrence of an act infallibly certain [*infallibiliter futurum reddere*] by moral means and by ways unknown to us, without physical predetermination. For if the will has no other liberty except the power of choosing as it does [*præter ipsum velle*], then all certain faith and the Christian religion fall to the ground, as has been before amply proved. But if God cannot cause the future certainty [*certo futurum reddere*] of the free volition of man, divine Providence in the Government of the world and the security of His promises are destroyed. Both which consequences are intolerable. But the question, how God does or can do this, misbecomes us dim-sighted pigmies." (Meth. Pars III. c. 25, p. 274.)

It is conceded "that the determination of the will by itself, and God's *moral* way of determining it (by which He causes the will to determine itself infallibly, and yet without physical determination), is consistent with liberty and formal power to the contrary." (Meth. Pars III. c. 25, p. 272.) See also *ib.* p. 288.

How can God prevent Sin?—"God could prevent all future sin, if he absolutely willed so to do, either by destroying the world or disabling the sinner, or by withholding his moving

influx, or by such a change of his nature as should make him indefectible." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. III. p. 58.)

§ 2. ABILITY.

"This unhappy CAN is the canon that battereth our peace and love." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 113.) "This one poor word is the grenade or fire-ball." (Ib. p. 88.) "I tell you, once for all, that the shaming and ending of all the controversies between the Synodists and moderate Arminians (or Jesuits), lieth in the true opening of the ambiguity of this one syllable, Can. And unhappy is the Church when its pastors have neither skill nor love enough to forbear torturing and distracting it, by one poor ambiguous syllable, not understood by the contenders." (Ib. p. 86.)

WHAT IS NATURAL ABILITY?—"Remember that a true power is that by which *we truly can*; and not that faculty which could do this or that, if God would predetermine it, and otherwise cannot; no more than the sun can shine without him." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. III. p. 74.)

"Is not natural strength or power a thing belonging to man as man which sin destroyeth not and grace restoreth not?" "The soul of every man hath a *true* natural power to repent, believe, and love God; and they omit it, not for the want of natural power, but of something else." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 86.)

"This unhappy syllable CAN, by its ambiguity, is the cause of all our silly quarrels. If by CAN, you mean a physical power or faculty, man can not only do more good than he doth, but he can *repent* and *believe*, who doth not." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 107.)

"If man's will had been made by God such as could not possibly love Him or holiness, it would not have left a man without excuse in judgment, that his enmity was voluntary." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. III. p. 100.)

"A natural power of freely determining itself, both to the choice of God and spiritual good, remains in the will of the unregenerate. For the sinner is free from a fatal predetermination to evil, and from the dominion of created causes over his will, and from the necessity of sinning, imposed in any other way." (Meth. Pars I. c. 15, p. 215.)

Ability is not a mere capacity, without a motive to action.—"Man's [involuntary] inclination to felicity, truth, and goodness, which is natural, doth continue." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. p. 155.)

"Man's natural faculty itself, besides natural power, hath all

these aptitudes to the act. Man hath self-love and a desire of felicity, and an unwillingness and fear of hell and misery, and of all that he knows doth tend to it, as such. He can seek for glory, honour, and immortality." He has "Reason to understand what is told him of good and evil in some sort," "conscience to accuse and excuse," "the disgrace of sin," "the fear of the devil," "the prospect of death and immortality;" and "God addeth by his works and word many vehement motives, persuasions and urgent exhortations, examples, mercies and corrections." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 147. See also p. 153.)

"Even in the point of believing [the will] hath natural power and liberty to act otherwise than it doth, even to turn itself from the act of unbelief to the act of faith. But being indisposed and ill-disposed, it *will not do* that which it hath a natural self-determining power to do; till God assist it or turn it by His grace." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 97.)

WHAT IS MORAL INABILITY?—"He that wanteth not natural force or power, but only a right *disposition* of his will, and *so far* wanteth it, that none, in his case, *do ever* change their own acts to good, without more help and power than he hath, is said to be *morally unable* or *impotent*." (Cath. Theol. B. I. p. 37.)

"Ofttimes, in Scripture, by the word 'cannot' is meant only that which a man cannot do without suffering, loss, or difficulty. (So 1 Sam. xxv. 17, 'He is such a son of Belial, that a man cannot speak to him,' i.e., without inconvenience by it.)" "Ofttimes this inconvenience, procuring *unwillingness*, is named like *impotency*, and it is said, 'men *cannot*,' because they will not. (Luke xiv. 20, 'I have married a wife and cannot come,' i.e., I will not, because I cannot without inconvenience.)" "And this unwillingness, when it is habitual and prevalent, is what is commonly called *man's moral impotency*, as to believe, love, obey, &c." "That power is morally called *impotency* which no man ever reduceth to act." (Cath. Theol. B. II. pp. 95, 96.)

"Both habitual and dispositive and actual willingness or unwillingness is not called usually *strength* or power, but will; the will itself hath its proper power to will, for it is a natural faculty; but its habits and acts are better known by the name of willingness or unwillingness than of power. If, therefore, men would do as the Scripture doth, usually express moral habits and acts, by these their best known names, and when we use the terms of power, *can* and *cannot*, would do it so rarely and explainedly as to be understood that it is nothing but moral *willingness* and *unwillingness* that we mean, it would do much to end all this controversie." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 98.)

WHAT IS MORAL ABILITY?—There are many passages in

which Baxter asserts that men are not only naturally able, but also *morally* able, to perform actions which they yet do not perform. The apparent confusion of ideas is obviated by observing that he sometimes uses the term *will*, in the way it is used by the old writers, to denote not only the power of choice, but also the tendencies or involuntary inclinations which influence the mind in choosing. When these involuntary inclinations are so excited by a gracious influence toward the right object that the choice of it is comparatively *easy*, then the mind is sometimes said to be *morally* able to perform the action. Hence, too, in his view, there are different degrees of moral ability. It is obviously important to ascertain his idea of the extent of moral inability, or the effect of sin upon those powers of the mind which lie back of the faculty of choice. This question Baxter answers both in the passages already quoted, which relate to the power of contrary choice, and in those which assert the existence of natural (involuntary) tendencies to happiness and goodness. He is, however, in other places, more explicit :

"This impotence is not a total defect, but weakness of power. And man still retains true power for acting here and now (even without the aid of any other cause)." But this power wants the alacrity and firmness "which render the action certain. It is not prompt and prepared for action, and can abstain from acting. Impotence is the cause (*sine quâ non*) of inaction, but not the *necessitating* cause. I say, therefore, that whenever the will does not act, when it ought to act, no necessitating reason for the inaction is to be rendered." "The reason of inaction is finally to be resolved into the will itself." "Sin does not destroy an essential faculty, and so destroy the human species;" "nor is every inclination to good, to happiness, to God, to the salvation of the soul, to virtue, lost." "But by means of sin, the active powers may be languid, and the intellect ill-disposed to perceive higher things, and the will disposed or inclined, by evil habits, against spiritual and toward sensual good." "No one is good or bad, contrary to his will; but the happiness or misery of every one follows his election or rejection of the means." (*Meth. Pars I. c. 7*, pp. 215, 216.)

Baxter sometimes uses the word *habit* in the sense of a fixed, voluntary inclination; but frequently, as it is used by the old writers, to denote an excited involuntary principle or inclination. "A habit," he says, "is not only a power to act, but a power to act promptly and easily." It implies a greater likelihood of the act than the term *moral power*.^{*} But prior to the existence of a holy "habit," the mind has involuntary inclina-

^{*} *Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 97. Meth. Pars I. c. 8, p. 202.*

tions which tend to God and holiness, and give it a true natural power to do right.*

“But habit itself does not necessarily produce an act, although by a natural agency it makes a man incline to the act. Indeed men often act against a habit. But habits are a kind of second nature, and so strongly incline to the act that they constantly produce it, but do not necessitate it.” (Meth. Pars III. c. 25, p. 275.)

It is, therefore, plain that in the passages where Baxter asserts that men have grace enough to enable them to perform certain acts which they omit, he refers to *moral* ability. His language is not free from ambiguity, but perhaps his meaning may be thus expressed: Men are morally able to do an action when, from their previous inclinations, it appears to us probable that they will perform it, and when the omission of it costs them a mental struggle. All men have not only the natural power to repent and believe, but they have such grace as confers *moral* ability, and if faithfully used, would lead finally to their conversion and salvation.†

Let us now ascertain the views of Baxter with respect to the Bible and the principal doctrines of theology.

§ 3. THE BIBLE.

What is the authority of the Bible?—The truth and Divine authority of the Scriptures have been abundantly proved. Whatever in the Bible professes to have the sanction of God is worthy of belief, and whatever errors or contradictions may be found are to be attributed to the mistakes of transcribers, printers, or translators.‡ There is nothing in the Bible which is superfluous, and nothing which does not conduce to the well-being of Christianity.§ The Bible brings the evidence of its own divinity to the attentive reader: “It shineth by its own light, and it beareth the certain seal of heaven.” Yet the perfection of the Scriptures is not absolute, but relative to the ends for which they were given, and by their fitness to these ends their value is to be estimated. One part of the Bible may be preferred to another, as it may treat of greater themes, or be furnished with clearer marks of Divine authority, or be the work of a writer who excels in style and method. The imperfections of the biblical authors in knowledge and the art of composition, contribute to the perfection of the Revelation, just as

* Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 92.

† Cath. Theol. B. III. p. 133. Meth. Pars III. c. 25.

‡ Meth. P. III. c. 15, p. 208. Pract. Works, Vol. XX. p. 430.

§ Meth. P. III. c. 15, p. 208.

the meanness of David's weapons proved that his victory over Goliath was a Divine achievement.*

What is essential to be believed?—Baxter makes a careful distinction between faith in the veracity of God and a belief that the doctrines of the Bible are divinely inspired. The former is essential, while one may think that no part of the Scriptures is canonical except the bare announcement of the condition of salvation, and although he is grossly mistaken, he can yet believe and be saved. Hence it is not requisite for ecclesiastical communion that one should subscribe to every verse, chapter, or book of the Bible, as canonical; but it is essential that he should credit all the words of God, and especially that he should believe the vital truths of the Christian religion. Men ascribe too much to the Bible when they affirm that it presents no signs of human imperfection, and maintain that we have no greater certainty of the truth of the Christian religion than we have of the truth of "every item of history, genealogy, number, or word," and assert that every one who doubts whether a single word is true or was dictated by the Holy Spirit may, with equal reason, doubt the whole Gospel.† "And here," he says, "I must tell you a great and needful truth, which ignorant Christians, fearing to confess by overdoing, tempt men to infidelity. The Scripture is like a man's body, where some parts are for the preservation of the rest, and may be maimed without death; the sense is the soul of Scripture, and the letters but the body or vehicle."‡

The relation of Reason to Revelation.—Baxter discovered no antagonism between Faith and Reason. He would have cordially assented both to the apophthegm of Augustine, "crede ut intelligas," and the proud saying of Abelard, "intellige ut credas." For he insists upon a right temper of heart as indispensable for the successful study of religious truth, and also teaches that nothing is to be done or believed without a sufficient reason. We always have sufficient reason for believing a doctrine that is proved to be the testimony of God.§

"They that believe and know not why, or know no sufficient reason to warrant their belief, do take a fancy or an opinion or a dream, for faith. I know that many honest-hearted Christians are unable to dispute for their religion or to give to others a satisfactory account of the reasons of their faith or hope; but yet they have the true apprehension of some solid reasons, in themselves." (Christian Directory, Part I. c. III.)||

* Meth. P. III. c. 15, p. 203.

† Meth. P. III. c. 15, pp. 200, 201.

‡ Pract. Works, XIX. p. 32.

§ Ib. XX. p. 429.

|| The "Christian Directory" is a companion to the "Methodus Theologiæ," and treats of Practical Ethics. It was first published in 1673 in a large folio volume,

Baxter was one of the earliest of the English writers on the proofs of revealed religion, and published the first answer to the treatise "de Veritate" of Lord Herbert, the founder of the English school of Deists. He appreciated the importance of Natural Theology, as furnishing proof alike of the possibility and of the need of a revelation, and as confirming the truths of the Bible. Worthy as are his defences of the external grounds of Christianity, his works on this subject now have their chief value in the force with which they unfold the internal evidences of Christian truth.

§ 4. THE TRINITY.

IS OUR LANGUAGE RESPECTING GOD LITERALLY CORRECT?—It is a fundamental principle of Baxter's theology, that the traces of a Trinity may be perceived in every part of the universe. What is dimly discerned in inanimate nature, and seen less faintly in the irrational animals, is more clearly recognized in the soul of man, which is the image of the Creator. From what we see around us and in ourselves, we derive language to express our conceptions of the Deity. But this language is tropical and must not be literally interpreted.

"All our terms concerning God are plainly metaphorical. For although the thing expressed is primarily in the Deity, yet the notion which expresses it, is primarily adapted to creatures; and by it something created is commonly signified. And since we must speak improperly or metaphorically concerning the Deity, nowhere else than from the human spirit can our conceptions and metaphorical modes of speech be borrowed. Nor is any other natural mirror known to us, in which we can more clearly see God. Nor is the soul vainly called by God Himself, the image of God." (Meth. Pars I. c. 2, p. 218. Also Practical Works, Vol. XIX. p. 576.)

WHAT IS KNOWN OF THE TRINITY?—Looking upon the human soul as upon a mirror, Baxter finds "in God, who is an infinite and undivided Spirit," a Trinity of "essentialities" or "active principles;" viz. Active or Vital Power, Intellect and Will [Potentia-Actus, Intellectus, Voluntas]. These principles are the ground of a threefold, eternal, immanent act in the Deity; viz., 1. Vital Activity or "Self-living" ["Sibi Vita vel vivens"]. 2. Self-knowing ["Intellectus se Intelligens"]. 3. "Self-

which would have been still larger had not the author fortunately been absent from his library during the time of its composition. It is an able treatise on Casuistry, and ranks with the "Ductor Dubitantium" of Jeremy Taylor. To this inferior department of moral science, little has been contributed since the time of Baxter.

loving ["*Voluntas se Amans*"]. These, too, are respectively the eternal ground of a *transitive* act, and so of God's relation, 1. to the existence of things or to nature; 2. to the order of things, and to grace; 3. to the end of things and the glory of man. These principles are the Trinity of persons, Father, Word and Holy Spirit. Hence, in the Scriptures, power is emphatically ascribed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and the communicative love of God to the Spirit. Hence, also, by His eternal act of self-knowledge, God is said to generate the Son; and as the communications of Divine Love are ordered by Wisdom and Power, the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father and the Son. "We shall be as loth to say that the Father or the Holy Ghost was incarnate for us, or died for us, or mediates for us, as that the power or love of God doth the works which belong to His wisdom." "As in man's soul, the power, intellect, will [*posse, velle, scire*] are not three parts of the soul, it being the whole soul *quæ potest, quæ intelligit et quæ vult*," so, "the whole Deity is power, the whole is understanding, and the whole is will." [See "*Methodus*," Pars I. c. 2, pp. 36, 37, 84, 28. Practical Works, Vol. XIX. pp. 62, 63, 576 et seq. Vol. XX. p. 439. Vol. XXI. p. 307 et seq.]

"I hold it certain that we are to conceive (though imperfectly) of God, as *triple* [*tripliciter*]: 1. in respect to his vital-active, intellective and volitive power; 2. in his triple immanent act; 3. in his transitive, external [*ad extra*] [or emanent] act, as an agent. It is certain that in the Holy Scriptures, the works of power are, in some way, most frequently ascribed to the Father, the works of wisdom to the Son, the works of love to the Holy Spirit. Efficiency of the works is ascribed to the Father, direction of the works to the Son, and perfection of the works to the Holy Spirit; creation is ascribed to the Father, redemption to the Son, and sanctification to the Holy Spirit. And so, eminently, the Father is the author of nature, the Son of remedy [*medicinæ*], the Holy Spirit of salvation, and all alike of glory." (Meth. Pars I. c. 2, p. 121.)

Whether the Trinity of the Divine Being be anything *more* than is above described, Baxter professed himself unable either to affirm or deny. "And what mortal man is able to say whether the distinction of persons be greater or less than this?" (Pract. Works, XXI. p. 312.) If it be more, the truth is still rendered credible by the manner in which it is shadowed forth in all the works of God. Nature is at least a ladder by which we may climb upwards to a knowledge of the Deity.

"There are some who do not presume to define the *Personality*, whether it be anything absolute, a power, an immanent act, a

mode of existence, a relation, a property, or something formal, and admit that no formal and proper conception of the Divine Personality (as well as none of the Divine Essence or of any essential Divine Attribute), is possible to the human intellect. That these agree with me, I do not deny [*minime diffiteor*]. (Meth. P. I. c. 2, p. 123.)

"That the Trinity of Persons *is* the same as that of Essentialities [or active principles], I have never verbally or mentally affirmed; I think that it cannot be affirmed." (Ib. p. 121.)

WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO BE BELIEVED?—Soundness of belief does not consist in the use of any particular words, as Person, Relation, Generation, or Procession. (Meth. P. I. c. 2, p. 119.)

"The reasons of Rada, by which he decides that it is not heretical to consider the Persons absolute Attributes, I deem to be entirely valid." (Ib. p. 122.)

"Whoever says, with proper reverence, that the third Trinity [Father, Son and Spirit] is the same Trinity [of principles or active powers], presented most clearly to the apprehension of men [*hominibus explicatissimam*], and in the sense, last and best known by us, is a Trinity of persons, as appearing in their special, visible works; whoever says this, will not be accused of heresy by me." (Meth. P. I. c. 2, p. 37. Pract. Works, Vol. XXI. p. 313.)

"He will be saved, who so believes in God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three persons in one Essence, as to give and devote himself wholly to God the Father, Creator (Lord, King, Friend), Redeemer and Sanctifier, and repose in Him his entire confidence and hope; and this is saving faith in the Trinity." (Ib. p. 122.)*

Baxter's theory of the Trinity may be in part accounted for by his fondness for the scholastic writers and his familiar acquaintance with their works. The history of the doctrine which he gives, at once evinces his profound research, and discovers the sources whence he derived his opinions. The view of Augustine tended to Sabellianism; and the well-known comparison which he had made between the persons of the Trinity, and the memory, intelligence, and will, may be regarded as the key-note to the principal speculations of the schoolmen. They reasoned of the nature of the Trinity from the analogy of the human mind. The common view among the theologians of the

* This baptismal formula appears to have been the result of Baxter's search for a symbol on which Christians ought to unite in love and communion. He frequently declares that this formula is the substance of our religion; and that the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Decalogue, are a summary expression of the belief, the desire and hope, and the duty of the Christian. (Pref. to Cath. Theol. Works, Vol. XXI. p. 265.)

twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Anselm, Abelard, Hugo a St. Victorè, Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, Raymund Lull), is like that of Baxter; and, indeed, the doctrine of Abelard, which represented the three persons as the power, wisdom and love of the Divine Being, "became, on the whole, current in the middle ages."* In later times, similar modes of reasoning were adopted by Melancthon, and to a certain extent by Grotius. But Baxter has gone beyond every other writer, in the minuteness with which he has carried the system of trichotomy through every form of existence, and every department of science. Groundless and diverse from the biblical view, as such speculations may be, they have not been without their value in counteracting a tendency toward Tritheism, which has more than once revealed itself in the history of the church.

§ 5. DECREES.

The following are the leading opinions which are presented, with endless distinctions, in his prolix discussions of this topic. †

The decrees of God are His eternal purposes. They are made in accordance with infinite wisdom. God foresees the results of all His possible actions. Yet, in the view of Baxter, the mode of the Divine prescience of actual events is to us inscrutable, and therefore the question, whether His foreknowledge is dependent on His purposes is beyond the reach of our faculties. ‡ The decree of God with respect to sin is simply a purpose not forcibly to prevent what he foresees will, without His efficient prevention, certainly occur. To the positive existence of sin,

* Hagenbach's Hist. of Doctrines, Vol. I. p. 478. Neander's Church History, Vol. IV. pp. 457—465.

† One cannot forbear to sympathize with those who deplored or smiled at Baxter's tedious distinctions. No man could divide a hair with so exquisite nicety. His fondness for logomachy often injured his cause. At the Savoy Conference he was pitted against Gunning, afterwards Bishop, first of Chichester, and then of Ely. Burnet says: "Baxter and he spent some days in much logical arguing, to the diversion of the town, who thought here were a couple of fencers engaged in disputes, that could never be brought to an end or have any good effect." (Burnet's "Own Times," Vol. I. pp. 283, 284.) The town were probably correct in their view. Yet, it is needless to say, Baxter was never a quibbling sophist, but was ever actuated by high moral aims. Often he alludes to some question as useless or impious, and grieves that it was ever raised; but for the sake of concord "a few necessary distinctions must be made," and then he goes on with them through many a weary page. With propriety he has been styled the last of the schoolmen. He seemed to think that men wanted only an exhibition of the truth to be convinced; and he would hardly have deemed an argument hopeless even with those whom the poet describes as on a "hill retired," reasoning high

"Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate."

‡ Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. pp. 24, 26, &c.

according to the view of Baxter, no specific decree is required ;* and in his view, the assertion of such a decree is in the highest degree objectionable,† since with the term decree he associated a preference on the part of the Deity that the event decreed, rather than its opposite, should occur. And it was a principle of his theology, as we have seen, that God prefers holiness to sin, in themselves considered and all things considered. The purposes of God have primary reference to his own actions.

ELECTION.—"The true meaning and scope of the doctrine of election is, that God, the absolute Lord and Benefactor of all, does not distribute his gifts equally, but, as it pleases His most wise will [*sapientissimæ voluntati*], gives to some more and greater, to others fewer and inferior blessings. To some He gives more grace, to the end that they may be certainly saved and happy ; but to some less grace—such as is merely necessary or sufficient (commonly so called)—but which He yet foresaw they would abuse to their destruction. And so it must be said that from eternity He has decreed that these blessings shall be distributed with the inequality with which He has actually distributed them." (Meth. Pars I. c. 2, p. 52.)

The order of Decrees.—In the order of time, the purposes of God are contemporaneous ; and to inquire respecting any other order than that of their execution is useless, if not impious. The ultimate end of God is His own glory or complacency in His glory. He predestinates men to destruction "only on the foresight of their wilful sin. The election of men to salvation is absolute, and not conditioned on His foreknowledge of their repentance."‡

§ 6. REDEMPTION.

Who is the Redeemer?—A human soul and a human body constitute the human nature of Christ ; this with the Divine nature of the eternal Word constitutes the person of the Mediator. The mode of this hypostatic union is incomprehensible. There are in Christ two principles of intelligence as well as of choice, the acts of which are separate ; but since the Divine nature moves the human faculties as subordinate, the act of the human nature is also the act of the Divine nature, while not every act of the Divine nature is also the act of the human nature, "for the Divine nature can do what is above and beyond the human."§ "So many diverse opinions have arisen about the person and natures of Christ, that we ought to beware of

* Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. p. 43. P. III. p. 72, &c.

† Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. p. 123.

‡ Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. p. 43.

§ Meth. P. III. c. 1, p. 31.

rashness in forming opinions and of a rash condemnation of those who differ from us."*

What is the origin of redemption?—"It must not be supposed that a covenant, properly so called, was formed between the Father and the eternal Logos. But since it was certain that some things were to be done by the Son, and some things were to be given to the Son, as incarnated, and some things were to be bestowed on men by His grace, theologians often call these divine decrees or volitions, by the name of covenant. But observe that these allegorical modes of speaking are not to be too often, or generally, used, lest they be mistaken for literal forms of speech. And when controversies grow out of them, we should revert to proper expressions." (Meth. P. III. c. 1, pp. 9, 10.)

Redemption springs from the love of God, and impious [nefandus] is the idea of those who attribute mildness and lenity only to the son.†

Did Christ suffer the punishment of sin?—In the first place, Baxter defines the term. Punishment, in its generic sense, is natural evil inflicted on account of moral evil. The primary and most common [famosissimus] meaning of the word is natural evil inflicted on the delinquent himself. But punishment, in a secondary and analogical sense, signifies the natural evil which, not directly, but mediately follows moral evil. This may occur in two cases: (1) where the sufferer has a natural connection with the offender, as in the instance of slaves who suffer for the faults of their master, or children for the faults of their parents; and (2) where suffering follows in accordance with a voluntary stipulation of the sufferer. The latter is called vicarious punishment.

Christ was not a sinner, and therefore in the usual meaning of the term, he was not punished. "Christ was not reckoned a sinner;" "for God does not judge falsely;" he was not punished, in the analogical sense of the term, for the faults of parents. He suffered vicariously, and therefore only in the last signification of the word can it be said that he was punished. "The sufferings of Christ were a natural evil, occasioned and remotely caused by the sins of the human race, and proximately caused by the obligation of a stipulation and proper consent of the sufferer."‡

Were the sins of men imputed to Christ?—In its primary and most proper signification, the term relates to "guilt of the

* Meth. P. III. c. 1, p. 36.

† Meth. P. III. c. 1, pp. 9, 10.

‡ Meth. P. III. c. 1, p. 38.

fault" [reatum culpæ]; and therefore sin is not, in this sense, imputed to Christ. But in an improper sense of the word, it can be said that our sins are imputed to Christ, "as they were the cause whence sprung the necessity of his suffering. But this phrase [viz. imputation of sins to Christ], however well it may be explained, though it can be tolerated, is yet improper, and is therefore not to be used too often, or in controversies, where there is great need of clearness."*

"The forensic meaning [of terms], when God is the judge, is their true and reasonable, and not their false meaning." "Christ did not suffer punishment on account of his own sins; therefore he was not reckoned a sinful person." (Meth. Pars III. c. 1, p. 47.)

"Christ chose and consented to be made a sacrifice for sinners; to a certain extent, he was our surety (sponsor pœnarum)." "Our sins were the remote cause of the sufferings of Christ. For if we had not, by means of our sin, become exposed to punishment [pœnarum reatum incidissemus], it could not have been in any way necessary for Christ to suffer punishment, as the means of liberating us." "In the proper sense of Imputation, not *our* sin but his own is imputed to Christ; not by God, but by men; not by the good, but by the wicked; not truly but falsely." (Meth. P. III. c. 1, p. 47.)

Did Christ die for all men?—Christ died for all, but not for all equally.† There are some benefits, as faith and repentance, which only a part of mankind actually possess; and hence we conclude that Christ did not determine that his death should eventually put all men in possession of them.‡ And yet he did intend and decree that the gift of them should be offered to all. Christ is the Redeemer of the human race, and suffered for the sins of the human race;§ the death of Christ is "in itself a remedy sufficient to profit all; but if it be not taken it will not heal."|| In consequence of his death, on the condition of faith and repentance, it is true that justification, adoption, and a right to celestial glory, are given to every man. Innumerable favours which "tend to produce repentance" are granted to all. To these benefits, there is added such assistance of the Holy Spirit as confers mediate or immediate [moral] power for the right use of them.¶

What is the matter of the Atonement?—The lofty dignity of Christ and his sinless obedience increase the value of his sufferings.** His sufferings were not the same in kind and degree as

* Meth. Pars III. c. 1, Determ. 7.

† Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. p. 53.

‡ Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. p. 118.

** Meth. P. III. c. 1, pp. 39, 40.

† Meth. P. III. c. 1, pp. 55, 56.

§ Meth. Pars III. c. 1, p. 42.

¶ Meth. P. II. p. 53.

are due to all sinners, nor is their value to be estimated by their severity. They were chiefly spiritual, and arose from his deep sense of God's displeasure at sin."* His humiliation forms a part of his atoning sacrifice.

What is the formal nature of the Atonement?—Christ did not literally fulfil the precept of the Law for us, "by representing our persons, as a man's servant pays his master's debt, by his command."† Nor did he literally bear the penalty for sinners. "The punishment of one is not the punishment of another." If the precept had been fulfilled, "we should not be bound to obedience;" if the penalty had been endured, "we should need no pardon."‡ It is more correct to say that "he suffered for our sake and in our stead," and "unless he had suffered we must have suffered."

What is meant by the satisfaction of Christ?—Satisfaction has respect remotely to the precept of the law and proximately to its threatening. The punishment of the sinner himself is satisfaction for the violation of the precept; the substituted punishment [i. e. suffering] of Christ is directly satisfaction on account of our release from punishment [impunitatem], and remotely on account of our disobedience.§

His sufferings render satisfaction, because they demonstrate the justice, wisdom and mercy of God, and enable Him to attain the ends of government in a better way than by executing the law and destroying the world.|| They express the Divine hatred of sin, and so repress any contempt of the lawgiver and the law, and are, moreover, wonderfully adapted to declare to the world God's love and compassion. Fitness to accomplish these ends is the principal ground of the satisfaction.¶ The punishment [i. e. suffering] of Christ is said to be meritorious in procuring the remission of sins, since it is the means voluntarily applied to attain the aforesaid ends.¶

Baxter often styles Christ our Surety, or "sponsor pœnarum." The word surety denotes one who undertakes to satisfy a creditor, when the debtor cannot pay. "But," he observes, "all this similitude of a creditor and debtor is to be limited in the application, according to the great difference of sin and debt, which will infer a great diversity in the consequents."**

§ 7. REGENERATION.

WHAT IS COMMON GRACE?—In interpreting the writings of

* Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. pp. 40, 41.

† Ib. p. 38.

‡ Meth. P. III. c. 1. p. 47.

§ Ib. p. 48.

|| Cath. Theol. B. II. P. I. p. 41. Works, Vol. XX.

¶ Meth. P. III. c. 1, p. 49.

** Ib. p. 38.

Baxter, it is necessary to consider his use of the term Grace. After the apostasy of the race, everything which they have, except their bare existence, is a gift, bestowed on them by the mercy of God. Hence, even man's natural power to do right (as it has been defined on a preceding page), when he is placed in the ordinary circumstances of life, is sometimes spoken of as a result of Divine grace, or as a gracious power. Hence, too, not only the supernatural influences of the Holy Spirit, but also all the arrangements of Providence, which have a tendency to win men from their sins and lead them to holiness, are the gifts of grace. Such gifts are bestowed on all men as give them, beyond their natural power, a moral ability or a facility for the performance of certain acts of duty.* If they perform these acts, they will acquire a moral power or promptitude for doing other and higher duties, until they have attained salvation and perfect holiness. Those who are not saved, must not simply neglect, but must positively *resist* merciful influences.†

Sufficient grace is given to all.—"By sufficient grace is meant that without which, the thing could not occur, and with which, it could be done. It is what is necessary and sufficient to produce the act; but not sufficient to render the event actually necessary or certain." (Meth. Pars III. c. 25, p. 265.)

"If they [men] talk only of passive or obediential power, and say 'man can believe because God can make him believe,' and so denominate man able to do that, which they mean God is able to make him do, this is to play with words." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 98.)

"All men have some helps and grace, in its kind sufficient to enable them to seek salvation, and God will not forsake them until they forsake him." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 133.)

What is special grace?—"Because no one would believe or have penitence without the aid of the Holy Spirit, plenitude of power is given to the Redeemer, to give the Holy Spirit to whom He chooses, and in whatever degree He pleases. But it is the wise design of the Redeemer not to give to men the same

* That men may believe this, he exhorts them "to turn their eyes a little from Pelagius, and everything else that useth to blind disputers with prejudice." (Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 156, 101.)

† On this subject, as we have before hinted, Baxter may not always be consistent with himself. He occasionally affirms that man has power, through grace, to do some acts which are preparatory to repentance, and employs such phraseology as would seem to imply that man has no *present* power to do more. Yet his strong doctrine of Natural Ability, which with him, as we have seen, is complete power for the performance of all duty, would require him in all these passages to signify a *moral* ability. That every man has full power, in some way, either mediately or immediately, to repent and be saved, is his unequivocal assertion. And to the possession of this power he links personal responsibility for declining the invitations of the Gospel. See Meth. P. III. c. 25, p. 291. Cath. Theol. B. II. p. 98.

degrees of aid ; but to vary the degree sometimes according to the preparation and receptivity of men, and sometimes only according to his good pleasure ; and, therefore, to give to some such degrees of aid as will efficiently work in them repentance and faith."

"It is given to the elect not only to be able to believe [*posse credere*] but also to believe." (Meth. Pars III. c. 25, p. 274.)

Is grace resistible?—" (1) Most of the disputants confess that the Divine working is not such as physically necessitates the human volition ; or takes away the simultaneous power to the contrary [*simultatem potentiæ ad contrarium*]. (2) With respect to the *force* of the means, almost all but the followers of Hobbes [*Hobbianos*] confess that it is not such as forces or physically necessitates the will." (Meth. P. III. c. 25, pp. 283, 286. Also Cath. Theol. B. II. pp. 136, 138.)

Has the truth an agency in regeneration?—Since man has the same essential faculties which he had before his apostasy, the spirit of God does not add to the mind any new faculty.* Faith and repentance are the acts of the natural faculties. To procure the performance of these acts, certain means, as preaching and reading, are appointed, which have an inherent aptitude to the end.* The Divine influence is in harmony with the nature of the mind, and "the word is a true cause which works with an efficiency subordinate to the final cause of conversion."† "It is most probable that God overcometh moral impotency and giveth moral power by moral means and operations."

The order of Divine operation in regeneration.—"It is most probable that He first rouses the mind by a certain awakening motion. 2. That He shows the *probability* of Divine truth. 3. That from this He excites some fear of punishment and desire of escaping it, and at length some little hope. 4. That then, before, by His Spirit, He renders the act of true faith and penitence morally possible, He gives a power of believing, inclined to the act (as the seed of faith). 5. And that at the same time, He excites the act of faith. 6. And that, finally, by frequent acts and the influence of the Holy Spirit, He produces a habit of faith, hope and love."

Who is the author of regeneration?—This topic is illustrated by a comparison of Paul and Nero. "Faith and unbelief are the constitutive, differencing causes." "Quest. 1. What is the cause (efficient) of Nero's unbelief? Ans. His own will or

* Cath. Theol. B. I. pp. 40, 41. B. II. p. 165.

† Meth. P. III. pp. 292, 293. Baxter appears to use the terms Regeneration and Conversion as interchangeable.

wicked heart. Quest. 2. What is the efficient cause of Paul's faith? Ans. 1. The principal efficient is God, by His Spirit. 2. The meritorious cause is Christ. 3. The chief ministerial efficient is Christ in giving the Spirit to work it. 4. The instrumental efficient is the Gospel. 5. The immediate efficient is Paul; for it is he that believeth and not God."

"This prerequisite disposition [of man] and the concurrence of man's will, is only the use of a power, freely before given of God, with all necessary helps to use it. And therefore that God is from first to last the first cause of all that is good in man, though not the only cause, and that of himself man can do nothing." (Cath. Theol. B. II. pp. 181, 183.)

"Lastly, forget not that as man is not moved as a stone, but governed as a moral agent, and as the wonderful changes by motion in the world are made *recipiendo ad modum recipientium*, by the diversity of receptive dispositions, which are no efficient causes of what they receive, so man can and must do somewhat, yea *much*, under God, to the due receptivity of the Divine Influx, not without God, nor by any power, not freely given him of God, but by a power which he may or may not use." "And when God giveth man not only the gold, if he will open his hand, and the meat, if he will open his mouth, or not turn away, and spit it out, and also giveth him all his vital power, by which he can do this, if he will, and also *can will it*, and giveth him both freedom to use this power, and manifold persuasions and helps to use it; all this must not be reproached as no grace, nor the world instructed in ingratitude, by them that should preach that Gospel of Christ which makes gratitude the universal complexion of all our duties, which must give life and beauty to them all." (End of the Discussion on Grace, Cath. Theol. B. II. pp. 196, 197.)

Do all, who are regenerated, persevere in holiness?—On this subject Baxter has written largely. He held that all the elect are kept by the agency of the Holy Spirit from falling into fatal sin. But the question, whether any but those who are elected to be saved are truly converted, he seems to have been unable fully to decide. He affirms that the authority neither of Augustine, nor Prosper, nor Fulgentius, nor of the church generally for a thousand years after Christ, can be adduced to sustain the doctrine of universal Perseverance. At one time he avowed his belief in the doctrine,* but in the "Catholic Theology," he inclines to the view, that "strong Christians" persevere, while Christians, weak in virtue, sometimes fall. "It is confest," he says, "that this point is no article of our

* In his tract on Perseverance, 1657.

creed, nor is an agreement in it necessary to church communion and Christian love, but difference in it must be accounted tolerable."*

It was a favourite belief of Baxter, that the number of the regenerate is not limited to those who profess a belief in the Christian religion. "As the sun," he says, "sendeth some light to the world before it riseth and is seen itself, so doth Christ send many excellent gifts of his grace to those that knew him not as incarnate." It appeared to him not improbable that some, besides nominal Christians, even some among the heathen, "do truly love God and holiness above the pleasures, profits, and honours of this world." The censures, of which this opinion was the cause, occasionally drew from him a sarcastic retort. "Those," he remarks, "that teach the church that it is a certain truth, that no one in the world, infant or aged, is saved from hell-fire, but Christians only, and that this is not only certain to such great understandings as their own, but must be so to all true Christians, do but discover that they overvalue their own understandings, and that siding hath contracted their thoughts and charity into a sinful narrowness, and that the opinion of men counted orthodox prevaieth more with them than the evidence of truth, and I think that they are to be numbered with those that by overdoing do dangerously undermine the Christian faith."†

§ 8. JUSTIFICATION.

Baxter's view of Justification is best learned by observing his doctrine of the Covenants. The Divine constitution, which was originally established with man, embraced two parts, the Law and its Sanctions; and as it contained a conditional promise, it may be called a Covenant.‡ Neither the legal precept nor the threat of punishment was annulled by transgression.§ By the law all are condemned.§ The Covenant of Grace is the promise of God, made in consequence of the work of Christ, that all who will repent of their sins shall be saved. We wish to ascertain the nature of the right [jus] to salvation, which is

* Cath. Theol. B. III. p. 217. B. I. P. II. p. 116.

† Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. p. 49. It was said of Baxter, by one who knew him, that he was "sparingly facetious," and satire certainly was not his usual weapon. But there was a class of persons in his time to whom he shows little mercy, and whom he describes "as those who are so very wise in their own eyes as hardly to suspect anything to be an error which they have long held, and who build much of their religion and theological reputation in adhering to the opinions of those whose communion they think most honoureth them, and who, out of a blind zeal for that which they count orthodox, will presently, without impartial consideration or friendly debate, magisterially pass their judgment among those that reverence them, and backbite those that they cannot confute."

‡ Meth. P. II. c. 2.

§ Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. p. 69.

acquired by those who fulfil the prescribed condition. It is not derived from our obedience, either actual or supposed, to the original law, nor is it founded on the fact that God judged Christ to be the legal person of the sinner, for such a judgment would not be true.*

"To say that Adam's Law meant '*Do this by thyself or by Christ, and thou shalt live*,' is a human fiction, not found in Scripture, confounding the law of innocency with the Gospel; and to say that the New Covenant maketh us one person with Christ, and then the law of Adam doth justify us, is a double error. We are not reputed one person with Christ, nor doth the first covenant justify any but the person that performeth it." (Cath. Theol. B. II. P. II. p. 62.)

"The disputes whether it be Christ's Divine, his habitual, his active or his passive righteousness, that is made ours to our justification, seemeth to be but the offspring of the error of the undue sense of Christ's personating or *representing* us in his righteousness, and the parcelling out of the uses and effects (that one is imputed to us instead of habitual righteousness, another instead of actual, and the third pardoneth our sins), is from the same false supposition. It is well that they suppose not that his Divine righteousness is imputed to our Deification." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. p. 42.)†

The covenant of redemption, in the view of Baxter, is a figurative representation of the Divine purposes.‡ And our whole right to salvation is derived from the gracious promise of God, who, on the ground of Christ's atoning work, publishes the offer of pardon, and freely justifies the believer.

"And so [Christ] is the true meritorious Cause of all. That Sacrifice and Obedience, Righteousness and Merit, which are directly given to God, for man, by [the] performance of Christ's undertaking, may yet be consequentially said to be given unto man, in that it was given to God for man, and in that the benefits merited were given to man; and so *relatively*, as to those benefits, the Sacrifice, Obedience, Righteousness, and Merit, may be said to be given unto us." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. p. 42.)

The foregoing passage indicates the only sense in which Baxter would allow the doctrine of the Imputation of Christ's righteousness. He contends that the faith of the Christian is imputed for his justification, not, however, as a meritorious

* Cath. Theol. B. II. P. II. p. 66. B. I. P. II. p. 75.

† See Meth. P. III. c. 27, p. 308.

‡ Meth. P. III. c. 1, pp. 9, 10.

cause.* Though he employs different phraseology, he seems to have held substantially the view of the stonement and of justification which has been taught by the New England theologians.

§ 9. CHRISTIAN VIRTUE.

Men have no virtue which deserves a legal reward. It is folly to divide the praise of a good act between God and man; for while the whole is due to God, a part is due to man, since man holds his powers in subordination to God, and has nothing but what he received. All Christians have an imperfect righteousness.†

"He that is no cause of any good work is no Christian, but a damnable wretch, and worse than any wicked man I know in the world. And he that is a cause of it [i. e., of a good work] must not be denied falsely to be a cause of it; nor a saint denied to be a saint, upon a false pretence of self-denial." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. pp. 73, 74.)

What is Holy Faith?—"This Gospel covenant is the Christian religion." "It is a true description of justifying and saving faith, that it is such an assent to the Gospel, as produces a trustful [fiduciale] consent to this covenant." (Meth. Pars III. c. 8, p. 95. Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. p. 82.)

"When faith is spoken of as a *virtue*, it always necessarily includes an act of the will. For the prime seat of morality is the will, and nothing is good but what is voluntary. To choose freely, or to place confidence in the fidelity of some one, is the moral form of faith. Therefore holy faith always includes an act of the intellect and of the will; because it is in the highest sense moral and voluntary." (Meth. Pars III. c. 27, p. 326.)

"As Christ, as Mediator, is the summary means and way of bringing man home to his Creator; so faith in Christ is a mediating grace to work in us the love of God." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. p. 91; also B. I. P. II. p. 82.)

The act of faith precedes the habit.—"God acts upon everything according to its nature." "But acquired habits follow very many acts; therefore infused habits follow at least one act. It is quite probable that, in the case of adults, by means of the word, through His vivifying and illuminating influence, He first moves the mind for the purpose of eliciting [ad elicendum] the first act of faith; and that from this a habit is produced." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. p. 84.)

What is repentance?—1. In its narrower sense, "the word

* Meth. P. III. c. 27, p. 311.

† Cath. Theol. B. I. P. I. p. 73.

repentance signifieth only the aversion of the soul from evil, by sorrow and change of mind." 2. "Repentance is sometimes taken comprehensively for the whole conversion of a sinner to God," "and is the same thing as faith, in the [its] larger sense, but expressed under another formal notion."

Distinction between faith and repentance.—"As man's mind is not so happy as to conceive of all things that are one, by a single conception; so we are not so happy in our language as to have words enough to express things entirely by one name, but we must have several words to express our inadequate conceptions by. And so that is called repentance, as the soul's motion from the *terminus a quo*, which is called sometimes faith or affiance, and sometimes love, from the motion of the soul to the *terminus ad quem*, though the *motus* be the same. But when faith and repentance are distinguished as several parts of the condition of the new covenant, the common sense is, that repentance signifieth *the conversion of the soul from sin and idols to God, as God*, which is, or includeth, faith in God; and faith signifieth specially faith in Christ as the mediator and way to God. And so [in this use of the terms] faith is below repentance as the means of it. (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. pp. 83, 84.)

Holy love.—The first holy act involves an exercise of love; but a man is not so properly said to love God, until he has trusted in Him for salvation, and love has become "the fixed habit or employment of the soul." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. p. 84.)

Yet, "no faith, no fear, no obedience, no praise, no suffering, is further accepted of God, and a part of true holiness, nor will prove our salvation than it participateth of predominant love to God." (Cath. Theol. B. I. P. II. p. 92.)

"The bellows of faith kindling love, and love working by holy obedience, patience, mortification, gratitude and praise, is the substance of all true religion." (Ib. p. 91.)

§ 10. ESCHATOLOGY.

Whether the sensitive principle ["*anima sensitiva*"] is a faculty of the thinking mind or distinct from it, is undetermined. Death does not annihilate the soul, or divide it into parts, or cause it to lose any of its essential powers. The mind does not give up its activity, nor does it lose its individuality and become absorbed in an all-pervading Spirit; nor is it transformed into any other creature, either of the same or of a different species. The souls of the redeemed, at the moment of death, are introduced by angels into the presence of Christ, and dwell for ever in heaven. The souls of the wicked enter upon a state of hopeless and endless suffering; for as the period of probation, and

with it the mutable state of man, close with the present life, the destiny of all is then irrevocably fixed.*

"The union of the rational soul with the body which has been formed anew, is the Resurrection."† Baxter indulged in curious speculations on the mode of the resurrection. He conjectures, that the vital principle ["*anima vegetativa*"] is pure, ethereal fire, and that while a portion of this fire adheres to the perishing body, another portion is indissolubly connected with the mind, and forms a spiritual organism. The subtle flame which invests the soul has only to touch the dust, and the body is restored to its pristine life and proportions.‡

The Resurrection is followed by the General Judgment. Whether there will be any change in the place of lost souls, after this event, is unknown; but their pains will be aggravated. The sources of their sufferings are not all revealed; but among them are probably outward fire and darkness, joined with the torment of evil passions and remorse of conscience.§

Baxter held that "the doctrines of immortality and a future state of retribution are evident by the light of nature."|| By arguments drawn from the nature of the soul, as an indestructible substance, its superior powers, its aspirations after happiness, and especially from its capacity of knowing and enjoying God, he endeavoured to prove that it is immaterial and everlasting. His belief, which was confirmed by the common consent of mankind to the doctrine, also derived support from the tales of celestial apparitions.¶ He argued the necessity of the endless punishment of the wicked from the justice of God as a moral Governor. An evil, so odious and dangerous as that of sin, is not to be endured under the government of God, without an adequate demonstration of His justice, and a vindication of the Divine Law from contempt. And when the penalty has been threatened, the veracity of God is pledged for its execution. In a remedial system even, His wisdom and goodness require Him to express His hatred of sin by inflicting the most severe sufferings upon the incorrigible.**

We have endeavoured to state the opinions of Baxter. In a subsequent Number, we design to present to our readers an estimate of his Theology and Philosophy.

* Meth. Pars IV. c. 3, p. 397.

† Meth. Pars IV. c. 5, p. 384.

‡ Ib. p. 390. Pract. Works, Vol. XXI. p. 447.

§ Meth. P. IV. c. 6, pp. 394—396.

|| Ib. c. 4, p. 380. Pract. Works, Vol. XVIII.

¶ Ib. XVIII. p. 284.

** Ib. c. 6, p. 393. XXI. pp. 95—115, 320.

ART. VII.—NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY ;

WITH COMMENTS ON A THIRD ARTICLE IN THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY AND PRINCETON REVIEW, RELATING TO A CONVENTION SERMON.

BY EDWARDS A. PARK, ABBOT PROFESSOR IN ANDOVER THEOL. SEMINARY.

WHEN Napoleon had made his majestic march to the Kremlin, and while he was retreating on a peasant's sled in a storm, he uttered the maxim that "there is but one step between the sublime and the ridiculous." We have been reminded of this incident by the late incursion of Dr. Hodge into our northern country, and his later precipitate egress. He advanced with the brave announcement that, "a man behind the walls of Gibraltar or of Ehrenbreitstein, cannot, if he would, tremble at the sight of a single knight, *however* gallant or well-appointed ;"* but he has now hurried back with the excuse, "There is another feature of Professor Park's mode of conducting this discussion, which is very little to our *taste*."† He sailed up along our rock-bound coast and cried aloud, "A man at sea with a stout ship under him, has a sense of security in no measure founded upon himself."‡ After *doubling* and *redoubling* his course, and *doubling* it over again, he has sped homeward with the apology, "When we ran out of the harbour in our yacht, to see what 'long, low, black schooner' was making such a smoke in the offing, we had no expectation to be called upon to *double* Cape Horn."§ We had said, in a plain way, that the same *truths* may be expressed in diversified forms, all reconcileable with each other. Our assailant rushed forward, with a seeming readiness to meet any foeman, anywhere, and proposed some of his own theories which he defied us to reconcile with our doctrines. We proved to him that his theories were not true, and that he himself did not believe them in his better moods. He now exclaims, "Where is this matter to end ? —This is a great deal more than we bargained for."|| And there is something rather ominous in the excuses which our antagonist has left behind him, for his very unexpected departure. After having publicly accused us of Rationalism, Schleiermacherism, Infidelity, profaneness, and, worse than all, "Pelagianism," he has retired because the discussion has assumed a "*personal* character."¶ After having introduced

* Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 319.

† Ib. p. 693. The italics throughout the present article are *our own*.

‡ Ib. p. 319.

§ Ib. p. 676.

¶ Ib. p. 688.

|| Ib. p. 676.

various doctrines, to which we had not even alluded, and having attempted to prove some of his theories, he listens to certain New England objections, and then retreats with the words, "We regard it, therefore, as a matter of *great* importance, that such questions should not be open, at least within the church (i.e. among Christians), to perpetually renewed agitation!"* This is significant. But the most instructive sign is, that our critic has declined an answer to our first Reply, because he did *not* understand it;† and has declined an answer to our second Reply, because he *did* understand it, and its contents were quite familiar to him.‡ It is a singular fact, that he has written an Essay twenty-one pages long, for the sake of excusing himself from answering our last argument, which might have been refuted in a single page, if it could have been refuted at all.

And among the apologies assigned by him for abandoning his position, there is one which deserves a formal statement. Our Reviewer drew out a creed§ which would have answered well enough as an amusing caricature of our faith, but which he dignified with the name "anti-Augustinian;" and he represented us as actually believing that strange creed to be true. He contrasted it with another system which he called the "Augustinian," and which likewise he represented us as believing to be true. He even ventured so far as to introduce a quotation, with the regular quotation marks, and to charge it upon ourselves, in which pretended quotation we are made to say of the Augustinian creed, "Let us admit its *truth*, but maintain that it does not differ from the other system" [the anti-Augustinian]. "Both [creeds] are *true*, for at bottom they are the same."|| He has ventured to accuse us repeatedly of having "*declared*," yea, of having "*proposed* to show," that those two creeds are "identical;" and only "different modes of stating the same general *truths*."¶ Now we affirm that neither we nor anybody else ever heard of that anti-Augustinian creed, until Dr. Hodge collected its discordant parts into one mass. No man, woman or child, not even "Pelagius" himself, ever believed it as a whole. It is no *system* at all, but a conglomerate of different schemes that contradict each other. Dr. Hodge himself has not dared to accuse any individual of believing it, except the author of a late Convention sermon. And his courage failed even here; for he once confessed that, "so far as the present discussion is concerned, he [Prof. Park] may hold neither of these systems in its integrity, or he may hold the one which we believe to be true, or he may

* Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 678.

† Ib. p. 307.

‡ Ib. p. 678, &c.

§ Ib. pp. 308—312.

|| Ib. p. 319.

¶ Ib. pp. 319, 320, 322, 326, 328, 692, 694, &c.

hold the opposite one;”* that is, he may attempt, “*ex professo*,” to prove that *both* are true, and still not acknowledge that either is true! We have once and again disclaimed a belief in that heterogeneous compound of errors mingled up for us by Dr. Hodge. We have pointed out some of its contradictions and eccentricities.† Had we deemed it worth our while, we might have resented the imputation of it to us, as at least an indecorum. But after all,—and will the reader believe it?—Dr. Hodge retires from his self-sought discussion, partly because we do not confine our Reply to the incoherent creed which was originated by himself, and then injuriously imputed to us.‡ First he requires us to *prove* a negative, viz. that his anti-Augustinian creed is not fairly stated: very well; we have shown that we favour no such compound of errors; that *as our creed*, it is not fairly stated, and has no more to do with our faith than Mohammedanism has to do with our Reviewer’s.§ Or secondly, he requires us to *prove* another negative, viz. that the *nondescript* creed imputed to us is not allowable: very well; we have shown that we do not allow it, and we challenge any man to name the individual who ever did allow it as a whole. Or, thirdly, he requires us to *prove* still another negative, viz. that he has not understood our theory: well, we have shown that we have harboured no theory like that which he has invented for us,|| and he himself is sometimes compelled to admit, that he imputes it to us merely by his own inference, which we will not sanction. Or, fourthly, he requires us to prove that our theory is philosophical: well, we have abundantly shown that it is demanded by the philosophy of common sense, and that he himself is necessitated to believe it in his better hours. But what if we had shown none of these things? What if we had not even denied that we believe that creed, which was never made to be *believed*, but to be *imputed*? If the anomalous medley of errors which our critic has been so kind as to devise for us be a logical result of our principles, he ought to have *proved* that it is so, instead of summoning us to prove that it is not. He ought to have produced at least one argument, to show that those errors grow up from our “three radical principles.” But when or where has he even hinted at so much as a single proof, that our principles lead into that medley? He has done nothing but *assert* that it is so; and now he has

* Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 320.

† Bib. Sacra, Vol. VIII. pp. 604, 605, 624, 627, &c.

‡ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 694.

§ Bib. Sacra, Vol. VIII. pp. 604, 605, 627, 628, &c. Also *Ib.* pp. 164—174.

|| *Ib.* pp. 594, 596, 627, 628, 646, &c. The first fourteen pages of our second Reply, detail the only theory on which we have attempted to reconcile opponents, and this is a sufficient proof that we have never made use of the scheme which Dr. Hodge, by mistake, ascribes to Schleiermacher.

hastened out of the contest in which he promised to be so victorious, and can plead no better apology than that we pay very little respect to his mere, sheer assertions. And is it enjoined in the ninth commandment, that anonymous Reviewers load an author with conjectural and false accusations of heresy, and then make a bold request that he spend all his time in proving a negative, and none of his time in showing that his principles have been once and again avowed by his accuser,—avowed in words which have suddenly become ‘*very little to the taste*’ of the man who first uttered them?*

But let us leave our author’s ingenious reasons for not holding out in the contest which he began. In his last Reply, he has made some remarks on New England theology, which have induced us to discourse on the same theme, with an occasional reference to that Reply.

In the preface to the first printed sermon ever preached in America is the following sentence: “So far as we can yet find, it [New England] is an island, and near about the quantity of England, being cut out from the main land in America as England is from the main of Europe, by a great arm of the sea, which entereth in forty degrees, and runneth up north-west and by west, and goeth out either into the South Sea or else into the Bay of Canada.”† This “great arm of the sea” means the Hudson river, the “South Sea” means the Pacific Ocean, and

* One chief benefit of theological controversy is, that it manifests the comparative necessity which the disputants feel for misrepresenting each other. He who has the greater need of this malpractice, has the weaker cause. We have long thought that our Reviewer impairs the public confidence in his theological system, by the extreme to which he carries his misstatements of other systems. Thus, because we have said that some men, speculatively believing different creeds, do yet in practical life disown their differences and heartily agree, Dr. Hodge goes so far as to ask: “Has any one, before our author, ever inferred from these facts, that idealism and materialism are different modes of one and the same philosophy, or that Arminianism and Calvinism, Moravianism and Pantheism, are but different forms of one and the same theology?” (Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 692.) He thus implies that we have a more absurd theory than anybody else, and yet his great object has been to stigmatize us as adopting nothing new, but rather an old Schleiermacherian theory! He overleaps himself; for a candid reader, instead of believing that we have ever misrepresented Materialism, Arminianism and Pantheism as in any sense allowable, will believe that our critic was compelled to make such a misstatement, because he was unable to oppose us in a more honourable way. We have said far less to authorize this caricature of our views, than our critic has said to justify us in publishing him as a worshipper of the Virgin Mary. For, notwithstanding all his protests against our effort to show the practical agreement of good men, he goes so far as to declare his speculative agreement not only with New England divines, but also with Romanists; see Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 324, 677, 686, &c. If, then, we should portray our Reviewer as sanctioning all the puerilities of Rome, we should have a better pretence for caricaturing him than he has for having caricatured us; but we should dishonour our dogmatic faith, by betraying a consciousness that we cannot defend it, except by misrepresenting its assailants.

† The Sin and Danger of Self-Love Described, in a Sermon preached at Plymouth, in New England, 1621, p. iii.

the "Bay of Canada" means the river St. Lawrence. Now it were about as easy to learn the shape of New England from the preceding account as to learn the type of New England Theology from the statements which some of its recent opposers have deemed it wise to make.

We beg leave, therefore, first of all, to explain the term, New England Theology. It signifies the formal creed which a majority of the most eminent theologians in New England have explicitly or implicitly sanctioned, during and since the time of Edwards. It denotes the spirit and genius of the system openly avowed or logically involved in their writings. It includes not the peculiarities in which Edwards differed, as he is known to have differed, from the larger part of his most eminent followers, nor the peculiarities in which any one of his followers differed, as some of them did, from the larger part of the others; but it comprehends the principles, with their logical sequences, which the greater number of our most celebrated divines have approved expressly or by implication. As German philosophy is not adopted by all Germans, and is adopted by some foreigners, so New England Theology is not embraced by all New Englanders, and is embraced by multitudes in other parts of the world. Its more prominent standards, however, are from these north-eastern States. It was first called New-light Divinity, then New Divinity, afterward, Edwardean, more recently, Hopkintonian or Hopkinsian. From the fact, that Edwards, Hopkins, West, and Catlin resided in Berkshire County, it was once called Berkshire Divinity. When it was embraced by Andrew Fuller, Dr. Ryland, Robert Hall, Sutcliffe, Carey, Jay, and Erskine, it was called American Theology by the English, in order to discriminate it from the European systems. It has been denominated New England Theology by Americans, in order to distinguish it from the systems that have prevailed in other parts of the land. In 1756, two years before the death of Edwards, there were, according to Dr. Hopkins, not more than four or five clergymen who espoused this new theology. In 1773, according to Dr. Stiles, it was advocated by about forty-five ministers; and Dr. Hopkins says that, in 1796, it was favoured by somewhat more than a hundred. Still, even while it was thus restricted in its influence, it was distinguished as a system peculiar to New England. In 1787, Dr. Stiles mentioned as among its champions the two Edwardses, Bellamy, Hopkins, Trumbull, Smalley, Judson, Spring, Robinson (father of Dr. Robinson, of New York), Strong, Dwight, Emmons. In 1799, Hopkins appended the names of West, Levi Hart, Backus, Presidents Balch and Fitch. We may now add such honoured men as Dr. Catlin, President Appleton, Dr. Austin. Divines of

this class were foremost in the missionary enterprises of the day. They were conspicuous in the establishment of our oldest theological seminaries, as Andover and Bangor. They gave its form and pressure to our theological system. They were imperfect men. They did not harmonize on every theme, but a decided majority of them stood firm for the "three radical principles," that sin consists in choice, that our natural power equals, and that it also limits, our duty. Idle, idle is the late attempt to draw a line of demarcation between the elder Edwards, Bellamy, on the one side, and the younger Edwards, Emmons, West, on the other, with regard to these three principles. Hopkins was the beloved pupil of the first President Edwards, and through life was the most confidential of his friends; was with him in sickness and in health, in the house and on journeys, by day and often by night. He was also an adviser and more than a brother to Bellamy. He was the teacher and a spiritual father of the younger Edwards, West, Spring, and he was an intimate friend of Emmons. He serves, therefore, as a *commune vinculum* between the elder Edwards and Bellamy, on the one hand, and the "choir leaders" of the "Exercise Scheme" on the other. But in more than two hundred of his free, private letters, and in all his published works, we have sought in vain for the slightest hint that, on these radical principles, there was even an approach to a disagreement between the two classes. He reached out his fraternal arms to Edwards and to Emmons, and gave them both his approval and his blessing in their maintenance of these three doctrines, and he often expressed, as clearly as words can express, his hearty union with the forerunner and the follower. And all the theories which the original Edwardians and the later Coryphæi of the Exercise Scheme were harmonious in espousing, are parts of the New England system.

What worthy end, now, could our Reviewer aim to accomplish by insinuating that we "regard the little coterie to which" we belong, "as all New England?"* We belong to no party which has not been honoured throughout the Christian world; but does our assailant dream that "*all* New England" must unite in the New England Theology? What! a single speculative creed for the Churchmen and Come-outers, the Presbyterians and the Quakers, the Baptists and the Swedenborgians, the Sub-lapsarians and the Supra-lapsarians, the Owenites and the Baxterians, the Burtonites and the Emmonites, of a community whose fathers were John Robinson and Roger Williams! We have never pretended that New England Theology is the dogmatic faith of every man, woman, and child, or of a majority of the laymen, or even clergymen, of these free States. It has,

* Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 694.

however, been the faith of certain elect minds, whom New England has loved, and will ever love to venerate.

We now proceed to say, in the second place, that the Theology of New England is marked by certain new features. We have seen that for a hundred years it has been called "new," it has been opposed as new, it has been admired as new. All its designations which we have just repeated show it to have been new. The younger Edwards wrote an essay on the "Improvements made in Theology by his father, President Edwards."* We do not mean to say, that the Edwardean school discovered principles which were never thought of before. They claim to have brought out into bold relief the obscurer faith of good men in all ages. They gave a new distinctness, a new prominence, to doctrines which had been more vaguely believed by the church. They produced new arguments for a faith which had been speculatively opposed by men who had practically sanctioned it. We say that Aristotle first discovered the syllogistic art, although Adam reasoned in syllogisms, whenever he reasoned at all. We say that Bacon first detected the law of induction, although Eve made obeisance to that law before she decided to eat the apple. We say that Longinus and Tully were among the first to find out the principles of rhetoric, and yet we are aware that all men, in all times, have known enough of those principles to comply with them in their speech. He is called a discoverer who makes that palpable which had been dim, and shows that to be reasonable which had formerly been held by an instinct.

We might illustrate these remarks by referring to several doctrines, but we will confine our illustration to the single truth, that an entirely depraved man has a natural power to do all which is required of him; a truth which has been so clearly unfolded by the New England divines, that it properly belongs to their distinctive system.† All unsophisticated thinkers, we

* See Dr. Jonathan Edwards's Works, Vol. I. pp. 481—492.

† Dr. Hodge errs in supposing that our natural power to repent must be the same as a power to regenerate ourselves. (Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 682, 683.) The very term, regenerate, implies that there is a parent, and also a child distinct from the parent. It has a different relation from the term repentance. It refers to the renewing Father, as well as to the renewed offspring. To say that a man can repent, is as different from affirming that he can regenerate his soul, as to say that he can learn is different from affirming that he can impart knowledge to his soul; or as to say that he can go from one place to another is different from affirming that he can carry himself in his arms from one place to another. Dr. Hodge asks, "Where is the man who has ever regenerated himself?" We answer by asking, first, Where is the commandment which requires a sinner to regenerate himself? and secondly, Is there no difference between a man's actually doing what the law does require of him, and his being able to do it? There is a requisition that we make ourselves new hearts; but no requisition that we be born again, by a special divine influence; and it is one thing to have a power of obeying, and another thing to obey actually. Our Reviewer is not alone in overlooking these distinctions.

are aware, have practically believed that a just God will not command men to do what they have no power to do; that he will not punish them with unending pain for doing as well as they can; that, in every case, physical ability is commensurate with obligation. In what sense, then, may so old a doctrine be called new? In this sense: the Edwardean school have made it more prominent and more effective than it has been made by some; have shown more fully than others have done its agreement with the truths of man's entire sinfulness and of God's decrees; have defended it against those metaphysical Calvinists who speculatively deny their own practical faith; have been the first to make obvious, prominent and impressive, the consistency of those two truths, which all good men have more or less secretly believed,—that a sinner can perform what a reasonable law requires of him, and that he certainly will never do as well as he can, unless by a special interposition of Heaven. They deserve far more gratitude for their originality in developing these truths, than Hume deserves for his originality in unfolding the laws of mental suggestion.

It has been lately maintained, however, that on this topic Edwards and his followers taught nothing which the Calvinistic standards had not taught with equal uniformity and consistency; that New England Divinity does not recognize a sinner's power to use his faculties aright, but simply recognizes the fact of his possessing a reason, a conscience and a will. When the word *able* is used in its literal and proper sense; a sense too simple to be made clearer by a definition; then, we are told, the Edwardean school believe, not that a sinner is able to use his capacities aright, but only that he is endowed with the above named capacities, distinguishing him from brutes. After all his past opposition to Edwards on the Will, Dr. Hodge now seems to believe that Edwards, "Bellamy, Dwight, and the other great men of New England," *denied* that "ability limits responsibility," and meant no more than that "since the fall man retains all his faculties of soul and body, and is therefore a free, moral agent." *

* This novel mode of explaining the Edwardean system has been advocated by several recent authors, and is here ascribed to Dr. Hodge on the ground of his assertions in Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 681—683, 685, 686, 693, 694. On those pages he gives in his adhesion to the great New England standards concerning the will and sin, and alludes to our own "*hallucination*." In the same paragraph which refers to our hallucination, he says, that the advocates of the "Exercise Scheme" were led to a "*denial*" of the doctrine that sin consists in sinning, and that the three radical principles which he has imputed to a Convention Sermon, were never "*rejected*" by any class of New England divines reputed orthodox, except the Emmons and the New Haven schools (p. 694). We presume that he meant here, as we hope that he has meant elsewhere, exactly the opposite of what he said; but it was not very *opportune* for him to speak of our own hallucination, in the very paragraph which combines so singular a want of carefulness, with so singular a kind of charity.

Are our opponents right, then, in affirming that the far-famed "natural ability" of the Edwardean school means nothing more than the natural capacities of soul and body and does not include an adequate power to use those capacities as they should be used?

1. This explanation is utterly inconsistent with the language of that school. It may agree with some of their expressions, but not with the rich variety of them. Our standards teach that, in the "proper sense of the terms," man *can* now repent, has now power to love. Do they say that a child, while it remains an *infant*, has power to speak, because it has the natural faculties of a speaker; that it can walk in its earliest days, because it has the natural faculties of a walker? Of what use is it to prove that man has the capacities of a moral agent, if he cannot use them in the right way? How can they be called power in its only "proper" signification?—and yet in this signification Edwards often affirms that we have power commensurate with duty. He refers not only to the existence, but also to the degree and extent of our faculties. Thus he writes: "We can give God no more than we have. Therefore if we give him so much, if we love him to the utmost *extent* of the faculties of our nature, we are excused. But when what is proposed, is only that we should love him as much as our capacity will allow, this excuse of want of capacity ceases, and obligation takes hold of us, and we are doubtless obliged to love God to the *utmost* of what is *possible* for us, with such faculties *and* opportunities *and* advantages to know God *as we have*."* The *faculties* must have *opportunities* enabling them to act.

Dr. Bellamy teaches, in a volume which Edwards recommended, that the heathen are without excuse because they enjoy "sufficient means of knowledge;" that God's law is on "a perfect level" with man's "natural powers *and* natural advantages;" "that if God looks upon the advantages of the heathen sufficient, no wonder that he so often speaks of the advantages of his own professing people as being *much more than* barely sufficient, even although they enjoy only the outward means of grace, without the inward influences of the Spirit;" "and thus we see how all mankind have *not only* sufficient natural powers, but *also* sufficient outward advantages to know God, and perfectly conform to his law, even the heathen themselves."† By sufficient outward advantages, Bellamy means all advantages except the special interposition of God's Spirit.

What says Dr. Smalley? "It must, I think, be granted that we do generally suppose a man's present duty cannot exceed his

* Edwards on Original Sin, Part I. Chap. I. Sect. V.

† See Bellamy's Works, Vol. I. pp. 107, 109, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, &c.

present *strength*, suppose it to have been *impaired* by what means it will.* If, then, the strength of the faculty be lessened, the duty is lessened. This strength of the faculty, and not the mere faculty itself, is power "in the proper sense of that term." The faculty must be strong enough to overcome all natural hindrances to right choice. Hence Dr. Smalley often speaks of a "want of opportunity" as excusing the sinner from blame.† Dr. Jonathan Edwards expressly declares that, on his father's theory, "men have physical power to remove their moral inability; that is, they are able to do what they are unwilling to do."‡

Dr. Hodge has seen fit to inform us, that "the aberration of the advocates of the Exercise Scheme" on this topic "was in the direction of ultra-Calvinism."§ Let us then go a little way in this ultra-Calvinism. The greatest of those advocates addresses the unregenerate thus: "You are as able to love God, as to hate him. You are as able to turn from sin as to continue sinning. You are as able to love God before you do love him as afterwards." He often says that unrenewed men are "as able to do right as to do wrong, and to do their duty as to neglect their duty; to love God as to hate God, to choose life as to choose death; to walk in the narrow way to heaven as in the broad way to hell;" "as able to embrace the Gospel as a thirsty man is to drink water, or a hungry man to eat the most delicious food;" "they can love God, repent of sin, believe in Christ and perform every religious duty, as well as they can think, or speak, or walk."|| And this is the common representation of the "Exercise" school, and this, according to Dr. Hodge, is "in the direction of ultra-Calvinism." It certainly is an avowal of something more than a mere impracticable faculty.

Again, if natural ability be nothing more than the capacities of reason, conscience and disabled will, what then is natural inability? Is it the want of reason, conscience and disabled will? When New England writers affirm that man has not natural power and is therefore not required to become as holy as his Maker, do they mean that he has not the faculties of a

* Smalley's Sermon on Moral Inability, p. 5. Ed. 1811.

† Smalley's Sermon on Natural Ability, p. 38. Ed. 1811.

‡ Edwards's Works, Vol. I. p. 309. Dr. Edwards here, as elsewhere, affirms directly what Dr. Hodge implicitly denies, in Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 682.

§ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 694.

|| Emmons's Sermons, Vol. V. pp. 154, 175. Vol. IV. pp. 352, 357—359, 361, 514. Vol. VI. p. 92. The authority of Dr. Emmons on this subject is very important. He was the brother-in-law of Dr. Samuel Spring, and agreed with that divine more nearly, perhaps, than with any other. "When Dr. Spring died. I lost my right arm," was a remark which he often repeated. The most munificent founders of Andover Theological Seminary were the devoted adherents of Dr. Spring, and admirers of his theology, and this was Emmonism.

moral agent? Dr. Smalley answers the question by saying, "Natural inability consists in, *or arises from*, want of understanding, bodily strength, *opportunity*, or *whatever* may prevent our doing a thing when we are willing, and strongly enough disposed to do it;" and also, "Persons who have ordinary intellectual powers, and bodily senses, *and are arrived to years of discretion and live under the light of the Gospel*, labour under no natural inability to obtain salvation" [by faith in Christ].* It is the common remark of the Edwardean school, that men have no inability to repent except their unwillingness, and this unwillingness is a sin, and sin is a voluntary act.

Our opponents are misled by confining their attention to one class of words, and using that class in its narrowest sense. When they read in Bellamy, for example, that the natural power to do right means "the capacities of a moral agent," they overlook his frequent explanations that "men's natural powers are *adequate* with the law of God, and so they, as to their natural capacities, are *capable* of a perfect conformity to the law."† We allow that, speaking in a general way, New England divines do often affirm, that our natural power is our natural capacity; but they do not mean to trifle; they employ the word *capacity* in its widest sense; they refer to a capacity which is *capable* of doing what is justly demanded of it; and not to an incapable capacity, which is nothing better than a natural incapacity, the very thing which they always deny. So when they speak of our natural powers and natural abilities, they mean abilities which are able, and powers which are sufficient, to bear what is rightly laid upon them.‡ "Nothing can be plainer," says Emmons,§ "than that those who have a natural power to act, have the same natural power to refrain from acting;" hence it is obvious that he uses the terms will, choice, moral agent, in their fullest sense, and, so used, they imply not a mere faculty of will, but a faculty able to choose or to refuse the same thing. What if a man have powers utterly incapable of performing the part assigned them? Merely because he has ears, can he be required to hear the conversation of the antipodes? Merely because he has eyes, can he be bidden, on penalty of eternal death, to see the remotest star of the universe? And on the same principle, what if he have a power of

* Smalley's Sermons on Moral Inability and Natural Ability, pp. 9, 37. Ed. 1811. See also Catlin's Compendium, Essay XV. Griffin's Park Street Lectures, Lect. I. West on Moral Agency, Part. I. Sect. 2. Dwight's Theology, Sermon 133.

† Bellamy's Works, Vol. I. pp. 105, 106, 109, 115, &c. &c. Dr. Bellamy here uses the word "adequate;" Dr. Hodge objects to this word above all others relating to the subject, and yet claims to agree with Bellamy. See Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII. pp. 681—683, 693, 694.

‡ Smalley's Sermon on Natural Ability, pp. 38, 39. Ed. 1811. Bellamy's Works, Vol. I. p. 93. Ed. 1850.

§ Emmons's Works, Vol. IV. pp. 304, 305.

will? Can he be justly required to put forth a choice equal to that put forth by an archangel, or to perform any kind of act to which his powers are naturally inadequate?* The doctrine of New England is, that any powerlessness, in the original, literal, and proper meaning of the word, is incompatible with obligation.

2. The new explanation which our opponents give of natural power, is inconsistent with the history of the disputes on the subject. President Edwards often says, that "no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean," can even conceive of any freedom greater than he ascribes to man; "and I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form a higher imagination of liberty."† He has always been opposed by the assertion that, before the fall, men had more freedom than they have now; and that although in paradise they lost their liberty and power to obey, yet God has not lost his right to command. Here has been and is now, a dispute. Edwards affirms, that for men to have more than their present freedom is inconceivable. His opponents object, that they once had more and lost it. He says, that for men to have a power of freer choice than they now have, is as impossible, as for an animal in *Terra Del Fuego* to take a step always before the first step. His Calvinistic opponents reply, that this power which he ridicules was once possessed by Adam. What do they mean? That Adam had once a moral power to do right? But Edwards never disputed this fact, for this moral power is holiness itself. Do they mean that Adam lost the natural capacities of a moral agent? They disclaim such an idea. They must mean, therefore, that Adam had and lost the power of using his capacities aright; he lost his natural ability. But Edwards affirms, that the race have as real a natural ability as they ever had.

Again, the Edwardean affirms, that holy beings in heaven possess a natural but not a moral power to do wrong. Does he mean that they have the natural capacities of a moral agent? Then there would be no dispute. But there is a dispute. The Edwardean is reproved, and told that the blessed in heaven have *no* power to do wrong. Now does the objector mean that they

* We had hoped that our Reviewer would attempt to explain the difference between the morality of requiring a man to love God when man has no real strength to do so, and the morality of requiring a man to love God with a greater degree of strength than belongs to man's constitution. See *Bib. Sac. Vol. VIII.* pp. 600, 601. But our assailant has chosen an easier part, and has merely reaffirmed some irrelevant distinctions. See *Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII.* p. 681, 682. Does he really believe that the "civil good" of the old divines has any reference to the supposed holiness which exceeds our constitutional powers? If not, why did he flee to the misapplied distinction between "civil" and "spiritual obedience?" Our question still remains unanswered: What is the moral difference between punishing a man for not being virtuous when he is literally unable to be so, and punishing him for not being more virtuous than he is literally able to be?

† Letter to a Minister of the Church of Scotland,

will not (i.e. they have a moral impotence to) do wrong? The Edwardean agrees with him. Still, the objector perseveres in impugning the Edwardean, and denying just what the Edwardean affirms, that the spirits in heaven have a power to make a wrong use of their capacities, and this disputed power is natural ability. It is a singular phenomenon that our opposers ascribe to Adam in paradise, more liberty than to any other being in the universe. "The inhabitants of heaven," they say, "have no power to sin. Men and fallen spirits have, in themselves, no power to be holy. But Adam, being left to the freedom of his own will, had a power to do right and also to do wrong, and used his power in doing both!"

3. This new explanation of physical ability is disrespectful to the memory of our fathers. Many of them have supposed, that our national literature is honoured by the Edwardean discriminations between physical and moral ability. And when the younger Edwards declared that before these distinctions were made, "the Calvinists were nearly driven out of the field by the Arminians, Pelagians and Socinians,"* did he mean that the tide of war was turned by his father's discovering man to be endued with reason, conscience, and disabled will? And when Dr. Dwight was born so high as to sing,†

"From scenes obscure did Heaven his Edwards call,
That moral Newton and that second Paul,"—
[Who,] "in one little life, the Gospel more
Disclosed than all earth's millions kened before,"—

did the bard thus exult because this "moral Newton" had found out that man, who was always known to be *wilful*, really had the capacity of will? And was it because this "second Paul" had detected a difference between the natural faculties of a moral agent, and the agent's inclination to use those faculties in a holy way, that another poet exclaimed on hearing of Edwards's death,

"Nor can the muse in deepest numbers tell,
How Zion trembled when this Pillar fell?"‡

Did several of our strong-minded fathers publish volumes of long-drawn, wire-drawn arguments, to prove that the possession of a will was not the same thing with true virtue, which is moral power to do right? Did they expose themselves to cavil and obloquy, and the charge of "Pelagianism," merely for the sake of proclaiming the discovery that impenitent man was not a

* Dr. Jonathan Edwards's Works, Vol. I. p. 481. † Triumph of Infidelity.

‡ See first edition of Edwards on Original Sin, p. x.

stone nor a brute, but was elevated above both by rational and moral faculties? Robert Hall teaches us, that the "important distinction" between physical and moral impotence "was not *wholly* unknown to our earlier divines;" and adds, "The earliest regular treatise on this subject it has been my lot to meet with, was the production of Mr. Truman;" and yet the learned minister of Cambridge questions even Mr. Truman's "claim to *perfect* originality."* Did the profound genius, then, of Robert Hall, pay homage to Mr. Truman for anticipating our own Edwards, in the discovery that man, since the fall, retains his human nature, and that this is not real holiness?† And have our fathers not only been cheating themselves with this "hallucination," but have their opponents been gravely disputing what few skeptics on earth ever called in question before? No. The New England theory of the will is a distinct and philosophical, and therefore uncommon, exposition of the very common faith, that a sinner can do without help what he is justly required to do without help, and can do with aid what he is justly bidden to do with aid. The theory may well be called original, for its faithfulness to human nature and the divine government; a faithfulness, alas! how unusual in scholastic treatises. So far forth as the theory unfolds the before hidden teachings of conscience, it is a specimen of the New England system; the substance of which is old, like all truth, but the form is novel, because it is a luminous and harmonious development of ideas which *had* been confused.

In the third place, New England Theology is Calvinism in an improved form. It does not pretend to be a perfect system. Both Edwards and Hopkins reiterated the wish and hope, that their successors would add to the improvements which the Genevan faith had already received. Neither does our system profess to be original in its cardinal truths. It has ever claimed that these great truths are the common faith of the church; that they are recognized in many evangelical creeds; that Calvinism contains the substance of New England Theology, not always well proportioned, not seldom intermingled with the remnants of an erring scholasticism, and sometimes enveloped

* Hall's Works, Vol. II. pp. 450, 451. American edition.

† Although Dr. Hodge claims to agree with Edwards on the Will, he fails to remember that, according to Edwards, a moral power to do right is a disposition to do right, and the want of this power is a disposition to do wrong. With much emphasis, Dr. Hodge insists that, "since the fall, men are *both* 'indisposed and disabled' to all spiritual good." (Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 681.) This expression means, on the theory of Edwards, that men are *both* indisposed *and* indisposed to all spiritual good. To be morally disabled is, with Edwards, only to be disinclined.

in inconsistencies and expressed in a nervous style. "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau." The substance of our theology is Calvinistic; here it is old. Much of its self-consistency is Edwardean and Hopkinsian; here it is new. It is not mere Calvinism, but it is consistent Calvinism. Instead of pretending to be an entirely new revelation, it *has* always professed to be a revised and corrected edition of the Genevan Creed. As such, it was extolled by its early friends, and ridiculed by its early foes. That Hopkins was far from having an ambition to shine as the originator of an altogether novel creed, is apparent from the following modest words which he wrote in his eightieth year: "I believe that most of the doctrines, if not all, I have published, are to be found in the writings of former divines; viz. Calvin, Van Mastricht, Saurin, Boston, Manton, Goodwin, Owen, Bates, Baxter, Charnock, the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, Willard, Ridgley, Shepard, Hooker, &c. These, indeed, did not fully explain some of those doctrines which are asserted or implied in their writings; and many, if not most of them, are, in some instances, inconsistent with themselves, by advancing contrary doctrines."* It was in reference to his labour in fitting together the heterogeneous parts of the Genevan creed, that Emmons said, "I have spent half my life in making joints." Both he and Hopkins defended the substance of Calvinism earnestly and reverently; and the Genevan divine who now assails their memory, must be ignorant of their controversial successes, or careless of that grace which is called "the memory of the heart."

Let us now allude to a few particulars, in which the New England divines have been employed in straightening the crooked parts of Calvinism, and have loved to retain all its theories which could be made to hold together. A favourite New England idea has been, that the certainty of human action is distinct from its necessity. But this is Calvinistic; for the great Genevan himself has said, "By impossible I mean that which never was, and which is prevented from being in future by the ordination and decree of God." "There is no reason for cavilling at the remark, that a thing cannot be done, which the Scriptures declare will not be done."† "I will not hesitate, therefore, simply to confess with Augustine, that the will of God is the necessity of things, and that everything is necessary which he has willed, just as those things will certainly happen which he has foreseen."‡ An Edwardean never complains of such defi-

* Hopkins's Ms. Letter in possession of the author.

† Institut. Lib. II. Cap. VII. § 5. See also § 21.

‡ Institut. Lib. III. Cap. XXIII. § 8.

nitions, but only regrets that they are so often forgotten by the Genevan school, and that a necessity is merged into a fate.

So are New England writers satisfied with many definitions which Calvinists give of human freedom. In describing the liberty which is "inseparable from the will," that learned old Puritan, W. Perkins, says, "Liberty of will consists in a double faculty; the first is, that when of itself it chooses anything, it can also on the other hand refuse the same; in the schools, this is called the liberty of contradiction. The second is, that when it chooses anything, it can choose another or the contrary; and this is called the liberty of contrariety."* We are often told by the Genevan divines, that the will is not determined to its volitions by a *natural* or instinctive necessity, as the sun is necessitated to shine, and the fire to burn, and the horse to eat grass or hay;† but that our freedom involves the intellectual faculty or power to discern good or evil, the power of will to choose or refuse either, and also the strength to execute the choice.‡

What more can a New England theologian desire? Only one thing; that the Calvinists would not here, as elsewhere, disown their faith. But this they do; for they no sooner ascribe to us free agency, than they take it all back, and affirm that man is free only to evil, and has not the slightest degree of power to choose good. This free will, "inseparable from man," is yet said to be "injured and destroyed;" we have an "utter and absolute impotence to do right;" and, in the words of Boston, "our father Adam, falling from God, did by his fall so dash him and us all in pieces, that there was no whole part left, either in him or us," &c. &c.§ Now we affirm, that if it be possible for human language to express a contradiction (like iron-wood, *σιδηρόξυλον*), it does express one in the Calvinistic sentence, that (properly speaking) man *must* have the ability to choose between right and wrong, and yet has not "the least particle of ability" to choose right.||

* "The Free Grace of God and the Free Will of Man," translated in the Southern Pres. Review, Vol. IV. pp. 527—540.

† See Turretin, Inst. Theol. Pars I. p. 729. Van Mastricht, Lib. IV. Cap. 4. § xxx.

‡ See, for example, Bucan. Inst. Theol. Loc. XVIII. § 1. Thomas Boston gives a definition equally unlimited.

§ Boston's Works, Fol. ed. p. 815.

|| Dr. Hodge is indignant at us for quoting sentences in a Princeton Review, which are understood to declare that man has an adequate power of choosing between good and evil; and for not quoting other sentences in the same Review which are understood to deny that man has such a power. But this indignation is unwarranted; for we expressly said, and our aim was to show, that the Review contradicts itself; and need we particularize *all* the instances in which its pendulum swings from one to the other extreme? Comp. Bib. Sac. Vol. VIII. pp. 600—602, with Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII. pp. 688, 689.

It is to relieve evangelical doctrine from this strife with itself, that our divines have explained the sinner's power of choosing right, to be consonant with the certainty of his choosing wrong; and the certainty of his choosing wrong, to be no literal necessity; and thus they have united the opposite poles of science into one attractive system. The process is a simple one, but nearly all discoveries appear easy to him who has once made them.

In their dogmatic theories, rather than in their practical faith, Calvinists have contradicted themselves with regard to the divine agency in producing sin. Inspiration declares, that God 'hardens the heart of men,' and 'moves them to do wrong,' and 'puts a lying spirit within them,' and 'deceives them,' and 'creates evil.' These intense expressions of a profound truth have been transferred into the reasonings of the Genevan school; and even the learned founder of that school, who was far milder on this topic than many of his successors have been, has yet sometimes written as if the fervid words of inspired prophets were to be used like the exact phrases of a metaphysical creed. In reply to men of "delicate ears," who choose to say that God permitted, rather than caused, the obduracy of Pharaoh, Calvin remarks, that "there is a difference between suffering a thing to be done, and actually doing it; and God sets forth in this passage not his endurance, but his power. It troubles me not to say, and confidently to believe, what is so often said in the Bible, that God brings the wicked into a reprobate mind, delivers them over to shameful vices, blinds their intellect and hardens their heart. It may be said that God is thus made the author of sin, and this is detestable impiety; but I answer that he is not blamed in the least, when he is said to exercise judgment; therefore if the blinding of the mind be his judicial act, he cannot be charged with crime for inflicting this penalty."* "What says the Spirit? Hardening is from God, that he may urge them on (*præcipitet*) whom he designs to destroy."† In his Commentary on Rom. ix. 18, Calvin censures those men as *diluti moderatores*, who say that the hardening of the heart is a mere permission of wickedness. But the ablest men of his school often deny that God exerts any positive agency in the production of sin, and then contradict themselves, by saying that our passive nature is itself sin. Must not this nature have a creating and sustaining cause? Adam does not create it, nor Satan. It is created, then, by God. Calvinists believe that preservation is a continued crea-

* Calvini Opp. Om. Tom. I. p. 269, in Exodum iv. 21.

† Op. Om. Tom. I. p. 35, in Josue, xi. 19.

tion, and they are driven to admit that our nature is constantly re-created by Jehovah, and yet the nature is sin. In this dilemma, they rush to a scholastic distinction which, even if it mean anything, avails nothing; and they affirm that God is the author of our nature as an essence, but is not the author of it as sin! Who then is the author of it as sin, or as *a* sin? * It must have an author. Is man himself the personal cause of his passive iniquity, which exists before his own personal action? † Nothing is gained by saying, that nature often means disposition. ‡ For, we ask, who is the author of this passive disposition? There is no way of covering up or retreating from the inference, that if our passive disposition, which we cannot separate from our infantile nature, be iniquity, or *an* iniquity, then the author of that disposition is the author of iniquity. And yet men who hold the premise, reject the conclusion, and deny, with emphasis, that He who made us, made also the nature, i. e. the disposition with which we were made! Seeing these theorists in trouble with their own hopeless incongruity, the New England divine went to their help, more than half a century ago. He taught that men must be the agents of all their own sin, and at the same time that God has made and placed them so that they will certainly and freely do wrong; that God never causes wickedness, in such a sense as renders it literally impossible for the sinner to avoid it, and yet that he never leaves the impenitent man in a state in which his wicked choices are uncertain. Thus is preserved the profound meaning of the declarations, that men harden their own hearts, and that God hardens them; and thus it is perfectly consistent to deny that Jehovah is the author of sin, and at the same time to affirm, that he so constitutes and circumstances men, that they will certainly do evil. The New England theory has been well expressed by the two Edwardses, thus: "The divine disposal, by which sin certainly comes into existence, is only establishing the certainty of its future existence. If that *certainty*, which is no other than moral necessity, be not inconsistent with human liberty, then surely the cause of that certainty, which is no other than the *divine disposal*, cannot be inconsistent with such liberty." § Hopkins expresses this truth, when he says:

* Each created human nature is itself sin. Then it is *a* sin. There are as many passive sins, therefore, as there are infants. Truly, we need a new language, or else New England Divinity.

† Some reply, that we were the causes of our own passive sin, when we were in Adam. But there is yet wanting a *personal* cause of this sin, existing in ourselves as distinct persons.

‡ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 684, 685.

§ Dr. Jonathan Edwards's Works, Vol. I. pp. 485, 486. See the same idea in the President's Inquiry on the Freedom of the Will, Part IV. Sections 9 and 10.

"Something must have taken place previous to his sin, and in which the sinner had no hand, with which his sin was so connected as to render it certain that sin would take place just as it does."* Here is the substance of Calvinism, in the self-congruous form of New England Theology.

Were it seemly to smile, while writing on so grave a theme, we should be tempted to do so by the lame English on which our Reviewer essays to get away from the logical results of his creed. He is so fond of using fervid expressions in his argumentative paragraphs, that he is often misled by them into errors from which he can extricate himself only by an unwholesome strain upon his mother tongue. At first he said with much apparent emotion, that our nature is "truly and properly sin."† We replied, that if our nature be sin, the sin must have been committed by the author of our nature, just as the author of any actual sin committed that sin.‡ Now what does our Reviewer rejoin? He gravely attempts to defend himself by the plea, which at the best would be unavailing, that the word nature, when it is called sin, means not essence, but disposition.§ Now substitute the word "disposition" for its synonym "nature," in our Reviewer's creed as first written, and see if it be, in his own language, "designed to state with all possible *precision* the intellectual propositions to be received as true." Here is the sentence: "It [Dr. Hodge's creed] acknowledges Adam as the head and representative of his posterity, in whom we had our probation, in whom we sinned and fell; so that we come into the world under condemnation, being born children of wrath, and deriving from him a nature [i. e. a *disposition*] not merely diseased, weakened, or predisposed to evil, but which is 'itself,'

* Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 106, new edition. It is readily admitted, that this writer and a few others in New England, have sanctioned the phraseology that God is the author of our wickedness. But, first, this is not the common phraseology of our best divines; and secondly, it does not express, without much qualification, the real philosophy of our writers who employ it. They never mean that Jehovah is the author of moral evil, in any such sense as takes from man the full natural power to avoid every kind and degree of sin. They teach that our iniquity is as really our own, and as really our free act, as if God had never made it certain. They affirm that he never produces any sin which precedes or overpowers, or in any way opposes, our own choice, and that our choice remains as free as the choice of any one can be, on earth or in heaven. Such a phrase as 'God is the author of iniquity,' has recommended itself to them by its *strength*, and not by its philosophical exactness. It is unfaithful to their precise meaning, and belongs to the style of excitement and impression, rather than to that of calm discussion. It was Hopkins's reverence for Calvin, and his fondness for expressing his creed in the powerful language of inspired men, which led him to say that our sins are *caused*, when he meant that they are *made certain*, by the positive efficiency of our Sovereign. His phraseology on this topic has been improved by more recent divines.

† Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 314, 315.

‡ Bib. Sac. Vol. VIII. pp. 631, 632.

§ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 684, 685, 690.

as well as 'all the motions thereof,' 'truly and properly sin!'"* Then our disposition, so strong to sin, is *weakened*, and even our *disposition* is *predisposed* to evil, and this predisposed disposition is, in itself, as well as its motions, sin. Who committed *this* sin? Did any divine ever use such language before? Can a parallel to it be found, except in our Commentator's exegesis of Rom. v. 12; which amounts to the doctrine that by one man all are punished, and because they are punished, they are punished, and so all men are exposed to punishment, because they are punished.† Is it wise for our friend to cherish so weakened and predisposed a disposition for technical terms, that he cannot tear himself from their net-work without maiming the idiom of our fathers? Would it not have been more consonant with the genius of an "easy English," for him to take up with what he calls "the last arrow in the quiver," i.e. the theory of a Convention sermon, and to confess outright, that his first affirmation was not what John Foster calls "the simple, general language of intellect,"‡ but was too intense for the Reviewer's own "sober second thought?"§

In the fourth place, New England divinity has been marked by strong, practical common sense. Its framers were remarkable men, invigorated by the scenes of an eventful era, and claiming our deference for their love of plain, wholesome truth. We might extol them as diligent readers. It is supposed that, on an average, Hopkins studied twelve hours a-day, for more than half a century. He read in the original Latin the whole of Poole's five folios, nearly the whole of Calvin's nine folios, Turretin, Van Mastricht, and the standard treatises of English divines. For seventy years, Emmons remained like a fixture in his parsonage study, and like his brethren read "books which are books." Dr. West sat near his library so long, that his feet wore away the wood-work in one part of his room, and left this enduring memorial of his sedentary habit. We care not, however, to extol our divines as readers. Many of them had been disciplined for practical life. The younger Edwards, who pe-

* Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 314, 315.

† Bib. Sac. Vol. VIII. p. 625.

‡ Foster's Essays, Andover edition, p. 192.

§ We are happy to confess that although Dr. Hodge has not recalled his assertion, Our passive nature is sin; yet in the creed which he gives in his last Review, p. 677, he has amended it; and he now says, that we are "by nature the children of wrath, infected with a sinful depravity of nature." The *depravity* is the *disposition* belonging to the nature. In some connections the word nature means disposition; but never in such connections as those in which our Reviewer used it. As Dr. Hodge has avowed his deference to the great Edwardians of New England, we commend to his notice a remark of the younger Edwards (Works, Vol. I. p. 485), that it is hard to conceive of a distinction between the authorship of an act and of the sinfulness of that act. How can Dr. Hodge conceive of God as the author of a disposition and not as the author of the sinfulness of it? Does not our Reviewer rush into two difficulties in order to avoid one? See Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 684, 685.

rused Van Mastricht seven times, was noted for his wisdom in his intercourse with men. It was a blessing not to be despised, that some of our standard-bearers had been early trained to rural labours in a new country, and by this discipline they gained a healthy and practical judgment. Nearly all of them had been teachers of the common school, and Luther has well said, that "no man is fit to be a theologian, who has not been a school-master." They were married men, and thus were saved from writing like the exsiccated monks of the Middle Ages. That melancholy phrase, "He hath no children," could not be applied to our divines, as to many who have speculated in favour of infant damnation. Our later theologians, as Dwight and Appleton, were adepts in the philosophy of Reid, Oswald, Campbell, Beattie, Stewart; and this has been termed *the philosophy of common sense*. The tendency of literature, during the last hundred years, has been to develope "the fundamental laws of human belief," and has aided our writers in shaping their faith according to those ethical axioms, which so many fathers in the church have undervalued. A modern reviewer has termed these axioms the germs of infidelity; but without them skepticism is our only refuge. There has never been a more independent class of thinkers than our Edwardean theologians. They lived under a free government in church and state. Nor council nor university could awe them down. Hence they did not copy after other men, so much as exercise, and thereby strengthen, their own judgment. They were peculiar, also, in being called to write a theology for the pulpit. In general, divines have written for the schools; but our fathers wrote for men, women and children. The Germans have wondered that several of our theological systems are in the form of sermons. It is a practical form, and it was designed to exhibit a practical theology. We can say of it, as of few other systems, it is *fit* to be preached. It has been accused of metaphysics by men who distinguish between the sin belonging to us as natures, and the sin belonging to us inchoatively as bodies, and the sin belonging to us as persons. But the metaphysics of New England Theology is such as the yeomen of our fields drank down for the sincere milk of the word. It is the metaphysics of common sense. There are pious men, trained under other systems, who say in their creeds, that let man do whatever he can possibly do there is no atonement available for him, if he be of the non-elect. But when these pious men are preaching to the non-elect, they hide this notion, "like virtue." We can hardly repress a smile when we hear good old Thomas Boston at one time exhort his impenitent hearers never to commit a sin, at another time assure them of their utter impotence to do any-

thing which is not sin, and after all, say to them, "Do what you *can*, and, it may be, while ye are doing what ye *can* for yourselves, God will do for you what ye *cannot*."* It is because our theology has been practical in its aims, that it has been, more than any other system, devoted to the ethical character of the acts preceding conversion, to the wisdom of demanding an immediate compliance with the law, and to the scientific refutation of all excuses for prolonged impenitence. Dr. Hopkins valued none of his speculations so highly as those in which he proved the duty of a sinner's instant surrender to God.†

But let us illustrate the practical nature of New England divinity, and its agreements with the intuitions of a sound judgment, by a reference to its theory concerning the nature of moral evil. This theory is just what Dr. Hodge affirms it not to be, "that all sin consists in sinning; that there can be no moral character but in moral acts."‡ We regard it as a dishonour cast upon the faith of our greatest divines to deny that it has been, and now is, characterized by the adoption of this simple truth.

1. The mode in which our Edwardian authors have reasoned on the doctrine of ability proves that they must have had the good sense to resolve all sin into moral acts. Even our reviewer will allow that they believed sin to consist in some kind of violated obligation. They are understood, by nearly all their friends and foes, to have believed that ability is commensurate with obligation. And if any man admit that he is able and obligated to avoid all sin, he must either contradict himself or else admit that he has no sin antecedent to his choice. For if the doctrine of power commensurate with duty be true, and if we be literally unable to do or to have a thing, we are not obligated to do or to have it. Now we are literally unable to have a well-balanced nature preceding our first choice. We are, therefore, not obligated to have it, and are not sinful for not having it. We are equally unable to avoid an ill-balanced nature preceding our first choice. We are, therefore, not obligated to unmake ourselves before birth and before our first act, and are not sinful in being born just as we were made by the Power which we could not resist. And not only is it true that our nature, antecedent to our first choice, and beyond the reach of our faculties, is free from moral blame, but also if we cannot afterwards change it, and can only resist it, we are not blameable

* Boston's Works, Fol. ed. p. 52.

† It were easy to trace the influence of this doctrine upon the missionary spirit which distinguished the early advocates of the New England creed, and also upon the revivals of religion in the midst of which that creed was developed, and to the furtherance of which it has conducted more than any other system.

‡ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 693, 694.

for not changing it, and are only blameable for not resisting it. And this is the consecutive theology of New England.*

2. That our Edwardean divines were practical enough to regard all sin as a moral act, is evident from their mode of reasoning on the doctrine of our Paradisiacal offence. According to their creed, we are never obligated to perform an act which we cannot perform, and therefore are never obligated to perform an act *where* and *when* we cannot perform it. Now we never could have obeyed a law in Eden, for we were never there. Of course we were never obligated to obey a law of that place, and, therefore, we never sinned in not obeying it. Again, we never could have obeyed a law at the time of Adam's dwelling in Eden, and of course were never bound to obey it, and thus were never sinful in not obeying it. Now we can no more prevent an evil *make* of our souls before choice than we could have prevented an occurrence in Paradise. We might as justly be commanded to go back six thousand years, and refuse to eat the apple, as we can be commanded to go back one week before birth, and unmake our natures. And if we are not sinful for Adam's offence because it eludes all our natural power, then, by parity of reasoning, we are not sinful for our bad moral structure before birth, because that eludes all our natural power. And so far forth as it is literally impossible for us in one instant to renovate our natural sensibilities, just so far forth are we free from sin in not renovating them, and are bound only to refuse the wrong indulgence of them. This is the *consistent* theology of New England.

3. The speculations of our Edwardean divines on moral agency are a proof of their having adopted the maxim of common sense, that all sin consists in sinning. And here the great fact is, that they looked upon moral *agency* as essential to good or ill-desert, and upon a moral *agent* as the only responsible being, and they frequently describe men as becoming sinners "as soon as they become moral *agents*," and not before. Whenever they speak of the brutes, who "do not act from choice, guided by understanding," or of anything "that is purely passive, and moved by natural necessity," they deny that such existences are sinful.† According to Dr. Hodge, there is sin in a nature which is incapable of any action; but according to the Edwardeans, men "are subjects of command or moral government in nothing at all, and all their moral agency is entirely excluded, and no room is left for virtue or vice in the world,"‡ so far forth as there is no possibility of virtuous or

* President Edwards often declares, that the kind of necessity which "the will has nothing to *do* in," "does excuse persons, and free them from all fault or blame." (Inquiry on the Will, Part IV. Sect. iii.)

† Edwards on the Will, Part I. Sect. V., and Part III. Sect. II.

‡ Ib. Part III. Sect. IV.

vicious acts. In whatever degree men deny the existence of virtuous action, they "do evidently shut all virtue out of the world, and make it impossible that there should ever be any such thing in any case, or that any such thing should ever be conceived of."* Both Edwards and his disciples often assert, that if there be an act which precedes every act of will, it cannot be subject to any command or precept, directly or indirectly, and, therefore, cannot be either obedience or disobedience: "if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is wholly involuntarily; there is no willing obedience or rebellion, no compliance or opposition of will in the affair, and what sort of obedience or rebellion is this?"† Now, *à fortiori*, if there can be no involuntary sinful *act*, there can be no involuntary sinful *nature*. Volumes might be filled with the repetitions which these men make of the assertion, that all sin is perverted free-*agency*, and that free-*agency* "consists in choosing, and in nothing else."‡ What says Dr. Dwight, with whom our Reviewer professes to agree on this subject? "*Man is the actor of his own sin*. His sin is, *therefore*, wholly his own; chargeable only to himself; chosen by him unnecessarily, while possessed of a power to choose otherwise; *avoidable* by him; and *of course* guilty and righteously punishable. *Exactly* the same natural power is in this case possessed by him, while a sinner, which is afterwards possessed by him when a saint; which Adam possessed before he fell, and which the holy angels now possess in the heavens. This power is also, in my view, perfect freedom; a power of agency, as absolute as can be possessed by an intelligent creature."§ "The advocates of the Exercise Scheme," whose aberration, according to Dr. Hodge, "was in the direction of ultra-Calvinism,"|| uniformly say, "When we talk of moral agency, we talk of some kind of *action* or *exertion*, and not merely of something which may be a foundation for action, and is yet perfectly and entirely distinct from it. When we speak of a person, or moral being, as the subject of punishment or reward, or as having in him desert of praise or blame, it is agreeable to the common sense and understanding of men, to consider him *as in exercise*, at least as *having put forth* some motion or exertion."¶

The standard Edwardean definition of law is, a rule of moral conduct. What other law is there to be transgressed? The

* Edwards on the Will, Part I. Sect. VII.

† Ib. Sect. IV.

‡ Dr. William R. Weeks's Nine Sermons, p. 72.

§ Dwight's Works, Sermon 27.

|| Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 694.

¶ West on Moral Agency, Part I. Sect. 1. In the very first sentence of his Treatise, this "patriarch of Berkshire," says, that moral agency "consisteth in spontaneous, voluntary exertion." See also Prof. Wines's Inquiry, *passim*.

standard definition of conscience is, the faculty to regulate moral conduct. What faculty is there to regulate a condition preceding choice? And where has obligation been described as anything more than a force binding to obedience? And what is obedience but activity? Here are facts, and they are more decisive than particular words and phrases, in favour of the proposition, that the New England Theology defines sin as the chosen rebellion against law, conscience and duty.

4. The speculations of our Edwardean divines on the nature of virtue, give evidence of their having adopted the sensible theory, that all sin consists in moral acts. Everybody knows their doctrine to have been, that the whole of virtue is comprehended in love to the Creator and his creatures; in "love to being in general;" and is not this love a voluntary act? Virtue is said to imply "consent and union with being in general;"* and what is consent but an act of will? It is said to consist in principle; but, says Edwards, "a principle of virtue, I think, is owned by the most considerable of late writers on morality to be general benevolence or public affection;"† and is not benevolence a voluntary feeling? And does not Edwards often say, that affections "are only certain modes of the exercise of the will?"‡ His whole doctrine of the affections is, that they "are no other than the more *vigorous* and *sensible* exercises of the inclination and will of the soul;" and that "true religion in great part consists in holy affections;"§ that is, in the more vigorous and sensible holy exercises.

But the objectors say, Virtue, according to Edwards, lies in "a good will." True, but what is a good will? It is, he adds, "the most proper, direct and immediate subject of command," "for other things can be required no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of, a good will." Now what is the immediate subject of command? He says, "The first and determining act" of the will is that which "more especially" "command or precept has a proper respect to," and "this determining, governing act must be the proper object of precept, or none."|| This determining, governing *act* of the will, is, then, the "good will" in which moral excellence resides.

The objectors reply, that virtue, according to Edwards, lies "in the tendency and inclination of the heart to virtuous action;" but when he speaks thus, he means a voluntary tendency,

* Edwards on the Nature of True Virtue, Chap. I. See also Hopkins on Holiness. Dwight's Sermons, 97, 98, 99.

† Edwards on the Nature of True Virtue, Chap. VI.

‡ Edwards on the Will, Part III. Sect. IV.

§ Edwards on the Religious Affections, Part I. Sect. I.

|| Edwards on the Will, Part III. Sect. IV.; and Part IV. Sect. I.

and inclination, for he says that "one, even the least, degree of preponderation (all things considered), is *choice*;"* and also that the virtuous "habits or qualities, as humility, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, heavenly-mindedness,"—"all these things are dispositions and inclinations of the heart."† Now what are these dispositions and inclinations? In one of the most emphatic passages of his best treatise, Edwards remarks, "Whatever names we call the *act* of the will by, choosing, refusing, *approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining, or being averse, a being pleased or displeased, all may be reduced to this of choosing.* For the soul to act *voluntarily* is, evermore, to act *electively.*"‡

It is, then, a settled principle, that in the Edwardean theology all virtue consists in the love of beings according to their value; that is, in the love of the greater more than of the less; and this love is an act. It is an act of the will, for, according to Edwards, the will is "that by which the mind chooses anything," and to love the greater more than the less is to choose the greater. Now the Edwardean theology has been shown to be self-consistent; and as virtue consists in action, so does sin. "It must be also observed and kept in mind, that sin, as does holiness, consists in the motions or exercises of the heart or will, and in nothing else. Where there is no exercise of heart, nothing of the nature of moral inclination, will, or choice, there can be neither sin nor holiness." "Sin consists in that affection and those exercises which are directly opposed to disinterested benevolence to being in general."§ Our Reviewer has suddenly announced his agreement with Dr. Dwight on the nature of sin. Now every one knows, that Dwight resolved all virtue into benevolence, and he therefore says, in consonance with himself, "Sin universally, is no other than selfishness or a *preference* of one's self to all other beings, and of one's private interests and gratifications to the well-being of the universe, of God and the intelligent creation."|| "Selfishness consists in a *preference* of ourselves to others and to all others; to the universe and to God. This is sin, and *all that in the Scriptures is meant by sin.*"¶ Now if the word "preference" do not

* Edwards on the Will, Part III. Sect. VI.

† Ibid.

‡ Edwards on the Will, Part I. Sect. I. When our theologians say, "Virtue is voluntary," it is idle for Dr. Hodge to interpret them as meaning, virtue "inheres in the will," but is not an exercise of it. He might as well represent them as thinking that the finiteness of the will is voluntary, for finiteness inheres in the will, or as saying that the existence of the will is voluntary, for existence belongs to the will.

§ Hopkins's System of Divinity, Chap. VIII. See also his Treatise on Holiness, *passim*. See also Bellamy's Works, Vol. I. pp. 130 seq.

|| Dwight's Works, Sermon 80.

¶ Ibid.

express an intelligent 'act, involving comparison and volition, no word can express it.

Need we say more? Is it not notorious that certain Princeton divines have long been fearful of Edwards's theory of virtue, and have dreaded to admit it within their walls, lest, like the Trojan horse, it let out an army of Hopkinsian heresies, which they have loved to call "Pelagian"?* They have known perfectly well, that if holiness be reduced to a disinterested love, sin will be reduced to a partial love, and if a consecutive logic has once resolved moral character into these voluntary acts, it will next infer an ability to perform or omit them, and this ability cannot exist, for it was believed in by "Pelagius."

5. That our Edwardean divines were practical enough to resolve all sin into wicked practice, is evident from their sharp discriminations between sin and the occasions of sin. Two of their most prominent doctrines have been, that the moral character of an act lies in the act itself rather than in its cause, and that the first occasion of wicked acts cannot be itself wicked. "If all sin," say they, "be caused by that which is sin, then sin exists as a cause, before it exists at all." If an active choice cannot be well or ill deserving, unless it proceed from a passive nature that is well or ill deserving, then its character lies not in itself, but in something antecedent to itself, and this is the error which the New England divines have regarded as subversive of their entire system. †

They often speak of sin as literally belonging to "the native bent," the "dispositions," "inclinations," "propensities," "ten-

* Dr. Miller, in his Memoir of Pres. Edwards, treats "the father of Hopkinsianism" with great urbanity, but expresses the opinion that if Edwards "had foreseen the use which has since been made of the doctrine of this Dissertation [on Virtue], he would either have shrunk from its publication, or have guarded its various aspects with additional care," p. 244. But Edwards adopted his theory of virtue while he was a member of Yale College; he wrote his Dissertation upon it three years before his death. It, therefore, contains his matured views. It is written with far more care than his Treatise on Original Sin. It was, probably, the theme of frequent conferences with Hopkins, who drew from it the conclusions so much regretted by Dr. Miller. Edwards was accustomed to subject all his works to the criticism of Hopkins, his nearest clerical neighbour for seven years, and to follow that great man's advice. It is on record that, in 1755, Hopkins and Bellamy spent two nights and a day with Edwards, in examining his kindred Dissertation on the End for which God created the World. Both this and the Dissertation on True Virtue were first published by Hopkins, seven years after Edwards's death. Is it at all probable, that so inquisitive a man as the original editor of these two works, had never conversed with Edwards on the consequences logically resulting from them? Can we believe, that so plain-spoken a divine as Hopkins would have built his system upon them, and not apprised his readers that his familiar friend, who drew out the premises, would not accept the conclusion?

† See, for example, Edwards on the Will, Part IV. Sect. I. Dr. Jonathan Edwards's Works, Vol. I. pp. 429—432, &c. Hopkins's System of Divinity, Chap. IV. West on Moral Agency, Part I. Sect. IV.

dencies," "habits," "relish," "taste," "temper," of the heart. But these terms, when thus used by our most eminent authors, are designed to signify the acts which involve choice. Dr. Bellamy, whom our Reviewer describes as strenuous in his opposition to the doctrine that all sin consists in act, says "that sinners are *free* and voluntary in their bad temper," "hearty in it;" that "this evil bent of our hearts is not of his [God's] making, but is the spontaneous propensity of our own wills; for, we being born devoid of the divine image, ignorant of God, and insensible of his glory, do, of our own accord, turn to ourselves, &c.—from whence we natively *become* averse to God," &c. He approves of Mr. Stoddard's remark, that "self-love is the very root of original sin."* He has left the following memorable words:—

"These [sinful tendencies] are the earliest dispositions that are discovered in our nature; and although I do not think that they are concreated by God together with the essence of our souls, yet they seem to be the very first propensities of the new-made soul. So that they are, in a sense, connatural; our whole hearts are perfectly and entirely bent this way, from their very first *motion*. These propensities, perhaps, in some sense, may be said to be contracted, in opposition to their being strictly and philosophically natural, because they are not created by God with the essence of the soul, but *result from its native choice*, or rather, more strictly, *are themselves its native choice*. But most certainly these propensities are not contracted in the sense that many vicious habits are, namely, by long use and custom. In opposition to such vicious habits, they may be called connatural. Little children do very early bad things, and contract bad dispositions; but these propensities are evidently antecedent to every bad thing infused or instilled by evil examples, or gotten by practice, or occasioned by temptations. And hence it is become customary to call them natural, and to say that it is our very nature to be so inclined; and to say that these propensities are natural, would to common people be the most apt way of expressing the thing; but it ought to be remembered that they are not natural in the same sense as the faculties of our souls are; for they are not the workmanship of God, but *are our native choice, and the voluntary, free, spontaneous bent of their*

* For these and similar testimonies, see Bellamy's Works, Vol. I. pp. 97, 98, 153, 154. Vol. II. pp. 554, 555, 581. Dr. Smalley differed from Bellamy (as well as from himself), on this topic, at least in words. He says that there is a sin of nature, "so entirely independent of the will as to be prerequisite to" every wrong volition. He does not allow, however, that the sinful principle is dormant, but styles it an active principle.

hearts. And to keep up this distinction, I frequently choose to use the word *native*, instead of *natural*.*

President Edwards and Dr. Hopkins often speak of holiness as literally existing in our spiritual discernment, and of sin as literally existing in our spiritual blindness; but they mean a discernment which involves a right choice, and a blindness which involves a wrong choice, and in the choice alone lies the holiness and sin. "It will be found on examination," says Dr. Hopkins, "that if *practical judgment* has any meaning, it intends something which implies a sense of heart or a degree of inclination or will." "Everything practical or that relates to practice, belongs to the heart or will." "Whenever, therefore, there is a practical judgment concerning anything that is presented to the mind, as the object of choice, that it is good, eligible and excellent, there is taste and *choice actually begun*." "By understanding, knowledge and wisdom, in Scripture, is commonly meant true holiness, which consists not at all in mere speculation, but in the *exercise* of a right taste and inclination of heart, in a view and sense of divine truth."† On the same principle, these divines often speak of our ignorance, stupidity, &c. as sinful, because these states involve a wrong "taste," "tendency," &c., all of which terms are here used to denote exercises of will.‡

There is, however, another sense in which our divines occasionally use the words, "taste," "propensity," "disposition," &c. They intend to denote by them not a choice, but a foundation for choice, and therefore not a sin, but an occasion of sin ;

* Bellamy's Works, Vol. I. pp. 138, 139. The treatise from which this passage is taken, is the one which President Edwards endorsed publicly. Dr. Nathan Strong says, "What we call a new moral principle, may also be called a new taste, relish, temper, disposition, or *habit of feeling* respecting moral objects and truth." "A temper, disposition, inclination, taste or relish, which are right or wrong, mean the same as a heart or will that is right or wrong." "The will, the heart, and the affections, may, in most moral and evangelical discourses, be used as words of the same meaning." Now what are the affections? "The sensible *exercises* of the heart and will are what we call the affections, such as love, delight, rejoicing, hatred, enmity, mourning, and all these are *exercises* of the heart." Sermons, Vol. I. pp. 103, 104, 105, 167, 168.

† Hopkins's Two Discourses on Law and Regeneration, pp. 48, 50. Ed. 1768. This distinction between the neutral principles and the moral exercises of the soul, is the basis of Hopkins's distinction between regeneration and conversion.

‡ That Edwards generally uses the word inclination as synonymous with choice, or else as implying choice, and as distinguishable not from acts but from *external acts*, is evident from Part III. Sect. IV. and Part IV. Sect. I. of his Inquiry. That he generally uses "habits" and "dispositions" as synonymous with *accustomed acts* of choice, is plain from Part III. Sect. VI. of his Inquiry. When, therefore, he says in the Preface to his Inquiry, that "all virtue and religion have their seat more immediately in the will, consisting more especially in right acts and habits of this faculty," his meaning must be that holiness belongs primarily to the occasional and habitual acts of the will, and not to any nature distinct from those acts.

an evil, not a wickedness. Thus Dr. Hopkins says, that in regeneration the Holy Spirit "begets a *right* and *good* taste, temper, or disposition, and so lays a foundation for holy exercises of heart." He then adds:

"It is difficult and perhaps impossible to form any distinct and clear idea of that in the mind or heart, which is antecedent to all thought and exercise of the will, or action, which we call principle, taste, temper, disposition, habit, &c.; by which we mean nothing properly active, but that from which right exercise of the will or action springs, as the reason and foundation of it, and without which there could have been no such exercise. Perhaps the real truth of the matter, when examined with true philosophic, metaphysical strictness, will appear to be this: that what we call principle, disposition or frame of mind, which is antecedent to all right exercise of the heart, and is the foundation and reason of it, is wholly to be resolved into divine constitution or law of nature. But this I leave to the inquiry and decision of those who are inclined to examine this matter to the bottom, seeing I have not room here to go into a more particular consideration of it; and, whatever is at bottom the truth of the case, nothing will be said on this subject that immediately depends upon it."*

Does any one suppose that Dr. Hopkins would call this evil bias a real, or even original, sin? Hear him: "Original *sin* is that total moral depravity which takes place in the hearts of all the children of Adam, in consequence of his apostacy, which consists in exercise or act, as really as any sin can do, and therefore cannot be distinguished from *actual* sin." "This *sin* which takes place in the posterity of Adam, is not properly distinguished into original and actual sin, because it is all really actual, and there is, strictly speaking, no other sin but actual sin."† Besides, the wrong bias which leads to wrong choice, is

* Hopkins's Two Discourses on Law and Regeneration, p. 38. Ed. 1768. Here is seen the *substantial* agreement of Hopkins with "the Exercise Scheme." The earlier advocates of that scheme believed that all our sin is occasioned by a law of nature; and gave as a definition of nature's law just what Newton and other philosophers have given; viz. "the established mode of divine operation." Edwards on Original Sin, especially Part IV. Chapters II. and III., gives the same idea of a law of nature.

† Hopkins's System of Divinity, Chap. VIII. Here is but a single specimen of this author's mode of regarding Original Sin. Only a very small proportion of the best New England divines have dissented from it. After Hopkins's system was published, Dr. Jonathan Edwards wrote his freest criticisms upon it, and did not intimate the slightest dissatisfaction of himself or his brethren with the above-named theory of Original Sin. It has had great influence on the New England clergy, as it pervades all the works of this good man. As early as 1787, Dr. Stiles writes: "It has been the *ton* to direct students in divinity, these thirty years past, to read the Bible, President Edwards, Dr. Bellamy, and Mr. Hopkins's writings; and this was

resolved by Hopkins into a "divine constitution or law of nature;" and did he believe that this is a real sin? Then he must have believed God to be not only the author but also the actor of moral evil. Still further, he supposed that in regeneration this bad relish is removed, and a good relish substituted for it; and in conversion this good relish is exercised. But this good relish is, of itself, no real holiness. According to him, it does not commend the subject of it to the divine approbation. Unless it be *exercised*, the man who has it as a passive quality, will not be saved. Hopkins quotes an objector as saying, "If persons are regenerated before they are enlightened and believe in Christ, what will become of them? Where will they go, to heaven or to hell, if they die after they are regenerated, and before they believe? It seems they are fit for neither; their hearts are renewed, so [they] cannot go to hell; but they are in an unpardoned, unjustified state, therefore cannot go to heaven!" Now what answer does Hopkins make? Does he say that this good, passive disposition will be accepted as a compliance with the conditions of life? No. He only affirms, that the disposition will be exercised before death, and the *acting* of it will, through grace, entitle the agent to the promises. "And," he replies, "what if a person who is elected to salvation dies in an unconverted state; will he be saved or not? Let the objector answer this question, and he will drop his objections; having fully answered it himself. His answer must be, there never was, and never will be, such an instance. All that are elected shall be converted before they die."*

Dr. Bellamy expresses the same idea thus: "The promises of the gospel are not made to the holy principle, *passively considered*, but to its acts and exercises, even as the blessings of the first covenant were not promised to that image of God in which Adam began to exist, but to his *active* compliance with that covenant." Bellamy then states the objection, that on his theory "a regenerated [but unconverted] soul may be in a state of condemnation for a time, and consequently perish, if death should befall him in that juncture." And he answers the objection in the words of Flavel, by remarking that the regenerated soul *will* be converted, i. e. the soul having the holy

a pretty good sufficiency of reading." He adds that the younger theologians were inclined to differ from Hopkins, in some particulars, but he does not specify the nature of moral evil as one of them. He says that none of the younger divines will "be equal to those strong reasoners, President Edwards and Mr. Hopkins." When, therefore, Dr. Hodge says, that "Bellamy, Dwight, and the other great men of New England, were no less strenuous than Edwards" in opposing the theory that all sin is actual and avoidable, he must have included Hopkins among these opposers, or else have used language inaccurately. Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 694.

* Hopkins's Two Discourses on Law and Regeneration, p. 50. Ed. 1768.

principle *will exercise* it before death, and by this action will secure an entrance into heaven. Death will not intervene between regeneration and conversion.* Bellamy does indeed call this principle "true holiness;" but he calls it so only as it implies the certainty of its being exercised. *In itself*, apart from its exercise, it is not a true holiness which God will accept as a condition of salvation; nothing which he has ever promised to reward. But has he not promised to reward all that which is true holiness in itself? And, on the same principle, what kind of sin is that which in its own nature deserves no punishment?

But does the choicest friend of Hopkins and Bellamy sanction their theory of an inward, neutral occasion of holiness and sin? They derived their theory from him more than from any other divine. President Edwards often speaks of "kind affections" which "are implanted by the Author of nature" within all men, and which are "the fruit of God's mercy," and, of course, are not sin.† He speaks of "the common, natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, &c., which were in man in innocence."‡ He then says, that these principles being left "to themselves, without the government of superior divine principles, will certainly be *followed* with the corruption, yea, the total corruption of the heart."‡ "When God made man at first, he implanted in him *two kinds* of principles. There was an *inferior* kind, which may be called *natural*, being the principles of *mere* human nature, such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions which belong to the *nature of man*, in which his love to his own liberty, honour and pleasure were exercised."‡ These inferior "principles, that are essentially implied in, or *necessarily* resulting from, and *inseparably* connected with, *mere* human nature," were designed "to be wholly subordinate and subservient." But when the Divine Spirit left the soul, "the inferior principles of self-love and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone and left to themselves, of course became reigning principles." "The immediate *consequence* of which was a fatal catastrophe, a turning of all things upside down, and the *succession* of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man did immediately set up himself, and the objects of his private affections and appetites as supreme, and so they took the place of God."‡ Edwards needed not to state more clearly that man's voluntary wrong action, which was his first sin, resulted from a previous disorder in his involuntary principles. He adds: "These inferior principles are like fire in

* Bellamy's Works, Vol. II. p. 634.

† Nature of True Virtue, Ch. VI.

‡ Original Sin, Part IV. Ch. II.

a house, which we say is a good servant, but a bad master ; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction."* Now is sin a good and very useful servant? If not, these principles are not sin ; but Edwards adds, that "*in consequence*" of them, "arises enmity in the heart" against God. "And therefore as God withdrew spiritual communion and his vital, gracious influence from the common head, so he withholds the same from all the members, as they come into existence ; whereby they come into the world mere flesh, and entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles, and so *become* wholly corrupt, as Adam did."† Can language express more decisively the truth that our lower principles, which left to themselves become the infallible occasions of sin, are yet in and of themselves *not* sin? This great father of New England Theology asks, "Is there anything in nature to make it impossible but that the superior principles of man's nature should be so *proportioned* to the inferior, as to prevent such a dreadful consequence as the moral and natural ruin and eternal perdition of the far greater part of mankind?"‡ And he answers his own question in this emphatic style : "If we are Christians, we must be forced to allow it to be possible in the nature of things, that the principles of human nature should be so *balanced*, that the *consequence* should be no propensity to sin in the first beginning of a capacity of moral agency."§ Here he not only asserts that our inferior principles of action might exist in a perfectly sinless being, but he sanctions the phrase that our sin results from a disorder, a wrong *balance*, a bad proportion of our sensibilities. These are Edwardean phrases, and yet men who never read him with care, if at all, denounce them as "German" and "Pelagian."

We are now prepared to notice a singular fact. The very reasons adduced for proving that our New England writers do not believe sin to consist in act, prove that they do thus believe. For example, the Treatise of Edwards on Original Sin has induced our Reviewer to say, that "the world-wide fame of President Edwards, as a theologian, rests mainly on his thorough refutation of"§ the doctrine that all sin consists in sinning, and that power equals and limits duty. It is true that, in some particulars, this treatise of Edwards is alien from the spirit of New England divinity, and contains a number of phrases incongruous with the prevailing style of Edwards himself. Still,

* Original Sin, Part IV. Ch. II.

† Edwards on Original Sin, Part IV. Ch. II.

‡ Ib. Part I. Ch. I. Sect. IX.

§ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 694.

it is the leading doctrine of that treatise, that all sin is an act, committed in our own persons, or else in the person of him who infolded us within himself. Why does the prince of metaphysicians make such gigantic efforts to prove that our sin is the same with Adam's, not only "in kind" but also "in number," if he deemed it right that we should be punished for anything other than our own action? He says that infants, as "all know, never committed any sin in their own persons."* Are they, then, guilty for 'a nature which, apart from its motions, is truly and properly sin?' No; for he declares that they "could be sinners *no other way* than by virtue of Adam's transgression,"† and he expressly denies that the children of Adam "come into the world with a *double* guilt; *one* the guilt of Adam's sin, *another* the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart."‡—"The guilt a man has upon his soul at his first existence is *one and simple*; viz., the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the first corruption or depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as *two* things, distinctly imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God."‡ He repeatedly affirms, that "the *first* existing of a corrupt disposition" in the hearts of men, is the same *identical* thing with Adam's first corrupt disposition, is the "extended pollution of that sin," is "the consent and concurrence with it," is a "participation" in it.‡ Now, what was Adam's first sin but an act? Edwards says, that "the first evil disposition or inclination of the heart of Adam to sin was not properly distinct from his first *act* of sin, but was included in it;" and as we are identically the same with Adam, so is our first evil disposition identically the same with his, and is not distinct from our first moral act. As Adam's "guilt was *all* truly from the act of his inward man," so is our guilt all truly from the act of our inward man, for our act is the same with his, just as the sap in a branch of the tree is the same identical sap which was once in the root.‡ The idea of our literal oneness with Adam is indeed a strange phenomenon in mental history, but so great a man as Edwards must commit great errors, if he commit any at all. For the sake of retaining the doctrine,

* Edwards on Original Sin, Part II. Chap. IV. Sect. II., and Part IV. Chap. IV.

† Ib. Part II. Chap. IV. Sect. II.

‡ These and many similar quotations are from Part IV. Chap. III. of the Treatise on Original Sin. If their author had been asked, whether we had the natural power of avoiding Adam's sin, he would have said, that in the sense in which we committed it we had the natural power to avoid it. Thus Andrew Fuller (Works, Vol. II. p. 472, ed. 1845) cites the following objection to Edwards's theory: "*We* could not be to blame for what we could not avoid;" and replies, "*Very true*; but if the notion of a union between Adam and his posterity be admitted, then it cannot properly be said we could not avoid it," i. e. the sin in Adam.

that all our sin consists in our own active "*consent of heart*," and also the doctrine, that the sin of Adam is imputed to us, he seized on the astonishing theory, that as Adam's rebellion was not imputed to him until he had actively engaged in it, so our rebellion is not imputed to us until we have actively engaged in it; and as we are one moral person with Adam, so our rebellion is one moral act with his, and, therefore, his act being ours is of right imputed to us as our act; and "the first existing of a depraved disposition in Adam's posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct from their guilt of Adam's first sin."* But, the objectors reply, Edwards does speak of a confirmed evil principle as imparting a distinct additional guilt to the soul. True, but he adds, "this confirmed corruption, by its remaining and continued *operation*, brought additional guilt on his [Adam's] soul,"† and does the same on the souls of his posterity. But our opponents inquire, Does not Edwards speak of an evil disposition, propensity, tendency, which precedes our own personal action, and is *itself* not only sin, but also a *consequence* of the imputation of Adam's sin? No, we reply. Our opponents have mistaken a theory of Dr. Hodge, for the exactly opposite theory of our New England divine. Edwards reiterates his belief: "The first being of an evil disposition in the heart of a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve of the sin of his first father as fully as he himself approved of it when he committed it, or so far as to imply a full and perfect *consent of heart* to it, I think is not to be looked upon as a *consequence* of the imputation of that first sin any more than the full consent of Adam's own heart in the act of sinning, which was not consequent on the imputation of his sin to himself, but rather *prior* to it in the order of nature. Indeed, the derivation of the evil disposition to the hearts of Adam's posterity, or rather the co-existence of the evil disposition, implied in Adam's first rebellion, in the root and branches, is a consequence of the union that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity; but not properly a *consequence* of the *imputation* of his sin, nay, rather, *antecedent* to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of the heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is *first*, and the charge of guilt *consequent*, as it was in the case of Adam himself."

* All the quotations in the text of this page are from Edwards on Original Sin, Part IV. Chap. III.

† It is useless to pretend that Edwards uses guilt in these passages as denoting a legal exposedness, and not a moral stain, for he expressly declares that "men are really, in themselves, what they are in the eye of the law, and by the voice of strict equity and justice." Part I. Chap. I. Sect. III.

Such remarks give a key to Edwards's otherwise enigmatical *Treatise on Original Sin*. When we read in it of our evil propensities, we are either to understand, first, that they are real *choices*, and thus real sins; or, secondly, that they are the *effects* of our having transgressed the law in Adam, and are thus metaphorically sins, just as our wrong outward actions implying a wicked motive are sins by a figure of speech; or, thirdly, that they are sinful by a like metaphor, as they are *occasions* of our personal disobedience to law; or, fourthly, that they are sinful by a double metonymy of cause for effect and effect for cause. How else can we explain many expressions like the following: "Man's nature or state is attended with a pernicious or destructive tendency in a moral sense, when it *tends to that which deserves* misery and destruction." This evil propensity is odious and detestable, "as, by the supposition, it *tends to that moral evil by which the subject becomes* odious in the sight of God, and liable as such to be condemned." It is "a tendency to *guilt* and *ill-desert* in a vast overbalance to virtue and merit." Part I. Ch. I. Whether our personal sins be induced by an inward propensity to them, or by animal appetites, &c., the occasion of those sins is pronounced to be equally "evil, corrupt and dreadful." Part I. Ch. I. Sect. IX. But are our animal appetites literally disapproved by conscience? Is it not plain that Edwards discriminates between real guilt and the guiltless occasion of it?*

* Against all such modes of interpreting Edwards, our Reviewer and others are fond of quoting his remark: "It is not necessary that there should *first* be thought, reflection, and choice, *before* there can be any virtuous disposition." Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 685. But why does Edwards make this obviously true remark? He is opposing a theory that our choices must be self-determined; that before a preference can be right or wrong, we must think of it, of its good and evil influences, and then must choose to exercise it, and must thus make the preference an effect of a foregoing choice. He denies, as we all deny, that we must choose to choose, that "thought, reflection and choice must go *before* virtue, and that all virtue and righteousness must be the fruit of *preceding* choice." *Treatise on Original Sin*, Part II. Ch. I. Sect. I. He teaches, that virtue need not be *preceded* by a distinct choice, but that virtue is the "leading choice." Again, Edwards is opposing a theory that virtue and vice consist, primarily, in subordinate and imperative volitions, which do not involve the "leading choice." In his intense aversion to this theory, he says, "The act of choosing that which is good, is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good principle or virtuous disposition of mind." *Treatise on Original Sin*, Part II. Ch. I. Sect. I. But he here means by "good principle or virtuous disposition," precisely what he elsewhere means by the "original," "determining," "leading," "governing," "regulating act," or "choice." *Inquiry on the Will*, Part II. Sect. X., and Part III. Sect. IV. It is this regulating choice in which, primarily, virtue consists, and not in any choice preceding it, nor in any subsequent choice not including it. This "governing," "habitual" choice is the "virtuous disposition or principle." It is love of being in general. It implies "thought and reflection" on being in general, but not thought and reflection on itself before it is exercised. Still less does it imply a distinct choice of itself, before it is exercised. This is Edwards's theory of virtue, and the same *mutatis mutandis* is his theory of sin.

It has been already stated, that Edwards's work on Original Sin is not a perfect exponent of what is now termed the Edwardean faith. Perhaps no two of our eminent theologians have adopted its theory of our sameness with Adam. Very few of them have imitated all of its intense expressions. It was written amid the constant alarms of an Indian war, under many embarrassing influences of its author's frontier parish, and with a constitution shattered by the fever and ague. Ill health prevented his revising it as faithfully as he had revised his other works, and when he had published only a few sheets of it, death ended his labours. Accordingly, it bears more signs of hurried composition than are to be found in some of his writings, which had lain by him for years. The principal regret which he is said to have felt in prospect of his untimely death, arose from his inability to modify some things which he had written; and there are several reasons to believe, that he meant to remove some verbal incongruities from the work, which he had not finished with his wonted care, and which he had deemed it needful to publish with more than his usual haste. Were it not for his sudden decease, he might have explained a few remarks, which in the fervour of composition he had left unqualified, and thus he would have saved a class of men from wrongly imputing to him the error, that sin lies in something beside moral agency—an error hostile to the whole spirit of his creed.

In the fifth place, New England Theology is a comprehensive system of Biblical science. Hopkins says of President Edwards, "He studied the Bible more than all other books, and more than most other divines do." "He took his religious principles from the Bible, and not from any human system or body of divinity. Though his principles were Calvinistic, yet he called no man father. He thought and judged for himself, and was truly very much of an original."* What had an Indian missionary, on the very bonds of civilised life, to fear from church authorities? The distance of our fathers from the old world, made them cleave to the Word of God as their dearest standard. Who was ever more inwardly and thoroughly Protestant in his rule of faith, than Samuel Hopkins? He expounded the entire Scriptures three several times to his congregation at Newport. Altogether too sternly would he have frowned upon the remark of Dr. Hodge: "If the point assailed can be shown to be a part of *the common faith of the church*, then we think the necessity for further debate is, in all ordinary cases, at an end."†

* Hopkins's *Life and Character of the late Reverend, Learned, and Pious Mr. Jonathan Edwards*. Ed. 1799, p. 47. It was Edwards's own opinion, that he had developed some new truths from the inspired volume.

† *Bib. Repertory*, Vol. XXIII. p. 677. There is a truth in this canon of our

Altogether too severely would he have reprimanded the spirit of this remark, as leading its author into the unreasoning dogmatism of Rome. The more recent divines of New England have felt a similar preference for the Bible above creeds. They have, accordingly, given such an impulse to Scriptural investigation as was previously unknown to the English world. Their mode of interpreting the sacred volume is the only mode which will save consistent thinkers from Romanism. The principles of exegesis on which our Reviewer proceeds in defending a limited atonement, inability, &c., are the very same on which the Romanists proceed in defending the Real Presence and the Supremacy of Saint Peter. If he stands, they stand. Indeed, the hypothesis that all men sinned in Adam, had never found currency in the church, if the Vulgate had not mistranslated the $\epsilon\phi' \epsilon\upsilon$ of Rom. v. 12. The Calvinistic theories which oppose the New England Calvinism, are founded either on the scholastic metaphysics, or on a literal interpretation of oriental metaphors; and these are the fruitful sources of Papal error. Painful, indeed, is the violence which those theories have done to such clear sayings as, "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father;" and Christ is the propitiation, "not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." Those artificial theories are useful, so far forth as they are symbols of great truths. Viewed as poetry and eloquence, they pertain to the form of presentation suited to earnest feeling; but viewed as doctrines literally expressed, they pertain to a theology of a "bewildered" reason, and not to *the* theology of a sound head or heart.* They may

Reviewer. Yet he is wont to carry his reliance on church authority too far. In the present controversy, for example, his principal argument against us has been derived, not from the Word of God, but from the opinions of men. In citing these opinions, however, he has been unfortunate. He appeals to the Romish standards on the nature of sin, &c. But the Council of Trent, at their fifth session, decided that our inborn proclivity to sin is called sin, only because it arises from and tends to moral evil, and "cannot hurt but him that consenteth to it." See Paul Sarpi's *Historie of the Council of Trent*, p. 184. See also Möhler's *Symbolik*, Theil I. Kap. III. § XIII., and Theil II. Kap. VI. § XCIII. Our assailant has laboured with rare assiduity, to prove that we agree with Schleiermacher. Suppose that success had crowned his toils. What then? Has he shown that the great German is in error? He has merely appealed to authority, and said that "such men as Hengstenberg regard [Schleiermacher's system] as subverting some of the essential doctrines of the Gospel." *Bib. Repertory*, Vol. XXIII. p. 692. But Hengstenberg also says, that Dr. Dwight is a Rationalist, on the very topics now controverted; and our Reviewer avows that he agrees with Dwight on these topics.

* See Convention Sermon, *Bib. Sacra*, Vol. VII. p. 563. This sermon has been represented as implying that certain doctrines literally expressed by words like "Imputed and Passive sin," belong to the theology of feeling, and that the New England faith is suited to the intellect only. One aim of that sermon is, to show that these doctrines belong to the theology of feeling, when they are viewed as *symbols, illustrations*, of the real truth; and that the New England system will adopt all truth, be it expressed in the prosaic style fitted for speculation, or the poetic style fitted for emotion. It will allow the theology of the intellect, and also the theology of the

be regarded not as true theories, but as the poetry and eloquence which give to accurate statements a readier power over the feelings. The Princeton Review has spoken, once at least, of "a true thought in a false expression."* A rare merit of the New England system is, that it has looked through the metonymy and the hyperbole of the oriental expression, and seized the "true thought" intended by it; while many of its opposers have clung to the false theories which that expression literally denotes. These theories have often repelled the inquirer into infidelity. He has mistaken figures of rhetoric for a literal creed, and has therefore revolted from that creed. The first sentence of Dr. Smalley's sermon on Original Sin, betokens one grand aim of the New England system, to preclude all occasion for infidel schemes, by so interpreting the Bible as to make sensible men confide in it.

The New England system is not only scriptural, but is scriptural *science*. Are its advocates condemned as too inquisitive? they *do* search for the truth; as too metaphysical? they *do* reason against a philosophy falsely so called; as too fond of novelties in speculation? they *do* love to "grow in knowledge;" as too ready to examine the foundations of their faith? they are not afraid of "open questions," nor of exposing their creed, in all its parts, to a rigid scrutiny. They know themselves to be imperfect. Free inquiry has made them humble; and can an arrogant temper, disdainful of all improvement, be either the seed or the fruit of science? They have borne much of abusive criticism. Two of their most eminent champions had not lain long in their graves, before they were publicly declared, even in the city of Brotherly Love, to have made their bed in hell. One of the men, thus humanly condemned, was the sainted Hopkins himself. But have our divines retaliated such calumnies? In reading the seven or eight volumes of Emmons, would any one suspect that he had ever been defamed? Would not the immortal ancestors of Dwight have frowned upon him, if, in one of his eleven volumes, he had returned railing for railing? The New England divinity can defend itself without personal vituperation, and in the

heart, which are the same substance in two forms. The doctrines *literally* denoted by words like Passive Sin, Guilt of Adam's Offence, and regarded as truths plainly expressed, do not belong to the right theology in either form. But the mass of Christians who contend for them, have not practically viewed them as credible in a literal interpretation. One of the best preachers in this, or any age, has styled those doctrines, as they are treated by the multitude, "the theology of the tympanum; for if the words which express them tinkle well in the ear, they are loved, let them mean anything or nothing." We have chosen to call them by a more reverential name, and partly because the phrases suggesting them are associated with the venerable piety of ancient days, and thus have a goodly sound.

* Vol. XIII. p. 81.

purity of its argument it breathes the spirit of a divine philosophy. It has developed its scientific temper in systematizing those old truths on which, as a broad, deep basis, many varying superstructures have been reared. By its accordance with the sensibilities of our race, it authorizes an intelligent use of the tropes which those sensibilities demand; demand not as faded, but as rhetorical figures; suggesting their original images, but understood in their rational import. It unfolds the meaning and the fitness and the power of that style, in which we summon the blind, deaf, dead, and twice dead, to see, hear, rise, walk, and take heaven by violence; in which we assert that God sits, and rests, stands up, and returns to his place, rises betimes, and plucks his hand out of his bosom; is wounded and is comforted, grieved, afflicted, and eased; considers and wonders; turns violently and tosses his foe like a ball; is quiet, or jealous, or angry, or froward; punishes the innocent, and beholds no sin in the vile; exacts impossibilities from the weak, condemns them for a misdeed of their ancestor, and smites his hands together and causes his fury to rest; and whets his glittering sword, and yet is love without change and without end. All these expressions are found in the hymns of our worship or in the tracts which are welcomed to our houses, and they are all admired as symbols of the truth explained in our dogmatic treatises.* In uncovering the profoundest philosophy that lies under the richest of the inspired poetry, and in illustrating the self-consistent character of the inspired volume, our theological system claims to be a true science.

Because it is a science, it is comprehensive. A Unitarian opposer shrinks "with a feeling approaching horror," from the "stern and appalling theology" associated with the name of Hopkins.† A Calvinistic opposer, as early as 1817, mourns over the Hopkinsian Seminary at Andover, because the doctrines taught there "do, in their nature and necessary consequences, lead to the Socinian ground."‡ The vane of the Princeton Review points to Emmonism on one day as Pelagian, and on another day as ultra-Calvinistic. What is the source of these charges, that nullify each other? It is the comprehensiveness of the Edwardean scheme. This scheme unites a high, but not an ultra-Calvinism, on the decrees and agency of God, with a philosophical, but not an Arminian theory, on the freedom and worth of the human soul. Its new element is seen

* "A slavish adherence to systematic divinity has much injured some of the finest passages of Revelation; and which were intended to be *felt*, rather than *criticised*." *Jay's Exercises for the Closet*, Oct. 21.

† Channing's *Memoir*, Vol. I. p. 142; and *Works*, Vol. IV. pp. 342 seq.

‡ Willson's *Historical Sketch*, p. 184.

in its harmonizing two great classes of truths; one relating to the untrammelled will of man, another relating to the supremacy of God. Because it has secured human liberty, it exalts the divine sovereignty; and its advocates have preached more than others on predestination, because they have prepared the way for it by showing that man's freedom has been predestined. They have insisted on an eternally decreed liberty, and on a free submission to the eternal decrees. Their faith ascribes to man a noble structure of mind, and sinks him the lower for abusing it. In reprobating his wickedness, it exceeds all other systems; because it exceeds them all in unfolding the equity of the Sovereign against whom the subject, so richly endowed, has so needlessly rebelled. When its opposers think of its efforts to justify the ways of our Heavenly Father, they hastily accuse it of Arminianism; and when they turn their minds to its description of the Supreme, Universal Governor, they hastily accuse it of hyper-Calvinism. In these alternations between conflicting charges, they copy old replies to old theories, and misdirect them to a new doctrine. They overlook the element which Edwards disclosed to the church, the union between certainty and spontaneous choice. They forget the very genius of his system. This genius is, to blend the loftiest truths concerning the Creator, with the most equitable truths concerning the creature; to heighten our reverence for God, by disclosing his generosity to man, and to deepen our penitence for sin, by showing the ease with which it might have been avoided. A pious heart longs to glorify God; a sympathizing heart would arouse men to free action; a comprehensive theology teaches in order to exhort freely, and exhorts freely in order to teach. If Cecil had been familiar with the New England scheme, he never would have felt the necessity of oscillating between his own speculative creed, and the speculative creed of his opposers. He betrays the disproportions of mere Calvinism, and its consequent failure to satisfy a practical Christian, in the following apophthegms:—

“The right way of interpreting Scripture is, to take it as we find it, without any attempt to force it into any particular system. Whatever may be fairly inferred from Scripture, we need not fear to insist on. Many passages speak the language of what is called Calvinism, and that in almost the strongest terms. I would not have a man clip and curtail these passages, to bring them down to some system: let him go with them in their free and full sense; for, otherwise, if he do not absolutely pervert them, he will attenuate their energy. But, let him look at as many more, which speak the language of Arminian-

ism, and let him go all the way with these, also. God has been pleased thus to state and to leave the thing; and all our attempts to distort it, one way or the other, are puny and contemptible."

"No man will preach the Gospel so *freely* as the Scriptures preach it, unless he will submit to talk like an Antinomian, in the estimation of a great body of Christians; nor will any man preach it so *practically* as the Scriptures, unless he will submit to be called, by as large a body, an Arminian. Many think that they find a middle path: which is, in fact, neither one thing nor another; since it is not the incomprehensible, but grand plan of the Bible. It is somewhat of human contrivance. It savours of human poverty and littleness."*

Mr. Simeon, also, whom the Princeton Review so justly extols, would have found the Edwardean scheme sufficiently copious and liberal to satisfy his many-sided heart, and to save him from adopting one speculative creed for one purpose, and an opposite speculative creed for another purpose. He says:—

"Here are two other extremes, Calvinism and Arminianism (for you need not be told how long Calvin and Arminius lived before St. Paul). 'How do you move in reference to these, Paul? In a golden mean?' 'No.'—'To one extreme?' 'No.'—'How then?' 'To both extremes: to-day I am a strong Calvinist; to-morrow a strong Arminian.'—'Well, well, Paul, I see thou art beside thyself: go to Aristotle, and learn the golden mean.'"+

Is it possible to conceive, that either of the Edwardes, or Hopkins, or Emmons, would indite such an apology for Antinomianism or Arminianism? They dreaded each of these creeds, as an angel of death. Yet they have been condemned for sanctioning both; condemned, because they have been misunderstood; misunderstood, because their system is original and novel; original and novel, because it combines the one-sided truth which the Antinomian had distorted, with the one-sided truth which the Arminian had distorted; separates the two truths from the errors with which the Antinomian and the Arminian had intertwined them, and harmonizes the two into one

* Cecil's Remains, pp. 162, 163. Boston edition. There is nothing in a late Convention sermon that approximates to the license of these remarks; yet the Princeton Review says, "Cecil is one of our classics," and it recommends him as tending "to cure young men of the hum-drum or *Blair* method." (Bib. Repertory, Vol. XVII. p. 639.)

† Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. Charles Simeon, M.A. By the Rev. William Carus, M.A. London Ed. 1847. p. 600.

capacious system; a system rigidly accurate in form, and still indulgent enough to allow many bold, hearty expressions of its own truth; a system the *minutiae* of which Calvin and Augustine would have consistently defended, if they had lived when the laws of interpretation and the philosophy of common sense had been as clear and prominent, as they have been during and since the time of the Edwardses.

In the last place, the Theology of New England is the only system of speculative orthodoxy which will endure examination; and it is, therefore, destined to prevail. It is impugned by men who are often forced to own its "radical principles." They are driven to it, and soon they disavow it, and then come to it, and leave it once more, and afterwards flee back to it, and as soon abandon it, only to return another time, and so forsake it yet again. Dr. Hodge often appears upon its ground, either as a friend or foe; and our only complaint is, that, in either capacity, he stays too short a time. In his onsets and retreats, he represents the character of all opposition to the truth. He writes condemnatory words upon our creed, and then we quote from him other words, in which he has uttered the identical sentiments which he now controverts. We produce against him the very Essays, from which he has mainly derived his fame, as an "accomplished Reviewer." He replies, that we impute to him essays "some of which [he] probably never even read."* This is to be

* Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 688. We have ascribed to Dr. Hodge's authorship, not more than four Articles in the Bib. Repertory, and those are the Articles which have been long admitted to be his, by "common fame;" an authority which ought not, since 1837, to have been "excised" from his remembrance. We have quoted other Essays, indeed, as expressing opinions, which he is known, from other sources, to entertain; but we have been careful to mention him as the author of not more than four, and those, the very Essays which have been most unanimously imputed to him. Their spirit and style bear a marked resemblance to the spirit and style of his assault upon a harmless Convention sermon, and are the legitimate results of a faith which shrinks from being investigated. Thus, in one of these Articles, he accuses Dr. Beman of reviving the "often refuted slander of Socinians and Papists;" of having made a "wicked misrepresentation;" of writing a book, according to which "the atonement must be rejected, as either incredible or worthless;" of leaving out "the very soul of the doctrine," &c. The Reviewer adds, "That Dr. Cox, in his Introduction, should applaud such a book, neither surprises nor pains us. We are all aware, that he knows no better." Bib. Repert. Vol. XVII. pp. 117, 137, 138. Was it not natural for us to infer, that the author of such phrases is the same gentleman by whom we are accused of having an alembic for evaporating the doctrines of the Bible, and by whom we are likened to a Frenchman trying to teach English, and our words are said to be "kept going up and down, like a juggler's balls," &c.? Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII. pp. 675, 687, 695, &c. We shall be happy to hear an unequivocal statement, that not one of these sentences came from the writer on the "Way of Life." We are sorry to say, however, that the four Essays which we have ascribed to him, are marked with his well-known facility of controverting himself, and with his tendency to pervert the quotations which he ascribes to his antagonist, and with what we may call, "for want of a better name," his *striking* style.

regretted. He has enjoyed, for many years, the ovations of a party for those bold Reviews; and now, when their self-nullifying character is exposed, he never read them, "probably." For twenty years, has he been shining in borrowed plumage? The Conductors of the Biblical Repertory have virtually avowed themselves responsible for two of the four Essays which we referred to our assailant; and is he prepared to assert, that he was not then a Conductor of the work, which one of his admirers has denominated "Professor Hodge's Biblical Repertory?"* He says, that we have "gone back twenty years," for the self-contradictions which we have collated from his reputed writings.† What! Does "Gibraltar" crumble into the Mediterranean, within a span of twenty years? Has it come to this, "that those old walls which have stood for ages, even from the beginning,"‡ turn out to be made of a substance which will not keep so long as a third part of a man's life? This is a frail plea, since all the more important Essays, which we cited, have been republished within five years, and are even yet applauded, as the very Ehrenbreitstein of our Reviewer's theology; a brittle theology, indeed, when the stoutest defences of it are not to be touched, because they were put up "twenty years" ago! Our critic has condemned us for having opposed the Augustinian doctrine of imputation. We have adduced the most decisive words of renowned Augustinians, to prove that our critic himself has often opposed it. He replies, first, that we are ignorant; and, secondly, that we quote authors of whom he has never heard.§ Yet these very authors are cited by Rivetus, as the standard-bearers of orthodoxy, and the Princeton Review has translated one part of their testimony, and expressed a desire to see the remainder "translated and published in a volume;"|| and just so soon as we have begun to comply with the wishes of that Review, it turns round, and protests that it never heard of the authorities, which it has recommended once and again. And in the same breath, it accuses us of turning a "corner," and performing a "pirouette."¶ Rivetus "was the greatest theologian of the age," says that same Review, and the Treatise from which we have quoted our authorities, is the most celebrated of his works, and Turretin (*Pars I.* p. 691) has recommended it as containing the standards of orthodoxy; and still the Review has never heard of some of those standards, and advises us to read Turretin, and condemns us for having "read

* See Dr. Brown's Law of Christ respecting Civil Obedience, Supplementary Notes, p. 17. See also Bib. Repert. Vol. II. p. 431.

† Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII. p. 688.

‡ Ibid. p. 319.

§ Comp. Bib. Repert. Vol. XXIII. pp. 678, 679, 682, 695.

|| Bib. Repertory, Vol. XI. p. 579.

¶ Ib. Vol. XXIII. p. 687.

up," *already*,* and pretends, withal, that its course is self-consistent. In our critic's endeavour to evade the responsibility of Essays, which have been so long regarded as the exponents of his dogmatic system, in his not having heard of the authors who have been so celebrated for avowing the old Calvinism in the plainest words, he has betrayed the vacillating character of the faith which he would set up against our own. We asked him for the bread of instruction; and he has given us back the stone of reproof, charging us with having misunderstood the Augustinian doctrine of Imputed Sin. But this very charge is a sign of his precarious position; for we have represented the Augustinian doctrine, just as it has been portrayed by Dr. Jonathan Edwards, Smalley, Dwight; by Neander, Brettschneider, Marheinecke, Hahn, Hase, Knapp, Reinhard, Doederlein, Meier, Schott, and, indeed, all the more eminent theologians of Germany.† But while Dr. Hodge avows his agreement with the old Augustinians, and denies that their doctrine involves an identity between ourselves and Adam, what is his reason for passing over, in ominous silence, their argument, that we are doomed not unjustly, but justly, to our earliest spiritual death; and therefore we deserve that death, and hence must have deserved it before we were visited with it, that is, before we were conceived in sin; and, accordingly, we must, ere we were shapen in our penal iniquity, have participated in Adam's offence? This is a standard argument. Our critic is logically bound to explain its origin and meaning. Instead of doing so, he busies himself in discoursing about Schleiermacher. The notable argument which he thus neglects, is useful in illustrating the old phrases, which pervade the Augustinian metaphysics. And why has not our Reviewer accounted for those phrases, if they do not, when used in philosophical prose, imply that we are morally blameable for Adam's transgression? Why do we read, in the most unimpassioned metaphysics of Calvinism, that "the sin of Adam is ours by propagation, by imputation, and *also by participation*;" that "as children are a part of their parents, so children are, in a manner, partakers of their parents' sin" (Pareus); that Adam's offence was "transferred," "brought over," "transmitted" to us as *persons*, because we had, as *natures*, previously existed and sinned in him?‡ The mental state which

* Comp. Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. pp. 678, 695.

† We have repeatedly asserted, that the doctrine of our having literally sinned in Adam, was the prevailing doctrine of the Augustinians, and that there were subordinate parties, who held other theories. See various theories stated in Hahn's *Lehrbuch des christl. Glaubens*. Theil II. § 81. Brettschneider's *Entwicklung*, § 89, vierte Auflage. Knapp's *Theology*, Art. VI. § 57, and Art. IX. § 76. Hase's *Hutterus Redivivus*, §§ 82—87.

- ‡ Bib. Sac. Vol. VIII. pp. 609—614. That many of these phrases were originally

led philosophers to the use of these as logical phrases, is a marked phenomenon; it demands an explanation from our Reviewer. No wonder, then, that he threatens to retire from the controversy, unless we confine ourselves to his freshly compiled "anti-Augustinian" creed. Why has he forbore, in all his hundred pages against us, to write one paragraph on the astounding theories which have been formed, for explaining the mode of our participation in the sin of Eden? He avers, that the old Calvinists were guiltless of believing in our moral demerit for that offence. What, then, was the need of their herculean efforts to prove that we were voluntary in the primal transgression? What necessity was there for the doctrine of "spermatic animalcules," by and in which we, who have grown up from them, were contaminated in the person of our ancestors? What induced men to invent their phenomenal explanations of personal identity, if they did not regard the entire race as morally identical with the first ancestor? And why has our Reviewer, seeing these old doctrines rise before him in such a questionable shape, refused to look at them, and turned away his eyes to what he calls the "Paine light" in a Convention sermon, and imitated Tully in the "public-place," who "spoke Greek," while "those that understood him smiled at one another, and shook their heads?"* And why has the learned Reviewer been so unwilling to explain the difference between the Calvinistic doctrine of Imputed Sin, and that of Imputed Righteousness? There has been a difference. The tomes of Calvin and his disciples are pervaded by the sentiment, that the sin of Adam is imputed to us "deservedly," but the righteousness of Christ "undeservedly;" the former, "justly;" the latter, "gratuitously;" the one, "*after and because* we had sinned;" the other, *before* we had been holy. What does this difference mean? And over and above his eloquent silence on these grave questions, why does our critic shrink from confessing, that the old Calvinists believed in our moral identity with Adam? Why does he not believe in it himself? What if we could not have been present in that garden? "Power does not limit responsibility." What if we could not have known the law of Paradise? "We may sin without any knowledge of law?" What if we did not act, in eating the apple? "All sin does not consist in acting." If we may be blameable for events which preceded our choice by one hour, we may be blameable for events which preceded our choice by six thousand years. And the only reason why our worthy

poetical, and are often now dissolved into the same, we have stated. But what is their meaning in logical formulas? How will our Reviewer interpret Gerhard, *Loci Theol.* Tom. IV. § 52, p. 316, and Marckius, *Theol. Cap.* XV. §§ 31, 32? He has quoted these authors, and therefore heard of them.

* Shakspeare's *Julius Cæsar*, Act I. Sc. II.

critic recoils from the hypothesis of "ante-natal" sin, is, that he practically believes in the three radical principles, which he intermittently disapproves. Once overlook the axioms, that power must equal duty, that knowledge is essential to holiness or sin;—then, we have nothing to hold us back from the faith that we ought to have obeyed the law in Eden, and to have performed a thousand unknown and impossible deeds. Our assailant cannot write a page on this theme, without betraying his regard for those principles of common sense, which undermine his theories.

Take an example. He describes us as saying, that "a man is put to death by a sovereign act;" and he describes himself as gainsaying us by the assertion, that a man is put to death "with the trifling, intermediate links of guilt and just condemnation."* But hold him close to this word "guilt;" he will at once try to escape, with the plea that he does not mean *moral* guilt: fasten him to the word "just condemnation;" he will struggle to get free, with the apology that he does not mean "morally just." What, then, does he mean? Nothing more than this: men, without any sin of their own, are subjected to evil, because they are "exposed" to it, by Him who designs, in this exposure, to express his abhorrence of sin in Adam. This is the New England representation, in all things except its verbiage. The Reviewer does, indeed, call our first suffering "penal," and "judicial;" but he has divested these words of their moral import, and thus given up the theoretical life, while he retains the dead letter of the ancient system.† He has reduced the words to *trifling* ambiguities. Pregnant with meaning is his assertion, that he connects the first suffering of men with their previous state, by "the *trifling*, intermediate links of guilt and just condemnation."‡ They are trifling links, when he has burned out their pristine temper. On many other doctrines, as well as on this, he is led astray by his favourite words; and he alternately disclaims and acknowledges their ancient meaning. He builds up a platform of metaphorical terminology; but no sooner does an examiner step on it, than it caves in. It is out of joint, and will not bear the weight of a lexicon. It cannot stand. In the hour of trouble, its advocates always flee to the New England system. This system is sustained by argument, and not by suspicious intimations about Schleier-

* Biblical Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 680.

† In his last Review (p. 679), he represents us as saying, that the difference between the ancient theory of Imputation and our own, is merely verbal. He mistakes. We said the very opposite. We represented as merely verbal the difference between our theory and that which our Reviewer adopts in those better hours, when he abandons the old Augustinianism.

‡ Bib. Repertory, Vol. XXIII. p. 680.

macher. It is a system which will bear to be looked at, and is not a theology of mere "Dissolving Views." The science of the world is in favour of it. The spirit and plain import of the Bible are in favour of it. The moral instincts of the race are in favour of it. The common sense of common men is in favour of it. They can be kept back from it, only by the incessant roll of a polemic drum, which alarms them by its discordant sounds.

More than thirty years ago, an eager antagonist announced, that "the grand enemy of truth, the most to be dreaded, because the most insinuating and the most to be opposed, is Hopkinsianism;" and that "a very large majority of the professors of religion in the United States, are either Hopkinsians or entire Arminians;"* and he invoked the genius of Princeton against the creed which drew its life from Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins. Nor was his invocation idle; for, many a time has Princeton declared, that the evils of Hopkinsianism may be traced to Edwards, who is said to have rejected the fundamental doctrine of the Gospel. Only six years ago, it spoke of "that pitchy cloud of religious and philosophical heresies, that covers the land of the Puritans;" and, after proclaiming that "the New England Theology has stood now almost a hundred years," characterizes it as "a system that had its origin in opinions, too much like 'another gospel,' although its teachers seemed, indeed, scarcely less than angels of God."† But, "*laborant, cum ventum ad verum est.*" The "northern heresies" are suddenly shut up to a "small coterie." "That pitchy cloud" has become no bigger than a man's hand. The stars that rose in the eastern sky, to shed disastrous light on half the church, have now only one "aberration," and that "in the direction of ultra-Calvinism." "The father of Hopkinsianism" now lies entombed in the confidence of theologians who once viewed him with dread. They have garnished the sepulchre of Bellamy, and embalmed "the other great men of New England." Through much tribulation, did those great men enter into the kingdom of truth. Their royal genius is now honoured by their foes. Well, then, may we do homage to our father's memory. How can we be recreant to their faith, when its past successes are but an earnest of its future triumph?

* Willson's Historical Sketch, pp. 210, 215, 191 seq. On pp. 184, 185, this writer quotes the Pastoral Letter of the Synod of Philadelphia, dated Sept. 20, 1816, and warning the Churches against "Arian, Socinian, Arminian and Hopkinsian Heresies." According to Hopkins, he says (p. 158), "the atonement really amounted to nothing."

† Bib. Repository, Vol. XVIII. pp. 25, 26.

ART. VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. PATMOS, AND THE SEVEN CHURCHES.*

THIS work is intended as a contribution to the Sacred Geography of the New Testament.

The modern name of Patmos is *Patino* or *Patmosa* (not *Patimo* or *Patmosa*, as in some of our helps); the ruins of Ephesus are near the Turkish village of *Aja-suluk*, thought to be a corruption of *hagios theologos*, 'Holy Divine'; Smyrna is the modern *Ismir*; Pergamos is now *Bergamo*; Thyatira is now called *Ak-hissar*, 'white castle'; Sardis is called *Sart*; Philadelphia is called *Ala-shehr*, 'high city'; and Loadicea, *Eski-hissar*, 'old castle.'

These localities are fully described by Mr. Brewer, who visited them all personally, excepting Thyatira. He has also entered into their ancient history. The description has been embellished by Mr. Barber with suitable engravings to illustrate the general appearance of these places, and the most interesting objects in them.

The stern and desolate character of the island, and the tradition existing on the spot, are vouchers that Patmos was the *actual*, and not merely the *ideal* seat of the visions.

The identification of Patmos and of the Seven Churches in Asia, as exhibited in this work, is a general confirmation of the scriptural notices concerning these places. There is no reasonable doubt in respect to any one of them. There is no dissonance between what is said of them in the Bible and what is learned from historians and travellers. The points of accordance are not indeed very numerous, not very minute; yet some of them are interesting.

1. The tradition of the Greek church still points out a grotto or natural cavern in Patmos, where St. John is said to have received his revelation.

2. The Seven Churches are in the neighbourhood (within about 200 miles) of Patmos, and are named in the Apocalypse in the order in which they might be most conveniently visited from that island.

3. The Seven localities appear in early Christian times as the seats of important churches. The only exception is Loadicea; but for this church we have the joint testimony of Paul and John. See Col. ii. 1; iv. 13, 15, 16.

4. Ephesian coins are still in existence, on which is exhibited a figure of the goddess Diana. Comp. Acts xix. 23.

* *Patmos, and the Seven Churches of Asia*; published by Rev. Josiah Brewer, of Middletown, Ct., and John W. Barber, of New Haven: 1851.

5. A temple of Esculapius, who is usually represented under the image of a serpent, is said to have existed at Pergamos. To this Rev. ii. 13 has been thought to allude.

6. An inscription in honour of Antonius Claudius Alphenus has been discovered at Thyatira, on which mention is made of a company of dyers; and Thyatira is famous for dyeing, even at the present day. Comp. Acts xvi. 14.

7. Jews are represented in an ancient epistle of the Smyrneans as being present at, and aiding in the martyrdom of, Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna. Comp. what is said of Jews, Rev. ii. 9.

Why St. John chose exactly these churches (not Collosse, Hierapolis, Magnesia, Tralles, Miletus, which would seem to have equal claim to be selected), does not appear. This, however, does not authorise us to assume, on the one hand, that the Seven Churches are merely symbolical of the Church universal, or of seven periods in the history of the same; or, on the other hand, that only the churches named have an interest in the visions. The correct view to be taken is that of De Wette, 'that St. John, out of the churches of Asia Minor, with which he was most closely connected, selected seven most needing his exhortations, in order through them to dedicate his work to the whole church.'

G.

II. HENDERSON'S COMMENTARY ON JEREMIAH.*

The venerable author of this Commentary has been favourably known to the religious public for many years. As the indefatigable agent of the Bible Society, he traversed the northern and central parts of the continent of Europe, and became versed in some of the most important living languages. His Travels in Iceland, and his Observations on the Vaudois of Piedmont, are full of valuable information, and are written in a very agreeable style. His Commentaries on the Minor Prophets and on Isaiah, are probably the best specimens of exegetical talent and learning which have ever appeared in England. The author manifests an intimate acquaintance with the original text and with the versions in the cognate dialects, an independent judgment, profound reverence for the inspired Word, power of condensing much matter into little space, and often a very happy tact in eliciting and expressing the shades of thought.

The work on Jeremiah is preceded by a short Introduction,

* The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah and that of Lamentations, translated from the Original Hebrew; with a Commentary, critical, philological, and exegetical. By E. Henderson, D.D. London.

in which the author considers the life and times of the prophet, the style of his writings, the arrangement of the prophecies, and the Septuagint version of the book. The notes are in general brief, usually filling not more than one third of the page: the remainder is taken up with the text. As usual with the author, numerous and valuable illustrations and analogies are drawn from the early versions. While he admits and acts upon the fair principles of criticism in regard to the text, yet he has no sympathy with the reckless and arbitrary handling of it, which has been recently so fashionable. The union of scholarship and of unaffected reverence for the Scriptures is rarely seen to better advantage than in Dr. Henderson's writings. The Notes, we think, are in some cases too brief. Ampler illustrations, especially on the more difficult passages, would have been acceptable. The translation fails, in some cases, in simplicity. Modern words and those of Latin origin are used, where monosyllables or Saxon terms would have been in better taste. We quote a few instances, and mark the objectionable words by Italics. "To whom the word of Jehovah was *communicated*," p. 1; "shall the calamity be *disclosed*," p. 4; "all who devoured him *contracted* guilt," p. 8; "a land of *sterility*," p. 9; "*apostate* deeds," p. 12; "thine iniquity is *ingrained* before me," p. 14; "go *powerless*," p. 281; "no hands *attacked* her," "they are not *recognised*," and "their skin *adheres* to their bones," p. 298. In these passages, the words marked are not essential to express the sense.

III. RECENT WORKS ON CHURCH HISTORY.*

The fourth volume of Torrey's translation of Neander's Church History has recently been published by Crocker and Brewster, of Boston. All those parts of Neander's historical writings which Professor Torrey has translated are the best which that author has written, and Professor Torrey thus far is his best English translator. Everywhere we see Neander himself, with his capacious, well-stored head, and his great, loving heart, and his blindfold, heavy, but most mighty movement. This Church History is the book of books for the thoughtful scholar, and it will have a predominating influence in moulding *the church of the future*. The most pernicious errors of this great and good man, his views of inspiration and the Christian Sabbath, are not prominently seen in these volumes, while all his numerous good qualities shine like the noon-day sun. His Life of Christ and his Apostolic Church, Mr. Torrey has not

* Neander's Church History, translated by Torrey. Gieseler's Church History, translated by Davidson. Schnaff's Kirchengeschichte.

translated, and it is in those works that his mistakes most painfully appear. They so fall in with the corrupt tendencies of the age, and are so sanctioned by his great name, that they are all the more mischievous. In regard to these parts of church history, we altogether prefer the excellent volume of Professor Schaff, recently published, and we cannot but recommend to Professor Torrey to translate that as the introductory volume to his Neander. The work would then be complete as far as it goes.

Neander does not often refer to his authorities, nor does he give many quotations from the original sources. In these respects Gieseler does just what Neander does not, and every scholar should have and use Gieseler as *notes and authorities*, or *proofs and illustrations* to Neander. The two together make up, what neither is or can be separately, *a full and finished church history*.

A very good English translation, from the older editions of Gieseler, was made by Mr. F. Cunningham, and published in Philadelphia, in 1836. Dr. Davidson has recently made another translation from the last German edition, extended to A.D. 1093, and the two volumes have been very handsomely printed by the Harpers, in New York. The high regard which is due to Dr. Davidson's excellences as a man and his merits as a scholar, makes us the more regret that he did not take more time to revise his translation, and carefully correct it before submitting it to the public. There are infelicities in it which can be accounted for only on the supposition of extreme haste and a pressure of other cares and labours.

In looking over the last half of the second volume, we find the preposition *vor* translated by the noun *preface*, p. 183, of the translation; *Extravaganten* made *extravagancies*, p. 216; *Engern* translated *Hungary*, p. 250; *Christann* made *Christianity*, p. 362, and other blemishes of the same sort. The work needs a careful revision.

C. E. S.

IV. SELECT DISCOURSES OF SERENO EDWARDS DWIGHT, D.D.*

There would have been an obvious impropriety in withholding from the public these memoirs, with the accompanying sermons of the late Sereno Edwards Dwight. His merits as a scholar and a preacher, the important services which he achieved for the church and the world, his character as a man and a Christian,

* Select Discourses of Sereno Edwards Dwight, D.D., Pastor of Park-street Church, Boston, and President of Hamilton College, in New York; with a Memoir of his Life, by William T. Dwight, D.D., Pastor of the Third Congregational Church, Portland, Me. Pp. 382. Boston: Crocker and Brewster. London: Delf and Trübner.

imperiously required the preparation of this volume. The accomplished editor has executed his task in a skilful and felicitous manner. The fraternal interest which he took in the work has not betrayed him into any exaggerations. Most readers would probably be glad had the events of Dr. Dwight's life been narrated with more fulness and minuteness of detail. This remark applies especially to the period of eight years in which he was pastor of Park-street Church. His connection with that church at so early and critical a period of its existence, the state of permanent prosperity in which his ministry was instrumental in placing it, the conspicuous part which he bore in the ever-memorable conflict between the Evangelical and Liberal parties and in all the important religious movements of the time, would seem to have rendered desirable a more copious narrative. We, however, appreciate the motive which prompted the writer to study brevity—a feature unfortunately so rare in biographical sketches.

The narrative of Dr. Dwight's life is followed by a selection from his sermons. The discourses on the Death of Christ comprise the larger portion. These were delivered and published in 1826. They well deserve a republication. They are constructed on a somewhat peculiar plan. The facts connected with the death of Christ are first given. The phraseology in which its purpose is set forth in the Bible is then subjected to a rigorous examination. After specifying the different erroneous theories that have been framed of the purpose of Christ's death, it is shown that no one of these theories gives an adequate solution of the facts connected with it, nor harmonizes with the language in which the Bible sets forth its purpose. A comparison of what the author esteems the true theory with these facts and with the phraseology of the Scriptures is then instituted, and the conclusion arrived at, that inasmuch as the evangelical view of Christ's death most satisfactorily explains the facts, and agrees best with the scriptural phraseology, it is the only correct theory. This method of discussing the subject has the advantage of novelty and impressiveness, and affords scope for much ingenious and conclusive reasoning. Its great evil is the sameness of manner in which each error is combatted, causing the reader to become sensible of a degree of weariness. With this abatement, the public will doubtless attach a high value to these discourses, although many of the errors which are discussed in them have long since ceased to be anything else than objects of dim remembrance.

For most purposes which a scientific theologian has in view, sermons, designed to produce their whole effect while listened to, have not the value of regular treatises on separate doctrines.

Yet the preacher and theological student may often derive much benefit from noticing the means by which those who have preached effectively on doctrinal subjects have succeeded in doing so. These Discourses, in this point of view if in no other, will reward a close examination.

The remaining sermons in the volume are of a practical character. The reader would not hesitate to infer what is stated in the Memoir, that Dr. Dwight studiously aimed in his preaching, not to win admiration by the charms of his style, but to convince his hearers of sin, and be an agent in their conversion. The modesty of the Editor will be thought, however, by many to have led him to underrate the merits of these sermons in respect to style. With the exception of here and there a word or form of expression which elegant usage perhaps does not approve, there is little to offend a fastidious taste. The truth is presented in a direct and forcible style, simple and by no means destitute of elegance, and with a remembrance of the oratorical talents of Dr. Dwight, it is easily seen how his auditories must have been powerfully moved by his sermons.

Notwithstanding the great number of books of this character which are at present published, no injury can be apprehended from even the indefinite multiplication of well-executed biographies of good men. Let the dead speak as well as the living. And let us be allowed, in order that we may become wise, sometimes to walk with the wise men who have departed.

ART. IX.—CORRESPONDENCE.

Letter from Rev. Dr. J. Perkins, Orûmiah, Aug. 9, 1851.

I RECENTLY (though not for the first time), passed an ancient sculpture of interest, in Salmas, which, you will recollect, is on the eastern border of ancient Armenia, and on the western boundary of modern Persia. The Plain of Salmas is sixty miles north of the city of Orûmiah. It is from ten to fifteen miles broad, and at least twenty miles long, and almost a water level; its eastern end lying on the lake of Orûmiah, and its western end and north and south sides being bounded by the Kûrdish mountains. On the southern border of this beautiful plain, about four miles west from the shore of the lake, is the sculpture in question. It is on the southern face of an isolated, craggy cliff of dark-coloured limestone, that rises abruptly from the plain, just at the foot of the mountain range on the south. It is not more than one hundred feet north of one of the roads,

which lead from the upper or western portion of Salmas over the mountains to the Plain of Orúmiāh, the road here passing between this isolated cliff and the mountain. The sculpture is perhaps forty feet above the plain. It is carved on the perpendicular face of the rock, which is hewn to receive it. It consists of two figures, or rather, clusters of figures, three or more feet apart, each, a horse on which is mounted a noble rider, armed with a sword, and a humbler footman at the head of the horse, facing the rider, and grasping his right hand, as if to receive a pledge or implore pardon. The figures are as large as life. The horses and riders face the west. The riders are beautifully clad; their heads being mounted with ample turbans having streamers flying from them. The work is very finely executed. Every feature is distinct, spirited and life-like. The figures are entire and perfect, with the exception of a slight injury on the face of one of the riders, caused by the weather. The rock itself being hard, and the sculptured face perpendicular, and on the southern side of the cliff, and thus shielded in a great measure from the common direction of storms, the work remains almost uninjured from age to age. The face of the cliff is broken around the hewn surface on which the sculpture is carved, so that it is impossible to determine in what relation the work originally stood. It may have formed a portion of the interior of a palace, hewn from the natural rock; but any such supposition is of course conjectural. There are no inscriptions on this cliff, nor in the vicinity. The sculpture may probably date from the early periods of the ancient kingdom of Armenia.

Near the northern side of the old town of Salmas (without the town), now containing about three thousand inhabitants (Jews, Mohammedans and Armenians), which is situated quite at the western end of the plain, are two old brick towers, of venerable appearance, on which are inscriptions, all, however, in the Arabic character.

On my late journey to Erzurûm, in passing Mount Ararat (an object always *new* as the fresh snow on its summit, though old as the world, and always intensely interesting, as the impressively august chronicler of the flood), I was struck more than once with the distinct outlines of the ancient craters, on the tops of both great and little Ararat; and a thing that never before arrested my attention, I now observed a *third peak*, though much lower than little Ararat, rising from the same mountain range, in the same direction with great and little Ararat (a somewhat longer distance intervening between it and the latter than between those two), and in like manner partially truncated and bearing every appearance of an ancient crater on the top. The three peaks thus appear to the eye of the

traveller in an irregular gradation in point of height, the range running in the direction of south by east. This third crater is of course another proof of the volcanic character of Mount Ararat, were any proof needed, additional to the blocks of lava, scattered thickly over the face of the earth for many leagues around, and the almost countless thermal waters that boil from its surface all through that region.

A few months ago, a weekly newspaper, 'The Journal,' in the Persian language, was commenced at the Persian capital, under favourable auspices, by an Englishman, Mr. Bagen, who has long been a resident in this country, and is familiar with the language, and every way well qualified for the undertaking. It is the only periodical in the empire, except our humble monthly (the RAYS OF LIGHT), in the modern Syriac. A very good geography has recently been prepared and published in the Persian language, by a young Frenchman. Printing Mohammedan books, in Persian and Arabic, is vigorously prosecuted at Tabreez; and works of modern science, when desired, are printed, without 'let or hindrance,' at the same press. The cause of civilization is thus gradually advancing in this remote Eastern land.

An interesting sign of the times, under the efficient government of the young king of Persia, Naser-i-dui Shâh, is the breaking down of hierarchal power. Formerly, a high Mùllah, by a word, could contravene, or annul, any order of government; his weapon being the rabble, excited to the fury of a phrenzied mob, ready to carry terror and bloodshed in any direction. But a few months ago, the highest Mùllah in Azerbijân was seized and hurried off, a prisoner, from Tabreez to the capital; and the second one in rank hastened thither of his own accord, to forestall the mortification of an arrest, both having become obnoxious for the same offence, opposition, by means of popular excitement, to the operation of government. Other hierarchs, in different parts of the country, have taken warning from these examples, and greatly lowered the arrogant tone of their pretensions.

The present prime minister of Persia, a *self-made-man*, as truly as President Fillmore, being the son of a donkey-driver, and having risen by the strength and energy of his character to be the second man in rank (and really the *first* in power) in the empire, is a very enlightened and intelligent man, and admirably qualified, for a Persian, to be at the helm of the government. He is introducing a regular police in the large towns, and attempting many other innovations and improvements, highly beneficial to the country. Such changes are of course the work of *time*, in the staid oriental lands, and must not be expected to avoid all obstacles in their commencement, or reach their

consummation in a day. No intelligent spectator can view them with indifference, nor mistake the point toward which they are tending. The young king of Persia bears a good character; in the familiar parlance of Europeans who know him, he is *a good boy*. He seems as earnestly to desire the welfare of his subjects, as the young Sûltan of Turkey, who is so much respected abroad.

A few weeks ago, the annual examination of our Female Seminary occurred. It was to us an occasion of intense interest. The pupils had made great advance during the year. The charm of this, as well as of our male seminary, is, that most of the pupils are, as we trust, 'plants of righteousness,' preparing to be transplanted to a celestial garden.

Our printing of the Old Testament is steadily advancing. The work, in both the ancient and modern Syriac, proves to be a heavy one for our rude native printers. We have taken great pains to prepare an accurate copy of the ancient Syriac, by comparing it with the most ancient copies of the Peshito which we find among the Nestorians, as well as a good translation into the modern; so that the work may be interesting and valuable to scholars, as well as unspeakably useful to the fallen people for whom it is designed.

Have I ever sent you a specimen of our Nestorian monthly, the Rays of Light? I have the impression that I have done so. We find this humble organ a very valuable auxiliary in our missionary work, especially in our seminaries and schools. Our printers are occupied three or four days in a month in printing it. The work of preparing the matter, being shared by several members of the mission, is easily accomplished.

We are endeavouring to extend our operations into the mountains as fast as practicable. The bloody Kûrds have been subdued, and law and order have taken the place of plunder and bloodshed, in Nestorian Kûrdistan. But we shall probably for some time be obliged to encounter more or less of opposition from Turkish officials, jealous of the introduction of too much light for their convenience in the remote parts of the Sûltan's dominions—though the *written ordinance* of the Sûltan so amply pledges religious toleration.

From Mr. Pischon, a Pupil of Neander, and now Private Secretary to the Russian Embassy at Athens.

Athens, July 1851.—In commencing the archæological communications which you desire me to send you for the Bibliotheca Sacra from this ancient metropolis of Grecian art and science, I am happy in being able to open with an occurrence which is,

perhaps, destined to make an epoch in the history of Athenian topography. I cannot begin, however, without expressing my deep regret, that here, on the old classic soil, the means and resources employed for the investigation of antiquity, are so extremely scanty. In the unhappy financial condition of the Grecian State, a State which, young as it still is, shows already the decrepitude of age, it is impossible to make appropriations from the public treasury for carrying on excavations. The *école Française*, a kind of archæological academy, established in this place by the French government, contents itself with sending its young members on tours through the provinces, and thus employing them for political more than for scientific ends. Hence, all that is done for the knowledge of antiquity is left to the zeal and enterprize of private individuals. Among these an Archæological Society has been organised for a considerable number of years. Since the year 1843, when the German scholars left, rewarded with ingratitude for their services (among them the deservedly esteemed Professors Ulrichs and Ross), this Society has consisted almost exclusively of Greeks. Among these the most prominent till lately were Pittakis, a man of much zeal as a collector, who, as early as the war of independence, was often to be found with his *toupheki* (firelock) on his shoulder, among the ruins of decayed places, copying ancient inscriptions, and gathering remains of statues or of coins—a pendant to Walter Scott's Antiquary—and Rizo Rangabís, Professor of Archæology in the University at Athens, and unquestionably the most learned and variously cultivated among the Greeks of this place. Unfortunately a growing jealousy between these two *Coryphæi*, led, at last, to the separation of the latter from the Society; and its activity has thus received no inconsiderable check. As its pecuniary means were at the same time extremely limited, it had contented itself for the last twelvemonth with undertaking some excavations and repairs about the steps leading to the Parthenon, when, in April of the present year, it received information, that remains of tablets containing ancient inscriptions had been discovered in the old city (*ἄστυ*) not far from the Stoa of Hadrian. This quarter of the city has been much built over, and is covered with the most miserable hovels; and here it often happens that in repairing old houses or putting up new ones, pieces of pillars or of statuary are discovered, which, however, have in general no great value as works of art. In this instance it was a German washerwoman who gave occasion to the discovery. Not knowing what to do with her dirty soap water, she fell upon the idea of carrying it off into a pit upon the premises of a female neighbour. The sharp lie worked its way to the surface of the marble slabs,

and washed them white; when characters in good preservation made their appearance and attracted the attention of a young man living in the neighbourhood. By him Pittakis, of whom I have just spoken, was informed of the facts, and led to make a close examination of the inscription; while the Society, so far as its means allowed, carried on excavations in the same spot, where pieces of inscriptions had already been found several years before. The results of these investigations were, with a certain affectation of importance, withheld for some time from the public. At length, however, at the end of June, they were brought out by the Society, on the anniversary of its foundation, in an oral report of the President's. This was followed by a pamphlet of Mr. Pittakis, with explanations and lithographs, entitled *ἐπιγραφαὶ ἀνέκδοται ἀνακαλυφθεῖσαι καὶ ἐκδοθεῖσαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρχαιολογικοῦ συλλόγου* (which has hitherto appeared only in manuscript, and is not to be found in the booksellers' shops). I have compared these explanations on the spot with the actual condition of things, and this is the result. The two pits which have been opened measure scarcely 20 rhenish square feet; they have been laid open to a depth of 8 or 10 rhenish feet. In them have been found a number of heads of statues, as well as torsos and parts of extremities; some of the greatest beauty, in the ancient Attic style. Among them are two bearded heads of Dionyeos, which evidently belonged to Hermæ; two female heads of exquisite workmanship show, by the rolls which they bear, that they belonged to Cariatids, and, therefore, with a lion's head of burnt earth, must have been intended for the decoration of some important edifice. Other things have been discovered which probably belonged to the same building; such as pieces of cornice and frieze, of Ionic style and of Pentelic marble; a large Ionic capital of the same material; and finally the beginnings of four large pillars (0.80 and 0.70 French metres in diameter) of marble of Hymettus, seemingly monoliths, which, however, are not yet fully excavated, and which lie singularly side by side in a horizontal position. We find besides many rectangular blocks of tuff, which seem in part to have been used at a later period in the construction of a wall, now buried under the earth. But the part of the excavation, which is to us the most important, consists of *forty-nine fragments of inscriptions on marble of Pentelicus and Hymettus*, some of which were found to match with fragments discovered two years ago in the same place, so as to furnish a connected sense of considerable length. The longest piece, which has been thus put together, is represented in the pamphlet before mentioned on Plate I. It relates to the formation of a league (*συνμαχία*), in Olymp. 100, 3 = 378 B. C., at the head of which,

Athens during the Boeotian war rose again to political importance in Greece, and in the battle of Naxos, Olymp. 101, 1 = 376 B.C., under the command of Chabrias, completely annihilated the Spartan navy.

After the introductory words 'Επὶ Ναυσινίκο(υ) ἄρχοντος Καλλιβίου Κηφισοφῶντος Παιανιεύς ἐγαμμάτευσεν, we find next some gaps and disconnected words. But the writing soon continues: 'Απὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκο(υ) ἄρχο(ντ)ος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ Ἀθηναίων μηδενὶ ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε οἰκίαν μήτε χωρίον μήτε πριαμένῳ μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ μήτε ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνήται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τίθεται τρόπον ὅτῳ οὖν, ἐξεῖναι τῷ βο(υ)λομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων, φῆναι πρὸς το(ῦ)ς συνέδρο(υ)ς τῶν συμμάχων οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀποδόντων τὸ μὲν (ἥ)μισυ τῷ φήναντι, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο εἰς τὸν θεὸν τῶν συμμάχων. Ἐὰν δέ τις (ἴ) ἐπὶ πολέμῳ (ἐπ)ὶ τ(οῦς) ποιησαμένο(υ)ς τὴν συμμαχίαν ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίο(υ)ς καὶ το(ῦ)ς συμμάχο(υ)ς τοῦτοις καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δέ τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης παρὰ τὸδε τὸ ψήφισμα ὡς λύειν τ(ι) ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι εἰρημέν(ων, ὅ)παρχέτω μὲν αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ (κτ)ήμα(τα αὐτ)ῷ δημοσία ἔστω καὶ τῆς (θεοῦ) τὸ ἐπιδ(έ)κατον καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθην(αίο)ις καὶ τ(οῖς) συμμάχοις ὡς διαλύων τῇ(ν) συμμαχί(αν. Ζ)ημιόντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ, δ(που) Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι' (δ ἂν) δὲ θανάτῳ τιμηθῇ μὴ ταφῆται ἐν τῇ (Ἀττι)κῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων. Τὸ δ(ὲ) ψήφισμα τὸδε ὁ γραμματεὺς ὁ τῆς βουλῆ(ς ἀναγρ)αψάτω ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ καὶ καταθέ(τω) παρὰ τὸν Δία τὸν Ἐλευθέριον τὸ δὲ ἄρ(γύ)ριον δοῦναι εἰς τὴν ἀναγραφὴν τῆς στ(ή)λης ἐξήκοντα δραχμας ἐκ τῶν δέκα τα(λάι)των το(ῦ)ς ταμίας τῆς θεοῦ. Ἐἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε οὐσ(ῶν) πόλεων συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ (ἥ)τις ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται. Ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγράψαι, ἐλέσθαι δὲ τὸν δῆμον πρέσβεις τρεῖς αὐτίκα μάλα εἰς Θήβα(ς, ο)ῖτινες πείσο(υ)σι Θηβαί(ο)υς ὅτι ἂν φαίνηται ἀγαθόν. Οἷδε ἡρέθησαν (Ἀριστοτέλ)ης Μαραθώνιος, Πύρρανδρος ιος, Θρασύβο(υ)λος Κολλυτεύς. Here follow on the same slab the names (only in part preserved) of the members of the league, among which, besides many Thracian towns, and islands of the Archipelago, we find the Ἀκαρναῖες, Κεφαλλήνιοι, Ζακύνθιοι, Χαλκιδῆς, Ἐρετριῆς, but above all, the Θηβαῖοι. Fragments of words of Ἀριστοτέλης, which form the conclusion, refer perhaps to the negotiations between Athens and Thebes, which brought the latter state to join the league.

The foregoing inscription is of no inconsiderable value, as being the supplement to and confirming the notices, which we find in Diodorus XV. 27, relative to the formation of this alliance. The humiliating conditions, by which Athens herself

engages to restrict the commercial enterprise of her citizens, in order to gain her place at the head of the confederacy, show clearly how little had been accomplished by a quarter of a century of peace since the liberation of the city by Thrasybulus, towards restoring that Athenian supremacy which had been shattered by the Peloponnesian War; while they explain, on the other hand, the dissatisfaction, of which the allies, after the victory of Naxos, became continually more sensible, that, in spite of all conventions, Athens now, instead of Sparta had become their tyrant. Hence the war of the allies, twenty years later, which exhausted the last resources of independent Greece, and paved the way by which the kings of Macedon rose to universal dominion.

In reference to Athenian topography, we have to consider that passage of the inscription, which speaks of it as being set up *παρὰ τὸν Δία τὸν Ἐλευθέριον*. Still more important, however, are the concluding words of another inscription, in itself of little consequence, among those previously found in this place; these words, which have only now begun to excite attention, relate to the position of the stone, and require that it should be set up *ἐμπροσθεν τοῦ βουλευτηρίου*. From this expression, we may conjecture that the edifice, whose foundation-walls have been thus accidentally discovered, is no other than the Council-house of the Senate of Four Hundred, to which topographers hitherto have generally assigned a different location. The indefinite expressions of Pausanias in his *περίοδος* about the city, are understood by Colonel Leake in his "Topography of Athens," as though the Metroon, Senate-house, Tholos and other buildings of the Athenian magistracy, were situated west of the Acropolis, south of the Areopagus, and north of the Museum; while the place of the present excavation is under the north-western declivity of the Acropolis, and east of the Areopagus. Professor Ross and Mr. Pittakis had before conjectured that those public buildings must have been situated in the latter region. What is most important in the matter is the hope, that excavations on the site of these official buildings will bring to light a rich store of inscriptions, relating to the polity and legislation of the city in the most different periods of its history. Yet as other stones found in this place bear the inscriptions *ἀνέθεσαν τῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ*, and *στῆσαι ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ*; and, further, as the horizontal position of the columns here discovered, shows that the very ground here must have been overturned by violence, the question is forced upon us, whether some caprice of the moment may not have flung these different relics on each other just as we now find them, and whether therefore, those topographical inferences can be defended. At

all events the question can only be decided by the further prosecution of the excavations, which, in the meantime, have been suspended from want of money. From the government, as before stated, although the occurrence has excited attention at the Court, a continuance of the work is not to be expected. And as the value of the ground has advanced in the interval from 5,000 drachms to 15,000, the work will exceed the means of the Archæological Society.

I have only to add, that the pieces of inscriptions are set up in the little Museum of the Stoa of Hadrian, while the remaining objects discovered are still in the hands of Miss Psomá, the owner of the house.

ART. X.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

UNITED STATES.

WILKINS, CARTER & Co., of Boston, have published new and revised editions of Pickering's Greek and Leverett's Latin Lexicons.

Among the classics recently published in this country, we notice The I. II. and III. Philippics of Demosthenes, with historical introductions and explanatory notes, by Prof. M. J. Smead; and Select Orations of Cicero, with English notes, by the Rev. P. Bullions, D.D., well known for his Greek, Latin, and English Grammars. A volume of selections from Ovid, belonging to the school series of Schmitz and Zumpt, has been republished in Philadelphia. A Horace, belonging to the same series, has recently appeared in England.

Appleton & Co., of New York, have lately published Arnold's First Latin Book, remodelled and rewritten, and adapted to the Ollendorffian method of instruction, by Albert Harkness, Senior Master in the Providence High School. The same method has been applied to the Greek language in Prof. Kendrick's carefully written manual, "Greek Ollendorff, being a progressive exhibition of the principles of Greek Grammar, designed for beginners in Greek, and as a book of exercises for Academies and Colleges."

Owing to the unexpected length of some of the Articles in the present Number, several pages of Literary Intelligence prepared for it have been excluded.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
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COMBINED SERIES.—No. VI.

ART. I.—INDIA AS A FIELD FOR INQUIRY AND
EVANGELICAL LABOUR.*

BY REV. H. R. HOISINGTON, MISSIONARY OF THE AMERICAN BOARD.

IN addressing the Society of Inquiry in a Seminary whose sons, at the bidding of their Divine Master, have encircled the world, I need make no apology for calling your attention to *India as a field for inquiry and evangelical labour*.

The Hindûs, in some of their more important features, are yet to be known. The labours of missionaries and the researches of oriental scholars have, indeed, brought out a valuable collection of facts respecting that peculiar people. Still, those facts are but *a part* of the whole—in many cases, disjointed particulars, and mixed with many errors.

The *system* of Hindûism, like many of the temples of India, is of vast extent, and, in its exterior, highly imposing. It is often grotesque in its forms, and grossly absurd, or strangely enigmatical, in its developments. Its interpretation is to be sought *within*.

If we would *know* Hindûism, we must trace its historic lines, and study into its mystic science. We must apply to those works which are claimed to belong only to the initiated, to those who have been led into the light of their own *divine wisdom*. But those more scientific works are not yet available to the mere English student. Though somewhat familiar with the results of oriental researches, I could never get a satisfactory view of Hindûism until I was enabled to trace it in Hindû authors,

* An Address before the Society of Inquiry of Andover Theological Seminary, Sept. 1, 1851.

and in their own language. Most of the reputed standard works on the Hindûs, in the English language, oftener lead to error, than to any just view of that people. Even the *Purânas*, in the best view that can be taken of them, present only the exterior of the system, its more modern and popular form. They leave us uninformed on those fundamental principles which are the life and strength of the whole.

All that I can attempt on the present occasion, will be to cast a hasty glance along the outlines of this interesting field of inquiry.

The origin of the Hindûs lies far within the misty regions of uncertainty. Yet we can catch some glimpses of it. The Hindûs were not the first inhabitants of India. Remnants of the aborigines of the country are still to be traced in various tribes inhabiting the fastnesses of the hills and forests. They are known under different names. Their several dialects, in most cases allied to each other, have no affinity to the Sanskrit. Never incorporated with their victors, they have maintained their simplicity of manners, and a rude religious creed which bears no resemblance to Hindûism. As successive conquerors poured into the country, these aborigines betook themselves to the protection of the less accessible regions where they still exist.

Though the Hindûs were evidently not the first inhabitants of India, yet they are to be sought among the earliest conquerors. In process of time they embodied successive hordes of emigrants, among whom the *Brâhmans*, as a tribe, are to be included. According to the uniform testimony of Hindû records and tradition, all came in from lands west of the Indus.

There are some reasons to believe, that the aboriginal inhabitants of India were of the family of *Shem*; and that they came into India by two routes; one, at the north-west, across the Indus; the other, by sea, into south-western India. But the successive tribes of conquerors were more probably of the family of Cush, and mostly entered India by the north-west passage. They first inhabited the Panjaub; and they were long confined to the countries between the Himâlaya and Vindya ranges of mountains.

The Brâhmans, in alliance with other tribes, fought their way into power and eminence. They were early identified, in many respects, with the *Solar line* of kings. The *Lunar line* was a branch from the *Solar*. In it arose the great civil war which forms the subject of one of the Hindû Epics, the *Mahâbhârata*. This division among the earlier Hindûs existed, and the Lunar line had even become powerful, before the Brâhmans had obtained any extensive footing in India. The *Buddhists* rallied

under the banners of the Lunar line. Between these two rival powers there were frequent wars, recurring through a long period of years. The Bráhmans were at length triumphant. The Buddhist power was completely broken. The priests, and other determined adherents of the Buddhist faith, being expelled from the country, took refuge in Ceylon and in countries farther east.

Buddhism was undoubtedly a prominent branch, or school of primitive Hindûism; at least it grew out of such a school. The leaders in this school obstinately resisted the encroachments of the Bráhmans, rejecting their claims to pre-eminence and their proposed additions to the simpler and purer faith held by them. Hence, the long and bloody contests referred to above, which resulted in the ultimate expulsion of the Buddhist branch of the early Hindû family.

The Bráhmans, aided by their royal allies of the Solar line, having thus either subdued or expelled all the opposing tribes of northern India, naturally turned their attention to religious matters. They now set themselves to carry out their peculiar notions into a *system* of their own. Here commences what I call *Bráhmaism*, or *Bráhmanical Hindûism*.

Whether the Bráhmans were originally a section of the Hindû family has been doubted. But it is certain, that at this stage they professed the Hindû faith as they explained it. But they evidently did not hold it in its pristine simplicity. They gradually engrafted upon the existing doctrines the marvellous system of Hindû idolatry which has shaped and controlled the mind of millions for many ages. To their system belong almost the whole genealogy of incarnate deities, both male and female, with their thousands of temples and multiplied rites and ceremonies; and also, the distinction of caste, which makes the Bráhmans the head, and gives to others, respectively, a relative pre-eminence over the more docile and dependent classes.

The origin of Hindû castes can be satisfactorily explained by a reference to the history of India in these earlier times, and, I believe, in no other way.

One ruling purpose, or aim, on the part of the Bráhmans, is everywhere prominent in their doings, viz., to *establish themselves as the hierarchy*, supreme in church and state. For this they planned, for this they fought. And when their victories were complete, they disposed of their acquisitions in accordance with their ruling passion.

The existence of but *one caste* in the age of purity, the *Krêta Yuga*, or Golden Age, is abundantly admitted in the *Purânas*. The meaning of this is, that in the first age of Hindûism, the distinctions of caste were not known. This, of course, is in-

compatible with the legend which represents the four castes as springing from parts of Brahmā's body. But this legend belongs to the age of caste, and has its explanation in the extravagant and baseless pretensions of the Brāhmans, which underlie all their marvels. Besides, in the same Brāhmanical authorities, which present the inconsistency above mentioned, we also find the separation of men into castes to be ascribed to different individuals, at different periods, and for various reasons. All this goes plainly to show, that the distinction was at first of a social or political character.

Let us, then, glance at some of the facts which bear on the origin of caste as a Brāhmanical institution.

Prominent among the tribes, with whom the Brāhmans contended for supreme domination, were the Kshatriyas. They seem to have been of Scythian origin, and to have obtained strong footing in north-western India. The struggle for supremacy between them and the Brāhmans continued for a long series of years. They were eventually subdued by *Parasurāma*, the most distinguished defender of the Brāhmanical pretensions in that eventful period. In the *Mahābhārata*, one of the two Great Epics above mentioned, it is stated of this Rāma, that "thrice seven times did he clear the earth of the *Kshatriya* race." Again, the Earth is represented as saying, "The fathers and grandfathers of these *Kshatriyas* (i. e. successive generations) have been killed by the remorseless *Rāma* in warfare on my account."

The Kshatriyas being thus humbled, many of them became Brāhmans. But in the final adjustment of affairs between the contending parties, as the condition of peaceful alliance, the mass of Kshatriyas seem to have been constituted a privileged class, or *caste*, bearing the name of their tribe, being made second only to their victors, the sacerdotal or Brāhmanical caste.

This view of the Kshatriyas, or military caste, harmonizes with what is said of them in the Brāhmanical writings, with the exception, of course, of the mythological legend, which, in accordance with the whole tenor of Brāhmanism, gives to all parts of the system a divine origin.

The *Vāisyas* constitute the caste next below the Kshatriyas. This term is also found in the Purānas, as designating a tribe or nation, who inhabited the south-eastern part of the Panjaub. They seem to have been one of the *Sacæ*, or Scythian tribes. They were allied to the Lunar line, and, consequently, opposed to the Solar interests.

This people, after a long and severe struggle, were, at length, subdued by *Sagara*, the sea king of India. Of them it is stated

in one of the Purāṇas, that they were "separated from affinity to the regenerate tribes [i. e. the two higher castes], and from the duties of their castes."

Here is sufficiently clear indication of the way in which the castes were originally formed. They were evidently the result of conspiring circumstances, which singularly favoured the ambitious designs of those aspiring warrior-priests, the Brāhmanas. But it was a result gradually attained, as one point after another was gained by the Brāhmanas, and their schemes became matured into a complete system. It is certainly a device well adapted to consolidate and establish in one expansive system, the various and hitherto conflicting tribes of northern India.

The origin of the *Sūdras*, the fourth and lowest caste, can be traced with an equal degree of certainty. Hindû authors speak of a tribe, or nation, by the appellation of *Sūdras*, as inhabiting the western extremity of northern India, near the Indus. They have been supposed, with great probability, to be the *Oxydrææ* who formed the limit of Alexander's eastern conquest. The same people are called by Strabo, *Sūdrakai*, which is almost exactly the Sanskrit term. One of the Purāṇas states, that "*Sūdras* (or *Sūdrakas*), outcasts and barbarians, will be masters of the Indus," &c., which, at once, indicates the *existence* and *position* of the tribe; and, also, their more servile character, classing them with "*outcasts* and *barbarians*." Here, then, we have at once the *name* and the *nucleus* of the *Sūdra*, or servant caste.

It is not to be supposed, that the tribes which bore these three distinctive appellations, were the only persons arranged in their respective castes; but that, from their prominence, in one respect or another, they furnished the *occasion* for those particular designations.

The *Kshatriyas* were a powerful race, or, more probably, a combination of the earlier warlike tribes, allied in their leading interests, and in opposition to Brāhmanical rule. Being a more civilized and a superior class of men, compared with other tribes, they would naturally have, next to their victors, the superior position in the new system. The idea of bringing other tribes into subordination and servitude, was not new to them; and they were, probably, not second to the Brāhmanas in the original arrangements which ultimately resulted in the institution of caste. Yet we must ascribe to the Brāhmanas the *religious moulding* of that system.

The *Vāisyas* were less aspiring, and more mild and docile; and yet they were a very respectable tribe. There are indications that they belonged to the purer classes of the earlier Hindû religionists, and were chiefly devoted to agriculture.

They are represented as "diligent in their occupations, and *submissive*." All, therefore, of similar occupation and like condition, of whatever tribe, might, in the ultimate adjustment of the system, well be arranged in the very respectable *caste* of *Vāsisyas*.

With the *Sūdras*, who were originally a ruder race of men, and who are represented as having been more completely subdued and humbled—with *these*, all the less pretending in the several tribes, the more humble classes of labourers, &c., would naturally be associated, forming the *Sūdra*, or servile caste.

The combination of such heterogeneous and hostile tribes into one politico-religious organization, might well be expected to be attended with mutual interference and contentions. That such was the case is but too manifest from the Brāhmanical writings. In the *Vāyu Purāna*, *Brāhma* is represented as assigning to "these castes *their several occupations*, to prevent their *interference* with one another, which *HAD OCCURRED as long as they recognized NO DUTIES PECULIAR TO CASTES*."

This implies, what is elsewhere clearly taught in the Purānas, that the distinctions of caste, or rather the division into four great classes, existed before any distinctive duties and privileges for the several castes had been laid down. The *Vishnu Purāna*, in full accordance with other authorities, states, that "the beings who were created by *Brahmā*, of these four castes, were at first endowed with righteousness and perfect faith;" that "they abode wherever they pleased, unchecked by any impediment;" that "their hearts were free from guile;" that "they were pure, made free from soil, by observance of sacred institutes. In their sanctified minds *Hari* dwelt; and they were filled with perfect wisdom, by which they contemplated the glory of *Vishnu*." Observe, all this is stated respecting the *four castes*. How different from what they now are, or, are even allowed to be!

Let us look again at the same author: "After a while . . . the innate perfectness of human nature was no more evolved; the eight kinds of perfection . . . were impaired; and these being enfeebled, and sin gaining strength, mortals were afflicted with pain," &c. Then, in view of this *later condition* of men, it is stated, that *Brahmā prescribed laws* suited to their station and faculties, the duties of the several castes and orders," &c. And this was to prevent *conflicts* which had already arisen between the existing castes.

However inconsistent with this *legendary origin* of castes, we find, in the *same authorities*, "the distinctions of caste ascribed variously to voluntary election, to accident, and to the positive institutions of different princes."

From all this, it is plain that caste was at first a mere social and political institution, designed to facilitate intercourse and co-operation among the tribes, in their earlier compacts, both before and after the institution of Brāhmanical rule.

But as Brāhmanical authority advanced, and those far-sighted sacerdotal warriors found themselves in circumstances favourable to the development of their designs, they seem to have devoted themselves more exclusively to their professional duties; to religious matters, to which they made all others subservient. Here began the more distinctive development of Brāhmanism as a system of religious faith and practice. Into this system everything was gradually woven; until, at length, the distinctions of caste formed a part of the very texture of Hindūism. Caste, thenceforth, became strictly a religious institution, enforced by all the sanctions of divine law. It has long been an essential part of Brāhmanism, a singular fact in the history of man.

The *general rules* of caste are given in the Purānas as follows:—

1. "The *Brāhman* should make gifts, should worship the gods with sacrifices, should be assiduous in studying the *Vēdas*, should perform ablutions and libations with water, and should preserve the sacred fires. For the sake of subsistence he may offer sacrifices on behalf of others, and may instruct them in the *Sāstras*; and he may accept presents of a liberal description in a becoming manner (i. e. from respectable persons, in a proper way, and at appropriate times). He must ever seek to promote the good of others, and do evil to none; for the best riches of a Brāhman are universal benevolence (!). He should look upon the jewels of another person as if they were pebbles," &c.

2. "The man of the *warrior caste* should cheerfully give presents to Brāhmans, perform various sacrifices, and study the Scriptures. His especial sources of maintenance are arms and the protection of the earth. The guardianship of the earth is indeed his especial province; by the discharge of this duty, a king attains his objects, and realizes a share of the merit of all sacrificial rites. By intimidating the bad, and cherishing the good, the monarch who maintains the discipline of the different castes, secures whatever region he desires" (i. e. in a future birth, or another world).

3. "*Brahmd*, the great parent of creation, gave to the *Vaisya* the occupations of commerce and agriculture, and the feeding flocks and herds, for his means of livelihood; and sacred study, sacrifice, and donation, are also his duties, as is the observance of fixed and occasional rites."

4. "Attendance upon the three regenerate castes is the pro-

vince of the *Sūdra*, and by that he is to subsist, or by the profits of trade, or the earnings of mechanical labour. He is also to make gifts; and he may offer sacrifices in which food is presented, as well as obsequial offerings" (i. e. he may perform these ceremonies through the agency of a Brāhman).

I need not enter upon the *subdivisions* of the four castes. They are as numerous as all the various trades and occupations of life.

The *evils* of caste are manifold. These distinctions, however, operate variously in different parts of India. Still caste exists in its full force over nearly the whole race of the Hindūs. But in Ceylon its power is greatly broken; and it is fast returning to its original character, that of a *social and civil institution*.

The palmy days of Brāhmanism were prior to the Mohammedan invasion of India. They extended thence, backwards, through a period of a thousand years.

Caste is but a part of the whole, an item in a vast and complicated system. *Hindūism* now spreads into every department of society, lays its injunctions on every act of life, appropriates to itself every phenomenon in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and every noticeable peculiarity in the physical universe. It consecrates to its service the mountain tops, the rivers, springs of water, holes in the earth, projecting rocks, and every form which may be distorted into a resemblance to any living being, or which may be made to shadow forth, as an emblem, any of the leading dogmas of its dark philosophy. To know India as the Hindū does, we must be able to read these emblematic inscriptions, and to look through them to their hidden and more sacred meaning.

But before we take a glance *within*, we must look again at some other historical facts of this gigantic structure.

The *original form* of Hindūism was probably that of the *Vēdas*. These works are the oldest of the Sanskrit writings; with them the Sanskrit seems to have been first introduced into India. Whether the *Vēdas* were written in India, or whether they were written in some earlier seat of the Hindūs, west of the Indus, is a problem yet to be solved. I am, however, inclined to think that they had their origin where the Hindūs first arose, and where the Sanskrit was a spoken language, as it continued to be for some time after its introduction into India, and that they were brought into India by some of those conquering hordes which constituted the early Hindū race.

The Sanskrit of the *Vēdas* is so unlike the more modern and the more polished language of the *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata*, the two great Hindū Epics, that those who can read the more modern, cannot understand the more ancient style of that

language which is found in the *Védas*. It is the more modern form of the Sanskrit that bears the strongest affinity to the existing languages of northern India, a fact which evinces that the Sanskrit may not have been the earliest language of the country.

Whatever may have been the *origin* of the *Védas*, it seems quite certain, that the worship inculcated in them was the earliest form of the Hindû religion in India. It was a worship offered to Fire, Air, the Sun, the Moon, &c. It was a branch of *Sabianism*, if not the earliest complete form of that system of worship; and, at once, connects the Hindû with the patriarchs of the Bible.

Another ritual has taken the place of that more ancient form of worship, a ritual found in those more modern works, the *Purānas*, which has so antiquated that ancient creed, that one who should follow the precepts of the *Védas* would be regarded as an infidel. And yet the Hindû glories in his attachment to the *Védas*, the forgotten Oracles of his fathers.

The earliest seat of the Hindûs within the borders of Hindûstân, was the *Panjab*. There the two great Epics were doubtless composed, as also the Institutes of Manu, and probably some of the *Purānas*. The Epics and the Institutes furnish the principal materials for the mythological form of Hindûism in all ages. These works were doubtless composed, in most particulars, of legends of an earlier date, which were imported into India, and now for the first time collected and written. The two Epics were probably written about three centuries B. C. They are the chief sources from which the Brâhmans of later ages have drawn their materials, especially the authors of the *eighteen great Purānas*. Hence, in these comparatively modern works, we find materials which belong to a high antiquity intermixed with modern ingredients. In these works the imposing mind of antiquity is distorted into unison with puerile modern inventions, and in such a way, as evinces a long period of successive innovations upon the ancient system of faith.

In these Brâhmanical writings we find unequivocal evidence of the previous existence of a system of Philosophical Religion. This was different from the religion of the *Védas*, being more metaphysical and argumentative. Yet both seem to have been embraced by all the leading schools of primitive Hindûism.

The early Brâhmans, like others of their time, ostensibly held the *Védas* as their Sacred Scriptures; yet they practically denied them; and, taking their stand on their mystic philosophy, they made it the basis of a marvellous system of incarnations, &c. This was the point of divergence between them and the priests of the Lunar dynasty.

The two Epics and the Institutes mark the period of Brâh-

manical domination, and present to us the transition-stage of Hindû learning and religion. This will be manifest from an intelligent view of the Bhāgavat Gêeta, the very singular episode in the Mahābhārata. It is a discussion, on the nature of the Godhead, and on the nature and destiny of man, between the god Krishna and the hero Arjuna, occurring in the midst of a civil war, and on the very field of battle where the opposing hosts are just ready for the onset. The god encourages the hero to fight, which he is reluctant to do, as he perceives that the hosts of the enemy were composed of his kindred, his teachers, and his friends. The argument of the god is based on the doctrine, that mind and matter are entirely distinct; that actions are duties incumbent on every one, but which must be performed without the least regard to their consequences, such as pleasure or pain, profit or loss, &c.; that death and life are but unimportant modifications of the same being, and hence the massacre of the dearest kindred becomes a matter of indifference. Let us listen a moment to the reasoning of the god :

"Thou mourn'st for those thou should'st not mourn, albeit thy works are like the wise.
For those that live or those that die, may never mourn the truly wise.
Ne'er was the time when I was not, nor thou, nor yonder things of earth :
Hereafter ne'er shall be the time, when one of us shall cease to be.
The soul, within its mortal frame, glides on thro' childhood, youth and age ;
Then, in another form renewed, renews its stated course again.
All indestructible is He that spread the living universe ;
And who is he that shall destroy the work of the Undestructible ?
Corruptible these bodies are that wrap the everlasting soul—
The eternal, unimaginable soul. Whence, on to battle, Bhāratha !
For he that thinks to slay the soul, or he that thinks the soul is slain,
Are fondly both alike deceived : it is not slain—it slayeth not ;
It is not born—it doth not die ; past, present, future, knows it not ;
Ancient, eternal, and unchang'd, it dies not with the dying frame.
Who knows it incorruptible, and everlasting, and unborn,
What heeds he, whether he may slay, or fall himself in battle slain ?
As their old garments men cast off, anon new raiment to assume,
So casts the soul its worn-out frame, and takes at once another form.
Thus deeming, wherefore mourn for it ?"—

On inspection, we find that this philosophical poem, the Bhāgavat Gêeta, presents a somewhat polemical aspect towards the Vêdas—"not rejecting them altogether, but representing them as falling short of the highest end, and devoid of true purity of mind."

The poem, also, is destitute of mythological imagery, and yet it lays a broad foundation for the whole monstrous system of divine incarnations.

Again, it positively discountenances the self-inflicted mortifications of the Yôghees, their excruciating penances, and their absurd and fantastic tortures : and yet all the fundamental doc-

trines of Hindû asceticism are here involved; and the whole poem goes to illustrate their importance.

Now, from such preparations, it was natural and easy to proceed to the full development of the Hindû Pantheon, with all their grotesque mythology, and to the whole round of ascetic observances. The Purânas, in which these matters are drawn out in detail, are all comparatively modern; the latest has been computed to be not more than 300 years old. The eighteen Great Purânas, with the almost innumerable and still more modern local Purânas, complete, what I regard, the series of Brâhmanical writings.

Brâhman were, indeed, the authors of some of the philosophical treatises which belong to the arcana of Hindûism. But the subjects treated in these works are not distinctively Brâhmanical. They are essential parts of Hindûism in all its ages of existence. The principles in these works, having been appropriated by the Brâhman to their own interests, now, of course, form a part of Brâhmanism, the more modern form of Hindûism.

Hindûism may be divided historically into three periods:

1. *The Patriarchal Period.*—This embraces the time when the earlier legends and dogmas of the Hindus were but partially systematized, and, probably, unwritten. It was the period when the notions of those aspiring men, portions of a dispersed race, held still some resemblance to the doctrines taught by the patriarchal “preacher of righteousness,” doctrines known also to the family of Abraham. This was the period of the *unwritten Vêdas*, or of that original Vêda, from which, according to the general sentiment of the Hindûs, all the four written Vêdas were formed. The distinctive features of this period are to be sought in the Bible, in the history of the great Iranian Empire, and in the Vêdas.

2. *The Philosophical Period.*—This was the period during which the principles and facts of the patriarchal age were still further removed from their primitive purity and simplicity; and when, in connection with other materials, they were moulded into a more recondite and philosophical form, and were, ultimately, wrought into a vast system of *metaphysical religion*. The mystic number “five,” the five divine operations, the division of the universe into classes of fives, &c., all which are essential principles in modern Hindûism, were also among the fundamentals of that earlier system. Then, too, was conceived the idea of man as a miniature universe, in whom these mysterious “fives,” with all their powers, divisions, relations, operations, &c., are fully developed. The mystic number “three,” as in the Triad, &c., seems to have had a later origin, as also the device of the four castes. Both these seem to belong to Brâh-

manism, or the next period. The chronological lines of this period cannot be so easily drawn. It must lie *back* of the Epoch B. c. 300, when the next period began to dawn. That there was then existent such a system of philosophical religion, is abundantly manifest from the earlier Brâhmanical works above mentioned. I had often looked into Manu's Institutes, and the Bhâgavat Gêeta, but I never understood them satisfactorily until I had become acquainted with some of the standard metaphysical works of the Hindûs; which are in fact the best commentaries we have on those ancient works, as well as on the whole system of Brâhmanical Hindûism.

3. The *third Period* is the *Purânic*, or *Mythological*.—This is the period of Brâhmanical domination; when the existing notions were developed in a more imposing and popular form, a form monstrously hieroglyphical and fabulous. It is here that we find the whole genealogy of Hindû gods and goddesses, with all their mystic dress and accompaniments. To this period belong all the popular forms of temple-worship.

The earlier form of the Purânic system is found in the two Great Epics, and in the Institutes; but its present form is that of the Purânas, works of a much more modern origin, and the products of different ages. The eighteen great Purânas, in most of the materials of which they are composed, are very similar to one another; and yet they are of a polemical character. Some of them claim supremacy for Brahmâ, some for Vishnu, and some for Siva. Each supports its peculiar claims, by the great mass of mythological legends and mystic dogmas, all being shaped to the distinctive nature of the god it exalts, and to his worship. All these works claim to be supported by the authority of the Vêdas.

This shows that there have ever been different sects, or schools, among the Brâhmans. These various schools are now all embraced in two great divisions, the *Sâivas* and the *Vâishnavas*. These two bodies recognize each other as right, or orthodox, in most respects; the one necessarily involving the other in all their fundamental doctrines. On certain points they violently contend.

Many popular errors are prevalent respecting some parts of Brâhmanical Hindûism. These the Brâhmans like to have prevail, as they help to shield them in their penitentialia. All such errors would be at once dissipated by a correct knowledge of their more sacred and concealed doctrines of philosophy. In their monstrous mythic system there is "*a unity in the midst of great diversity*." The Brâhman can quote his Sâstras for authority in all his idolatrous practices, while he claims to be a worshipper of one God, in accordance with the doctrines of the same Sâstras. This is a great fact in modern Hindûism, without a knowledge

of which the system is not understood. My limits will allow only a brief illustration of this particular :

The doctrine of *one God*, in connection with almost innumerable objects of worship, and these of all varieties of character and relations, seems to be an inexplicable paradox. But the Hindû, whose transcendental powers have been developed through their divine Wisdom, finds no difficulty in the matter. How, then, do they explain it? To understand their explanation we must glance at some of the leading doctrines in their theology. Respecting the Deity, they hold :

1. That there is but *one God*, who is eternal, self-existent, omnipotent, omniscient, all-pervading, formless, and unchangeable, even so as to exclude the exercises of desire, love, hatred, &c. Yet, he is capable of being developed, or manifest through material organism.

2. That this one God exists in a *twofold nature*, that of male and female. In the philosophical poems these natures or *Energies* are often designated by the terms *Purusha* and *Sakti*. In the English translation of the Bhâgavat Gêta, the female nature or energy of deity is obscurely brought to view under the term "nature." All the divine operations whatever, are performed through the co-operation of these *two Energies*. In order that they may operate, it is necessary that they be developed, each in its appropriate organism. This doctrine lies at the foundation of Hindû theogony, and leads to the whole genealogy of gods and goddesses. Every operative deity must necessarily be an incarnation, and must have his incarnate Sakti or consort. These two Energies and their *modus operandi* stand out to view in a great variety of symbols. These symbols, like the gods and goddesses themselves, are proper objects of worship. Of these, the most prominent, and the one everywhere to be seen, is, the LINGA. This is usually a compound symbol, designed to shadow forth the two divine Energies in co-operation. It is, accordingly, a higher object of worship than most of the idols of the land.

These views explain the worship of posts in certain cases, of stones of various forms, of univalve shells, holes in rocks, &c. The elephant's proboscis has the same hieroglyphical meaning as the Linga. Hence, that animal is sacred, and of great importance in the services at temples. Herein, also, we have an explanation of the god with an elephant's head, variously named *Ganpat*, *Ganêsa*, *Pilliyâr*, an idol worshipped more than any other one throughout India. He is the *god of action*, the operator in the reproducing processes in all organic beings.

It is also an established principle that the two Energies may be developed in any form, at any time and to any extent, or to any number of times ; and that the form assumed is determined

by the nature of the service to be performed, as the one must be adapted to the other. Hence, the innumerable local deities which fill the land, such as Giants, Monsters, Men, Women, Beasts, Birds, Reptiles, Trees, Mountains, and the like.

The myths respecting these local gods do not so much explain the character of the deity exhibited, as the occasion of his appearance. The specific characteristics of a local deity are to be sought in the distinctive attributes of the great family to which he belongs, either that of *Siva* or *Vishnu*, and in the nature of his organism, as having the benevolent or malevolent propensities developed. These things are all explained in their "divine philosophy!"

3. There is another very important principle to be considered in deciphering the complicated system of Hindû idolatry. It is that which is involved in the mystic "fires" above mentioned. The specific doctrine here to be considered is, that the production and government of the universe involves *five distinct divine operations*. Each of these operations, in accordance with the preceding statements, requires that the operator have an organism adapted to the nature of his service. Hence the necessity and consequent actual existence of *five superior gods*. Both the *Sâivas* and *Vâishnavas* hold this doctrine, and have each their five gods: some of whom bear the same names in both schools, but others are differently denominated by them. The *Sâivas*, so far as my reading extends, are more precise in their designation of these duties, and in their modes of worship and meditation. Yet the existence and relations of the five can be distinctly traced in the earlier, as well as the later, works of the Vâishnava Brâhmins.

These five operative gods include the common Hindû Triad, as Brahmâ, Vishnu and Siva, and two others of a higher order of development. These two are more commonly denominated, the *Obscurer*, and the *Illuminator* or *Grace-giver*. Their prerogatives respect the more spiritual department in the divine government, being confined to intellectual beings, to their conduct, destiny, &c. Hence their organisms are of a more ethereal nature. They are not regarded as belonging to the catalogue of visible deities; they can be seen only by the illuminated eye of the Wiseman.

The other three, with their grosser organisms, are concerned in the management of the physical universe. Yet Siva and Vishnu are spoken of, each by his adherents, as supreme. But this is not strictly correct, and in the contests between these rival schools it is mutually condemned. In each of these schools the name of their distinctive deity is used in two senses: one, referring to his specific development and office-work; the other, to him as the representative of the whole class of operative gods,

and hence as the index of the Eternal one. In this last sense he is, with them, the supreme God. They use these terms variously, somewhat as we use the term *Christ*, sometimes meaning the *Mediator*, and sometimes "God manifest in the flesh."

The order of development and relative standing of the five operative deities is as follows :

The first is the Illuminator or Grace-giver. His form, or *Rûpam* (a more comprehensive term than form), is a complete development of all the perfections of the five. In him *Gnânam* (divine wisdom) shines perfect over all. He dwells in light ineffable. When he reveals himself to the soul, then its vision is perfect, and all things are seen as they are. The soul has then escaped all the entanglements of its organism, and will not be born again. Now clothed in light, it is "like his Lord."

The second is the Obscurer. He is born, as the Hindû expresses it, from the preceding. His *Rûpam* is deficient in the development of the organ of *Gnânam*, which is the characteristic perfection of the Illuminator; but it possesses the attributes of the other forms. His characteristic propensity, or physiological bump, is that of *Action*. He prompts and guides the soul through all the courses of human action. The object is, that man may be made to eat the fruit of his own doings, and thus "work out" his ultimate deliverance from the bondage of the human organism, which is his salvation. As this *god* keeps men in their native ignorance as to spiritual things in order that they may be led on in their fated courses of action, both good and bad, he is called the *Obscurer*. But as this is necessary for man's ultimate good, even this administration is declared to be gracious.

The third deity is Rudra, or less properly Siva. He is born from the Obscurer. His *Rûpam* is wanting in the development of the characteristics of the first two; but in comparison with the last two, *wisdom* predominates in him. He is, collectively, *the Triad*. The three commonly named as the Triad are but an expansion of Rudra, by successive births, or developments. Rudra's province is, to secure the proper continuance of the physical universe. This of course is done in accordance with laws before mentioned; for everything comes and goes by the co-operation of the two divine Energies. Hence, in his department, there must be the work of generation, continuance or growth, and destruction, with reproduction. These are all illustrated in the case of a plant propagated from the seed. Rudra, or Siva, is commonly called the Destroyer, because the work of destruction is peculiarly his right, and is not performed by the other two below him. But he is more strictly the Regenerator, or Reproducer. He destroys in order to reproduce.

The fourth deity is Vishnu. He is born from Rudra, or Siva.

His office-work consists in the agency which is required for the continuance and growth of organic beings, from the moment of generation until perfect maturity. He is hence called the Preserver.

The fifth and lowest of the five is Brahmâ. He springs from Vishnu. He is the Generator, and properly the agent of all the others. Hence he is not generally recognized as a distinct, visible deity. He is rather a metaphysico-physiological abstraction; and is one of the divine objects to be sought and seen by the devotee in his mystic studies and meditations. I once asked a learned Hindû, who, under the motive power of money, had been imparting to me some of their secret dogmas, "Why do you have no temples to Brahmâ, and seem to pay him so little respect?" His characteristic reply was, "Sir, were I to visit your house, should I pay my respects to your servant, or to yourself?"

Brahmâ is in no proper sense a Creator; nor should he be placed first even in the common Triad. His name is displaced from the catalogue of the visible deities; and his proper office-work or agency is carried on by developments bearing other and various appellations in the different schools. Among most classes, however, the elephant-headed god *Pilliyâr*, or *Ganêsa*, is regarded as the acting deity in every production. In reference to the physical world, he is virtually Brahmâ, especially since the original production of things from their eternal entities. This god (*Pilliyâr*) is called the Son of Siva. By means of this development of his own physical organism, Siva effects the work of generation, as a part of his proper business in the management of the physical universe.

Here it seems in place to remark, that the distinctive nature and character of the gods depend entirely on the development of their organisms; just as the structure of the animal determines its kind, marking out one an elephant, one a horse, one a cow, &c.; and just as the physical conformation of a man has been supposed to determine his peculiarities of temper, mind, &c., i. e. to make him such a man as he is, rather than any other.

Hence Siva, being what he is by means of his organic development, must, in carrying forward his appropriate work, be everywhere present in his own proper form, either *visible* or *invisible*; both of which conditions are equally possible, and may be equally apposite.

On the same principle, Siva's son, the generating *Pilliyâr*, may be everywhere developed. Hence the multiplicity of this idol is regarded as quite consistent with the unity of the godhead. The cupidity of the priesthood has not been slow in discovering occasions for extending his visible presence. These considera-

tions, *mutatis mutandis*, explain the multiplicity of other gods, all of whom, with very few exceptions, are but branches or children, from the family of either Siva or Vishnu, the two who head the catalogue of visible deities. As the agency of Pilliyâr, the Generator, is necessarily involved in the production of Siva's form, as really so as in any other developed existence, he has been shrewdly denominated, in their own poetic language, "The son that was born before his father."

These *fundamental doctrines*, and other assumed attributes of the supreme deity, are variously drawn out and combined, so as to form, in fact, the very fabric of popular Hindûism. These radical principles are seen by the eye of the initiated, in the forms, vehicles, and dress of idols; in the form, divisions, and decorations of temples; in the number, the varied shapes and uses of sacrificial utensils; and in the articles offered in sacrifice; in the institution and performances of dancing women; in the nature, order and circumstances of the great periodical festivals held in temples throughout the land; in the Ganges and other sacred waters and sacred places, resorted to by pilgrims for bathing and other prescribed meritorious rites. My limits will not allow me to trace out these things to any great extent. A few additional particulars must suffice:

The Hindûs have several Triads, which are more or less distinctly to be seen in their popular forms of worship, as well as in various symbols. The commonly-known Triad, Siva, Vishnu and Brahmâ, constitute, as above mentioned, the embodiments of the three natural or physical powers of the godhead. The prerogatives of these deities properly extend to no other departments of the divine administration, than what appertains to the physical universe. The government of man, as distinct from mere animal or inanimate existences, lies beyond their province. This is not the highest of the Hindû Triads. It does not enter so much into the spiritual relations and interests of the soul as others yet to be named.

Another Triad is composed of the first three of the five operative deities. In this case, Rudra, or Siva, is considered as embracing the two lower developments, which both his organism and office-work imply. The doctrine of this Triad is not published to the masses; but belongs to the mysteries which are to be known only by the regularly initiated. It is shadowed forth in many of the mystic hieroglyphics which adorn the temples, and in the forms of worship.

Still another Triad is seen in the three deities which are usually drawn on the cars, or carried in sedans, on "the *great day* of the feast" or festival, which occurs at stated times, in the several temples. The three idols presented on such occasions

may sometimes be regarded as the representation of one or the other of the Triads above mentioned. But they more strictly and properly represent the SUPREME, or *Superior DEITY*, whose form or Rûpam embraces the two divine ENERGIES, and the two ENERGIES separately developed and embodied. In all such cases, of which Jagganaut is a fair specimen, the *Superior* deity is A MALE, while the *two inferior* are A MALE and A FEMALE. These, to the experienced eye, at once present to view the *unity of the Godhead*, and the *modus operandi* in all departments of divine administration.

This view of the subject shows the meaning and appropriateness of the name Jagganaut, or *Universal Lord*, as applied to the principal deity in that celebrated temple in Orissa; and also the propriety of all classes, all castes, mingling indiscriminately in his worship. He belongs equally to all, being the Lord of the universe.

So in multitudes of other temples we find substantially the same thing—Jagganaut under other appellations, and different schools, mingling in the same worship. This is strikingly the case at Râmêsuram, a celebrated temple and bathing place, commonly called Adam's Bridge, between the continent and Ceylon. It is a place of great resort, at stated times, of all classes, and from all parts of India.

Hence, also, in smaller temples Saiva priests not unfrequently conduct festivals in honour of Vâishnava deities, and *vice versâ*. This is consistent when the service is viewed as offered to the Universal Lord, and to his two instrumentalities, or agents, ever employed in the divine operations.

These examples will be sufficient to show how the whole system of Hindû theogony and their mytho-symbolic worship may be deciphered and explained by the aid of their higher doctrines. They will also illustrate the declaration made, that, in that monstrous system of Brâhmanical religion, "there is a *unity in the midst of great diversity*."

I must now beg indulgence in a few remarks suggested by my subject.

In Hindûism we have the singular fact of a *living antiquity*, and that, too, of the highest order. The intellectual life and vigour which have given such perpetuity and expansion to the principles that formed the ancient mind, are still manifest in the Hindû character. The principles which have thus operated to uphold such a vast and cumbrous system, have been equally efficient in sustaining the physical and intellectual powers of the people, in despite of the lowering and noxious influences of error, and all the abominations of idolatry. The Hindûs, unlike the red men of our forests, or the inhabitants of the

Pacific isles, are not dying out, but are a living people, as thriving as any other, where the chances of life are allowed to them in any reasonable degree.

We find in the character of the Hindû, and in his modes of life, an expression of what has been for many ages. As their fathers were, so are they in many things. The account given of the people in Alexander's time, twenty-one centuries ago, is, with a very few exceptions, equally correct now. The earliest allusions, found in Brâhmanical writings, to the domestic and other customs of the people, have a perfect illustration in what now exists. Have we not here then an important and deeply interesting field of inquiry for the classical scholar, for the ethnologist, and for the Biblical antiquarian and interpreter?

The *Sanskrit* is now justly receiving much attention from European scholars, not only as a rich and finished language, but as holding a prominent place in comparative philology. The *Tamil*, which is the radical language of Southern India, is, in my opinion, equally deserving of attention. It is, perhaps, in its primitive character, farther removed from the Sanskrit than is the German. It is equally as rich, polished and pliant as its northern neighbour. In it is found all the learning of the ancient Brâhmanical tongue. In its two dialects, the High and the Low Tamil, it possesses a peculiarity of great interest to the philologist. The High is the *poetical dialect*, and embraces nearly all the learning of the people. Everything is written in poetry, even their Arithmetic, their Dictionary, their *Materia Medica*, their Astronomy. The poetical dialect, in its words and structure, is so unlike the common Tamil, that one acquainted with the latter merely, cannot understand a line of the former. Hence, *interpreters*, men whose business it is to sing off and translate the Purânas and other works into the language of the people, are everywhere in demand. The native Grammar of the High Tamil is complete and well-formed.

Not only do these languages, these revealers of man as he has been and is, deserve attention; but the system also which they embody, embracing, as it does, not only the religion of the people, but their whole encyclopædia of science and literature, is worthy of much more consideration than it has yet received from American scholars. The Hindû philosophical works, rightly understood, would, as I fully believe, form the best commentary on the ancient philosophy of the West, that we can have.

During the age of Grecian philosophy, more was drawn from that fountain of Hindû thought and scheme, than has been generally supposed. In the Philosophical period of Hindûism the eye of the western philosopher was attracted to the East,

to the Hindû hierophant, with whom he found not only new ideas in philosophy, criticism, and ethics, but a system already formed, and far surpassing anything previously known in Egypt or Greece. We have good evidence that some of the earliest of the Greek philosophers visited India, and carried thence many oriental ideas. But Plato, perhaps, did more than any before him, in working up the products of the oriental mind, and giving them an occidental cast. Of him it has been well said, "At length the *balance soul* was born, who made the *East* his *base*, and *Europe* his *superstructure*."

Hindûism also hinges on Bible facts and Bible truths at many points. Its earlier periods stretch through Old Testament times, back to within a few ages of Nimrod's reign, while the forming period of Brâhmanism embraces the times of Christ and his apostles, and the first publishment of the Gospel among the nations. It is abundantly manifest, that the principles and movements of the people of God, during those eventful periods, had an important influence in India. In existing Hindû works the characters of Noah, Abraham, Moses, and other Bible worthies, are clearly discernible, appropriated, of course, to the interests of Hindûism, and metamorphosed into oriental myths. Many of the great truths of revelation undoubtedly lie in the foundations of that master-system of error; truths respecting God, the human soul, and the great work of Redemption. Some of these coincidences, or transcripts, belong to philosophical Hindûism, forming radiating lines, which lead us back to that central region whence sprung the post-diluvian race, and where cluster the great facts of the Old Testament Scriptures. Others belong to the Purânic age. These give pretty clear indications of the existence in India of apostolic or other missionary labours of the early Christian church. There is much in the character of *Krishna*, a god who is often figured as crushing with his foot the head of a serpent, which is biting his heel, that bears strong resemblance to the New Testament view of *Him* who came "to bruise the serpent's head." But in the religious rites and ceremonies of the Hindûs, and in their domestic customs, the Bible student will find much to interest him, much that will remind him of the rites and ceremonies of the Jewish temple, much that will closely correspond with the character and habits of the Jew, and things that will furnish ready illustrations of many passages in our more ancient Scriptures.

I would not, however, point to India as a field interesting to the scholar merely. More especially would I invite the attention of this Society to it as *a field for Christian enterprise*. Here is at least one fourth of the unevangelized portion of the

human race, and in circumstances of great interest to the Christian philanthropist. I know of no class of unevangelized men, whose conversion to God would seem to promise more for the interests of the church, than that of the Hindûs. Besides, they are enthralled in such a system of religious faith and practice, as leaves no hope of their deliverance, except help come to them from without, from the Gospel. That marvellous combination of truth and error, of influences, which has held these millions in bondage through so long a succession of generations, will hold them still if left unresisted.

And now, my brethren, shall this state of things continue? The only remedy we know, is that presented in the Bible. The application of this remedy must be made by means of Christian missions. But where are the missionaries? India, all open to the Gospel; and already moving and heaving as if in its transition stage—yes, *India* has long been stretching out her hands to our “schools of the prophets,” saying, “*Come ye, and help us.*” And never was this call more urgent than now, never enforced by more encouraging considerations; and yet how few respond to it! *Why is this so?* Has this Society, in a Seminary so honoured in the records of Christian missions, duly entertained this question? Has it either *in fact*, or in the *plans* and *purposes* of its members, its full and fair representation in that wide and whitened field—men who shall speak for you among those teeming millions, and tell to those ready to perish, your love to Christ, and your sympathy for dying souls? Does not the command of Christ require this of you? Do not the best interests of this Seminary, do not the best interests of our country which we so much love, the best interests of our American Zion, yea, of all that is valuable in life, and precious in the kingdom of Christ; do not all these interests, so far as they depend on you, my brethren, demand that you *do your duty*, that you spread yourselves, in due proportions, through *the whole field*? I leave with you the question. I have time only to put it. Let each see to it, that *he does his duty*; let him so plan and labour, that he may make the *most of life*, in this eventful period of the world’s history.

ART. II.—THE GROTIAN THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF DR. FERDINAND CHRISTIAN BAUR, PROFESSOR ORDINARIUS OF EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TUBINGEN, BY REV. LEONARD SWAIN, NASHUA, N.H.

[The work from which the following extract is taken, is entitled, "Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung; in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung von der älteste Zeit bis auf die neueste."]

It was a natural and almost necessary result, that two such opposite views as that of Socinus on the one hand, and that of the church on the other, should call forth a third one of intermediate character. And in this remark is indicated the place which Hugo Grotius and his well-known treatise holds in the history of our doctrine; since, although it was his design, in taking ground against the Socinian view, merely to defend the satisfaction-theory which was held by the church,* the actual result was, that, instead of defending that theory, he substituted an entirely different one in its place.

The fundamental error of the Socinian view was found by Grotius to be this: that Socinus regarded God in the work of redemption as holding the place merely of a creditor, or master, whose simple will was a sufficient discharge from the existing obligation.† But as we have, in the subject before us, to deal with punishment and the remission of punishment, God cannot be looked upon as a creditor, or an injured party, since the act of inflicting punishment does not belong to an injured party as such. The right to punish is not one of the rights of an absolute master or of a creditor, these being merely personal in their character; it is the right of a ruler only. Hence God must be considered as a ruler, and the right to punish belongs to the ruler as such, since it exists not for the punisher's sake, but for the sake of the commonwealth, to maintain its order and to promote the public good.‡ The act of atonement itself

* Hence the title of the work: *Defensio fidei catholicæ de satisfactione Christi.*

† *De satisf. c. 2. § 3. p. 36.* Vult Socinus partem omnem offensam esse pœnæ creditorem, atque in ea tale habere jus, quale alii creditores in rebus sibi debitis, quod jus sæpe etiam dominii voce appellat, ideoque sæpiissime repetit, Deum hic spectandum ut partem offensam, ut creditorem, ut dominum, tria hæc ponens tanquam tantundem valentia. Hic error Socini, per totam ipsius tractationem latissime diffusus — τὸ πρῶτον ψεύδος.

‡ *Cap. 2. § 1. p. 34.* Pœnas indigere, aut a pœnis aliquem liberare, quem punire posse, quod justificare vocat scriptura, non est nisi rectoris, qua talia, primo et per se, ut puta in familia patris, in republica regis, in universo Dei.—Unde sequitur,

is defined in general as a judicial act, in accordance with which, one person is punished in order that another may be freed from punishment, or as an act of dispensation, by which the binding force of an existing law is suspended in respect to certain persons or things. The first question to be asked, therefore, is, whether such a dispensation or relaxing is possible in respect to the law of punishment. Grotius does not hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative, on the ground that all positive laws are relaxable. The threat of punishment in Gen. ii. 17, contains in itself, therefore, the implied right to dispense with the infliction of that punishment, and that too without supposing any essential change in God himself, since a law in relation to God and the divine will, is not something having an internal force and authority of its own (*nichts Inneres*), but is merely an operation or effect of the divine will. The objection that none but the guilty person himself can receive the punishment which is due to his crime, is answered by the distinction, that although every sinner, as such, does, in accordance with the very idea of sin, deserve punishment, still it is not a matter of absolute necessity that this punishment should be actually inflicted. As therefore the remission of punishment is a thing which is not in its own nature impossible, it must be left to the circumstances of each particular case to decide how far such remission shall really be admitted. If the authority of law is not to be dangerously weakened, it should be admitted only in cases of the greatest exigency. Such a case clearly, is that which is offered in the very instance which we are now contemplating, where, by the actual infliction of the punishment the entire race of man becomes devoted to death.* And as, on the one side, the possibility of the remission of punishment cannot be denied, so on the other it cannot be shown to be absolutely unjust that one person should be punished for another's sin. The essential thing in punishment is, that it should be inflicted in consequence of sin, not that it should be inflicted upon the person who committed the sin. If now it admits of no doubt that a superior may properly inflict upon a subject, as the punishment of another's sin, whatever he might properly inflict upon him irrespectively of another's sin, then may God, without incurring the charge of injustice, permit Christ to suffer and

omnino hic Deum considerandum ut rectorem.—Cap. 2. § 9. p. 41. At jus puniendi non punientis causa, existit, sed causa communis alicujus. Pœna enim omnis propositum habet bonum commune, ordinis nimirum conservationem et exemplum, ita quidem ut rationem expetibilis non habeat nisi ab hoc fine, cum jus domini et crediti per se sint expetibilia.

* *Cap. 3. § 6. p. 51. Quia, si omnes peccatores morti eternæ mancipandi fuissent, perirent funditus ex rerum natura dum res pulcherrimæ, ex parte hominum, religio in Deum, ex parte Dei, præcipue in homines beneficentiæ testatio.*

die for the sins of men.* This course, then, being in itself a permissible one, the only question is, why God actually determined to adopt it. As the Scripture says that Christ suffered and died for our sins, we are to infer that God purposed not to forgive sins so numerous and so great, without a striking penal example, in order to show his displeasure at sin by some act which should in strictest propriety be termed a penal act. And besides this inward reason, lying in the very nature of the Deity, and called in Scripture the wrath of God, there was the additional consideration that the less sin is punished, the more lightly it will be regarded. Prudence itself, therefore, must lead the Deity to exact the punishment, especially where such punishment has been expressly threatened beforehand. Thus in the penal example furnished by the death of Christ, there is exhibited at once the divine grace and the divine severity, the hatred of God against sin and his care for the maintenance of the law.† And this is the mode of relaxing the laws which jurists themselves pronounce the best, viz. by commutation or compensation; because thereby the least injury is done to the authority of the law, and the design with which the law was made is effectually secured, as when one who is charged with the delivery of a thing is free from his liability on paying its full value. For, the same thing, and the same value, are terms very nearly related.‡ Such a commutation may take place, not only with respect to things, but also with respect to persons, where it can be done without injury to another.

In these few statements is contained the entire theory of Hugo Grotius. What is essential to it lies in this main propo-

* Cap. 4. § 18. p. 63. Hoc proprie quæritur: an actus, qui sit in potestate superioris, etiam citra considerationem delicti alieni possit ab ipso superiore ordinari in pœnam alieni delicti. Hoc injustum esse negat scriptura, quæ Deum hoc sæpius fecisse ostendit, negat natura, quia vetare non probatur, negat aperte consensus gentium . . . Nihil ergo iniquitatis in eo est, quod Deus, cujus est summa potestas, ad omnia per se non injusta, nulli ipse legi obnoxius cruciatibus et morte Christi uti voluit, ad statuendum exemplum grave adversus culpas immensas nostrum omnium, quibus Christus erat conjunctissimus natura, regno, vadimonio.

† Cap. 5. § 8. p. 69. Hoc ipso Deus non tantum suum adversus peccata odium testatum fecit, ac proinde nos hoc facto a peccatis deterruit (facilis enim est collectio, si Deus ne respicientibus quidem peccata remittere voluit nisi Christo in pœnas succedente, multo minus inultos sinet contumaces), verum insigni modo insuper patefecit summum erga nos amorem ac benevolentiam, quod ille scilicet nos pepercit cui non erat ἀδιάφορον (*indifferens*), punire peccata, sed qui tanti id faciebat, ut potius quam impunita omnino dimitteret, filium suum unigenitum ob illa peccata pœnis tradiderit. Cap. 5. § 11. p. 71. Justitiæ rectoris pars est, servare leges, etiam positivas et a se latas, quod verum esse tam in universitate libera, quam in rege summo probant Jurisconsulti: cui illud est consequens, ut rectori relaxare legem talem non liceat nisi causa aliqua accedat si non necessaria, certe sufficiens: quæ itidem recepta est a Jurisconsultis sententia. Ratio utriusque est, quod actus ferendi aut relaxandi legem, non sit actus absoluti dominii, sed actus imperii, qui tendere debeat ad boni ordinis conservationem.

‡ P. 68. Proxima enim sunt idem et tantundem.

sition : God neither would nor could forgive the sins of men without the setting up of a penal example. This is done by the death of Christ. Hence the death of Christ is the necessary condition of the forgiveness of sin, and what it always actually presupposes. The theory, therefore, hangs upon the idea of a penal example, and of its presupposed necessity, and the question for us now to consider is, how, by means of that idea, it stands related on the one hand to the theory of the church, which it would defend, and on the other, to the Socinian theory, which it would confute.

As to its relation to the satisfaction-theory held by the church, it will be seen at once, that it asserts the necessity of the death of Christ in order to the forgiveness of sin, in a sense wholly different from that which the church intends. If the death of Christ is necessary only as a penal example, then its necessity is grounded, not in the very nature of God himself, not in the idea of absolute justice, by which sin, guilt and punishment are inseparably bound together, but merely in that outward relation which God holds to men as a Ruler. The real object of consideration is not past sin, but future. The guilt of past sin may be removed immediately, for God has the absolute right to remit punishment ; and a penal example is necessary only for the purpose of maintaining the honour of the law, and guarding against sin in time to come. The connection, therefore, between sin and punishment is not an inherent, internal connection, founded in the very nature of sin ; the design of punishment is merely to prevent sin ; or, in other words, it is connected with sin only in consequence of a positive law emanating from God as the supreme Ruler. Hence the final ground upon which Grotius goes back to prove the necessity of instituting a penal example, is merely the penal sanction contained in Gen. ii. 17. The advocates of the satisfaction-theory indeed go back to the same sentence, but only to remark in it a necessary outflowing of the divine justice. Grotius, on the contrary, takes the absolute idea of divine justice entirely away ; for, if he affirms, in opposition to Socinus, that justice is an attribute which belongs of itself to the very nature of God, but at the same time asserts that the actual exercise of the attribute depends on the will of God,* it is precisely the same as the assertion of Socinus himself, that penal justice is the effect of the divine will ; and if he further says that God does what He does, not without a cause,

* Cap. 5. § 9. p. 70. *Justitia illa, sive rectitudo, ex qua nascuntur tum alia, tum penarum retributio, proprietas est in Deo residens. Sed in hunc errorem inductus videtur Socinus, quod Dei proprietatum effectus quosvis esse credidit necessarios omnino, cum multi sint liberi, intercedente scilicet inter proprietatem et effectum actu libero voluntatis. Neque ideo, quia liber est Deo proprietatum istarum usus, dici potest, cum iis utitur, sine causa facere quod facit.*

still, the ultimate ground is not God's absolute nature, but His absolute will, which is, in itself, equally competent to punish or not to punish.

Here, then, is an important distinction between the theory of Grotius and that of the church. The best scale for the measurement of their mutual relations is furnished by the idea of satisfaction. The main point in the church's theory of satisfaction is this, that what Christ did was precisely the same thing which men themselves were to have done. If Christ had not made a strict and perfect satisfaction for men, they could not have been released from sin. Socinus objected to this, that satisfaction and forgiveness were contradictory ideas. This assertion, Grotius, as the defender of the church's doctrine of satisfaction, could not admit. He therefore replied that satisfaction and forgiveness were not strictly simultaneous; that according to the conditions established by God, the latter then first follows the former, when a man by faith in Christ turns to God and prays Him for the forgiveness of his sins.* This distinction must certainly be made if the objection of Socinus is to be successfully met, and the two ideas are to be permitted to stand side by side. But Grotius could not stop here. If it is only a penal example that is furnished by the death of Christ, then the idea of satisfaction, strictly speaking, has no further relevancy. As, however, Grotius wished to retain this idea, he brought to his assistance a peculiar distinction, which is made in law between the two ideas denoted respectively by the terms *solutio* and *satisfactio*. If, said Grotius, the very thing which is owed, be paid either by the debtor himself, or, which is in this case the same thing, by another in the debtor's name, then the discharge of the debt takes place by that very act, but it is to be called a discharge, not a remission (*remissio*). Not so, however, when something else is paid than the specific thing which was due. In this case, there must be added, on the part of the creditor or ruler, an act of remission, as a personal act; and it is this kind of payment that may be either accepted or refused by the creditor, which is properly called, in the technical language of the law, satisfaction. While, therefore, it was the original design of Grotius in all this, merely to prove, in opposition to Socinus, that the idea of satisfaction did not exclude that of remission, what he really did was to substitute in place of the common idea

* Cap. 6. § 8. p. 81. Fuit et Christi satisfaciens, et Dei satisfactionem admittentis, hic animus ac voluntas, hoc denique pactum et fœdus, non ut Deus statim ipso perpeñsionis Christi tempore pœnas remitteret, sed ut tum demum id fieret, cum homo vera in Christum fide ad Deum conversus, supplex veniam precaretur. Non obstat hic ergo satisfactio, quo minus sequi possit remissio. Satisfactio enim non jam sustulerat debitum, sed hoc egerat, ut propter ipsam debitum aliquando tolleretur.

of satisfaction a totally different one.* For the common idea of satisfaction rests essentially on the supposition that Christ has rendered precisely the same thing which men themselves were to have rendered. If now such a payment (*solutio*) be, as Grotius asserts, no remission (*remissio*), but only a discharge (*liberatio*), then it must be conceded to Socinus, which was the thing contested by Grotius, that the ideas of satisfaction and remission mutually contradict and exclude each other, or in other words, that the satisfaction which was made by Christ does not deserve the name of satisfaction in the sense which the common theory of the church connected with that expression. But if Christ has not made satisfaction in this sense, if He has not truly and perfectly rendered for men what they were to have rendered for themselves, then the idea of satisfaction can be applied to Him only so far as He has given to God something, whatever that something may be, in place of that which was to have been rendered by men themselves in their relation to God. This, then, is the precise meaning of the theory of Grotius, and the difference between it and the satisfaction-theory of the church. The idea of satisfaction is let down from its full and real import to the idea of a mere rendering of something (*einer irgendwies geschehener Leistung*); Christ has made satisfaction so far as He has fulfilled a condition, of whatever kind it may be, upon which God has suspended the forgiveness of the sins of men; so far as He has given to God a something with reference to that end.† This *something* is that penal example, without the setting forth of which, God could not have forgiven the sins of men.

* The principal passage which belongs here reads thus:—Cap. 6. § 6. p. 78. *Alia solutio ipso facto liberat, alia non ipso facto. Ipso facto liberat solutio rei plane ejusdem, quæ erat in obligatione. Perinde autem est utrum ipse reus solvat, an aliud pro eo, hoc animo, ut ipse liberetur. Ubi ergo idem solvitur aut a debitore, aut ab alio nomine debitoris, nulla contingit remissio. Nihil enim citra debitum agit creditor aut rector. Quare si quis pœnam pertulerit, quam debet, liberatio hic erit, remissio non erit. Ac talis liberationis professionem in jure crediti proprie ac stricte ἀποχρῶν, apocham (quittance), vocant Juriconsulti. Alia vero quævis solutio ipso facto non liberat, puta, si aliud quam quod erat in obligatione, solvatur. Sed necesse est, actum aliquem accedere, creditoris aut rectoris, qui actus recte et usitate remissio appellatur. Talis autem solutio quæ aut admitti aut recusari potest, admissa in jure, speciale habet nomen satisfactionis quæ interdum solutioni opponitur. Compare Cap. 6. § 8. p. 80, where he remarks in opposition to Socinus: Illud vero, quod dicit, satisfactione omnino et statim tolli debitum, ad rem quidem pertinet, sed verum non est, nisi satisfactio contra juris usum sumatur pro ipsius rei, quæ debetur, ab ipso qui debet, facta solutione, de qua nos non agimus. In an essay in the *Evangel. Kirchenzeitung* for 1834, p. 606, a doubt is very justly expressed whether Grotius was quite honest on this point, and a document is brought forward from the *Corpus Juris* to show that the distinction which Grotius assumed to exist between the terms *satisfactio*, and *apocha*, or *solutio*, as used in the technical language of law, is by no means of such a character as he has represented it.*

† Though Grotius is very careful not to bring forward this point into any position in which he could be expected to go into a formal defence of it, still it lies very clearly in his definition of satisfaction. See for instance how he expresses himself in reference to certain passages of Scripture. That we are according to 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23,

If it appears from what has been said, that this theory has no right to give itself out as the theory of the church, the following points will show also how little it differs in essence from that of Socinus himself:—

1. Even supposing that in the language of law there is such a distinction to be made between payment (*solutio*) and satisfaction, as Grotius alleges, still he has by no means shown that the idea of satisfaction as held by the church is in itself untenable, and that it is in the nature of the case impossible to hold the legal idea of satisfaction at the same time with the church idea of it. It is rather the definitions of Grotius himself which appear capricious and self-contradictory. The idea of satisfaction, according to him, does not rest upon the fact that another has made payment, but upon the fact that he has paid something else than the precise thing itself which was due. If now it be said in further explanation of this *something else*, that the obligation requires the punishment of the person himself who has incurred the guilt, according to the principle that guilt attaches to the person,* then it is clear that the second definition becomes identical with the first again, that he who pays for another, pays something else than the precise thing which was due, for the very reason that he is another, and not the person himself who was bound to pay. And still, in giving the definition of the term *solutio*, Grotius declares it to be indifferent whether the debtor himself pays, or another pays for him, if it only be done in his name. Either, therefore, one man can never pay another's debt without the payment (*solutio*) immediately becoming a satisfaction (*satisfactio*) because it is made by another, or else, if the possibility that one man should pay for another is not to be

bought with a price, means merely, *solutione aliqua liberati sumus*. The expression ἀντὶ λύτρου, 1 Tim. ii. 6, whose real meaning he proposed to maintain against the Socinian explanation of *impedimentum qualecunque*, he nevertheless himself thus explains: Est tale λύτρον (*pretium*), in quo liberator simile quiddam subit ei malo, quod ei imminebat, qui liberatur. In explanation of the words ἀντὶ πώλλων he remarks, p. 114: Eramus mortis debitores. Ab hoc debito liberationem nobis Christus impetravit aliquid dando. Dare autem aliquid ut per id ipsum alter a debito liberetur, est solvere aut satisfacere. It is always of a mere *aliquid* that he speaks, never of an *equivalent*. Hence such expressions as, that in the death of Christ there was no *solutio rei ipsius debitis*, quæ ipso facto liberet: nostra enim mors et quidem eterna erat in obligatione, can be regarded only as a direct contradiction of the theory of the church, it being an essential part of that theory that Christ has endured eternal death for men.

* On p. 78, Grotius assigns as the reason cur pœnæ corporalis vicarius ipso facto reum, solvendo pœnam, nequeat liberare . . . non quia alius solvit, sed quia solvit aliud quam quod est in obligatione. Est enim in obligatione afflictio ipsius qui deliquit, unde dici solet, noxam caput sequi. Quod in aliis quoque obligationibus factum mere personalibus videre est. In his enim omnibus, si alius solvat, ipso facto liberatio non sequetur quia simul aliud solvitur. Quare ut ex pœna unius alteri liberatio contingat, actus quidem rectoris debet intercedere. Lex enim, ipsum qui deliquit puniri imperat. Hic actus respectu legis est relaxatio, respectu debitoris, remissio.

denied, the essential thing in satisfaction must be this, that one man pays for another, irrespective of the question whether what he pays is the same thing that the debtor himself was to have paid, or something different. The legal possibility, however, that one person should pay or be punished for another, cannot be denied by Grotius, since the essential thing in punishment, in his view, is, not that the sinner himself should be punished, but only that there should be in general a connection between punishment and sin. It is, therefore, an entirely wilful substitution of one thing for another, in which Grotius has here allowed himself. Instead of proving what was the main point, and what did not admit of being approached in any such stealthy and sidelong manner, viz. that Christ not only paid as *another*, but also paid an *other thing* (nicht blos als *alius solvit*, sondern auch *aliud solvit*), Grotius merely proved that, according to the common language of law, that which takes place in an instance of satisfaction, is not so much the payment by another (das *alius solvit*), as it is the payment of another thing (das *aliud solvit*). The real thing in question, therefore, is not proved; all that has been done is merely to assume the thing itself as already granted, and apply to it a legal definition. But if Grotius thought himself compelled absolutely to assume the thing itself, can he have done it for any other reason than because he himself could not withhold his assent from the arguments which were urged by Socinus against the idea of a satisfaction in the strict sense of the word and as held by the church?

2. As Grotius rejected the common idea of satisfaction as held by the church, so also he declared himself against the idea of Acceptilation.* He objects to Socinus that he has applied this idea to the act of God in forgiving sin, an idea which can have no pertinence whatever in the case of a penal relation.† But

* Acceptilation, according to the definition of Bretschneider (Dogmat. II. pp. 338, 341), is that which takes place when one consents to accept a thing as an equivalent, although it is not in itself really equal to that in place of which it is received; its sufficiency for the given purpose being constituted not by its own inherent worth, but by the receiver's determination to accept it.—TR.

† P. 79. Nam accepto fertur ea res, quæ accipi potest. At pœnam corporalem rector revera exigit, sed non accipit, quia nihil ex pœna ad ipsum proprie pervenit. So little had Socinus to do with the idea of Acceptilation, that he never deals with it as Crellius properly observes in his Reply to Grotius: Videre jam potest Grotius, etiam Socinus dixisset, agi hic de acceptilatione, seu actum hunc Dei esse acceptilationem, eam tamen sententiam isto quo hic utitur, argumento, utpote invalido, non everti. Sed unde constat Grotio, ita sentire Socinum? Quod idem de ipso affirmat (cap. 6) nec scripsit id Socinus uspiam, nec cogitavit, sed tantum alicubi reprehendens doctos quosdam viros (in margine autem libri sui Bezam notat), qui vocem imputandi apud Paulum exponentes dicunt, id nobis acceptum ferri, quod non ipsi exsolvimus, sed alius pro nobis, ostendit, illos non recte locutos: siquidem actus quo quippiam acceptum fertur alteri, qui acceptilatio dicitur, sit per sola verba obligationis liberatio, ita ut acceptum non possit ferri illud quod revera solum est. Quod si ob hæc verba (alia enim non reperio) Socinum et hic et infra reprehendit Grotius, ipsemet cer-

here again he has entirely changed the point of view, and the legal definitions to which he once more resorts, are only a weak device to conceal the real state of the case. The idea of acceptilation can mean nothing to Socinus, for he holds that nothing was actually given to God by the death of Christ, but that Christ was only a promulgator of that which God, of his own good will, has imparted to men. On the contrary, there is no other theory to which the idea of acceptilation can be applied with so much right as the very theory of Grotius himself. When he says, in explanation of that term, that it stands opposed to actual payment, that it is only figurative, a payment merely conceived to have taken place, it is obvious that there is a play upon the double meaning of the term payment (*solutio*); for the opposite of acceptilation can be only that particular kind of payment in which is rendered the very thing that was due, or else its perfect equivalent.* That acceptation presupposes something which can be accepted, is what Grotius himself alleges as a proof that something must really be given. If, therefore, it is called an imaginary payment, it is imaginary only so far as that which is given is imperfect, so as to require that what is lacking, whether more or less, should be regarded as if it were received. Moreover, this is the very thing which Grotius repeatedly puts forward as the peculiar point of his theory, that something was offered to God by Christ, through which satisfaction was rendered, and without which satisfaction, God could not have forgiven the sins of men. On this very ground it is obviously incorrect to say that the idea of acceptilation has no pertinence in the case of punishment. When Grotius himself, in speaking of Christ's death, says there was in it a giving of something (*in rem dare aliquid*), he reduces the penal relation to the relation of the debtor and creditor, and with obvious propriety too, since punishment even may be regarded in the light of a debt which must in some way be removed before a man can come into favour with God.

The more undeniably the theory of Grotius is seen to agree fundamentally with that of Socinus in the two points above-mentioned, the more necessary becomes the inquiry, In what

nere jam potest vel Socini verba se non considerasse, vel inique reprehendisse. This remark also, to which Crellius is fairly entitled, is another testimony to the equivocal dealing of Grotius.

* With equal ambiguity Grotius expresses himself when he says, p. 107, *Ea est prelii natura, ut sui valore aut æstimatione alterum moveat ad concedendam rem, aut jus aliquod, puta, impunitatem*. If estimation is to be distinguished from worth in the objective sense, from equivalency, then it can be only the subjective estimate of a thing that is declared to be sufficient, without reference to its objective value. But why did not Grotius explain himself more definitely on this point, and why does he to the last persist in using, as if it were the most appropriate expression, that most indeterminate of all formulas, *dare aliquid propter aliquid*?

then does the peculiarity of the Grotian theory consist? It can be found only in that idea of penal example, which Grotius transferred to the death of Christ; though even in this respect it cannot be concealed that there is a close affinity between the two theories. Although Grotius chooses to hold fast the idea of satisfaction in a certain sense, it nevertheless amounts to nothing else at last, but the idea of a penal example, through which, God, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of his law, declares, in the language of palpable fact, his hatred and abhorrence of sin.* For what other purpose, however, should the authority of the law be maintained, than that sin may be prevented at the same time that the pardon of sin is bestowed? The principal thing insisted on, then, both by Grotius and Socinus, is, the moral impression which is produced by the death of Christ; with only this difference, that this moral element is taken by Grotius in a negative sense, by Socinus in a positive sense; since, according to Grotius, the moral effect of Christ's death consists in the fact that it is a setting forth of the punishment which is connected with sin, while according to Socinus, it consists in the moral disposition which was exhibited by Christ

* This is especially evident from the following passage, in which Grotius maintains against Socinus, p. 86, *Duplicem Dei non liberalitatem (ea enim vox ab hoc argumento aliena et Scripturæ inusitata est) sed beneficentiam nostra quoque sententia agnoscit, et quidem majorem multo, quam ista nupernata Socini opinio. Prior est beneficentia, quod cum Deus magno odio contra peccatum incitaretur, possetque tam nobis parcere omnino nolle, quam peccatoribus angelis parcere omnino noluit, tamen ut nobis parceret, non modo solutionem talem, quam admittere non tenebatur, admitteret, sed ipse quoque ultro eam repperit. Hoc certe beneficium multo est majus atque illustrius, quam si Deus plane judicans nihil referre, exemplum statueretur aliquod nec ne, peccata nostra reliquisset impunita, quod vult Socinus. Non ergo clementia Dei pœnæ solutione evertitur, cum talem solutionem admittere multoque magis invenire (the *solutio*, therefore, is only the setting forth of the penal example) ex sola clementia processerit. The second proof of the divine goodness is that God gave his son to die ut eam solutionem, sive satisfactionem perageret pœnas peccatorum nostrorum ferendo, to which Grotius adds still farther against Socinus, Dei caritatem a nobis majorem predicari vel hoc evincat, quod beneficia non ex solo impendio, sed pricepue ex utilitate, quæ ex impendio ad beneficio affectum manat, par est æstimari. Nos autem præter utilitatis, quas nobiscum Socinus confitetur, unam eximiam, quam ille abnegat, grato animo agnoscimus. Neque dicimus a Deo impensum esse filium, ut ipse Deus suum receperet (Grotius finds fault with this accordingly in the theory of the church) ac si Deum sordidum facimus, quod nobis exprobat Socinus, sed ideo id factum a Deo dicimus, ut peccati meritum suumque adversus peccata odium palam testata faceret, et simul quantum ejus nobis parcendo fieri poterat, rerum ordini legisque suæ auctoritati consuleret. All this again is only the idea of penal example, and yet it is called by Grotius immediately afterward a finis superadditus satisfactionis. Even the idea of active obedience Grotius cannot wholly relinquish. P. 87, *Negare nolumus vim satisfactionis esse etiam in ipsa Christi actione (obsequiosa). Solet enim sæpe etiam actio grata admitti velut in pœnæ compensationem. Quamvis beneficium accipere Deus non potest, ipsius tamen summa bonitas qualecunque obsequium quasi pro beneficio accipit. Is this actio obsequiosa anything else than the moral disposition which was manifested by Christ in his death, and which, even the Socinian doctrine makes a condition (Voraussetzung) of the forgiveness of sin? The instrumental agency (das Vermittelnde) in either case, is the moral impression which is produced by the death of Christ.**

in his death. Even by Socinus himself, therefore, the bestowment of pardon is made dependent upon a moral condition which is connected with the death of Christ.

Although it is obvious that, if the death of Christ is once put under the moral point of view, and in accordance therewith, the attention be directed not so much to past as to future sin, it is not necessary to confine ourselves exclusively to any one mode of explaining its moral action, still it is just as deniably obvious that, viewing the two theories of Grotius and Socinus from their common point of opposition to that of the church, we must regard the Grotian idea of a penal example as an essential improvement of the Socinian theory. Not only is the idea of punishment in itself a very essential element of every theory of atonement and redemption,* and, as such, unjustifiably omitted by Socinus, but there results from the fact the not inconsiderable advantage, that so many passages of the New Testament, in the explanation of which, the Socinian exegesis cannot escape the charge of caprice and violence, fall into easy and natural accordance with the idea of Grotius.† This, however, is the only advantage of which this theory can boast; in other respects, so far as it differs from the main points of the Socinian scheme, it is obnoxious to the same charge of incompleteness which is so seldom to be escaped by those theories which affect an intermediate position between two points of view that are essentially divergent. The Socinian system is at least entirely consistent, in this respect, that as it takes a much lower view of the work of Christ than was taken by the church, so also it takes an equally low view of the person of Christ; while in the theory of Grotius, there is this marked disproportion, that, occupying the same position with the Socinian scheme, in its view of the work of Christ, it at the same time regards, as does the church, the person of Christ, not as a mere man, but as the incarnate Son of God, and hence fails to explain in any satisfactory manner why the sufferings of such a God-man should have been necessary, if they were designed to be only a penal example. This defect, however, is only of a piece with the entire character of the Grotian theory, so far as it is distinguished from the other two theories to which it is opposed. While they start from the *idea*, the church theory from the idea of the absolute Justice, the Socinian from the idea of the absolute Goodness, of God, or at least, put the historical fact, the death

* P. 87. Finis hæc satisfactionis, sive pœnæ ferendæ, multo apertius, immo multo etiam certiore nexu cum morte Christi cohæret, quam illi fines quos agnoscit Socinus. Nam testimonium doctrinæ satis atque abunde præbere poterant miracula: gloria quoque cœlestis conferri Christo, non interveniente morte, facile potuit: at pœnæ luendæ mors, talis præsertim, propriè accommodata est et pœna ipsa pariendæ liberationi.

† See on this point cap. 7—10 of the work of Grotius.

of Christ, into such relation to these respective ideas, as that our whole mode of conceiving that fact is to be determined by them, the theory of Grotius is founded upon exactly the opposite view. This theory cannot rightly be said to start from an *idea*; since, in the penal example which it beholds in the death of Christ, absolute Justice and absolute Goodness neutralize each other in such a way that the theory hardly has a definite principle left; except, as we must confess, that the idea of a penal example of which it makes so much, distinguishes it from the Socinian, though even that distinction is rather formal than material. The more, however, the theory assumes the appearance of having for its only starting point, the historical fact, in its pure objectivity, in connection with the already existing idea of satisfaction, so much the more does it take its position over against that fact, with the confidence of being able so to explain it by means of the judicial definitions and distinctions to which it resorts, that there shall be as little necessity of endorsing whatever is harsh and inconceivable in the theory of the church, on the one hand, as of agreeing in full with that exact contradiction of this theory which is set up by Socinus, on the other. If, therefore, all that one has to do, is, to hold in this manner upon the mere historical fact, it is difficult to conceive how he can have any further interest in defending a theory which starts from a determinate idea. He has to do only with the fact itself, and he is to treat it exactly after the manner of a process in law, in which one understands himself as bound to nothing but that to which he is held by the existing legal forms, taken in their closest construction.

So also with the person of Christ. That the divine human dignity of the Redeemer is as necessary a presupposition for the theory of the church, as it is superfluous to that of Socinus, is obvious at first sight. The theory of Grotius, on the contrary, although it recognizes that dignity in form, really nullifies it in fact; since it is unable to explain what is the precise importance of that dignity in the work of redemption. How Christ should have been peculiarly fitted to stand as a penal example on account of the dignity of his person as God-man, it is not easy to see.* If he became incarnate for this end only, which could with equal ease have been secured by him as a mere man, as the Socinians hold, and so includes in himself nothing which is in its own nature necessary, then there is, and will always remain, an irreducible disproportion between the means and the

* P. 72. Quod pœna in Christum collata fuerit, hoc ita ad Dei et Christi voluntatem referimus, ut ea quoque voluntas causas suas habeat, non in merito Christi (qui peccatum cum non nosset, a Deo peccatum factus est), sed in summa Christi aptitudine ad statuendum insigne exemplum, quæ tum in maxima ipsius nobiscum conjunctione tum in incomparabili personæ dignitate consistit. This is all that Grotius can say on this subject.

end. Instead of falling back upon the internal necessity of things, and drawing an argument from thence, as was done in the theory of the church, and instead of entirely renouncing an idea whose rational necessity cannot be acknowledged, as was avowedly done by Socinus, Grotius has given us a mere vindication, flattering himself that it has done all that can be justly demanded of it, when by suggesting some plausible end to be accomplished, it has relieved the presupposed fact from the charge of being absolutely inconceivable. Such is the difference between the formal, judicial point of view, having as its outward standard of reference a given case in law, and the speculative, which goes back to the internal idea of things, or to the absolute nature of God.*

* The externality and want of firmness which marks the Grotian theory is very justly and strikingly indicated in the essay already referred to in the *Evang. Kirchenzeitung* for 1834, p. 539: "The judicial mode of conception adopted by Grotius is merely formal; i. e. those forms and conceptions which have their origin in mere positive laws are transferred unchanged to the divine relations; or rather, the latter are subjected to the former, and fashioned and determined by them; a procedure which makes it appear very much as if the doctrine laid down by him in the first chapter, and the doctrine of the Scripture and the church which he defends, were two very different doctrines, or as if, in other words, his system led to a very different doctrine from that which he proposes and professes to defend." P. 595: "The partial and distorted character of this theory betrays itself first and most clearly in the fact that Grotius is not able, in consistency with himself, to point out any necessity (not even a moral one) for the satisfaction made by Christ." "Without satisfaction there is no forgiveness, was the fundamental maxim in the orthodox doctrine of redemption, first distinctly expressed by Anselm, but held by the church in all ages. So long as the adverse party opposed to this the mere proposition that forgiveness was possible even without satisfaction, no ground was gained against the actually existing, and therefore divinely-appointed, satisfaction, as a condition of forgiveness. They must go further, and prove that forgiveness was not possible *with* satisfaction. This was precisely what the everywhere-consistent Socinus attempted to do. Of course, the only thing which was now left to the defender of the church theory who would not accept the direct antithesis (without satisfaction there is no forgiveness), was, negatively, to prove that forgiveness was not impossible without satisfaction; i. e. that the satisfaction made by Christ, and planned by God, was entirely consistent with that forgiveness which might have taken place without it; or to express it somewhat paradoxically, that God can forgive sin in spite of that satisfaction. This, and in fact nothing more, Grotius has proved by his book. But if the satisfaction of Christ stands in no necessary connection with the forgiveness of sin, then this could not have been the design of satisfaction, and neither forgiveness nor redemption in general, has any immediate dependence upon satisfaction; for to assign the forgiveness of sin as the object to be secured by satisfaction, and still to deny the internal necessity of satisfaction for the purpose of securing that object, is, so to say, a logical *contradictio in adjectis*. Accordingly, the question with Grotius assumes this form: whether God had not grounds for the penal sufferings of Christ although he could have effected the object in view without them. The utmost which Grotius has done, is, to show the possibility, the fitness of Christ for the object in reference to which God employed him. Upon this point, however, his opponent had raised no question. The question rather was, Why God would not forgive sin otherwise than on account of the death of Christ. The answer which Grotius gives, stands in no necessary, or even real, connection with sin. Grotius himself acknowledges, that God, who in accordance with his love desired to spare, i. e. to admit the relaxation of the law, had also the power to do it without setting forth any penal example, but that he was desirous of showing his wrath at the same time with his love. But why any additional example, when a suffi-

ART. III.—LIFE OF ZUINGLI.

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[Continued from Vol. II. p. 226.]

Labours, Cares and Studies of Zuingli at Zurich, 1520—1522.

ZUINGLI, as has been previously intimated, was again in the pulpit before he had fully recovered from the severe attack of the disease by which he had been visited. He had even resumed all of his arduous labours while yet so weak that he writes to a friend, "It [the plague] has enfeebled my memory and prostrated my spirits. While preaching, I often lose the thread of my discourse. My whole frame is oppressed with languor, and I am little better than a dead man." But as returning health gave vigour to his frame, and strength and elasticity to his mind, it became apparent that afflictions had not been sent in vain. His preaching was even more fervent and spiritual than before his sickness. The hearts and understanding of his auditors were appealed to with a power and discrimination, that constrained many of the magistrates as well as private citizens to cast in their lot with the people of God. The spacious cathedral could not contain all that now flocked to hear him.

Some time in the year 1520, the influence of Zuingli in Zurich became more conspicuous from the measures which the Council of Zurich felt constrained to adopt. The priests and monks had become notorious for the effrontery with which they promulgated the most absurd tenets in their addresses from the pulpit. The council, in which there was at that time a considerable number of adherents to the cause of reform, felt that their influence was derogatory to the best interests of the community, and without much consideration in reference to the respective duties of the civil magistrate and the church, thought

ciently strong one is given in the case of the reprobate and his final condemnation? And to what exceptions and objections does Grotius in this way expose himself? Is it not, for example, the grossest injustice, nay, the grossest cruelty, in God, if, merely for the purpose of exhibiting his wrath, he gives over his Son to the most excruciating tortures, when he might forgive sin without them, yea, when he actually does (according to Grotius) forgive men without them?" Just as these last remarks are, it must still be said, when we consider the relation of the Grotian theory to the Socinian, and the relation of both to the teaching of the Scripture, that Grotius was right in regarding the death of Christ from the point of view which is furnished by the penal relation; only, he ought not to have found the whole design of it in a mere penal example. Only when the necessity of the death of Christ is explained on other grounds (as was done by Socinus), is it possible, without charging God with cruelty, to connect the idea of penal example with the death of Christ, so that the symbolic representation of punishment shall be considered as substituted for its actual endurance.

themselves called upon to undertake the reform of such abuses. They accordingly issued an ordinance, that nothing should be promulgated from the pulpit that was not drawn from the sacred fountains of the Old and New Testament. Thus the reformation became blended with the civil polity, and various were the results to Switzerland and the Reformation, some of them propitious, and others adverse.

The action of the magistrates caused still more decided opposition. Many of the monks had never read the Bible, and how could they preach in accordance with its principles? The nature of the ordinance of the council proclaimed its origin in the teachings of Zuingli. As the natural result, more bitter enmity speedily followed him. Even plots were laid against his life; but through the watchfulness of his friends and the care of a kind Providence, he escaped unharmed.

Another event occurred in the year 1521, which caused Zuingli much anxiety. The war in Italy was just ready to break out afresh between the Emperor Charles V. and Francis I. Pope Leo had sided with the former. Francis claimed the assistance of the Swiss cantons, and Zurich alone refused to respond to his call. But they were not allowed to remain neutral, although Zuingli lifted up his warning voice. The eloquence and intrigue of the cardinal of Sion prevailed, and 2,700 Zurichers marched forth to the assistance of the Emperor and the Pope. Although Zuingli's voice was unheeded at this time, yet he was not disheartened; he was too well assured that his words of warning would come back upon the breezes that wafted information from the battle-field, with redoubled force. He accordingly went quietly and with renewed energy about his Master's business among the Zurichers who remained at home.

Many, however, were roused by the truth to more vigorous opposition. They accused their pastor of concerning himself too much with the political affairs of Switzerland, and of placing undue stress upon particular doctrines and repeating them too often in his discourses. But we are unable at present to follow him through all the labours and perils of this and the following year. Opposition of every kind beset him both from open and secret enemies, from private individuals and civil magistrates; but wisdom and strength were given him sufficient for every emergency. Even when the assassin's hand was ready to fall upon him, he says, "God being my helper," "I fear them as the lofty crag the roaring waves that dash against its base." Accordingly, when exhorted by Hedio and Myconius to unite in preparation for more open and direct warfare upon his enemies, he mildly replied, "I could wish to conciliate those

stubborn men by kindness and gentleness of demeanour, rather than to get the better of them in an angry controversy.”* And indeed many encouragements were mingled in his varied life. The good seed was springing up and bearing fruit in many hearts about him. His silent study and meditation was interrupted by one and another of those from other cantons, who had caught something of his spirit, and were desirous of consulting with him whose words had fallen upon their ears as a light in a dark place. Among those who visited him and shared in his counsels, may be mentioned Berthold Haller and Henry Bullinger, names familiar to all who have interested themselves in the Swiss Reformation. Letters, too, not from the different cantons alone, but from abroad, frequently cheered him on in his manifold and difficult labours. Professor Vesse of Frankfort writes: “Oh how it gladdens my heart to hear with what boldness you are preaching Christ Jesus! Strengthen, I beseech you, by your exhortations those whom the cruelty of unworthy prelates has banished from our bereaved churches.”†

During the year 1522 the bishop of Constance renewed his efforts to suppress the heresy which was becoming so prevalent at Zurich. Three of his emissaries appeared there. Late one evening, their arrival was announced to Zuingli, connected with the information that an assembly of the clergy was summoned for the next morning. There was great consternation among the more doubting adherents of the new doctrines. Zuingli himself appeared in the meeting, and the efforts of his enemies were unavailing. The smaller council, in which were the most violent enemies of the truth, was next appealed to, and in the absence of Zuingli, he might have been condemned without a hearing, if his friends there had not insisted that the matter should be brought before the council of the two hundred. The smaller council were unwilling that Zuingli should be admitted to this consultation, but he and his friends were firm in their demands, and the council finally decided that their pastor should be present. The coadjutor of the bishop first delivered his fulmination against the “men who teach newly invented, abominable and seditious doctrines,” and exhorted the council to continue in the church where alone they could be saved. When Zuingli arose to reply, the deputies were already on their feet to leave the council, and could not be prevailed upon to remain until a murmur of disapprobation at such dastardly conduct ran through the assembly. When they were again seated, Zuingli proceeded with a most triumphant and Christian confutation of the aspersions of his enemies, and vindication of the

* D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation, p. 373.

† Quoted from D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation, p. 366.

Gospel. The council arose without taking any action upon the matter, but the rumour of the signal defeat of the emissaries of Rome was soon spread abroad, and enthusiastic congratulations were poured in upon Zuingli from every side. His enemies, too, were on the alert, and Hoffman assailed the reformer in a written discourse before the chapter. But Zuingli replied with so much pertinency and point, that the matter "ended in a peal of laughter at the canon's expense." Zuingli soon after, April 16th, published his Treatise upon the "Free Use of Meats."*

The bishop of Constance, supported by Faber, next attempted to accomplish by a letter to the Canons of Zurich what he could not do by his deputies. This letter, at Zuingli's request, was committed to him to answer, and the result was his Treatise denominated "Architeles," *The Beginning and the End*. This letter was written in the best spirit, and couched in respectful language to the bishop, but yet it was a firm and decisive vindication of his course, closing with an aggressive attack upon popish superstition and a significant indication of the result that must follow from the present controversy. The Helvetic diet was next appealed to by the bishop, but the result was a renewed declaration on the part of Zuingli that he should freely preach the Gospel, and contradict those who preach error whenever opportunity should present itself. In pursuance of this resolution, and in accordance with the wishes of the Great Council, Zuingli visited the nunnery of Oetenbach, where the daughters of the first families in Zurich were accustomed to take the vows of celibacy upon themselves, and from the pulpit which had previously been occupied only by monks, pronounced a discourse "Upon the Clearness and Certainty of the Word of God," which was afterwards published, and produced a very decided and salutary impression.

Zuingli was not without many significant testimonials of regard from the citizens of Zurich during the first years of his labour there. He was elected to a canonry in the cathedral which had been left vacant by the resignation of Henry Engelhardt, who however retained the pastorship of the abbey church, and was an aid to Zuingli in his work of reform. This appointment was accompanied by a "letter from the authorities of the city, bearing honourable testimony to his character and services." But this appointment added new cares and labours. An extract from a letter to Haller will show how much occupied his hands as well as his thoughts must have been at this time: "The hurry of business," he says, "and the care of the churches occupy me

* *De Delectu et libero Ciborum Usu.* See a more extended account of this whole controversy in D'Aubigne's *History of the Reformation*, p. 364 seq.

to such a degree, that Dr. Engelhardt lately told me, he wondered that I had not before this time become distracted. For instance, I have been ten times called off since I began this letter. From Suabia they write to me for what I am not competent to perform for them; though I do what I can. From every part of Switzerland I am applied to by those who are in difficulties for Christ's sake. If however anything occurs in which I can be of use to you, do not spare me, for I hope for more leisure," &c.* He seems sometimes to have almost given way to despondence from the anxieties and cares that pressed upon him. He writes: "Such are the storms that beat upon the house of God, and threaten to overthrow it, that unless the Lord himself had evidently appeared to watch over it, I should long since have given it up for lost. But when I see that the vessel of the church is in every case piloted and controlled by him, and that he even commands the winds and the waves, I should be a coward indeed, and unworthy the name of a man, should I disgracefully ruin myself by quitting my station. I therefore commit myself entirely to his care and kindness."†

In the midst of all his other duties, Zuingli did not neglect his study. He devoted certain hours to it, and did not allow himself to be disturbed, except to attend to important business that could not be deferred. From sunrise until ten o'clock, he employed himself in writing, translation, and his most severe studies, and always retained the standing posture in study. After dinner he gave audience to any who might have communications to make to him, or who wished for advice. When not detained, however, by such persons, he engaged in familiar intercourse with his friends, frequently walking with them, until two o'clock. On holy days he was often to be seen in the customary gathering places of the citizens, where he met the councillors and other leading men, and consulted with them upon matters pertaining to the borough or whole country. At two o'clock he again resumed his studies, which he continued until supper time. After supper, and a short walk, he wrote letters, which often kept him up until after midnight.

Marriage and Domestic Life of Zuingli.

Some time during the year 1522 Zuingli seems to have claimed for himself the privilege which he maintained for others, and married a lady who resided near him, although, for some reason, the marriage was not made public until two years afterward. Anna Reinhardt had been wedded at an early age to a youth of noble extraction, John Meyer von Knonan, in opposition to the will of his father, on account of her plebeian birth, who accord-

* Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 46.

† *Ib.* p. 46.

ingly disinherited him. After the death of the son in 1513, leaving three children, two sisters and a younger brother, to whose care and education the desolate mother devoted herself, the heart of the old father became softened toward his daughter and her orphans by a trivial circumstance. When the young Gerold was three years old, the maid-servant while on a walk with him, stopped in the fish market, where the graceful and joyous motions and beautiful face of the boy attracted the notice of the grandfather. When to the question, Whose child is that? the reply was made: "It is your own son's," the old man relented and immediately received the wife of his son and her little ones to their appropriate place in his heart.

Anna had ever been highly respected at Zurich, and had been constant in her attendance on Zuingli's ministrations from the time of his arrival there. As she lived near him, her faithfulness in the intelligent discharge of all her duties, had not escaped the pastor's eye. Neither had her sufferings and years entirely eradicated her beauty. But perhaps no one circumstance contributed more to the mutual regard of both than the attachment and kindness that Zuingli had manifested to the young Gerold. He had not only aided and encouraged him in his studies at home, but had sent him to Basle where he supposed he would enjoy greater advantages for culture. And the gifted young man was destined not only to reverence and love him who had long been in the place of father to him, but also to fall by his side in the battle-field.

The married life of Zuingli seems to have been a very happy one, and it is to be regretted that we have not more extended notices of it. It would be pleasant to be able to turn occasionally in the life of struggle and conflict that ensued for him, to the joys and sorrows of home, but records of this kind were for the most part written only upon the hearts of those long since sleeping in the dust. Of his several children only two seem to have survived the days of childhood. The one, a son named Ulrich, trod in his father's footsteps, and was a canon and arch-deacon of Zurich. The other, a daughter, Regula, married "Rudolph Guaeter, a divine of eminence, to whom, we are indebted for the Latin translation of many of Zuingli's writings."*

The enemies of Zuingli found ground for reproach in the rank† and wealth of the lady of his choice. He must, they contended, have been influenced in marrying by motives of avarice and ambition. In answer to this charge he gives us a picture of the simplicity of his mode of life, and the little desire that he felt for the accumulation of this world's goods. "People talk,"

* Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 101.

† The rank to which she had been elevated by her previous marriage.

he says, " of the rich benefices of the pastors of Zurich, but I can declare that mine this year would not have produced me sixty pieces of gold, unless the heads of our college (the chapter) had allowed me some advantages. My adversaries swell the amount from sixty to three hundred! I do not make this statement as complaining of poverty. God is my witness, that, if ever I feel uneasiness upon that subject, it is only because I cannot, to the extent of my wishes, relieve the number of poor people who need assistance. And, indeed, if I consulted my own ease I should gladly resign every sixpence of my stipend, to extricate myself from the hazardous services in which I am engaged. But neither the state of the times nor the improvement of the talent committed to me, will allow me to retire. As for my wife, apart from her clothes and her ornaments, she does not possess more than four hundred pieces of gold in the world; and for her ornaments she so little esteems them, that she has never made use of them since her marriage with me. The children of her former marriage, indeed, are rich; (may God give them grace to use their wealth aright!) and from them she receives thirty pieces of gold per annum; I have forborne to claim any further dowry, though I might have done it."*

The First Colloquy before the Council of Zurich; the Invocation of Saints, &c.

It will be recollected that Luther was summoned to appear before the diet of Worms as an enemy of the empire, a schismatic and an obstinate and perverse heretic in 1521. His forty-one propositions had been condemned by the Pope, his writings adjudged to the flames, and himself threatened with excommunication in the previous year, in which also Zuingli renounced his pension from the Pope. After this time, *Lutheran* became an appellation of all those who were considered as innovators, either in doctrine or practice, in politics and religion. The enemies of Zuingli did not fail to give this appellation to him, in order to render him odious. He protested against the injustice done him, not from any dislike of Luther, nor from a desire to deny a conformity with him, but because he had derived his opinions from the Bible before he had heard of Luther. But the opposers of the truth were unwilling to forego so direct a means of defaming him, and the controversy waxed continually hotter and hotter. Preachers were interrupted in the midst of their sermons, and controversy ensued. Zuingli felt great solicitude in regard to the influence that such violent and rancorous

* Swiss Reformation, pp. 101, 102.

disputes would have, in unsettling the minds of those who could hardly be expected to form a correct judgment for themselves in such circumstances. It was even to be feared that they would lose all respect for that religion whose ministers they saw thus divided and inimical. The influence of the present state of things upon the officers of government, too, was not to be disregarded. They would soon feel called upon to interfere in order to put a stop to the contentions which were every day becoming more bitter, and if they were not enlightened in reference to the doctrines of the reformers, their severity would in all probability be visited upon them. What was to be done? Should Zuingli and his associates keep quiet till the tempest was past? This they could not in conscience do, for their office was to preach the Gospel, and woe would be to them if they preached it not in sincerity and truth. Should all subjects of difference be submitted to a Council of the Church, convoked by the Pope and presided over by his legates? What hope of any fair adjustment of differences by such a tribunal, when the Pope and tradition were ultimate authority instead of the Scriptures. And besides, what had the council of Constance done a little while before, but decree "that faith with heretics was not to be observed," and condemn to the stake John Huss and Jerome of Prague, for no greater crime than all were guilty of, who faithfully advocated reform in the church? No, in no such snare was Zuingli to be taken. His resolution was finally and wisely formed.

In the beginning of the year 1523, he appeared before the supreme council of Zurich and requested a hearing before them. He was desirous, he said, to submit his doctrines, which were condemned as heretical and subversive of good order in church and state, to a rigid scrutiny. He only stipulated one thing, that the Scriptures, and not tradition or decisions of councils, should be the ultimate source of appeal. Should he be proved to be in error, he was ready to retract, and suffer the consequences; if not, he claimed the protection of government in the proper discharge of his duties. The council could not deny so reasonable a request, and accordingly appointed a meeting on the twenty-ninth of the same month (January), in the senate house. All persons who had allegations to make against the conduct or doctrine of the chief pastor were invited to be present, and freely make them. The bishop of Constance was specially requested to appear in person or by his representatives, and the diet of the cantons then assembled at Baden were solicited to send deputies to aid in this discussion. To the ecclesiastics of the canton a circular was sent, of which the following extract is all perhaps that is important in the present con-

nection : " Great discord prevails among the ministers employed to announce the word of God to the people ; some affirm that they teach the Gospel in all its purity, and accuse their adversaries of bad faith and ignorance, while the others in their turn, talk continually of *false doctors, seducers*, and heretics. In the meantime, the heads of the church, to which these matters belong, are either silent, or exhaust themselves in fruitless exhortations. It is therefore necessary that ourselves should take care of our subjects, and put an end to the disputes that divide them. For this purpose, we order all the members of our clerical body to appear at our town hall, the day after our festival of Charlemagne ; and there we will that every one be free publicly to point out the doctrines which he considers as heretical, and to combat them with the Gospel in his hands."*

As soon as the decree was made known, Zuingli, with that fairness which he ever exhibited, in order that his adversaries might have time for arranging their thoughts and arguments, and not have reason to complain that they were taken by surprise, published sixty-seven articles, embracing all the points in dispute.

" It is highly observable," says Mr. Scott,† " that precisely at this period, in the interval between the issuing of the summons by the council, and the meeting taking place, the Pope, Adrian VI. (who had succeeded Leo X. a year before), addressed to Zuingli, to his friend Francis Zingk, of Einsiedeln, and to the burgomaster of Zurich, highly flattering letters, holding out to them hopes of receiving distinguishing marks of his favour." The object of these letters is too plain even to require a remark. But the matter did not end here. The Pope attempted to exert an influence upon Zuingli through the intercession of others, and as D'Aubigne‡ says, There was nothing, whether mitre, crozier, or cardinal's hat, which the Pope would not have given to buy over the reformer of Zurich. But, mistaken man ! what promise or offer of thine can avail anything with this true-hearted and honest man, when it comes in conflict with the principles of the Gospel ?

When the day appointed arrived, the council of two hundred assembled. The bishop of Constance was represented by the Chevalier d'Anweil, intendant of his household, Faber, his grand vicar, and some other persons of distinction. All the clergy of the canton, with many others from abroad, and a multitude of other persons were present. The burgomaster of Zurich, Reust, president of the council, opened the meeting by an address, explaining the object of the convocation as it had been set forth

* Hess, p. 145.

† Calvin and the Swiss Reform., p. 69, 70.

‡ Hist. Reformation, p. 497.

in the letter to the clergy of the canton. The Chevalier d'Anweil then arose and stated that the bishop had heard with great sorrow of the discords at Zurich, and in accordance with the invitation of the council had deputed himself and colleagues to ascertain the real state of the case and aid in adjusting all differences.

Zuingli next addressed the assembly. Corruptions, he said, had crept into the church; the divine word had been confounded with traditions. The revealed will of God was little understood or heeded by professed Christians. An outward show of sanctity, external ordinances and ceremonies were relied upon more than the merits of our Saviour Jesus Christ. Those who attempted in all sincerity to preach the Gospel, were treated as heretics and enemies of religion. He himself had for five years laboured at Zurich, and his conscience bore him witness that he had endeavoured to preach nothing but the Gospel of Christ as set forth in the Scriptures; and yet he had been treated as a seducer, corrupter, disorganizer. He was anxious to exhibit his doctrine before the assembled people and ecclesiastics, the deputies of his diocesan, and the Senate of his country, to hear what could be said against it; and if in error, to be corrected; although he felt prepared to maintain that which he believed to be the truth. This he was ready to do anywhere, even at Constance, if a safe conduct were granted him. Finally a summary of the doctrines that he proposed to defend, were contained in the sixty-seven articles recently published.

Faber, who from his name (*faber*) was called a *blacksmith* of lies, in a wily and courtier-like speech, replied, lamenting the ill treatment that his brother Zuingli had received, not doubting that he had faithfully preached the Gospel, "for who, that had been ordained by God, to the ministry of the word, could do otherwise than preach the doctrine of the holy Gospels and of the Apostle Paul? He himself had done and ever would do so, as far as other duties would permit. He could assure Zuingli that should he ever be called to Constance, he would be received and welcomed as a friend and brother. He had not come to Zurich to throw any impediments in the way of preaching the Gospel, but, if persons opposed or perverted it, to find it out, and help compose differences. If any one wished to attack 'ancient rites and ceremonies, or customs handed down to us through a long series of ages,' he should engage in no controversy with them, for a council of the church was expected to be held in that or the following year,* in which all such matters

* As a matter of fact, the council of Trent commenced its sessions twenty-three years and closed them forty-one years afterward.

should be decided ; or if not there, in some renowned university, as Paris, Cologne or Louvain."

But Zuingli was not to be thwarted by such artful evasions. The question was not what is ancient, but what is according to Scripture. Besides, allowing that an impartial council could be obtained, would nothing be done before the decision of a council could be made? In respect to referring the question to universities, they had more men skilled in the original Greek and Hebrew Scriptures, then resident at Zurich, than at any of the universities named; and there were then present many learned divines and members of universities. After this address, of which I have given but a meagre abstract, a profound silence ensued. The burgomaster again called upon all who had objections to Zuingli or his doctrines, to make them known. When no one arose, Zuingli himself called upon all who had made charges against him to substantiate them, or he should feel compelled to call upon them by name.

As no one, after repeated and urgent requests, had the courage to speak, the meeting seemed nearly to be broken up, without any canvassing of the propositions of Zuingli. An incident, however, brought on a discussion. A minister of the canton arose and complained that a country priest had been illegally arrested, condemned and imprisoned by the bishop of Constance for not retaining one of the customs of the church, the invocation of the saints and the Virgin. Now the propositions of Zuingli were opposed to this, as denying the authority of tradition, and one or the other was wrong. If then no one was prepared to demonstrate the error of the doctrine of Zuingli, all were at liberty to disobey the bishop's edict, and pronounce the condemnation of Wyss unjust. This called up the vicar-general, Faber, in defence of his master, and unfortunately for him, after disparaging somewhat the character of the prisoner, said that he had induced him to retract many of his errors; and, in particular, had convinced him from the Scriptures of the wrong in denying the propriety of the invocation "of the mother of God and the saints."

The unguarded and dishonest claim of Faber was forthwith seized upon by the reformers, and he was requested to bring forward the passages of Scripture which had produced conviction upon the mind of Wyss. But without effect. He was obliged to declare: "I see that this has happened to me which is said of the fool. He is entangled in his own words." Still he went on to discourse upon the authority of the church which in past ages and all countries had maintained the disputed doctrine, and expressing his firm belief in "the intercession of the

Queen of heaven, the Virgin Mother of God.”* “As to those who refer to the Scriptures in the three languages, I reply, that it is not sufficient to quote the sacred writings, it is also necessary thoroughly to understand them. Now the gift of interpretation is a precious one, which God does not grant to all. I do not boast of possessing it; I am ignorant of Hebrew; I know little of Greek, and though I am sufficiently versed in Latin, I do not give myself out for an able orator.” He then goes on to repeat his belief in the authority of councils alone in deciding such questions, his disposition to be submissive to them, which he thinks others might imitate.†

Zuingli still pressed him for Scripture proofs, and brought forward the same arguments for the fallibility of the Church in its councils, popes, and writers, which are relied on in all Protestant countries to this day. But he adds, “there is a church that cannot err, and which is directed by the Holy Spirit. It is composed of all true believers . . . but is only visible to the eyes of its divine founder, who alone knoweth his own. It does not assemble with pomp; it does not dictate its decrees in the manner of the kings of the earth; it has no temporal reign; it seeks neither honours nor domination; to fulfil the will of God is the only care by which it is occupied.”‡

He also denied the antiquity which Faber claimed for the usages in question, and closed by saying that it was not a confession of his faith that they wanted from the vicar-general, but Scripture proofs. Leo Jude and others then arose, and declared, that if proof from the Bible could not be adduced by their opponents, their course was plain; they should continue to teach with confidence the inutility of the invocation of saints.

After another urgent request from Zuingli not to trifle with the assembly or his own reputation, Faber proceeded to his Scripture proofs. They were: The words of the Virgin herself: “All generations shall call me blessed;” and the salutation of Elizabeth: “Blessed art thou among women. . . . Whence is this to me, that the mother of my Lord should come to me?” and the words addressed to our Saviour in Luke xi. 27: “Blessed is the womb that bare thee,” &c. Zuingli interposed: “We ask not for testimony to the *dignity* or *sanctity* of Mary, but to the *intercession* and *invocation* of the saints;” and when Faber perceived that his authorities provoked a smile, he said: “If what I say is esteemed empty and foolish, I have only to sit down in silence.” After some more discussion by different individuals, of little importance to the question in hand, the as-

* Calvin and the Swiss Reformation.

† Hess, p. 152.

‡ Ibid. p. 154.

sembly was dismissed, the members of the council remaining to consult upon the decision to be made by them. In the evening the meeting was again assembled, and the following decree communicated to them: "That as no one had come forward to substantiate any accusation against their preacher and antistes, Ulric Zuingli, though numbers had previously reproached him as a heretic, and though he had submitted his doctrine to examination in propositions or articles duly published, and had challenged any one to convict him of error; therefore the burgomaster, council and people of Zurich decreed and confirmed, that the said Ulric Zuingli should go on to declare and preach the holy doctrine of the Gospel, and the oracles of the word of God, as he had heretofore done; and that all persons should abstain from criminating one another as heretics and offenders, on pain of such penalties as should show the sense which the government of the country entertained of their misconduct."

When the decree had been read, Zuingli rose, and with the warmest devotion said: "We give thanks to thee, O Lord, who willest that thy most holy word should reign alike in heaven and in earth;" and turning to the council, he continued: "And on you, venerable Lords, the same Lord of all will bestow that strength and determination of mind, which will be necessary for supporting and advancing the doctrine of the Divine word throughout your territories; and I doubt not that the Lord God will abundantly reward this your present act." The grand vicar, on the other hand, complained that the decision was hasty, and desired that the matter should be referred to the doctors of some university. But Zuingli would submit to no arbitrator but the Bible as explained by itself. After some further discussion, which was favourable to the cause of Zuingli, in proportion as the temper and spirit that he exhibited was more gentle and Christian than that of his opponents, the assembly broke up. The influence of this colloquy can hardly be estimated, as it deserves, in reference to the progress of the Reformation, especially in Zurich. The clergy of the canton and many out of it, were present. It could not be expected that even the eloquence and zeal of Zuingli should, in a few hours, make converts of the canton; but this discussion gave him an opportunity of disseminating to some extent his doctrines, and turning the attention of the clergy to the word of God; and as no answer was made to him, although some of the leading men in the church were present, the impression would naturally and justly be, that his opponents were in the wrong. He had infinitely the advantage of his antagonists, too, in the fearless yet kind and gentle spirit in which he did and said everything. The relation of the government to him was now changed. In-

stead of opposing, it afforded him protection and encouragement. But Zuingli did not, as some would perhaps think him bound to do, make precipitate changes in the form of worship. He and his two colleagues, Leo Jude and Engelhardt, devoted themselves unceasingly to preaching and teaching the true doctrines of the Gospel. Others in different directions imitated their example in promoting the same views.

The Second Colloquy at Zurich upon the Worship of Images, and its results.

All, however, were not contented to go forward in the same sure path which Zuingli chose for his steps. They desired a shorter way to the reformation of abuses, and accordingly published at Zurich a tract, "full of vehement declaration," entitled: "The Judgment of God against Images," in which their worship was represented as gross idolatry. This was a sufficient incitement to some to exert themselves to purify the city by whatever means it might be done. Some persons "of the baser sort" assembled and pulled down a crucifix which stood at the gate of the city. A commotion ensued, and the council interfered and arrested the offenders. In the debate of the council in regard to the punishment deserved, Zuingli maintained publicly that the law of Moses prohibited the worship of images, and the law, as never having been repealed, was yet binding upon Christians. The accused were accordingly not guilty of sacrilege, but yet deserved punishment for acting without the authority of the magistrate.

The council now found themselves in a dilemma. They respected the opinion of Zuingli and were not prepared to discard it; and yet they were solicitous about the impression that would be made upon the other cantons if they dealt leniently with the offenders. They had already incurred the suspicion of favouring heresy. They finally concluded, before making their decision, to summon the cantons, the University of Basle, &c., to send their deputies to another colloquy upon the question: Is the worship of Images authorized by the Gospel, and ought the Mass to be observed or abolished? On the 28th of October, 1523, the assembly convened to the number of about 900 persons, including 250 ecclesiastics, most of the cantons refusing to comply with a call which had previously been so disastrous to their party. The colloquy proceeded and lasted three days; but our limits do not permit us to trace its progress from day to day. It is sufficient to say that the character of the colloquy was very similar to that of the preceding one in January. Few could be prevailed upon to open their mouths in favour of the Mass or the

worship of images; and when they did so, they were triumphantly answered by Zuingli and Leo Jude.

Soon after the assembly had dispersed, the council liberated all the prisoners, except the leader Hottinger, who was banished for two years.* As a result of this colloquy, the reformation gained new adherents as well as some more active opposers. At Schaffhausen, for instance, the report of the deputies gained the abbot over to the side of the reformation, where he ever after remained. Dr. Erasmus Ritter, too, from a strong opponent, became a warm disciple of Zuingli. The council of Zurich did not, however, feel sufficiently confident to go forward very actively and openly in reforming abuses. Yet being sensible of the ignorance of the clergy in the scriptures, they caused "a short Introduction to the true Christian doctrine," which Zuingli had prepared, to be printed and sent to all the clergy, "that by means of it they might learn to preach the truth sincerely and without adulteration," and left them to say mass or not, as they chose. The consequence was, that it was much neglected both by clergy and people. They also sent the little book of Zuingli to "the three bishops of Constance, Basle, and Coire, as also to the University of Basle, and each of the twelve cantons," asking them, if they could bring from Scripture any good reasons for retaining the worship of images or the Mass, that they would communicate to them, and that their decision should be delayed until Whitsuntide, to hear from them. They were resolved after that time was elapsed, unless some satisfactory answer were received, to proceed to the abolition of those popish observances.†

The bishop of Constance alone made a reply, which, however, did not move the council; yet from the importance of the subject they requested Zuingli to answer it; which he did not hesitate to do. The impression of this treatise upon the council was so great, that early in the following year, 1524, they gave permission to all who had given pictures or images to the churches, to remove them. Soon after, an order was given, and carried into execution, to exclude all objects of superstition from the churches in the city. About the same time deputies from the other cantons, except Schaffhausen, assembled at Lucerne, and passed severe decrees against all the doctrines and innovations of the reformers. Zurich, alarmed at the violent spirit exhibited, sent in a remonstrance and asked an explanation of their conduct, but received little, besides vague assurances of friendship, in answer. The images and pictures from the churches were first

* His banishment finally resulted in his death by violence, although contrary to the intentions and exhortations of the Senate of Zurich. See Hess, *Life of Zuingli*, p. 167, 168; and Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 91.

† Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, pp. 91, 92.

deposited in a hall for preservation, but *intemperate* zeal was engendered by opposition, and the images were ruthlessly broken or defaced, and the pictures committed to the flames. The example of the capital was soon followed by a large part of the canton. Many other superstitious observances were abolished, or fell into disuse, very soon after this first step was taken. "They," says Mr. Scott, among other things, "abolished offerings for the dead, the blessing of palms, of holy water, . . . extreme unction," &c. The Mass was still allowed to be celebrated. Other expostulations and threats from the cantons followed, and firm and unequivocal replies from Zurich. The bishops finally in June sent a long answer to the application made to them in the previous year, but no new arguments were adduced, and Zuingli, to whom the task was committed, did not find it difficult to answer it. In the meantime the spirit of reform at Zurich was spreading more and more.

Reforms in Switzerland. Publication of the "True and False Religion."

A letter from Pope Adrian VI., soon after his elevation to the papal throne, commending their zeal, excited the cantons to another and severer reprimand of Zurich, and a warning to Schaffhausen and Appenzel not to follow its example. They assured them that they would tolerate no one in their borders who favoured the Lutheran heresy. Several of the cantons went still further, and declared that they would neither call the Zurichers to the diet of the Helvetic states, or sit with them there. An occasion presented itself for them to put their threats in execution. Two men by the name of Wirth, father and son, were condemned to death, in reality for favouring the cause of the reformers, although they had been given up by Zurich for trial on the express condition that their religious sentiments should not be taken into the account. Zuingli with others blamed the want of decision in the council in respect to this affair, and predicted fatal consequences.

This treatment of the cantons influenced the Government of Zurich to provide against other more direct measures of hostility, and to appeal to the cantons of Berne, Glaris, Schaffhausen and Appenzel, who returned a favourable answer, and were ever after more inclined to befriend her. The several parishes of Zurich were also assembled to find whether the people would sustain the magistrates in carrying out the changes they had begun to make. They expressed themselves ready for any emergency, and the council accordingly proceeded in its work with boldness. Instead of the recitation of the canonical hours

the practice was adopted of assembling five times a week for the public reading of the Scriptures in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and finally in German, and for listening to an exposition of them, beginning and concluding with prayer. Religious houses were also suppressed, and revenues given to charitable purposes. The utmost watchfulness was maintained by Zuingli to prevent the embezzlement or abuse of church funds by individuals. His desire was only that they should receive a more enlightened and pious destination than before.

During this same year (1524), a public discussion was proposed by the Catholic cantons to be held at Baden, Dr. Eck taking the lead on their side, and Zuingli on that of the reformers. But the conduct of the cantons had been such of late that it was immediately suspected, that their object might be to get Zuingli away from under the protection of Zurich, in order to take his life. He accordingly declined going "either to Baden or Lucerne," although he was ready to meet his antagonists under their new leader "at Zurich, Schaffhausen, S. Gullen or Glaris." The magistrates even *forbade* Zuingli to go to Baden, and thus the colloquy was not held.

The Roman Catholic cantons even felt themselves called upon to make some reforms, so much had the attention been turned to multiplied cases of abuse and neglect in matters of religion. Their scheme of reform, however, had reference mainly to matters of external form, which, although they did not perceive it, could not be corrected without abandoning the dogmas, combatted by Zuingli, upon which they rested.* But Berne alone adopted the regulations, the other cantons preferring to wait for the long-expected council. The new Pope, too, in the beginning of 1525, thought it best to try his hand at reclaiming its allegiance to the Holy See. But his flattering words and honeyed tones had little influence with those whose ears and eyes had drank in the sayings and reasonings of Zuingli. The latter in the last part of this year, and in the beginning of the next, published several works. To Valentine Compar, public secretary of the canton of Uri, who had defended the church of Rome in sincerity, and as well as the nature of the case admitted, he replied with great courtesy and kindness, but showed, among other things, the extreme superstition in which the people had been living in regard to images and saints. Not even the pagans, he said, were ever guilty of more gross idolatry than that practised towards the Virgin Mary at Lausanne and Einsiedeln.

The most important work of this time, and perhaps the best

* Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 116.

of all his works, was the "Treatise on the True and False Religion." It explains the fundamental principles of the Christian religion, and points out their relation to the doctrines and practices of popery. Much of the work is taken up in the discussion of the errors of the times, and yet not more than we should naturally expect from the circumstances. There is, indeed, a striking similarity of many of the views of Zuingli with those now entertained in New England. The three reformers, Luther, Calvin and Zuingli, it is true, agreed *substantially* in theological views, and yet there were points of difference in character and habits that led to some dissimilarities in them as theologians. Zuingli was less impetuous than Luther, but more venturesome than Calvin. He was less rigid, perhaps, than the Genevan reformer, in some of his theological tenets, and less fond of strictly theological speculation and reasoning, and not so much prone as the Wittenberg professor to place an excessive stress upon some to the exclusion of other parts of the Christian system. He probably believed as sincerely and heartily in redemption by Christ alone as Luther; for he explicitly affirms that our Lord Jesus Christ, "very God and very man,"* purchased everlasting life for all who rely upon him with firm and unwavering faith; and again, "Eternal salvation proceeds solely from the merits and the death of Christ." Still, he did not dwell upon this doctrine in his preaching, as if it were the whole of the Gospel. On the other hand, some of his expressions upon predestination, and upon the salvation of the virtuous among pagan nations, would hardly have been permitted, although they had sought it long, to pass the lips of the more cautious Calvin. The Christian system, as a whole, was the object of far more admiration to Zuingli, but enthusiasm for certain phases of it was stronger in Luther, whilst the author of the Institutes could mark out the metes and bounds of each dogma with more accuracy than either of them. The active life and early death of the pastor of Zurich, if nothing else, would have prevented him from reducing his views to so rigid a system, and fortifying them against attack on all sides, as his Genevan brother was permitted to do. Calvin was the profounder scholar, but Zuingli possessed in far higher degree a genial scholarly spirit. In culture, the latter was more nearly allied to Melancthon than either Luther or Calvin. Each of the three had his peculiar part to perform, and performed it well. Luther moved the passions especially of the lower orders in Germany; Zuingli won over and persuaded the youth, the magistrates, the better informed of the clergy, and the private citizens of the cantons; Calvin influenced

* Christus, verus homo et verus Deus.—Opp. I. p. 206.

Francis I., the Duchess of Jessura, the educated in France, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, the world. Luther delighted more in depressing man, the poor, guilty subject of an enslaved will; Zuingli in elevating God. Indeed, in his views of God, there is a loftiness of sentiment and a simplicity of feeling well worthy of his piety and learning.

The views of Zuingli upon original sin have perhaps been more questioned than any of the other parts of his system. Still, he explicitly states his belief in the fall of man and its consequences: "Before the fall, man had been created with a free will, so that if he had been disposed he might have fulfilled the law; his nature was pure; the disease of sin had not yet tainted it; his life was in his own hands. But having desired to be 'as God' he died, and not he alone, but all that are born of him."* It is true he says, original sin is not properly sin, but a malady of our nature, consequent upon the fall; and yet he distinctly asserts the criminality and ill desert of our natural evil disposition, and says that it "deserveth God's wrath and damnation,"† which would seem to be enough to satisfy the demands of a strictly orthodox faith. Other passages almost without number might be referred to, did our limits permit, to show the substantial correspondence of his views of Christian doctrine with the approved standards of the present day.

Change in the Manner of celebrating the Lord's Supper.

In the appendix to "The True and False Religion," Zuingli again discussed the subject of the Mass and the Eucharist. For some years he had not hesitated to declare his dissent from the doctrines of the Romish church in this particular. Jesus Christ, he said, died on the cross, and made a sufficient expiation for the sins of all men. There is, therefore, no need of further sacrifice, and the Lord's Supper should be only a commemoration of his death. He had submitted his views to the Senate in 1523, and proposed some changes in the canon of the Mass, still retaining some of its accessories, which he did not then think contrary to the spirit of the Gospel. They postponed a decision, and he now rejoiced that they had done so; for further investigations had convinced him that a more radical change must be made. With all his usual candour, which led him frankly to acknowledge a change in opinion, he writes subsequently: "My first advice was not followed, and I am thankful to providence that it was not; this would only have been substituting one error for another, and the rite newly established would have

* Quoted from one of his Discourses.

† See Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 257.

been much more difficult to abolish than that of our ancestors."

This discussion of Zuingli called the attention more directly to the necessity of reformation in this particular, and in the beginning of 1525, Engelhardt, Leo Jude, Myconius and others united with him in pressing upon the Senate a radical reform in the mode of celebrating the Lord's Supper. The most of the Senate were prepared for action, but some few had doubt in reference to the reformer's explanation of the words, This is (represents) my body, and he was requested to defend his interpretation, which he did "so satisfactorily, that the Senate that same day passed a decree abolishing the Mass, and ordering the Eucharist to be thenceforward celebrated according to the institution of Christ and apostolical practice." Zuingli himself relates an experience of his, connected with this discussion, which is not without interest. He had not been able to refer to a passage entirely satisfactory to himself, of the use of the verb *to be*, in the sense required in the disputed passage. This subject had occupied his thoughts during the day, and, when he laid himself down to rest, it mingled with his nightly visions. In his perplexity, suddenly a monitor seemed to stand by him (whether white or black,* he says, I do not remember, for it was a dream), who said, "Simple man, why do you not answer from the twelfth chapter of Exodus; 'It (the lamb) is the Lord's passover'?" He adds: "I awoke immediately, sprang out of bed, and examined the words in the Septuagint, and the next day publicly discoursed upon them with so much success as to remove every doubt from the minds of all who sought to understand the Scriptures; and such sacraments followed as I never at any other time witnessed."† Zuingli was not probably the first or last who has been helped out of a difficulty after a day of toil and anxiety by a suggestion in sleep.

It was on Easter Sunday (13th of April) that the Eucharist was celebrated according to Zuingli's ideas. On the table, covered with a white cloth, a basket of bread and cups filled with wine were placed. One of the assistants of Zuingli read the account of the institution of the Lord's Supper in the latter part of the eleventh chapter of first Corinthians, and our Saviour's words in regard to eating his flesh and drinking his blood, in John vi. 47—58. Zuingli exhorted the church to examine themselves carefully, so as not to eat and drink unworthily, and then, having offered a fervent prayer and repeated the words of Christ at the institution of the last sup-

* A proverbial phrase which Zuingli frequently used, meaning "I can give no account of the matter."

† See *The Swiss Reformation*, pp. 113, 114, and other biographies.

per, the elements were distributed, while the last discourse of our Saviour as recorded by the Apostle John was read. The whole service was closed with prayer and an appropriate hymn. Zuingli was not disappointed in reference to the influence of this change in worship. The churches could hardly contain the crowds that came to participate in it, and, says Hess, "The good works and numerous reconciliations that followed it, proved the sincerity of the devotion with which it was attended."

The Establishment of the New Academy at Zurich.

Zuingli was now desirous of placing the reform which he had commenced on a firm basis, and of leaving no incentives to a return to former superstitions. He took special interest in a Translation of the Bible into the Swiss-German for the use of his adherents. Luther's translation of the Pentateuch and historical books of the Old Testament was published in Germany in 1523. This was now revised by Zuingli and his coadjutors, Leo Jude, Caspar, Meyander and others, adapted to the Swiss dialect and printed in 1525. Of the rest of the Bible they made an independent translation, which appeared in 1527. The subject of educational institutions had naturally ever been one of interest to a man of so scholarly tastes as Zuingli. He now formed a project both for directly weakening the influence of the Pope, and building up sound and well-endowed institutions of learning. The chapter of the cathedral of Zurich, which held a considerable amount of property, was entirely independent in its jurisdiction. Zuingli, who had been admitted as one of its canons, was desirous that its revenues should be devoted to establishments for education, and that it should be brought under the control of the civil authorities. He wished, however, that it should be effected by the mutual consent of all parties. He represented to them the disgrace of living by the altar without serving it, and of the necessity of reform to prevent the magistrates from undertaking it. He finally effected a mutual convention of the chapter with the Senate. The most important points of the agreement were, that the chapter should yield obedience to the council as its sovereign. Salaries should be paid to as many pastors as should be needed for the public worship of the town. As many as should be supernumerary, if they were old or infirm, were to retain their benefices, but others should not be elected to their places; and as the benefices became vacant they should be employed in founding professorships for lectures whose instructions should be gratuitous. The provost of the chapter was still to retain the admi-

nistration of its revenues, rendering an account to the Senate, which in turn should protect the chapter in all particulars. Some slight opposition was made to so great a change without the sanction of the bishop or pope, but it was easily overruled.

Some members of the chapter became useful preachers, others enjoyed their benefices until removed by death. Five only quitted the city and retired to the Catholic cantons. The example of the chapter was soon followed by the abbey of Fraumünster, whose disposable revenues were employed in supporting a seminary established by the council, where a certain number of young men, destined for the pulpit, were sustained and instructed gratis. The establishments of several mendicant orders were also broken up, and their funds employed for charitable purposes, as in the care of the sick, relieving of the distressed, &c.*

By the means above referred to, the foundation was laid for what was called the New Academy. The arranging of it fell mostly upon Zuingli, who was best of all fitted for the task, and most heartily interested in it. It was only by means of thorough education that he hoped to banish and exclude ignorance and superstition, and thus bless posterity. It is to be regretted that his life was not spared to rear the structure upon the foundation that he had laid, but we ought perhaps rather to give thanks for what he was permitted himself to do, and to prepare for others to execute. A school for elementary instruction in the learned languages was already in operation when Zuingli went to Zurich, but its pupils are few, and there was need of reform there as well as in the church. Zuingli early directed his attention to this object, and had much influence in encouraging the masters and inciting them to exertion, and of arousing the emulation of pupils. He had long been desirous that there should be a school which could be entered by those who had gone beyond the elements, where they could go through a complete course of Latin and Greek literature, and he now had procured the means of establishing it. Two professorships of humanity were established, and from these chairs not only the grammatical analysis and interpretation of ancient authors was to be taught, but the higher branches of philology and criticism, which would enable the pupils to appreciate the works which they studied, and gain the highest cultivation therefrom. This was but a stepping stone, however, to the main object with him, the study of theology, especially biblical theology.

In this department the New Academy was made to differ

* See Hess, p. 206.

widely from the universities, both in respect to the manner and objects of study. The Old and New Testaments, instead of the schoolmen, were the basis of instruction. The two professors entrusted with the interpretation of the Greek and Hebrew text, were expected "to compare the originals of the sacred writers with the best versions, as the Septuagint and Vulgate; to cite the commentaries of the Jewish doctors on the Old Testament, and the Fathers on the New; to apply a knowledge of the manners and customs of the Jews to the clearing of obscure passages; to establish the true sense of each by its connection and parallel passages; to show its relation to other truths of religion; and finally, to point out the application to be made of them to morals and the instruction of the people."* These lectures were held in the cathedral, and not only students in divinity but all the ecclesiastics were expected to attend. Others also were encouraged to do so, and such was the interest in these subjects at the time, that large numbers of all the classes of society were assiduous in their attendance on the theological lectures. The influence in favour of classical learning was also such, that "a taste for the ancient languages was so thoroughly diffused, that twenty years afterward it was not uncommon to meet with magistrates and merchants who could read the Old and New Testaments in the originals."†

The four professorships above mentioned, two of ancient languages, and two of biblical interpretation, were first endowed; and as other benefices became vacant, professors in other departments were added. Yet the interpretation of the Bible was the prominent object with Zuingli, and it cannot be doubted that his care in this particular was of incalculable benefit to Switzerland in subsequent ages, in producing a large number of enlightened ecclesiastics, who were vigilant in watching against the introduction of error, and steady in cherishing whatever of good might spring up around them.

At the time of the establishment of the New Academy, men of the right stamp, and of requisite qualifications, could not be found in Zurich to take the chairs of instruction. Zuingli therefore procured Conrad Pellican, an Alsatian, well versed in the Hebrew, and familiar with the writings of Erasmus and Luther, who for thirty years was a faithful servant of the church of Zurich, and died at an advanced age, much respected "for his piety, modesty, and erudition." To the Greek professorship, Rodolph Collinus was appointed, and he performed the duties to the greatest acceptance, and with the highest success.

* Hess's Life, pp. 209, 210.

† Ibid. p. 210.

Struggles against the Anabaptists.

Zuingli, like Luther and Calvin, was not compelled to contend against the Catholics alone. Those appeared in the ranks of the reformed, who by their extravagance and fanaticism were more troublesome than open enemies. It is well known that the Anabaptists, after being partially suppressed in Germany, spread over Switzerland and France. It was as early as 1521, that Thomas Münzer, after being driven from Saxony, arrived on the borders of the cantons. He was there met by Conrad Grebel, and Felix Mantz, from Zurich. These men were possessed of considerable learning, and had aspired to professorships in the Academy of Zurich. Zuingli had incurred their displeasure by not depriving some canons of their benefices, which had been promised them during life, in order to endow the chairs which they aspired to. This circumstance, together with their own restless dispositions perhaps, inclined them to listen to Münzer. Still Grebel soon attempted to gain over Zuingli, and probably would have succeeded if Zuingli had been ambitious of becoming the head of a party, rather than of forwarding the reformation from love of the truth. "Let us," said Grebel, "form a community of true believers. They alone will be blessed. Let all communication with false teachers be broken off." Zuingli replied, "Christ commands that the tares should be allowed to grow with the wheat until the harvest, and shall we make a separation which he did not deem necessary? Rather let us labour to diffuse a knowledge of the truth, and not to foment schism, and produce disorder and confusion."*

This repulse, however, caused only a temporary suspension of the efforts of the Anabaptists with Zuingli. He had some time before expressed an opinion unfavourable to infant baptism. They now represented that his agreement in this respect with Münzer was a bond of union. Zuingli immediately replied, that further examination had convinced him of the error of his former opinion, and he proceeded to expound fully what he believed to be the true doctrine.† This was so contrary to their belief that the baptism of infants is a horrible abomination, a "flagrant impiety invented by the devil and Pope Nicholas II.," that they abandoned the attempt to gain over the "Old Dragon," as they called the reformer, to their way of thinking and acting.

They next attempted, after gaining some adherents away from Zurich, to influence the people by appearing in considerable numbers in the town, in fantastic apparel, denouncing Zuingli

* See D'Aubigne's Hist. Ref., Book XI.; and Hess's Life, pp. 226, 227.

† See a summary in Hess's Life, p. 228 seq.

and exhorting to repentance, and proclaiming the speedy destruction of the town, were it not soon converted. Great alarm was thus caused, which probably would not have been quieted by a weaker arm or less determined will than that of Zuingli. The council, in order to prevent the recurrence of such scenes, appointed, as usual, in case of disagreement, a colloquy between Zuingli and the leaders of the fanatics, forgetting that reason or reasoning would be as utterly lost upon these demoniacs, as upon the veritable inmates of the mad-house. Disorder, however, was for the time suppressed in Zurich; but in the country, where the influence of the leading spirit at Zurich could not be felt, partisans of the new doctrine increased, and the most ridiculous as well as painful scenes were witnessed. The anxiety of Zuingli at this time can hardly be imagined. The whole labour of anxious years seemed not merely about to be lost, but to be turned to the destruction of those whose life and salvation it should have proved. But he did not sink into inactivity from discouragement. Trusting in an Almighty arm, he was instant in season and out of season in opposing the evil that had come in upon them like a flood.

The excesses that ensued were such that the council felt called upon to use rigorous, coercive measures to restrain those who made obedience to a higher than civil law a cloak for all sin. Zuingli advocated the employment of gentle means first, hoping that the misguided might thus be restored to the use of right reason. At his request, another colloquy was appointed, and some few yielded assent to the arguments employed, but by retracting they lost all influence with their party. Finally, the Senate had recourse to imprisonment, and in one case, which seemed to threaten a general insurrection, even to capital punishment. Zuingli took no part in these severe measures, but exerted himself in every way to restore to all a proper state of feeling, in the emergency. He drew up in the form of a tract his views of baptism, and dedicated it to the council of St. Gall, which caused it to be read in the churches. "The spirit which is abroad among us," said he, "is like the waters of the torrents which rush from our mountains, hurrying with them everything within their reach. At first small stones only are put in motion, but these are driven violently against larger ones, until the torrent acquires such strength that it carries away everything it encounters in its course, leaving behind lamentations, vain regrets, and fertile meadows changed into a wilderness; it occasions disturbances, banishes charity, and where it found fair and prosperous churches, leaves behind it nothing but mourning and desolate flocks." The Anabaptists, not thinking that they had been listening to the word of God

by His servant, cried out, "Away with the book! away with the book! Do you keep the doctrine of Zuingli; we will have the word of God." Well might the council have replied, Our God is a God of order, and not of confusion. In the pulpit, too, he lifted up his voice unceasingly, but it was exceedingly difficult to influence those who were not only exhorted not to attend the discourses of the reformed preachers, but even to avoid all communication with those without the bounds of their own party. Thus the minds of the proselytes seemed sealed up against all good impressions. Still, the influence of Zuingli in his writings, preaching and in private, together with the loss of their leaders by the execution of one, the death of another, and the banishment of others, soon put a stop to the outrages and violence of this sect, and with that a large number of its adherents were soon no longer to be found.*

[To be concluded.]

ART. IV.—THE WRITINGS OF RICHARD BAXTER.†

BY GEORGE P. FISHER, RESIDENT LICENTiate, ANDOVER.

It is a remark of Mr. Hume, that John Locke was the first person who ventured openly to assert that Christian Theology is a reasonable science.‡ But the wary sceptic would not deny that the principle had often been tacitly assumed by the defenders of religion. Whether it had been announced before, in so formal and explicit propositions, we need not now inquire. Nor would one be competent to decide the question without a wider acquaintance with the literature of theology than Mr. Hume possessed. It is an interesting fact, however, that while Locke, a youthful scholar, was revolving the themes of those Essays, which have made his name for ever dear to the lovers of knowledge and freedom, and soon after Chillingworth had built up his impregnable defence of the right and necessity of private judgment, against the Romish dogma of an infallible church, the Puritan divine, whose works we now review, wrote these words:—"Is not faith a rational act of a rational creature? and so the understanding proceeds discursively in its production. And is not that the strongest faith, which hath the strongest reasons to prove the testimony to be valid, on which it resteth, and the clearest apprehension and use of those

* Zuingli, *Opp.* Tom. II. p. 230. Bullinger, *adv. Anabb. et alii.*

† The present Article is designed as the complement of an Article in the *Bib. Sacra* (Vol. III. p. 133) on "The Theology of Baxter."

‡ Hume's Works, Vol. II. p. 434. See Locke's Essays, p. 456.

reasons? And the truest faith, which hath the truest reasons, truly apprehended and used?"* "The probability of most things, and the possibility of all things, contained in the Scriptures, may well be discerned by reason itself, which makes their existence or futurity the more easy to be believed. Yet before the existence or futurity of anything beyond the reach of reason can be soundly believed, the testimony must be shown to be truly divine."†

These are pregnant sentences. Who, among the recent writers, has more clearly described the relation of reason to faith? Who will now have the boldness to accuse Baxter of a sinister desire to degrade revelation, by exalting reason? He felt that he could best honour the Bible, by insisting on its agreement with an enlightened intellect. And he realized the peril incurred by those who would place the Bible in antagonism to the fundamental laws of our belief. He saw that the infidel could wish for nothing better than the short-sighted concession, that the truth of Christianity cannot be established by evidence. His doctrine, which may now be familiar, had then a novel sound. The asperity with which it was assailed is indicated by the severity of his replies.‡

Yet no one of his opponents received with a more hearty deference the testimony of God. He declares that he would not exchange four chapters of John's Gospel for all the books in the world. Who sought with greater industry to learn the mind of the Spirit? or studied with keener delight the pages of Inspiration? He did not overlook the moral causes which pervert the intellectual faculties. Hence he frequently points to pride and prejudice, as the causes of error, and in an able treatise exposes the "Arrogancy of Reason against Divinity." He enforces the duty of approaching the subjects of religion with an humble disposition. Such earnest and just declamation against the vices which blind the mental vision, as we find in his writings, has been an important, though unhappily not always the sole

* Works, XXII. p. 251.

† Ibid. p. 267.

‡ In a note to the "Saint's Rest," after developing his doctrine with remarkable precision, Baxter says to his opponents, "Doth not your doctrine teach men, in laying aside reason, to lay aside humanity and to become brutes? If faith and reason be so contrary as some men talk; yea, and reason so useless, then you may believe best in your sleep, and idiots, infants, and madmen are the fittest to make Christians of." "By this much, judge of the ignorance and vanity of those men, who, when they read any that write of the reasonableness of the Christian religion, do presently accuse it or suspect it of Socinianism."—Works, XXII. p. 261. On the subject of Immortality, he alludes to "a sort of overwise and overdoing divines" who censured him for "appealing too much to natural light and over-valuing human reason." "They speak," he says, "against reason, even in the greatest matter which our reason is given us for. As much as I am addicted to scribbling, I can quietly dismiss this sort of men, and love their zeal, without the labour of opening their ignorance."—Works, XXI. p. 415.

ground for the charge of infidel writers, that Christians have sought to impose their doctrine on the minds of men, without furnishing proof of its truth, and have disparaged the very faculties to which a religious system must appeal for credence. The import of these passages of Baxter, and of similar passages in kindred writers, is little different from what is expressed by Lord Bacon, when he demands a "true and genuine humiliation of the human mind," as a pre-requisite for successful study. Their meaning is compressed in the aphorism of Coleridge: "There is a small chance of truth at the goal, where there is not a childlike humility at the starting-point." We only claim that Baxter excels most of the writers of the Calvinistic school, in unfolding the rational sources of our belief, and in guarding his positions against the fatal inferences of the sceptic and the enthusiast. It is of course not implied that a writer whom the historians of English philosophy have deemed hardly worthy of a mention, is to be compared with the author of the *Essays on the Understanding*. Yet his striking hints, as well as sound reflections upon the mind, evince philosophical powers of no common order. While he cherished a piety not less devout than that of St. Bernard, he yet boldly affirms, "*Philosophia sacra est pars vera theologiæ, religionis et pietatis.*"* In him, the inquisitive Abelard would have found a kindred spirit.†

Baxter's perception of the imperfection of language, as an instrument for conveying thought, evinces his discernment.

"My mind being thus many years immerst in studies of this nature, and having also long wearied myself in searching what Fathers and Schoolmen have said of such things before us, and my Genius abhorring confusion and equivocal, I came by many years longer study to perceive, that most of the doctrinal controversies among Protestants (that I say not in the Christian world) are far more about equivocal words than matter; and it wounded my soul to perceive what work both tyrannical and unskilful, disputing clergie-men had made these thirteen hundred years in the world." "Proud opiniators have striven partly about unrevealed or unnecessary things, but chiefly about mere ambiguous words and arbitrary human notions; and multitudes condemn and revile each other, while they mean the

* Meth. P. IV. c. 9. p. 418.

† Baxter attributes much of the obloquy which was heaped on him, to his zeal for study. "And so our hard studies and darling truth must make us owls, or reproached persons, among those reverend brethren, who are ignorant at easier rates, and who find it a far softer kind of life to think and say as the most or best esteemed do, than to purchase reproach and obloquy so dearly."—Works, XVIII. p. 316.

same things and do not know it." "And so taking verbal differences for material doth keep up most of the wretched academical and theological wars in the world."*

Impelled by his strong feeling, he exclaims: "What shadows of knowledge deceive the world, and in what useless dreams the greatest part of men, yea learned men, do spend their days: much of that which some men unweariedly study and take to be the honour of their understandings and their lives; and much of that which multitudes place their piety and hopes of salvation in, being a mere game of words and useless notions, and as truly to be called vanity and vexation, as is the rest of the vain show that most men walk in."†

Let not the reader regard these as expressions of scepticism. On the contrary, Baxter accords with Bacon, and with Descartes, whose attention to the illusions of language has been pronounced to be one of the chief merits of his philosophy.‡ So far from involving a sceptical feeling, such sentiments of Baxter grew out of his intense thirst for knowledge. He sought for truth, as for a hidden pearl of great price. "I have read," he says, "almost all the physics and metaphysics that I could hear of. I have wasted much of my time among loads of historians, chronologers and antiquaries; I despise none of their learning. All truth is useful."§ Theology, in his view, is the comprehensive science to which all knowledge is subservient. Hence theology is to be first and always taught. Physics is a barren science, except as it brings to view the Author of nature. Metaphysics is the humble handmaid of divinity. Every form of knowledge is to take its proper place and complete the symmetry of that solid and graceful edifice, whose pinnacles point to the skies. He did not fear investigation or shrink from submitting any opinion or system to a rigorous test. No dread of the dangers of speculation deterred him from exercising his intellect upon the high themes of religion. The uneasy suspicion that a favourite doctrine has a weak foundation, instead of inducing the timorous feeling which repels inquiry, leads him to examine with a more searching scrutiny the grounds of his belief. His zeal for improvement was tempered by a healthful reverence for the past. His unwearied study of their writings proved his respect for the great scholars and theologians of the church. But it was with no servile spirit that he engaged in these studies. He lived too soon after the Reformation to give up his private judgment; and when he had formed an opinion, he was suffi-

* Preface to *Cath. Theol.* See also *Works*, XV. p. 50; XVIII. pp. 322, 258.

† *Works*, XVIII. p. 324.

‡ Stewart's *Diss. on Eth. Phil.* p. 62.

§ *Works*, XV. p. 16.

ciently versed in the writings of Schoolmen and Fathers not to be much disturbed by an array of names. He complains that Protestants, while they have abjured the Pope, have too often retained the evils of the Papacy, by setting the authority of a few leaders above the authority of their own minds. He complains bitterly that "when a man hath read once the opinion of the divines that are in most credit, he dare search no further, for fear of being counted a novelist or heretic, or lest he bear their curse for adding to, or taking from, the common conceits! So that divinity is become an easier study than heretofore. We are already at a *ne plus ultra*. It seemeth vain, when we know the opinion [which] is in credit, to search any further."*

With an ardour which no misfortunes could dampen, he pored over the obscure pages of monks, perused the writings of every school, and compared them with the teachings of his own clear understanding. Those were winged hours, when he was wandering through the mazy tomes of Aquinas, or bending, till the eye grew dim, over the dark folios of Bradwardine. His beloved library is often in his thoughts, and it is one of his sad reflections at the close of life: "I must depart from the manly pleasures of my studies." "I must leave my library and turn over these pleasant books no more."†

We may here observe that the acuteness of Baxter did not wholly save him from the errors of his age. He thought that he himself had been more than once delivered from perils by miraculous interpositions. In the reality of ghosts and witchcraft, he was a devout believer. One of his last works was an attempt to prove the certainty of a world of spirits by "Unquestionable Histories of Apparitions." His sufficient apology is found in the simple fact that the laws of evidence were not then so clearly understood, as at present. Frauds could not be so easily detected. And the progress of medical science has explained, on natural principles, many phenomena, which were then inscrutable. At that time, incredulity on the subject of witchcraft was regarded as a sign of infidelity. Even Sir Matthew Hale, the ornament of learning and the pillar of justice,

* Works, XXIII. p. 138.

† The libraries of the Puritan divines of the seventeenth century were such as a modern preacher might covet. In his record of marvellous deliverances, Baxter introduces us to his study by the narration of an amusing incident, which might have proved a tragedy. "As I sat in my study, the weight of my greatest folio books brake down three or four of the highest shelves, when I sat close under them, and they fell down on every side of me, and not one of them hit me, save one upon the arm; whereas the place, the weight and greatness of the books was such, and my head just under them, that it was a wonder they had not beaten out my brains, one of the shelves right over my head, having the six volumes of Dr. Walton's Oriental Bible, and all Austin's Works, and the Bibliotheca Patrum, and Marlorate, &c." — "Reliquiæ Baxterianæ," P. I. p. 82.

condemned two innocent females for this imaginary crime, and in his pious meditations mentions the transaction with complacency. Many theories were in vogue two centuries ago which the mental science of later times has dissipated. The metaphysics of original sin, by which a man is made really participant, and so literally guilty, of an action that was performed five thousand years before his birth, sound strangely to the students of Reid and Dwight. Seizing upon the great fact that the sin of Adam involved the certainty of the fall and condemnation of his posterity—a fact which has always been embraced by the feeling and faith of the church—Baxter adopted a common theory of explanation, that was elaborated in the darker ages, that prevailed until the philosophy of common sense was applied to the interpretation of the Bible, and still lingers to remind us of the crude speculations of a former day.* But in all his practical writings, the substantial elements of moral agency are strongly upheld. And although he preached his favourite theories about original sin, until the clamorous objectors were “as mute as fishes,” he was careful to make prominent the easy remedy which he found in the baptismal pardon and sanctification of infants.

The independence of Baxter as an inquirer, makes it important to determine his place in theology. By casual circumstances, the theological position of a man is often greatly modified. If a one-sided tendency is predominant, when he appears upon the stage, the force of reaction may drive him to an opposite extreme. And even when his own doctrine is well balanced, the vigour and constancy with which he contends against the perversion of truth in a particular direction, may give a partisan tone to his works. Hence subsequent times, and even his contemporaries, may conclude that he holds a partial view. Martin Luther, for example, while stoutly defending justification by faith, gives occasion for thoughtless or artful readers to infer that he forgot the necessity of a virtuous life. The mistake, to which we allude, is specially liable to occur, with respect to the subject of man’s moral freedom, as it is related to the Divine government. According to their view of this subject, theologians have always been classified. The old problem of liberty and necessity is one which the theological student must confront at the threshold of his inquiries. Though he evade it once, its grim form re-appears a hundred times. In the field of theological science, this question may be likened to the vertical stratum which goes down into the earth, only to pass under the surface and come up again after a short interval.

* See Bib. Sacra, Vol. II. p. 142.

If not in theory, yet practically, the theologian must solve the problem. There is danger that his solution may be one which loosens the tie of dependence on God, or that it may be such as weakens the feeling of moral obligation. Between these evil extremes, whole communities will sometimes vibrate. And hence many a man has been styled a Pelagian, for his strenuous and persisting opposition to fatalism; and many a man has been pronounced a fatalist, in consequence of his zealous antagonism to a doctrine of lawless freedom. He must be deemed fortunate, therefore, who appears at a time when the speculative and practical aspects of both these extreme theories are conspicuously held up to his view. And this is the case of Baxter. He had hardly commenced his career of authorship, when there appeared a writer, of whom it has been lately said, by one most competent to judge, that "among English—among modern philosophers, he towers, a shrewd and intrepid, an original and independent, thinker."* In a style so pithy and luminous as to enchain the attention, without wearying the mind, Hobbes set himself to prove the inevitable necessity of our moral choices, and to deduce with unshrinking boldness the logical consequences of his doctrine. It is vain to deny that he gets support for his leading proposition from the theologians to whom he sometimes appeals.† It is true that in his own time there were teachers of Christianity, who held a doctrine, which is really not less repugnant to religion, and at war with the moral sentiments of mankind. But the consciousness of freedom to choose aright, which no sophistry can eradicate, revolted, as it always will revolt, against the theory of necessity. It was natural that in the ardour of a revolt, men should be led to deny truths of vital importance, which they hastily judged to be contrary to the known fact of moral freedom. No wonder that men were found fighting for the liberties of "indifference" and "self-termination," when they were menaced by the chains of a compulsory decree. We are not surprised to hear them assert a chimerical liberty, inconsistent with the prescience and providence of God; or even deny the pre-ordained certainty of moral events. In his youth, Baxter eagerly entered upon the study of the intricate questions in dispute between the Arminians and

* Sir Wm. Hamilton. Ed. of Reid, p. 890, note.

† See Hobbes's Works, Vol. V. pp. 1, 2. The only mention of Baxter which we have found in the writings of this sturdy philosopher, is in a posthumous tract entitled, "Considerations upon the Reputation of T. Hobbes." He speaks of himself in the third person, and says to his clerical opponents: "It is no argument of contempt to spend upon him so many angry lines as would have furnished you with a dozen of sermons. If you had in good earnest despised him, you would have let him alone, as he does Dr. Ward, Mr. Baxter, Pike and others that have reviled him as you do."—Hobbes's Works, Vol. IV. p. 435. Doubtless Hobbes was feared and hated, more than he was contemned.

Calvinists. "My genius," he says, "was inquisitive and earnestly desirous to know the truth."*

The result of his studies, which he omits no occasion to avow, was the fixed conviction that the difference between the moderate Arminians and reasonable Calvinists was merely verbal. His sympathies were also divided. On the one hand, he approved the inflexible, God-fearing piety of the Genevan School, and the doctrines on which it was founded. On the other hand, he applauded the earnest pleas for freedom and responsibility which were put forth by the brethren of Episcopius. He could not therefore join in the indiscriminate censure of either school, but aimed to detect the ambiguity of terms and to propound statements of truth, so exact and complete as to gain the assent of the candid of all parties. He looked for a more generic formula, which should combine the fractions of truth and infold apparently conflicting dogmas.

It is, therefore, difficult to affix to Baxter the badge of a school. Is he not one on whom such a badge would be an ungraceful ornament? Distinct as are his views of Church polity and of doctrine, yet no sect can claim him. He approached near to Presbyterianism, but he was not a Presbyterian, or an Episcopalian, or an Independent. Notwithstanding that he professes to accord substantially with the Synod of Dort, he can hardly be styled a Calvinist. The only appellation, other than that of Christian, which they who insist on giving names can attach to him, is that of Baxterian. He speaks with respect of the creeds of the church; but had he been less familiar with the history of councils and with "clergie-men's contentions," he would probably have bowed with more deference before the symbols of faith. He bestows a just encomium on the Westminster Assembly of Divines; but he did not hesitate to dissent, as well from some words of their Catechism as from some parts of their government.† Highly as he honoured them, he would by no means have recognized them, or the Parliament for whom they acted, as the infallible expounders of the Christian religion to succeeding ages. He retained his place in the confidence of the nonconformist party as one of their best and ablest men. He rose to be their revered leader. Still, his independent course exposed him to much suspicion and reproach. When he is accused of departing from the received opinions, his reply is often

* Preface to *Cath. Theol.*

† See "*Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*," L. I. p. 73. Baxter wrote a preface to the Assembly's Works. It contained the following words, which the editor, Dr. Manton, took the liberty to leave out, and which Baxter publishes that he may not be misunderstood. "I hoped the Assembly intended not all in that long Confession and in those Catechisms, to be imposed as a test of Christian communion; nor to disown all that scrupled any word in it. If they had, I could not have commended it for any such use, though it be useful for the instruction of families," &c.—*Reliq. Baxt.* L. I. p. 122.

marked by what one of his friends has called "a useful acrimony in his words." It is worthy of remark, that in his treatise on self-denial, he inserted a chapter on the duty of denying ourselves the reputation of orthodoxy; "for it commonly falls out," he says, "that the thing itself and the reputation of it are inconsistent." The opposition which he met with, is owing in part to his peculiar opinions. It is in part to be ascribed to his bewildering distinctions. But it was chiefly caused by his well-meant, though fruitless efforts, to strip theology of its technical garb, and to present its truths in a new dress. Probably his main views of religious doctrine nearly resemble those which have been more consistently taught by the calm and sagacious Andrew Fuller.

The liberality of Baxter does not spring from the foolish idea that opinions are unimportant. It grows out of his deep sense of the difficulties of theology, and the supreme importance which he attaches to religious affections.* Conscious of his own faults, he is not forward to condemn those whose speculative faith is different from his own. He is ready to recognize anywhere the image of his Master. Hence he zealously opposes the enlargement of the ancient creeds. A creed, in his view, is "not a snare to catch heretics," but "a test for Christian communion." He would only require a subscription to a few cardinal truths, expressed in scriptural language.† He longed for a visible unity of pious souls, and persisted, by his writings and example, in the attempt to secure a catholic communion among Christians. His doctrine on this subject seems to be as broad as that which has been so emphatically declared by Robert Hall. In this cause, he submitted to sneers and reproaches and more cruel persecutions. There was too much truth in his bitter acknowledgment, after his ineffectual efforts to unite the two principal parties in fraternal communion: "I have turned both parties, which I endeavoured to part in the fray, against myself." To quote his own forcible words, "he made a wedge of his bare hand, by putting it into the cleft, and both sides closing upon it to his pain."

* Works, XXIII. pp. 127, 140.

† "Two things have set the church on fire and been the plagues of it above one thousand years:—1. Enlarging our creed, and making more fundamentals than ever God made. 2. Composing, and so imposing our creeds and confessions in our own words and phrases. When men have learned more manners and humility than to accuse God's language as too general and obscure, as if they could mend it, and have more dread of God, and compassion on themselves, than to make those to be fundamentals and certainties which God never made so;" "then, and I think not till then, shall the church have peace about doctrinals."—Works, XXII. p. 237. Baxter, however, would require of ministers a pledge not to preach against the more important doctrines of the church. And he would not dispense with creeds, as expressions of the common belief.

The acrimony of Baxter's controversial style may appear to be at variance with a kindly spirit toward those who held opinions diverse from his own. But his temper was naturally irritable, and his physical system was tortured with cruel diseases. He often wrote hastily, while smarting from the blow of a hostile hand. He was often assaulted by troops of dunces and wily bigots. In his apology for his "provoking writings," he quaintly remarks, "I have a strong natural inclination to speak of every subject, just as it is, and to call a spade a spade, and *verba rebus aptare*; so that the thing spoken of may be fullest known by the words; which methinks is part of our speaking truly."* With all its blemishes, his controversial style is far above that of Milton, whose gross and fierce abuse of his opponents is in singular contrast with the tone of modern disputes, where biting severity is gracefully couched under more polite phrases. Critics have censured the harshness of Baxter in his disputes with Owen. Undoubtedly he was fond of breaking a lance with the great Independent. Their controversies, which began with the first printed work of Baxter, lasted until the death of Owen. Even after this event, there appeared, in reply to the posthumous work of the latter, the "Reasons why Dr. John Owen's Twelve Arguments change not Richard Baxter's Judgment." As their habits of mind are different, so is their style. If Baxter is irritated, we expect from him a downright rebuke of his opponent. Owen conceals his feeling under a placid face, while a bitter stream of satire flows through his involved sentences. Baxter tries to hew down his antagonist, Owen prefers to use the stiletto. To a casual reader, the tracts of Owen appear to be the more decorous. They abound in expressions of profound humility. But it is a self-abasement before God and not before men. He is too apt to ascribe the opinions of his opposers to the depravity of their hearts. His feeling of compassion for his antagonists is a little too prominent to consist with genuine respect. He couples expressions of love with insinuations of fatal heresy. When we hear him deplore the "fleshly minds and dark understanding" of such men as Hugo Grotius, we cannot but suspect that, in his lamentations over the vanity of human reason, he unconsciously excepts the reason of himself and his special friends. We would not, if we could, detract from the solid fame of Owen. But let Baxter have justice. If his plain dealing was sometimes indiscreet, let not his blunt words cause him to be depreciated in the comparison with his more learned and adroit, but not

* Orme's Baxter, p. 784.

more able or charitable opponent. If he could not himself boast of discretion, he commonly inspired his adversaries with this "better part of valour," and they were loth to renew their attacks upon so dauntless and tireless a polemic.

It is to be regretted that Baxter, with his large charity, did not fully grasp the idea of religious toleration. He relied on the civil magistrate to suppress the most dangerous opinions. We look in vain through his writings for the noble spirit of freedom that glows in the *Arcopigatica* of Milton. We miss the ringing note of that

—"voice whose sound was like the sea."

Indeed, the political course of Baxter is disfigured by mistakes. Skilful casuists are not the best persons to manage revolutions. Instead of fixing their eye upon the great questions at issue, and acting with prompt vigour, they waste time in arguing upon inferior points. Meanwhile they forget the demands of the hour, or cling with useless tenacity to some impracticable project. At the beginning of the contest against the king, Baxter espoused the side of the Parliament. To his credit be it said, that he never repented of the step. Believing that England was not made for the private benefit of the house of Stuart, and perceiving that this family were of a different mind, he felt the duty of resisting their dangerous usurpations. But quickly alarmed at the excesses which he might have foreseen would infallibly attend a revolutionary movement, he gave to the popular cause a reserved and inconstant support. When the interests of liberty called for a decisive blow, his cautious mind would interpose difficulties or suggest ill-timed plans of conciliation. He had inserted in the *Saint's Rest* the names of Brook, Hampden and Pym among those whom he rejoiced in the prospect of meeting in heaven. Hoping to conciliate the enemies of the Puritans, in the later editions of the work, he omitted these names; an act which won no favour and exposed him to hurtful misapprehension. He had entered the lists against Hobbes and Harrington, and at the same time vindicated the popular cause, in his work entitled "*The Holy Commonwealth*." Tired of the virulent attacks which were made on this treatise, in 1670 he formally recalled it, but re-affirmed many of its obnoxious principles! From his own narrative, it is clear that Cromwell understood him much better than he understood Cromwell. The Protector had the good sense to tolerate his well-meant rebukes. While Cromwell, as Baxter frankly owns, "prudently, piously, faithfully, to his immortal honour, did exercise the government," he failed to

gain the cordial support of the Presbyterian party. Baxter lived to see the dark day when two thousand excellent ministers were ejected from their pulpits by the edict of a dissolute court. He probably lived to regret the cold and distrustful manner with which he had regarded "the greatest Prince that has ever ruled England."* But his theories of government did not improve with his experience. We even find him complaining of the democratic tendencies of Hooker. His name must be added to the long list of clergymen, who have signally failed to comprehend the true province and best maxims of political society.

Having ascertained the position of Baxter, we may next advert to the practical character of his theological system. This is seen in its leading inquiry, which relates to the causes and the remedy of sin. The alienation of man from God first engaged his attention. Around this fact, as a centre, the doctrines of his theology cluster.

In the first place, he endeavoured to reconcile the existence of sin with the character of God. He discards all the solutions of the problem which imply that God prefers sin to holiness; since he was convinced that the logical results of such an hypothesis are fatal to religion. He assumes that free agency is possible in a creature, and that man can determine the moral character of his actions. The question is then immediately suggested: Why does the Creator, who foresees that man will sin, cause or permit his existence? To this question Baxter replies that the beauty and perfection of the universe are promoted by the existence of moral beings, who are liable to abuse their powers; that if the Deity should prevent sin by destroying the powers of the agent, He would mar and injure the order of His works. It is fairly implied in the statements of Baxter that the objects of comparison and choice in the mind of the Creator, are the occurrence of sin, against His commands and influences, by the efficient agency of men, and the existence of moral agents in the system which was foreseen to be most fruitful of beneficent results. And he points to a special reason for the Divine permission of sin, which is found in the fact that God is able, in a great degree, to thwart its tendencies and render it the occasion of good. The omniscience of the Deity precludes the occurrence of an unforeseen event. Although Baxter did not penetrate the subject of moral causation so as to convey his ideas in the terms of exact science, he yet believed that, in some way, sin may be the certain, while it is not the necessary, consequence of God's agency. The Deity is the

* Macaulay's History of England, Vol. I. p. 145.

first cause of the certainty of all actual events. He thus upheld the truth of man's dependence on his Creator.*

In the second place, Baxter endeavoured to reconcile the doctrines of universal atonement and personal election. Having fastened the responsibility for the existence of sin upon man alone, and shown the justice of his condemnation, he welcomes the way of deliverance through the mediatorial work of Jesus Christ. This work, in his view, is a provision, that is sufficient for the salvation of the human race. But a cordial acceptance of it is prescribed to every man, as a condition of his pardon and eternal life. On account of their moral perversity, men refuse to accept the condition. They resist the merciful influences of Heaven, which are bestowed on every offender. Accordingly God, by a special interposition, in consistency with their moral freedom, influences a certain number to repent and believe, and prepares them for Heaven. These, and these alone, are not selected to be recipients of peculiar blessings without wise reasons, the most of which, however, are to us unknown. Those whom He actually regenerates, He purposed in the beginning to regenerate; and hence they are called the elect.

In the third place, Baxter aimed to reconcile the doctrines of personal election and the strict accountableness of unconverted men. The personal election and actual pardon of a limited number do not, according to his view, hinder the salvation of any. The invitations of the Gospel are general. The conditions of pardon are liberal. The persuasives to repentance are numerous and cogent. The goodness of God to sinners, as evinced in His works, in the arrangements of Providence, and yet more

* Mr. Hume thus states the old questions of Epicurus, which, he observes, "are yet unanswered."

"Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?" *Dial. on Nat. Rel.* (Vol. II. p. 409.)

The questions of course have respect to the exclusion of evil from the system which actually exists, and not from an imaginary system. To the argument, three replies can be made: 1. The reply of those who take a sceptical position with regard to the whole subject. It is thus stated by Hume: "Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive, except we assert that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them." The inconvenience of this position is, that it leaves unanswered those grave objections to the doctrine of the Divine attributes, which are derived from the existence of evil; objections which meet us at the outset of theological inquiry. If God be omnipotent, how can we prove his benevolence? 2. The reply of those who assert that God is able, but not willing, to prevent evil. But can the Divine benevolence be maintained in consistency with this hypothesis, without calling evil good? 3. The reply of those who affirm that the exclusion of evil by God from the best system is, in the nature of things, impossible; or, in other words, that the existence of the best possible system, and the efficient prevention of all evil by the act of God, are incompatible. Benevolence chooses the best system; omnipotence cannot do what, in the nature of things, is impossible to be done. To this last view the reasoning of Baxter obviously tends.

brightly in the revelation of His truth, is the theme on which Baxter is never wearied. His sense of God's love to ungrateful men pervades his practical writings and blends with his holiest meditations. In the midst of the dry waste of scholastic discussion, it gushes forth in a melodious stream to refresh the reader and to allure him onward. Baxter did not believe that the religious truth, which God expresses in manifold ways, falls powerless on the soul. He did not think that sin has eradicated conscience. Their powers of feeling are not so far palsied as to render men utterly insensible to the claims of God and the beauty of holiness. There are certain constitutional faculties of the mind, which God addresses by His truth and His Spirit, and which respond and prompt all men to do right. But we come to the question whether, in view of all this truth and with the feelings which it must excite, men can choose the path of duty. Can it be truly said of all that God has placed salvation within the reach of their power? Baxter easily saw that most of the theological disputes in which he was engaged, finally merge themselves, for decision, in this question. He did not hesitate to render an affirmative answer. If men do what is in their power, their salvation is sure. He announces and reiterates this doctrine with thankfulness and evident satisfaction. He accepts it as a proof of the sincerity of God in the offer of forgiveness. He founds on it his glowing appeals to impenitent sinners, which in pathos and all the characteristics of pious eloquence, are unsurpassed by any similar compositions in the English language. On this truth he rests the accountability of those who refuse the invitations of the Gospel. They will not come unto Christ that they may have life. The doctrine of the voluntary wickedness of men, because it gives the certainty that they will not repent, leads to the need of those special influences of the Divine Spirit which cause the conversion of all who are elected to be saved. We are to conceive of the elective purpose of God, as formed in view of the voluntary rejection by all men of an ample provision for their salvation. It is the act of an impartial sovereign who dispenses his gifts in a way to subserve the best interests of his kingdom; who disposes all events according to His good pleasure.

In view of his discriminating statements of theological doctrine, we are at first surprised to discern the mystical vein that runs through the practical writings of Baxter. If a mystic be one who regards the feelings as direct sources of knowledge, then Baxter was not of this class, since he expressly disowns the theory.* But his fondness for calm contemplation, in which the soul may enjoy a silent and indescribable communion with God, and gain more vivid

* Works, XXII. p. 179.

ideas of His excellence, and new assurances of His love, imparts a hue of mysticism to his devotion. He speaks with rapture of that state, where the creature, absorbed in disinterested love of the Infinite Creator, renounces and forgets himself; when, with every faculty exerted in contemplating the perfect goodness and glory of God, the soul bathes in an ocean of bliss. "God will be praised and honoured," he says, "when I am dead and gone. Were I to be annihilated, this would console me now, if I lived and died in perfect love"—a sentence, conceived in the same spirit that animates the pages of Fenelon. It is significant of his mental habit, that, prominent among the sceptical feelings, with which he was at times harassed, was the vague apprehension that his soul at death might lose its distinct personality, and be merged in a world-spirit. We easily see why Baxter, in his later years, found in himself some points of affinity with the Quakers, whom he had strongly opposed, and whose excesses he always discarded. We see also why he cultivated a personal intimacy with Henry More.

But Baxter was many-sided, and could quickly rouse himself from his meditative mood. This is aptly shown by the polemic pamphlet which he wrote against one Giles Firmin, who had reviewed "*The Saint's Rest*," in what Baxter calls "a gentle reproof for tying men too strictly to meditation." He belongs to that peculiar class of men who combine with a strong logical faculty a fervid imagination; whose love of contemplation gives to their piety a savour of mysticism. Of this class, Jonathan Edwards may be named as an example. He is styled by Mackintosh a Calvinist and a mystic. The comprehensive greatness of his mind is shown by the fact that he could be the author both of the *Essay on the Freedom of the Will* and of the treatise on *Religious Affections*. In this class may be reckoned Pascal, who with natural powers of mind superior to those of Baxter, was fettered by the dogmas of his church, while his mental attainments were hindered by a morbid asceticism. Hence the mystical piety of Pascal grew out of his profound sense of the difficulties of religion and his refusal to yield to the despair of scepticism. It was an appeal from the doubtful voice of the intellect to the irrepressible feelings of the heart; a retreat from the demons of unbelief to a sanctuary of humble devotion. Thus a melancholy tinge pervades the *Essays* of this, in many respects, incomparable writer, which is quite in contrast with the cheerful temper of Baxter. The Puritan too was obliged to strive with terrible doubts; but with godly sincerity and humbleness of spirit, he brought them manfully before the bar of his intellect, and heard them patiently, until he saw the falsity of their pleas. Then he dismissed them with a peaceful mind. The eye of Pascal often rests mournfully

upon the ruins of human nature. He seems to meditate alone, in the stillness of night, when a yet more sombre shade is cast over the shattered and prostrate columns which sadly suggest the splendour of the original structure. Baxter often dwells upon a pleasant future. He delights to meditate at the dawn, when the songs of the lark float through the air, and the morning-star shines in the east with a silvery light, the harbinger of the rising day. With that "calm consideration which doth as it were open the door between the head and heart," he fastens his thoughts on Heaven, until he is transported at the glory and living reality of that unseen world. He soars "above the Aonian mount," and in the holy presence of the Invisible, purifies and gladdens his soul. Even the wild-flowers that bloom around him distil a fragrance, grateful to the Father, who clothes them with beauty. Like the inspired Prince of Israel, to him the heavens are articulate, and all the works of Nature echo the praises of God.

"When the sun in the spring draws near our part of the earth, how do all things congratulate its approach! The earth looks green, and casteth off her mourning habit; the trees shoot forth; the plants revive; the pretty birds, how sweetly do they sing! the face of all things smiles upon us, and all the creatures below rejoice. Beloved friends, if we would but try this life with God, and would but keep these hearts above, what a spring of joy would be within us; and all our graces be fresh and green! How would the face of our souls be changed; and all that is within us rejoice! How should we forget our winter sorrows; and withdraw our souls from our sad retirements! How early should we rise (as those birds in the spring) to sing the praise of our great Creator! O Christian, get above: believe it, that region is warmer than this below."*

"When thou walkest forth in the evening, look upon the stars, how they glisten, and in what number they bespangle the firmament. If in the day-time, look up to the glorious sun; view the wide expanded, encompassing heavens, and say to thyself, What glory is in the least of yonder stars; what a vast, what a bright, resplendent body hath yonder moon, and every planet! O, what an inconceivable glory hath the sun! Why, all this is nothing to the glory of heaven. Yonder sun must there be laid aside as useless, for it would not be seen for the brightness of God. I shall live above all yonder glory; yonder is but darkness to the lustre of my Father's house. I shall be

* Saint's Rest. Works, XXIII. p. 226. It will be observed that our quotations from the Saint's Rest are from the *unabridged* edition, and not from the edition of Mr. Fawcett.

as glorious as that sun myself; yonder is but the wall of the palace-yard; as the poet saith,

‘If in heaven’s outward courts such beauty be,
What is the glory which the saints do see!’

So think of the rest of the creatures. This whole earth is but my Father’s footstool: this thunder is nothing to his dreadful voice; these winds are nothing to the breath of his mouth. So much wisdom and power as appeareth in all these; so much and far more greatness and goodness and loving delights, shall I enjoy in the actual fruition of God.”*

Baxter is one of the few writers who have said much of heaven without offending a sanctified taste. His heaven is one of intellectual activity, of social converse, of devout worship. He stands apart from the descanters on the invisible world, whom John Foster forcibly describes, “who make you think of a popish cathedral, and from the vulgarity of whose illuminations you are excessively glad to escape into the solemn twilight of faith.” With him earthly objects are only the symbols of the heavenly. The heaven which Baxter conceives, has none of the commonplace arrangements and low associations which degrade the Arcana of Swedenborg to the rank of a dull fable. His visions are spiritual, and the curtain of mystery that hangs over them is never quite withdrawn. He does not lose the reverence that becomes a mortal who speaks of the mansions where immortals dwell. Although we may apply to him, in a nobler sense, the words which describe the enthusiastic Herschel—“*cœlorum perrupit claustra*”—yet we cannot say that he is rash or presumptuous. For long periods, he was daily expecting his own departure from the earth. He stood on the brink of eternity, and tried to sound its unfathomable depths. In a vast temple, reared by human art, where many generations have trod, one who long gazes through the dim vistas and far upward to the spreading arches, is sensible of his own littleness, while a feeling of awe steals over him. So when this thoughtful man is at the portal of another world, on which his eye is steadily fixed, the present moment is seen to be but a single link in an endless chain, and the things of time dwindle to insignificance. Yet he does not tremble with fear.

“O then, my soul, fear not to enter that estate, where thou shalt ever after cease thy fear. Sit down, and sadly, once a day, bethink thyself of this eternity; among all the arithmetical numbers, study the value of this infinite cipher, which though it

* Saint’s Rest. Works, XXIII. p. 384.

stand for nothing in the vulgar account, doth yet contain all our millions, as much less than a simple unit. Lay by the perplexed and contradicting chronological tables, and fix thine eye on this eternity; and the lines which remote thou couldst not follow, thou shalt see all together here centred. Study less those tedious volumes of history, which contain but the silent narration of dreams, and are but the pictures of the actions of shadows; and, instead of all, study thoroughly this one word 'eternity,' and when thou hast learned thoroughly that one word, thou wilt never look on books again. What! live, and never die? Rejoice, and ever rejoice! O, what sweet words are these, 'never and ever!'"*

It is in passages where his pious emotions are poured out in unstudied words, that the poetical talent of Baxter is best disclosed. His metrical compositions—his volume of *Poems and Paraphrase of the Psalms*—though they have won the praise of Mr. Montgomery, are in a clumsy style of versification, which renders them of little worth to modern readers. Like Bunyan, he wrote his best poetry in prose. Unlike the wonderful Pilgrim, the free play of his imagination is hindered by the weight of his cumbrous learning. But it is pleasant to know that this demure Puritan loved to compose hymns, though in homely rhymes, and to while away the sleepless hours of night with gladsome songs.

The expectation of heaven has a varied influence upon different minds. Some there are whose ruling desire is to escape in safety from this life and to enter a haven of rest. If they do not flee to the desert or hide their disgust at the world within the walls of a cloister; if they do not even cherish a cynical aversion for the scenes of the present state of existence, they yet insulate themselves from the interests of our busy planet not less completely than did St. Simeon on the top of his pillar. Dwelling in communion with a few kindred souls, they submissively await their translation to a better home. There are others who mingle valiantly in the great contest of which the object is to break down the empire of Satan. Exulting in the virtuous strife of this mortal life, they are barely consoled on leaving the world by the promise of a celestial abode. Both these types of piety, exemplified in all the Christian ages, are shown to be imperfect when they are compared with the temper of Paul, who was "in a strait betwixt two." His aspiration to be with the Saviour was balanced by his desire to subserve the welfare of

* Saint's Rest. Works, XXII. p. 170.

men. Deeming this life to be given for beneficent ends, he had no will to alter the divine appointments. This blending of a quenchless aspiration for a sinless and perfect state with an indomitable purpose to contend against the principalities and powers which beset the soul on her upward path, constitutes the transcendent worth of the Puritan character. Like Paul, Baxter made his hopes of heaven the spring of charitable exertions on earth. Heartily as he despised the fopperies of the world, he would have been the last man to become an anchorite. His piety, like his theology, was practical.

His broad conception of the Christian character is perhaps most fully presented in "The Saint's Rest." It is unfortunate that this remarkable work is chiefly known through a mutilated edition, which contains not a third of the original treatise, which divides sentences and shorter paragraphs, and is divested of the personal allusions, and the quaint phrases which give a charm to the work, as it came fresh from the hand of its author. It has thus in a great measure lost its dramatic interest. "An Abridgment of the Saint's Rest!" It has a harsh sound. True, the work is often prolix, and has many digressions, but they are the digressions of a versatile mind that is too full of thought to move on in a right line. The style may be likened to one of our expansive rivers that flows on in a sinuous course, with now a slow and now an impetuous current, and sending out broad branches to adorn the landscapes. The reader must expect to meet, here and there, a rugged steep, or a dizzy height of speculation. But embosomed in the hills there is many a shady nook where the humblest wayfarer may find welcome repose. The work is a portraiture of the author's character. It is stamped with the seriousness, the purity, the warm-hearted sympathy with men, which give impressiveness to his entire life. For the sake of doing good, he gladly gave up his desire of literary popularity. Once he thought, "that nothing should be made public but what a man had first laid out his most choice art upon." "But," he adds, "my conscience soon told me that there was too much of pride and selfishness in this." Accordingly he wrote as occasions seemed to require. The multiplicity of his works is explained by the astonishing celerity of his mind. Lightfoot and Owen and Jeremy Taylor—each of them is a voluminous author; but Baxter has written more than they all. He humorously accounts for his prolixity "by the great distance between men's ears and their brains." There was one item of truth in the vile address of Jeffries: "Richard! Richard! thou hast written books enough to load a cart." Besides the injury to his permanent fame, there were grave evils incident to such a course. His opinions, put forth in a crude form, he was more

than once compelled to explain or recal. His haste often entangled him in perplexing disputes. He sacrificed the peculiar influence which is derived from a consistent, life-long maintenance of a single system. On the other hand, his powers were drawn out by opposition. His boldness enabled him to strike a blow when a slower mind would have lost the opportunity. He won from men what more cautious writers often fail to gain, a confidence in his frankness and unswerving integrity. He demonstrated that he prized the truth above his own good name. Let those who would too severely censure Baxter, ponder these golden words: "It is too little remembered that repugnance to hypocrisy and impatience of long concealment, are the qualities of the best formed minds, and that if the publication of some doctrines proves often painful and mischievous, the habitual suppression of opinion is injurious to reason and very dangerous to sincerity."*

Unlike the traditional formulas which may be recited and then forgotten, the religious opinions of Baxter were grasped with a lively faith. Because they had been wrought out by his own inquiries and spiritual struggles, they were living principles. Whatever imperfections in his dogmatic faith the criticism of this later time may detect, there was somewhat in it that gave him a strange power over the human heart. Well might he bear with patience the sneers of critics, while he was every week receiving letters from persons who gratefully attributed their religious conversion to a perusal of his books. They who were alarmed at the tendency of his speculations, were compelled to acknowledge a charm in that "Call to the Unconverted," which has reached the ears of thousands through most of the languages of Europe, and in the translation of John Elliot, as Cotton Mather relates, melted to tears an Indian prince, in the remote forests of New England. Singular was the success which attended his sermons. All his views of religion he could frankly and hopefully avow. He spoke "as a dying man to dying men." Delighting to preach the Gospel, although his polemic zeal kept him in close contest with many opponents, he never lost sight of what he regarded as the noblest of avocations. His life shows the need of qualifying the sweeping remark of Hallam on the degrading and contracting influence of religious controversy.† It proves that the effect of controversy on the disputants, materially depends on the motives which impel them to engage in debate.

Baxter's ideal of the minister is portrayed in "The Reformed Pastor," a work which, like the "Saint's Rest," has suffered

* Sir James Mackintosh, *Eth. Phil.* p. 135.

† Hallam's *Middle Ages*, Ch. IX. p. 453.

much from the scissors of editors. A description of the sacred office, so full, so graphic, and at the same time so redolent of a divine unction, cannot elsewhere be found. Other works may exhibit with more exactness the rhetorical qualities of the preacher's style; but none so well insist upon the moral traits, more essential to the true success of pulpit oratory. Some have written more ably on the dignity of the pastoral office, but none have so vividly unfolded its varied duties and opportunities. There are many passages in this work which aptly illustrate the directness and point of Baxter's style. He never loiters. He writes with an importunate earnestness which fixes the attention, if it does not force conviction.

"How few ministers do preach with all their might; or speak about everlasting joy or torment in such a manner as may make men believe that they are in good sadness. It would make a man's heart ache to see a company of dead and drowsy sinners sit under a minister, and not have a word that is likely to quicken or awaken them." "Most ministers will not so much as put out their voice, and stir up themselves to an earnest utterance. But if they do speak loud and earnestly, how few do answer it with earnestness of matter; and then the voice doth little good; the people will take it but as mere bawling, when the matter doth not correspond."*

The following passage upon ministerial pride, illustrates his heart-searching power:—

"O what a companion, what a tyrannical commander, what a sly and subtle and insinuating enemy is this sin of pride!" "Fewer ministers would ruffle it out in the fashion in hair and habit, if it were not for the command of this tyrannical vice. And I would that were all, or the worst; but, alas, how frequently doth it go with us to our studies, and there sit with us and do our work! How oft doth it choose our subject, and more often choose our words and ornaments. God biddeth us be as plain as we can, for the informing of the ignorant, and as convincing and serious as we are able, for the melting and changing of unchanged hearts; but pride standeth by and contradicteth all." "It persuadeth us to paint the window, that it may dim the light; and to speak to our people that which they cannot understand, to acquaint them that we are able to speak unprofitably. It taketh off the edge, and dulls the life of all our teachings, under the pretence of filing off the roughness, unevenness, and superfluity. If we have a plain and cutting

* Works, XIV. p. 182. (*Unabridged Ed.*)

passage, it throws it away as too rustical and ungrateful." "And when pride hath made the sermon, it goes with them into the pulpit; it formeth their tone, it animateth them in the delivery; it takes them off from that which may be displeasing, how necessary soever, and setteth them in a pursuit of vain applause." "When they should ask, 'what should I say and how should I say it, to please God best, and do most good,' it makes them ask, 'what shall I say and how shall I deliver it, to be thought a learned, able preacher, and to be applauded by all that hear me.' When the sermon is done, pride goeth home with them, and maketh them more eager to know whether they were applauded, than whether they did prevail for the saving change of souls! They could find it in their hearts, but for shame, to ask folks how they liked them, and to draw out their commendation. If they perceive that they are highly thought of, they rejoice, as having attained their end; but if they perceive that they are esteemed but weak or common men, they are displeased, as having missed the prize of the day."*

If "The Reformed Pastor" sharply chides the faults of the clergy, we may listen to the author's own apology:—"If the ministers of England had sinned only in Latin, I would have made shift to have admonished them in Latin, or else have said nothing to them. But if they will sin in English, they must hear of it in English."†

The Reformed Pastor is valuable as a transcript of Baxter's pastoral life. None can read the account of his residence at Kidderminster, without being amazed at his Herculean labours. There was no limit to his beneficence. Besides his onerous pastoral duties, and his public duties apart from his parish, during six years he gratuitously practised medicine among his people. During this time, he was sending from the press a larger number of pages than many ministers read. The considerable pecuniary profits afforded by the immense popularity of his books, he distributed among the poor. These unremitting efforts were not made by a man in robust health, but by one who was so variously afflicted, that he gained a respectable knowledge of therapeutics by an inductive study of his own diseases. We must go far, even back to the days of the apostles, to find the parallel of this self-denying philanthropy. The striking reformation in the character and manners of his hearers was the reward of his faithfulness. Who will wonder at his ardent friendship for his flock? Among his people at Kidderminster, he was most happy. But when he was driven away from his weeping disciples, he still preached wherever he could

* Works, XIV. pp. 154, 155.

† Ibid. p. iv.

gather a congregation. And when the arm of civil tyranny debarred him from publicly teaching the truth, so strong was his love of souls that he addressed a few hearers, whom he could secretly gather in his own household. "He continued to preach so long," says Dr. Bates in his funeral sermon, "that the last time, he almost died in the pulpit. It would have been his joy to have been transfigured in the mount." Indeed, whenever he entered the pulpit, he appeared to have come from the converse of Moses and Elias and Jesus, to bring glad messages to the sinful, sorrowful children of men. His pallid face beamed with a radiance not of earth. His emaciated form and lustrous eye lent a supernatural life to his pictures of the invisible world. When his voice was raised to commend the Christian faith to the unbelieving, it was hard to resist the impassioned fervour of his appeal. The few printed sermons of such an orator as Baxter, give but an inadequate idea of the effect of his spoken discourses. But they still retain much of their richness of illustration and vehement energy. They prove how earnest he was to exhibit the wide difference, in character and destiny, between irreligious and regenerate men. They present, in bold relief, the characteristics of a renewed heart. They show with what urgency he pressed upon the sinner's conscience the duty of repentance. They abound in vivid descriptions of the terrors of future retribution, reminding us of certain fearful passages on the pages of Edwards. But in Baxter the intense excitement of his mind is not concealed; while in Edwards, the representations, so distinct and elaborate, are yet more impressive in consequence of the repressed emotion and determined style of the preacher. The emphasis, disproportioned though it may have been, which the most successful religious teachers have given to the motive of fear, should rebuke the fastidious taste that shrinks from using the awful imagery of inspiration. Allusions to Satan are frequent in these, as in most of the writings of Baxter. By the Puritan mind, the Spirit of evil was felt to be an insidious and a powerful enemy. He was believed to exist in manifold forms, from the debasing shapes which he assumed in the vulgar superstitions to the colossal and sublime Demon of Milton. Not more truly did men realize the presence of God, than they realized the presence of an ever-active and dangerous fiend. And this feeling is obvious in the works of our author. Yet with all their terror, his sermons breathe a tender spirit of compassion for every innocent infirmity of human nature. They have faults of structure and style which a tyro can now detect. But if they are to be judged by their fitness to renovate the character of men, then they have a higher excellence than the bold and

terse productions of South, or the learned and ornate compositions of Jeremy Taylor. And we believe that no devout man will rise from the perusal of the discourses on the "Mischiefs of Self-Ignorance and Benefits of Self-Acquaintance,"* without the persuasion that they are such sermons as Paul would approve. Will he not rise with the conviction that a race of preachers has passed away, whose places have not been supplied? Free, in a good degree, from the pedantry and the conceits of style that were fashionable in their time, the better class of Puritan divines, of whom Baxter is a representative, are doubtless among the most effective preachers the world has seen. They were called to achieve the good work which "old father Latimer" had foretold, in the flames of Oxford. Stout and zealous reformers, they used a bow which few of their successors have been able to bend.

The best reflections of Baxter during his later years, are comprised in his *Autobiography* and in the "*Dying Thoughts*,"† The *Autobiography* ‡ is replete with interest. This rare old folio is a daguerreotype of the author's heart. Here we have Baxter to the life. Its every page is stamped with the mark of open-hearted truthfulness. All the foibles which other men would have covered even from their own close insight, are spread out to our view. The pranks of his boyhood, the rash judgments and hasty speeches of his youth, the blunders and sins of maturer life, are plainly exposed. He was determined to deal fairly with his fellow men. And the simplicity with which he tells the story of his life, is far enough from the affected humility that is too often visible in the diaries of eminent persons. His sincerity leads him to confess with "shame" that when a boy, he has "oft gone into other men's Orchards and stolen their Fruit," and "was extreemly bewitched with a Love of Romances, Fables, and old Tales." The same feeling dictates the acknowledgment that he was "too raw a writer" when he first "meddled with Owen;" and that once being about to preach before the king, he was ashamed of his want of Academic honours, when he was obliged to decline the offer of a tippet, which he wrongly judged to be "the proper insign of a Dr. of Divinity."§ No other historical personage with whom we are acquainted, has furnished

* Baxter's Works, Vol. XVI.

† "Mr. Baxter's Dying Thoughts upon Philippians i. 23, written for his own use in the latter times of his corporal pains and weakness. 1683."

‡ "Reliquiæ Baxterianæ: or, Mr. Richard Baxter's Narrative of the most Memorable Passages in his Life and Times. Faithfully published from his own Original Manuscript, by Matthew Sylvester." London, 1696. A copy of this curious volume may be found in the library of Harvard College. It is the basis of Mr. Orme's excellent Biography of Baxter, which was published in 1830.

§ Rel. Baxt. P. II. p. 382.

us with so ample means of judging himself. The confessions of authors are proverbially insincere. If, like Gibbon, they faithfully trace the steps of their intellectual progress, they are wont to conceal the deeper experiences of the heart. The Chesterfields and Walpoles who talk of themselves with apparent freedom, veil their profound hypocrisy under a frank and careless style. How few, even of good men, scrutinize their own motives; and of these, how few who are thoroughly honest with themselves, can bear to discover to the world the darker shades of their spiritual history! Imagination, too, colours past events with deceitful hues. How else shall we account for the air of romance that often invests the personal narratives of pious men? Of all these faults, incident to a biographer of himself, Baxter must be acquitted. And yet as we follow him through the shifting scenes of his eventful life, our respect for his talents and piety deepens into an affectionate reverence. Even his grave errors appear trivial, when we consider the magnanimity with which they are confessed. His lofty virtues are seen to overshadow his faults. Whatever may be the follies of his mind, (and they were many in number,) the reader is compelled to recognize an intellect of eminent powers.

We feel bound to enter a protest against the extraordinary liberty which has been taken with the writings of this great divine. While Baxter is regarded by the multitude as a man of saintly piety, his intellectual traits are poorly appreciated. And this is not the only injury which has resulted from the labours of well-meaning, yet merciless editors. In their eagerness to make useful books, they have in some instances invaded the sacred rights of an author. By altering sentences and culling paragraphs, they produce a book widely different in its impression from the original production, and then claim for it the sanction of an honoured name. The work which is widely circulated under the title of the "Dying Thoughts," is not the work of Baxter; but may be correctly entitled, "A Third of Baxter's Dying Thoughts, in which much that relates to himself is omitted, sentences are inverted, and strong words and homely similes to a large extent dropped, the whole selected and arranged by Mr. Benjamin Fawcett." It may be said that the usefulness of the work is promoted by abridging it (which may be fairly doubted), and that the end justifies the means. We need not now attempt to determine the few cases where important changes in the writings of an eminent author can be justified. In the present instance, it is enough to reply that this work of Baxter has a great part of its value, as a historical picture of himself and his times. To mutilate it for the purpose of giving it greater interest, is to garble history. It is like changing the

costume of an old portrait of Vandyke, to accommodate it to modern fashions. But who does not prefer to read any book as it was written? And who does not agree with Mr. Macaulay, that "in works which owe much of their interest to the character and situation of the writers, the case is infinitely stronger? What man of taste and feeling can endure harmonies, *refacimientos*, abridgments, expurgated editions?" In his later editions of the Life of Johnson, Mr. Croker, profiting perhaps by the suggestion of his unsparing critic, has presented the text of Boswell in its unbroken integrity. And one would render a grateful service who should publish an accurate edition of Baxter's select treatises.*

The "Dying Thoughts" were composed for the spiritual benefit of the author. He gave them to the printer, only to keep the manuscript from being lost.† It is instructive to compare this, which was one of the last, with the Saint's Rest, which was one of the first, of his works. His vigorous imagination had not grown weak with his declining years. His piety, if less enthusiastic, had become deeper and more humble. Avoiding the mooted topics of theology which are somewhat prominent in the earlier work, he directs his mind to themes which have the closest relation to death. He reviews the proofs of immortality, and having calmly surveyed the blessings of this sublunary state, he brings before him the hopes of the believer and the more alluring joys of heaven. Reminiscences of his own history are interwoven with candid criticisms of his writings and conduct. Their wisdom, mingled with the subdued pathos of their tone, will secure for these meditations an exalted and a lasting place in the literature of devotion.

The misfortunes which clouded the last years of Baxter would have suspended the literary labours of a less heroic man. He found himself hated and calumniated by the rulers in church and state. "Even men that had been taken for sober and religious," he says, "when they had a mind for preferment and to be taken notice of at court and by the prelates, did fall on preaching or writing against me."‡ His long life, his multifarious writings, were studied by mercenary writers who sought material for slander. Many of his associates, and among them Sir Matthew Hale, who had consoled him by their friendship,

* A valuable edition of several practical treatises of Baxter, including the "Dying Thoughts," was published in two volumes in 1831, under the editorial supervision of Dr. Leonard Bacon of New Haven. For a graphic sketch of the Life and Times of our author, the reader is referred to an article in the Ed. Rev., 1839, from the pen of Sir James Stephen; or to the brief but interesting Biography which accompanies the edition of Dr. Bacon.

† See Preface to the "Dying Thoughts." Works, XVIII.

‡ Orme's Life of Baxter, p. 713.

were dead.* The survivor of a past generation, he stood exposed to the blast, like the lonely pine that has outlived the forest which once murmured around it. He had beheld the downfall and the restoration of a dynasty. From the stormy periods of revolution he had come forth with an unspotted character. His energetic will had not yielded to temptation. With an intrepid and pious spirit he had borne heavy reverses of fortune. He had seen the great party, of which he was a resolute leader, rise until it gained the supremacy; and he had followed its sinking fortunes when it was beaten down amidst the jeers and blows of its enemies. One after another of his clerical brethren died in Newgate; and in recording the event he calmly says, "The prison, where so many are, suffocated the spirits of aged ministers; but blessed be God, that gave them so long time to preach before, at cheaper rates."† He was now hunted by the police for the crime of teaching the Gospel, his property seized, his person imprisoned and then released, only to become the victim of new persecutions. Then occurred that scene, so disgraceful to English history, when the most venerable divine in the kingdom, burdened with years and bodily maladies, was brought to the court of King's Bench and abused by the Chief Justice in language unfit to be spoken to a common thief. The demeanour of Baxter on this trying occasion did not misbecome the man who, in his youth, had fearlessly joined in the resistance to royal tyranny; who had braved the Protector when his name was a terror, and had refused the mitre of Hereford at the hand of a king. To the vituperation of Jeffries, he replied with meek dignity, "I am not concerned to answer such stuff; but am ready to produce my writings for the confutation of all this; and my life and conversation are known to many in this nation." Twenty centuries before, a moral teacher who had reached the same advanced age, was arraigned on charges equally frivolous, before an Athenian tribunal; but the heathen judges listened to the defence of

* Hale died in 1676. Baxter looked upon his intimacy with this blameless judge, as one of the most pleasant incidents of his life. "The conference," he says, "which I had frequently with him (mostly about the immortality of the soul, and other foundation points, and philosophical) was so edifying, that his very questions and objections did help me to more light than other men's solutions."—*Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, P. III. p. 46.

So great was Hale's regard for Baxter, that the Chief Justice wept with grief on hearing of his arrest. "While caressed by Wilkins, Barrow, Tillotson and Stillingfleet, the great ornaments of the Establishment, Hale kept up, as long as he could, his intimacy with the venerable leader of the Nonconformists, and, if the law had permitted, would have delighted to reap the benefit of his ministrations."—*Campbell's Chief Justices*, Vol. I. p. 569. While Baxter compliments the writings of Hale, it is amusing to hear him complain of the Judge's prolixity.

† *Orme's Life*, p. 354.

Socrates. When Baxter attempted, in a Christian age and in an English court, to plead his cause, he was roughly silenced.

During these years of tumult and persecution, Baxter's pen was by no means idle. While he continued to live, he could not cease to write. A harmless, if not very meritorious work, the "*Paraphrase on the New Testament*," was the cause of his arraignment on the charge of sedition. Several publications attest his unabated zeal for the doctrine of "*Free Grace*." But one of his most interesting productions during this period, is his treatise on *Knowledge and Love*.^{*} He had found at last, as he supposed, the secret source of the contentions and divisions among Christians. They grow out of a proud understanding, or out of "*falsely pretended knowledge*." And his object, in the first Part of the treatise, is to show the uncertain grounds of many of the dogmas which are confidently held, as well as to indicate the true principles of knowledge. In the second Part, he endeavours to prove that the ultimate end of all intellectual attainments is to implant and cultivate holy love. In the midst of his earnest argument for the wisdom of piety, he is careful to affirm that no knowledge is contemptible.

"I would put no limits to a Christian's desires and endeavours to know, but that he desire only to know useful and revealed things. Every degree of knowledge tendeth to more: and every known truth befriendeth others; and, like fire, tendeth to the spreading of our knowledge to all neighbour truths that are intelligible. And the want of acquaintance with some one truth among an hundred, may hinder us from knowing rightly most of the rest; or may breed an hundred errors in us. As the absence of one wheel or particle in a watch, or the ignorance of it, may put all the rest into an useless disorder."[†]

It is delightful to witness the serene faith, so conspicuous in the last days of Baxter. He lived to see the bigoted James driven from the realm, and the Prince of *Orange* firmly seated on the throne. But he has left slight notices of *this revolution*. His mind appears to have been absorbed in the prospect of the heavenly world which he was soon to enter. Dark clouds had gathered over the dying day, but a light, beautiful to behold,

^{*} "*A Treatise on Knowledge and Love Compared*," &c., &c. "By Richard Baxter, who by God's blessing on long and hard studies, hath learned to know that he knoweth but little, and to suspend his judgment of uncertainties, and to take great, necessary, certain, things, for the food of his faith and comforts, and the measure of his church communion,"—*Works*, XV.

[†] *Works*, XV. p. 205.

streamed through them. Indeed, the cheerful composure of Baxter through all the vicissitudes of his troublous career, is a phenomenon which they who distrust the power of the religion of Christ will find it hard to explain. There is an eloquence in the prophetic words which preface the "Dying Thoughts." It is an eloquence, founded only on the luminous lessons of Apostles, and of Him who is the Resurrection and the Life!

"A better and glorious world is before me, into which I hope by death to be translated, whither all these three sorts of love should wrap up the desires of my ascending soul; even the love of myself, that I may be fully happy; the love of the triumphant church, Christ, angels, and glorified men, and the glory of all the universe, which I shall see; and above all, the love of the most glorious God, infinite life and light and love, the ultimate, amiable object of man's love; in whom to be perfectly pleased and delighted, and to whom to be perfectly pleasing for ever, is the chief and ultimate end of me, and of the highest, wisest, and best of creatures."*

We have considered the spirit and the opinions of Baxter. What, it may be asked, is the secret of his commanding influence? Why is he still honoured in his usefulness, while a thousand more cautious, more correct, possibly more wise divines are forgotten for ever? It is the power of an independent thinker whose soul is unawed by the frowns of men. The very style of his utterance, so fearless and animated, betokens the vigour of his mind. Such writers originate thoughts which are instinct with vital energy. It is the power of a persevering will that in the face of obloquy presses onward with unshaken resolution. A gifted mind, it has been well said, is able, simply "by a steady and rapid movement, to impart movement to others."† It is the power of an honest man who shrinks from deceit and scorns a mean action. As he may err in judgment, so he may blunder in his conduct; but all men know that he never will be guilty of an unworthy artifice. It is the power of a holy life to disarm hostility and to embolden the timid and wavering and to attract the homage which men are constrained to pay to a virtue that is above their own. A man, like Baxter, lives on, and his influence will extend afar, in ever widening circles, when he has long slumbered in his grave. To such is justly awarded the meed of greatness. For surely none have a better title to the epithet great, than they whose character

* Works, XVIII. p. 243.

† Isaac Taylor. "Loyola and Jesuitism," p. 103.

and words, through the Divine favour, have been potent instruments for the salvation of many souls. This we say, mindful of the severe standard of Milton: "He alone is worthy of the appellation, who either does great things, or teaches how they may be done, or describes them with a suitable majesty when they have been done: but those only are great things which tend to render life more happy, which increase the innocent enjoyments and comforts of existence, or which pave the way to a state of future bliss, more permanent and more pure."*

ART. V.—OBSERVATIONS ON MATTHEW XXIV. 29—31,
AND THE PARALLEL PASSAGES IN MARK
AND LUKE, WITH REMARKS ON THE DOUBLE
SENSE OF SCRIPTURE.

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THE *literal* meaning, it is said, must be given to our Saviour's words in this passage, because the metaphorical meaning usually assigned to them would be insignificant and degrading. Let us proceed to some inquiries necessary to a right understanding of the subject to which they appertain.

(1) V. 29 (of Matt. xxiv.) says, that "*the sun shall be darkened*;" the true meaning of which is, that it will be *eclipsed*; for plainly and certainly, the expression is borrowed from an eclipse. This indeed is a thing that may happen *literally*. But is eclipse all that takes place at the day of judgment? Peter tells us (2 Pet. iii. 10), that "*the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat*," when "*the day of the Lord shall come*." But there is nothing of all this in the eclipse before us. Such a fact may indeed be literally true; but taking it in this literal sense, it indicates nothing peculiar to the judgment-day. Eclipses take place every year, but the judgment-day does not occur quite so often. There is then no meaning here, at least, which is "infinitely superior to anything which could be comprised in a description of the fall of Jerusalem."

(2) "*The moon shall not give her light*."—The same thing as before, only it is invested with different costume. *The moon shall be eclipsed*, is the extent of the meaning. But as this, like the preceding event, is merely an ordinary occurrence, nothing can be made out of it which is exclusively appropriate to the general judgment.

* Milton's Prose Works, Philad. edit. Vol. II. p. 495.

(3) "*The stars shall fall from heaven.*"—A serious difficulty there is here for the *literal* interpreter. Well do we know, indeed, that the ancient world regarded meteors as falling stars, or fragments of shattered stars; and therefore (as in our text) such meteors are called ἀστέρες, *stars*. If now we assume here such a meaning of these words as was commonly given to them by the ancients, when they attributed a literal sense to them, viz. that the fixed stars will fall on the earth, being loosened from their orbits; or (to express the idea in the words of Peter), that "the heavens shall pass away;" then comes the difficulty at which I have hinted above. The *falling*, beyond all question, is *falling to the earth*. How many millions of millions of suns now, i. e. of fixed stars, can fall and lodge together on the surface of our little earth? One of them would in its fall crush our world to atoms. Such being the case, how are the wicked to survive this crash, who will *afterwards* wail the coming of the Son of man? for it is *after* the stars have fallen that this wailing takes place, as v. 30 assures us. How many, moreover, of the *elect* will then remain *alive*, to be "summoned from the four winds, and from one extremity of the heavens to the other?" Wailing or rejoicing on this earth, after all the stars of heaven have literally fallen upon it, is a matter rather too dubious for even a *double-sense* to clear up. In simple words, a *literal* sense is plainly a downright absurdity.

(4) "*The powers of the heavens shall be shaken.*"—Every reader of Hebrew knows, of course, the meaning of the often repeated צְבָאֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם, i. e. *host of heaven*. For the most part, it designates the *stars*; but sometimes it means the *angels* who were supposed by the Hebrews to be guardian Genii of the stars. In Isa. xxxiv. 4, occurs the expression in Hebrew before us; which the Septuagint, as elsewhere, translates by αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν οὐρανῶν. This clause—"the powers of the heavens shall be shaken"—follows No. 3 above, and apparently assigns the ground or reason of the falling of the stars. There is a concussion among the heavenly bodies; and so great is it, that they fall out of the firmament down to the earth. All this is borrowed from the philosophizing or *astronomizing* of the Hebrews, in respect to the visible heavens. The firmament (רָקִיעַ) was in their view an

expanse in which the stars moved, and by which their course was rendered steady and invariable, Gen. i. 6 seq. In the passage before us, a mighty concussion is spoken of, which loosens the stars in their socketings, and they fall—of course to the earth; here was Hebrew astronomy, and such the language derived from it and built upon it. What then is the *literal* application of all this, in the case under consideration?

Thus far, then, we have in reality only the eclipse of the sun and moon, and in point of fact (making all due allowance for Hebrew modes of thinking and expression), only a shower of meteors with great concussion or agitation. Now none of these events are in themselves specially characteristic of the "great and terrible day of the Lord." They are things which happen every year; at least, excepting perhaps the great concussion, they do happen every year in the ordinary course of nature. And even *concussion*, during a shower of meteors, is an event by no means unfrequent, but altogether common. Still, I do not apprehend that the speaker, in the passage before us, designs to refer to such events, as taking place in the *ordinary* course of things. The object of his discourse clearly indicates, that he places them under the category of things to be regarded as *extraordinary* here, i. e. out of the due and usual course of things. It is on this ground that they are regarded as indicative of impending terrible calamities.

Verse 29, then, literally describes, as we have just seen, great changes and overturns in the world of nature, i. e. its language or costume is borrowed from such supposed changes, or it has these for a literal basis. Whether all this, however, is to be figuratively or metaphorically taken, is a question to which we shall come again in the sequel. Enough for the present, that the *literal* sense has been shown to be in two cases irrelevant as peculiar or appropriate to the last judgment-day, and the third case to be, *literally* considered, an absolute impossibility.

We pass on to verse 30, still in pursuit of the *literal* sense. (5) "*Then shall appear the sign (τὸ σημεῖον) of the Son of man in heaven.*"—Which heaven? For the word has two senses in the Bible; the one *heaven proper*, as we usually employ the word; the other, the atmosphere, or the apparent welkin. It is difficult to say which is the primary or secondary sense of the original Hebrew word מַעְלָה ; but probably, it is that of the

elevated and apparently arched firmament of the sky as seen by us. It is then in this that the *sign* of the Son of man is to appear; for in the superior heaven, i. e. the one above the firmament, he would be invisible. But what is *sign*? Many interpreters say, that it means the changes in the heavens which are described in the preceding verses. But this is out of question; for this phenomenon *follows* those catastrophes—*τότε φανήσεται, κ. τ. λ.* Others say, that *sign* means the destruction of Jerusalem, as before described. But the sign is in *heaven*, not on earth. Others suppose it to indicate the meteoric phenomena mentioned by Josephus.* I will not venture

* Jewish War, VI. 5.

to assume with any great positiveness, that these things corresponded altogether with the σημεῖον before us ; but if they be credible (Josephus most solemnly vouches for them, and appeals to eye-witnesses), then this corresponds well with the nature of the σημεῖον, which was to precede the destruction of Jerusalem. The objection of De Wette, viz. that 'the meteoric phenomena are already disposed of in the preceding verse,' will not apply to the present case. There the sun, moon and stars are treated of; but here are phenomena of a different kind. It seems to me, that those who believe that the verses before us relate to the destruction of Jerusalem, may find in these phenomena a sufficient indication, that the Son of man was indeed coming, to punish a hypocritical and ungodly people. If several of the things mentioned by Josephus may be accounted for on natural grounds, yet the preternatural brightness and long continuance of the so-called star and comet, as also of the illumination in the temple, and the voice from the most holy place, if real facts, cannot be solved by any aid of philosophy. Considering the nature of the occasion, it would not seem incredible that some extraordinary indications should be made of the great events about to take place. But every one must decide for himself, whether he will admit or reject the account of Josephus. But, it is time to resume our exegesis.

Many of the Christian fathers maintain that *sign* here means the *cross*, e. g. such as is said to have appeared to Constantine. Some recent critics declare for the star predicted by Balaam, as related in Num. xxiv. 17, and which appeared to the wise men of the East at the birth of Christ. But how could the generation living seventy years after this, viz. at the time when Jerusalem was destroyed, be said to see this star? Besides, this was no token of *judgment*, but of *mercy*. Finally, some critics represent the *sign of the Son of man* as being merely a periphrasis, designating the Son of man himself. But to such a periphrasis the Bible is elsewhere a stranger; and what is still more, the Son of man himself is said to appear *afterwards* (τότε), i. e. in the midst of the weeping of the tribes occasioned by the σημεῖον. All these explications are quite inapposite and unsatisfactory.

I imagine that this phraseology (peculiar to Matthew alone) is best explained by a reference to Matt. xxiv. 3, where the disciples are said to have asked Jesus, Τί τὸ σημεῖον τῆς σῆς παρουσίας, i. e. What is the *sign* of thy coming? They doubtless expected a sign, i. e. a symbol, an admonitory token or pledge, of some extraordinary nature, which was to be the forerunner of his appearance. But we can only conjecture what this was to be; for the Evangelist has not told us, nor did the

disciples designate any particular sign. Not improbably, therefore, it was some *Shekinah*, i. e. some supernatural brightness or splendour, such as the Old Testament everywhere ascribes to the appearance of the Godhead, or of his commissioned *presence-angel*. Or if not this alone, then it might be this in connection with clouds and thunder and lightning, as on mount Sinai. The Son of man is coming to punish, and therefore the premonitory token of his approach must be such an one as to inspire terror. We may then, as I have already said, consider it as by no means improbable, that *sign* in this case means, in its primary sense, some *preternatural brightness* like what Ezekiel saw, or something like the thick dark clouds, ominous of lightning and tempest and hail, such as are presented to our view in Ps. xviii. 11—14. The imagery (for such no doubt it is) is selected from some phenomena of this nature, and is indicative throughout of punitive justice. The sequel will help to confirm this. Possibly the suggestion of Elsner may be admitted. He supposes, that the prodigies which appeared before the destruction of Jerusalem, according to the account of Josephus, may have been the *σημεῖον* which was to appear. The Jewish historian relates what he declares to be vouched for by eye-witnesses then living, and relates it as worthy of entire credit. He says, that just before the destruction of Jerusalem, "a star appeared over the city like to a sword; also a comet continued to be seen for a whole year; and at the feast of unleavened bread, on the eighth of April, at nine of the clock at night, a light so bright shone around the altar and the temple, that it seemed to be splendid day; and this light continued until midnight. . . . Before the setting of the sun, chariots appeared in the air around the whole region, and armed bands floated in the clouds and surrounded the city. On the festal day of Pentecost, the priests, having entered the inner temple by night for the performance of their services, perceived a moving of the place, and then a sudden cry of *Let us depart hence!* What was more horrible still, a certain Jesus, son of Ananus, a rustic, four years before the war, while the city was quiet and flourishing, coming to the feast, began of a sudden, in the midst of the services, to exclaim, A voice from the east, a voice from the west, a voice from the four winds—against Jerusalem and the temple, against the bridegroom and the bride, against this whole people!" Josephus then relates, how this same individual continued, in spite of severe stripes and imprisonment, to cry out continually, Woe! woe to Jerusalem! through seven years and five months. At last, mounting the walls and crying out in like manner, he finally added,

Woe to myself! when a stone from a Roman catapult struck and killed him. De Bell Jud. VII. c. 11. ed. Francov.

(6) "*Then shall all the tribes of the land weep*" (κόψονται, *shall beat themselves*, i. e. strike upon their breasts or heads, through grief).—A strong expression of terror and dreadful apprehension. But who are they that exhibit these tokens of dread? *The tribes* (φυλαί), viz. of Israel; for so the word nearly always means, unless other words in the context necessarily open wide the sense of it into *nation* or *people*. Of course if the *Jewish tribes* are meant here (as I cannot doubt they are), then τῆς γῆς must be limited, as it is times almost without number, in both Testaments, to the land of Palestine. Besides, the *appearance* first of the *sign* of the Son of man, and then of the *Son of man himself*, shows that the phenomena have a *locality* attached to them. If so, i. e. if they were *local* phenomena, then how could all the tribes of the earth (τῆς γῆς in the widest sense) see these phenomena, and bewail themselves because of them? The *literal* sense therefore, in the present case, would be an impossible sense, in its present connection.

(7) The premonitory sign has thrown all the inhabitants of the land into consternation: how much more so, when in the sequel they see "*the Son of man coming on the clouds of heaven, with a host and much glory*."—Matthew says, *On the clouds*, ἐπὶ τῶν νεφελῶν; Mark says, ἐν νεφέλαις, *in clouds*; Luke, ἐν νεφέλῃ, lit. *in a cloud*. There is no difference between them, however, even of the least importance. Like Jehovah (Ps. xviii. 11. Isa. xix. 1), the Son of man rides on a cloud, and is surrounded by it. He comes accompanied by a δύναμις of attendants, i. e. with a *powerful host* of angels. That δύναμις is often employed in this sense, is quite plain. That such an attendance is a familiar idea in the Gospels, may be seen in v. 31, τοὺς ἀγγέλους αὐτοῦ, also in Matt. xiii. 41. xvi. 27. xxv. 31.—*Much glory* means great splendour, such as we may well suppose would belong to the great Leader and his accompanying forces or angels, on such an occasion.

Having now come to the close of v. 30, let us stop for a moment in order to make a few inquiries. How, after the *literal* shaking out and falling of the stars, by which this world would be crushed to atoms and ground finer than powder—how comes it that there are tribes still left to wail? How, that there are any left to see the approaching Son of man? Questions that need no answer; and which cannot receive one which favours the *literal* scheme. All, all has and must have a modified, and, in regard to some particulars, a *tropical*, sense, or else it has no sense. We advance to v. 31.

(8) "*He shall send his angels with the loud sound of a trumpet.*" —The angels are always at his bidding, "swift to do his will." But the *trumpet*?—A literal one? And the *time*?—Is it at the general judgment? Then how can the *literal* sound of a trumpet reach the ears of the unnumbered dead, who have slept in dust for thousands of years? The bare idea, if literally taken, is of course a manifest absurdity.

(9) "*And they shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from the extremities of the heavens unto their extremities.*" —From the four winds means, from every direction. Four points constituted the whole *compass* of the Hebrews. But what, *literally*, are "the extremities of the heavens?" Do the elect live there, so as to be summoned from those places? or have they died, and then been buried there? The *extremities of the heavens*, if literally taken, would be we hardly know where. The *fixed stars* are a part of the Hebrew heavens; and can our text mean from their extremities? Surely not. The phrase merely means, from one extremity of the earth to the opposite one, wherever the elect may be found; at least it means so, in case a *universal* gathering is meant here. I suppose Mark has explained it by saying, "From the extremity of the land, to the extremity of heaven." But is this *gathering together* to be interpreted as *literal*? Or does it mean, the affording to them an asylum or place of refuge from the evils which would overtake the wicked, like the promise that the Messiah should "*gather* the lambs in his arms, and carry them in his bosom?" Isa. xl. 11. If a literal gathering is intended, one which is for the general judgment, then must a *resurrection* first take place. But not a word of this in our text or context. Besides, the gathering for the general judgment, according to Matt. xxv. 31, will be of *all nations*, i. e. of all both good and bad. So in John v. 28, 29; Rev. xx. 12, which make this certain. Both are to be judged. Yet not a word about the wicked in the present case, nor of any separation of the righteous from the wicked. For what purpose then are the righteous, i. e. the *elect*, assembled? The Evangelist expressly designates none, but leaves the purpose to be deduced from the context. But where, in the context, is there intimation made of a general judgment, or even of the end of the natural world? I can find none. And would the account of such a matter be thus left, with less than half of it told, if it is really begun in vs. 29—31, and these have respect to the final judgment?

The result then of an examination of the *literal* sense here, with respect to a general judgment, presents us with not only the greatest improbabilities, but with downright and numerous *impossibilities*. If the language applies at all to a general judg-

ment, it must be in the way of *trope* or *metaphor*. It is plainly possible, in this way, to give the passage such an interpretation as to make it, so far as the figurative expressions merely are concerned, consistent with the preparatory events of the general judgment, or the preparatory measures for entering upon it. But is there anything in all this description, which may not apply to *civil, political and natural changes and commotions*? This is the next great and very important question. I apprehend it may be satisfactorily answered; and I now proceed to undertake the task.

It has been alleged, that the language in Matthew is such, that it can never be reconciled with the idea, that the destruction of Jerusalem is principally or solely the object to which it refers.

But what, now, if we repeatedly find the same language employed elsewhere in the Bible, in reference to great changes and catastrophes of a civil and social nature? What, if it is applied merely to the devastations of locusts, as well as to the destruction of cities and nations? If such be the case, then the whole assumption that the language in the prophecy before us is infinitely too bold and strong to indicate any terrestrial occurrences, is nothing more than assumption. *Facts*, in the usage of the sacred writers, disprove this assumption and the assertion implied in it.

Let us look at them. Isa. xiii. and xiv. obviously and confessedly have respect to the invasion and destruction of Babylon. In describing this "day of the Lord" (a phrase always indicating punishment, condemnation, and the like), the prophet says, "Behold, the day of the Lord cometh, cruel both with wrath and fierce anger, to lay the land desolate: and he shall destroy the sinners thereof out of it. For the stars of heaven and the constellations thereof shall not give their light: the sun shall be darkened in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine." Isa. xiii. 9, 10. Here v. 10 contains the very same imagery which is employed in Matt. xxiv. 29. The mode of expression in Isaiah, respecting the stars and constellations, is somewhat different from that in Matthew, but the fundamental idea is the same, viz. the extinction of light. In regard to the sun and moon, the passages in both are nearly identical. All this, be it remembered, as introductory merely to the capture and destruction of Babylon; an event of less significance to a Hebrew, than the destruction of Jerusalem.

In Isa. xxiv. the desolation and destruction of Jerusalem are predicted. In vs. 19, 20, 23, we find the following declarations: "The earth is utterly broken down, the earth is clean dissolved, the earth is moved exceedingly. The earth shall reel

to and fro like a drunkard, it shall be removed like a cottage. . . . Then the sun and moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign in Mount Zion," &c. Here are events which, if literally understood, are no less astonishing than those described in Matt. xxiv. 29. 'The earth is *dissolved*—it is *removed* like a cottage. The sun and moon are ashamed;' implying that they will hide their faces, or suffer eclipse, as in Matthew. All this too, with reference to the ancient desolation of Jerusalem by the King of Babylon.

In Ezek. xxxii. is a description of the fall of Egypt. Vs. 7, 8, speak as follows: "When I shall put thee out, I will cover the heaven, and make the stars thereof dark; I will cover the sun with a cloud, and the moon shall not give her light. All the bright lights of heaven will I make dark over thee, and set darkness on thy land." This, be it noted, has respect only to the invasion of Egypt by Nebuchadnezzar.

In Joel ii. 30, 31, it is said, "I will show wonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood and fire and pillars of smoke. The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before the great and terrible day of the Lord come." In Acts ii. 16—20, Peter is represented as quoting this passage with some of its preceding context, and applying the whole to the occurrences then taking place, and about to take place, in Palestine, viz. the miraculous effusion of the Spirit, and the great changes of things in Palestine, which were soon to follow. In other words, we have again, in the verse just quoted, another declaration of the judgments of God on Jerusalem. The language did not seem inapposite to the apostle, as having respect to terrestrial occurrences; why then should we decline to apply it in the same way?

In Joel iii. judgments are announced against the heathen, who at some future day would come up against Jerusalem. Their excision is described as being accompanied by some wonderful phenomena. V. 14 says: "The sun and moon shall be darkened, and the stars shall withhold their shining." The specific destruction here aimed at is not pointed out in a definite way; but that the whole is a *terrestrial* matter, is quite plain from the context.

Again, in Joel ii. is a vivid description of wasting and desolation by locusts. When these come to devour, the prophet says (v. 10), that "the earth shall quake before them; the heavens shall tremble; the sun and moon shall be dark; and the stars shall withdraw their shining." Here then, merely in regard to the ravages of locusts, are the very same images presented in Matt. xxiv. 29. If the fall of Jerusalem is an event so infinitely

below the meaning of Matt. xxiv. 29, what shall be said of merely a famine and ravages occasioned by locusts? Are they more dignified, more lamentably significant? This will hardly be said. Consequently, even great natural evils, and merely such, may have such language applied to them, and it is applied to them by the prophets. If so, then surely it may be applied to the final destruction of Jerusalem and its temple.

Other passages of like tenour might be cited. Speaking of the sore chastisement of Israel, Amos says, "I [the Lord God] will cause the sun to go down at noon, and I will darken the earth in a clear day." The like imagery is found in many other places. All this goes now to illustrate and establish the principle, that the Hebrews regarded changes in the celestial physical world, as accompanying and indicative of great changes in the natural or political one. Eclipses inspired them with dread and horror; meteors were still more the objects of fear, as coming nearer to them. Hence these things became a common fund of imagery for vivid, and specially for poetic, description of what was dreadful. Different writers drew from the same fund, and applied what they drew to different catastrophes and overturns. Now Babylon, then Egypt, then the rebellious Jews, and anon the devastations of the locusts, and the like, are all objects to which the same or the like language is applied. When poetically or figuratively employed, the amount of such descriptions is substantially this, viz. that what such changes in the heavenly bodies would be to the luminaries of the sky, the impending changes and catastrophes, political and natural, will be to the objects respectively concerned with those changes. Or, to express the idea in a different way, changes as great and fatal to this city or that, to this nation or that, are taking place, or are about to take place, as would be brought about among the heavenly luminaries by the concussions and eclipses which are brought to view.

It is easy now to see how such a generic source of imagery is applicable to a great variety of catastrophes. But these must all have respect to *important* objects. In other words, the changes must be of great magnitude and of serious consequence. Otherwise the application of such language would savour of the swelling or bombastic in style. And so we always find the language in question applied. The destruction of capital cities, the wasting of nations, or the terrible famine and pestilence which follow in the train of ravages by a boundless host of locusts, are such events as are connected with the use of the descriptive language in question.

Thus far then it is clear as the light, that such imagery as we have in Matt. xxiv. 29, may be and is actually applied to events

and occurrences like that of the destruction of Jerusalem. In most cases where it is employed, the subject-matter is even less grave and important than the final desolation of the holy city. Thus far, then, there seems not to be any ground for the conclusion, that the imagery is infinitely above the supposed subject-matter of it, viz. the destruction of Jerusalem. Indeed, there can be no room for doubt, at all events, that the imagery in Matt. xxiv. 29 is employed in the same way as in the Hebrew prophets, and for the same purpose. The whole thing lies before us. It is little more, as it is presented by Matthew, than a transcript of the like Old Testament descriptions.

Let us now advance to the next verse, v. 30. Here a new turn is given to the description, and a new personage introduced, of whom the Old Testament speaks seldom, and indeed contains little or nothing, in regard to the particulars of his appearance to punish his enemies. Often does it speak of him, indeed, as a rewarder, a vindicator of his people, and an avenger in respect to the enemies of the church. But the *modus* of being or doing all this, is not a subject of Old Testament instruction or declaration. Of course, a good part of v. 30 stands on its own particular basis, without special analogies in the ancient Scriptures. Still, we have already seen, that a literal exegesis of this would involve some great absurdities and impossibilities. Some *matter of fact*, some *substance*, lies of course at the bottom of the expressions; for there can be no significant imagery, where there is nothing substantial or real to which it applies. But *costume* does not constitute *person*. There may be a variety of the first, where the last remains the same.

There is not, indeed, in v. 30, much which might not be supposed literally to take place, were it not that the preceding context, if in like manner literally construed, leaves no room, for example, for the existence at that time of any tribes in the land who shall mourn. The whole earth has already been crushed to atoms. The *sign* of the coming of the son of man might be a visible one (for aught we know it was so); but it could not be seen by all the world in its *locality*; and this locality is a necessary incident of it, if it is visible to the eye. It must be limited to comparatively narrow bounds. The *sign* (whatever it may be) is a reality; the weeping is a reality; but the local visibility in the one case, and therefore the extent of the weeping in the other, do neither of them comport with the occurrences of the general judgment.

Next, the Son of man is seen, *coming in the clouds of heaven*. This is specially relied on as altogether inapplicable

to the destruction of Jerusalem. We are told that 'no such event took place; and that therefore the Saviour could not have designed to apply it to anything but his final coming.' Yet the cogency of this meaning must depend entirely on the fact, whether Christ meant to be *literally* or *figuratively* understood.

The Bible elsewhere speaks in the like way, without leaving us any room to suppose that the *coming* in this manner was a visible one. The language of the Bible respecting the *coming* of God or of Christ is sufficiently frequent and intelligible to enable us rightly to understand it. In Scripture language, God *comes*, whenever he proceeds to do or execute any purpose of his will in respect to men. When Babel was built, "the Lord *came down* to see the city and the tower," Gen. xi. 5. Again, he said, "Let us *go down* and confound their language," v. 7. When Sodom and Gomorrah had provoked his righteous anger, he said, "I will *go down* now, and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it," Gen xviii. 21. When Israel was oppressed by the Egyptians, God said to Moses, "I am *come down* to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians," Ex. iii. 8. The Lord said to Moses, respecting the Egyptians, "About midnight *will I go out* into the midst of Egypt, and all the first-born shall die," Ex. xi. 5. The Lord *came down* upon mount Sinai, Ex. xix. 18, 20. Again, in writing the Law a second time, "he *came down*" on the same mountain, Ex. xxiv. 5. When Miriam and Aaron murmured against Moses, "the Lord *came down* in the pillar of a cloud," Num. xii. 5. In Num. xxii. 9 it is said, "And God *came* to Balaam and said." So "the Lord *came* from Sinai," Deut. xxxiii. 2. Again: "Lord, when thou *wentest out* from Seir, when thou *didst march out* of the field of Edom," Judg. v. 4. So Hab. iii. 3, "God *came* from Teman." Ps. lxviii. 7, "O God! when thou *wentest forth* before thy people, when thou *didst march* through the wilderness." Is. lxiv. 1, 3, "Oh that thou wouldest rend the heavens, that thou wouldest *come down*! . . . Thou didst *come down*."

These are only a few of the abounding specimens of the like mode of expression in the Old Testament. But they are enough. In a few cases, and only a few, there is some visibility of the *σημεῖα* or *tokens* of God's coming; e. g. cases like the development on mount Sinai, where all Israel saw the clouds and the lightning, and heard the thunder. But inasmuch as God is a *spirit*, and by his very nature is himself invisible to mortal eyes, it is contrary to all sound principles of exegesis to interpret the examples or declarations of his coming

in general, as having respect to *ὁρατά*, i. e. to *things* visible to the natural eye, unless the context obliges us to believe that the *σημεῖα* of his presence were visible. What said he to Moses, when the latter requested that he would show him his glory? He said, "Thou canst not see my face, for there shall no man see me and live," Ex. xxxiii. 20. Paul calls him "the King *invisible*," 1 Tim. i. 17. He says of him, "Whom no man hath seen, or can see and live," 1 Tim. vi. 16. John says, "No man hath seen God," 1 John iv. 12, 20. Of course, all those passages which speak of him as *seen*, are not to be *literally* interpreted; but they refer either to some symbol by which God manifested himself, or to a mental apperception of his presence. Even so when God is said *to come*. When men accomplish anything by their own efforts, they must first approach the object of action, and be present so that they may act; for they cannot act where they are not. The like now is said, in an anthropopathic way of God himself. He is spoken of *more humano*. But we are never to suppose an actual and *visible* coming, except by symbols. God is always and everywhere present, and cannot *come* or *go*, in the literal sense. Of course, we are not at liberty to give such passages a *literal* interpretation.

Enough for the Old Testament usage; let us now come to the New. Further inquiries respecting the *coming* in general of the divine Being are unnecessary. The only question now is, whether there be any other than a *visible coming* of Christ spoken of in the New Testament. If there be plain and indubitable cases of such a nature (and it seems plain that there are), then it does by no means become a matter of necessity, that the *coming* of Christ in Matt. xxiv. 30, should be interpreted in its literal sense, and thus be referred to the general judgment.

Christ said to his disciples, "If I go and prepare a place for you, I will *come again*, and receive you to myself," John xiv. 3. Did he come then in *propria persona* and visibly, when each of his disciples died, and take them to himself in this way? Again: "I will not leave you comfortless; I will *come* to you," v. 18. In v. 23 is a still stronger expression: "If any man love me, he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and we will *come* to him, and make our *abode* with him." And was this a literal, bodily, visible coming? Again: "If any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will *come in* to him, and will sup with him," Rev. iii. 20. And is this literal? In John xxi. 22 is a very significant passage: "And Jesus said, If I will that he tarry until I *come*, what is that to thee? John's fellow-disciples spread abroad a report from this, that the Saviour had said to him, that he should not die. But John himself remarks,

that "Jesus did not say, 'He shall not die,' but, 'If I will that he tarry till *I come*, what is that to thee?'" v. 23. In other words, John understood Jesus, not as promising exemption from death, but only that he should live until his *coming*. And when, now, was that to be? If his coming meant the general judgment, then John would not have to die at all; for saints then alive were not to die, but to be immediately "caught up to meet the Lord in the air," doubtless with an appropriate metamorphosis. The *coming* in question, then, *after* which John was to die, and not before, must have been some coming during that generation. And what else could it be referred to, except to his coming to punish the unbelieving Jews?

In Matt. xvi. 28 is an instructive passage: "Verily I say unto you, there be some standing here, who shall not taste of death, till they see the son of man coming in his kingdom." Mark says, in the parallel passage (ix. 1), "Till they see the kingdom of God come with power;" and Luke says, "Till they see the kingdom of God," ix. 27. The *coming of the Son of man* in Matthew is not therefore a *visible* coming, but a coming through the power and efficacy of gospel-truth. At the close of the parable of the ten virgins (Matt. xxv. 13), Christ says to his disciples, "Watch, therefore, for ye know neither the day nor the hour wherein the son of man *cometh*." If now this exhortation was addressed to the disciples as having respect to practical duty, and was uttered for the reason assigned, then it follows, that the *coming* of Christ here must be some other coming than the final one to general judgment. If not, then Christ, as it would seem, was himself mistaken, and also led his disciples into error. How could he speak of their living on the watch and in constant expectation of his coming, when that coming was to take place some thousand of years at least, and perhaps thousand of ages, after they were all dead? There is no other alternative here. Either the Saviour was mistaken, and led his disciples into error, or else the *coming* in question was different from the final one. A pious fraud, for the sake of making his disciples watchful, is inadmissible, and utterly incompatible with the character of him "who knew no guile." I understand this passage, therefore, as I do the declaration of Christ to his apostles (John xiv. 3), that "he is going away to prepare a place for them, but will *come again*, and receive them unto himself." He *comes* to each of his disciples, when he removes them to another world and to another service in his heavenly presence.

In the very chapter before us, in the first portion of it, which nearly all interpreters refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, it is

said, "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world, for a witness unto all nations; and *then shall the end come*," v. 14. Yet the Apocalypse teaches us, that after the spread of the Gospel among all nations, a thousand years at least are to follow, before the general judgment comes. The literal *end of the world*, then, that is, of the earth in general, is not the subject of mention or allusion here; for the end here mentioned is one which is speedily to follow the general diffusion of the Gospel among the gentiles. This took place before the destruction of the Jewish capital and commonwealth. Paul says, that the messengers of Gospel-truth had caused "their sound to go forth into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world," Rom. x. 18. Again he says of the Gospel, that it is come to the Colossians, and "into all the world," Col. i. 5, 6; and again, that it was "preached to every creature under heaven," v. 23. There is no difficulty, therefore, in the expression in Matt. xxiv. 14, viz., "preached in all the world." This was done, in the sense intended by the sacred writers, before the *end* here spoken of came; and then, soon afterwards, this end did come. If it were different from the *end* which the disciples had in view, in their question (v. 3) about "the end of the world," it matters not. (It has not yet been duly shown that it is different.) They might, while as yet uninstructed on this point, have erroneous views about the matter; but we cannot ascribe such mistakes to the Saviour.

There are then *comings* of Christ spoken of in the New Testament, at the death of each believer; a coming in order to commune with each (*sup with him*, Rev. iii. 20); a coming at the destruction of Jerusalem, Matt. xxiv. 27. This last text, viz., "So shall the *coming* of the Son of man be," belongs to that part of the chapter which has respect to the destruction of Jerusalem; for it is conceded that the transition to a description of the judgment-day is made at v. 29. Here then, at all events, is a coming which is not visible and literal. And such is the case with every one of the passages already quoted. A personal visible coming cannot be supposed in any one of these cases; certainly not, if we give heed to the words of Peter in Acts iii. 21. He says, "Jesus Christ . . . *whom the heavens must receive until the times of the restitution of all things*," i. e. until "the new heavens and the new earth are created." Other passages might easily be adduced. But enough for our present purpose are already before us.

Plainly then there are *comings* of Christ which are not *visible* to the fleshly eye. This is quite certain. God is often spoken of, also, as coming, where there is no visible appearance, no literal coming. Therefore when Manoah said to his wife, "We

shall surely die because we have *seen* God" (Judg. xiii. 22); when Isaiah said, "Mine eyes have *seen* the King, the Lord of Hosts" (Is. vi. 5); when it is said that Moses and the seventy elders of Israel "*saw* the God of Israel" (Ex. xxiv. 9, 10); we cannot suppose that the *invisible* God himself was actually seen with the bodily eye, or in a literal sense. Some *symbol* of God might, perhaps, have been so seen, in these cases; but a strong mental apprehension of his immediate presence would be sufficient to warrant the expression of *seeing* him, according to Hebrew usage. Who does not know that *internal seeing* is everywhere spoken of in the Scriptures?

It is manifest, then, that we are under no necessity of regarding the *coming* of Christ as visible to the bodily eye; in other words, we are not at all warranted in the assertion, that these descriptions *must be* literally understood. His coming, and the seeing or perception of Him as coming, by witnessing the effects which followed the chastisements inflicted by him, may be asserted as in Matt. xxiv. 30, without any design to make the impression that it is literally and optically visible.

If this is so, then His *coming in the clouds visibly* cannot be proved from the passage before us. The question is, whether this costume, designed to convey an impression of His regal majesty and exaltation, is to be literally or figuratively understood. In the case of the theophany at Sinai, we are told (Ex. xix. 16), that "there were thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the mount." Here then there was, no doubt, a *visibility* of these objects, which was perceived by the natural eyes of the Israelitish camp. God had before said to Moses (v. 9), "Lo, I come unto thee in a thick cloud." So also, when Moses went a second time into the mount, "the Lord descended in a cloud, and stood with him there," Ex. xxxiv. 5. In this last case it seems quite probable that there was a visible cloud in the sight of the camp, and for the sake of the people. Not improbably it was the same in a similar case (Num. xi. 25), where it is said, "The Lord came down in a cloud." This was in order to speak to Moses and the seventy elders, in the presence of the people, and thus make a deep impression on them. In the case of murmuring by Aaron and Miriam against Moses, a like descent "in the pillar of a cloud" was made, in order to rebuke them, Num. xii. 5. But there are other cases where no *visible* cloud or coming was seen, and yet the like language is employed. Psalm xviii. 9—13 presents us with a signal instance of this nature. The introduction to this Psalm tells us, that it was composed in commemoration of the deliverance of David "from the hand of all his enemies, and from the hand of Saul." Here Jehovah is said to "bow the heavens and

come down; darkness is under his feet." Mounted on a chariot supported by cherubim, with "dark waters and thick clouds of the skies around him," he moved swiftly on, "thundering in the heavens, and shooting forth his lightnings." And yet, not anything of all this was *visible* or *palpable*, when David experienced deliverance. This is not even pretended. The literal meaning is out of all question. The whole is costume. There is indeed a *person* beneath, so to speak. The *fact*, which was palpable and certain, was the *deliverance* itself—the deliverance at times of great peril and extreme danger, which was brought about by special divine interposition and aid. No ordinary language in describing this would satisfy the feelings of David. Jehovah, his deliverer, is therefore pourtrayed in all the colours of awful majesty and might; and in an attitude adapted to inspire all minds with awe and terror. And if God himself could be thus described, on an occasion merely of David's victories through His aid, then why may not the Son of man, about to destroy Jerusalem, be pourtrayed in like manner? And all this, without any room for the conclusion, that the description must of necessity be literally understood?

So the Psalmist (xcvii. 2): "Clouds and darkness are round about Him," i. e. Jehovah. Not literally, I trust; for "God is light." Ezekiel, in trance or prophetic vision, saw "a whirlwind from the north, and a *great cloud*, and fire enfolding itself," Ezek. i. 4. Again, when he saw "the glory of the Lord . . . the temple was filled with a *cloud*," x. 4. All this was seen in a state of ecstasy, and therefore with the mental eye, and not with a bodily one. But in Is. xix. 1 is an example of such a description, that is altogether to our present purpose: "Behold the Lord *rideth on a swift cloud*, and shall *come* to Egypt." And is this to be literally interpreted? I trust not, by any considerate expositor. The Psalmist (civ. 3) has given us the generic source of such language: "Who maketh the *clouds* his chariot." Costume like this fills the mind with reverential awe. Clouds, thunder, lightning, and hail, are the uniform accompaniments of the Divine Majesty in the Scriptures, whenever He comes to punish. And since the Saviour has told us, that "the Son of man will come in the glory of His Father, with his angels" (Matt. xvi. 27), why should it be strange that His coming is represented in the same manner as that of God in the Old Testament?

Any one, who has not carefully attended to this subject, will be surprised to find how often the imagery of a *cloud* (dark or bright, as the case may be) is employed in the Scriptures. We will limit ourselves, for the present, merely to the New Testament. At the transfiguration of Christ, a bright cloud over-

shadowed him and his disciples; and from this the Father addressed him, Matt. xvii. 5. Jesus said to the adjuring high-priest, "Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man, sitting on the right hand of power, and *coming in the clouds of heaven*," Matt. xxvi. 64. Ye shall see—was then the high priest to live until the day of judgment, that he might see such a coming? If it is said that he might see this after he was raised from the dead, at the final day, and that all others in like manner might then see it, the reply at hand is, that the descent of Christ is always represented as *preceding* the resurrection of the dead, and not as following it. The objector to the view which I have suggested, therefore, is chargeable with a ὑστερον πρότερον in this case. The obvious meaning of Matt. xxvi. 64 is, that the high-priest and his coadjutors should personally witness the coming of Christ here spoken of. If so, what else can it be, than His coming with great power, in order to destroy Jerusalem and the Jewish commonwealth? When Christ ascended to heaven from Mount Olivet, "a cloud received Him out of the sight" of the disciples, Acts i. 9. Those who are alive at the day of judgment, "will be caught up in the clouds . . . to meet the Lord in the air." In Apoc. i. 7, Christ, it is said, "will come in the clouds, and every eye shall see Him, even they who pierced Him, and all the tribes of the land shall wail on account of Him,"—the very same description that is contained in our text, and referring to an event then near at hand, Rev. i. 3, 1; xxii. 10, 20.

In some of these cases there was doubtless a visible cloud; in others, not. But where it is not so, then does the costume or imagery of clouds adorn the picture, or make it awfully graphic, as the case may require. Beneath this costume, however, there is a *reality*; and what that is, must be judged of by the nature of the case.

Thus far, then, there is nothing to show that a literal sense *must* be put on Matt. xxiv. 30. There is clear and abundant evidence, moreover, that the language in question is often employed in a figurative and secondary sense. Consequently it may be so employed in Matt. xxiv. 30, in analogy with other like cases.

Nor does the adjunct μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης πολλῆς (*with a host and great splendour*) at all exempt the passage from a reference to the destruction of Jerusalem. "God came from Sinai with ten thousands of his holy ones," Deut. xxxiii. 2. "When the Almighty scattered kings" before David, . . . "the chariots of God were twenty thousand, even thousands of angels," Ps. lxxviii. 14, 17. Isaiah says (lxvi. 15), that "the Lord will come with fire, and with his chariots like a whirlwind," i. e. chariots filled by angels. When the king of Syria was

plotting against the life of Elisha, and some of his troops surrounded the city where the prophet was, he told his trembling and affrighted servant "not to fear, for they that were with them were more than they who were against them. . . . And the Lord opened the eyes of the young man, and he saw, and behold, the mountain was full of horses of fire and chariots of fire," 2 Kings vi. 16, 17. In a chariot like these, Elijah ascended to heaven, 2 Kings ii. 11. "The angels of the Lord encamp around them who fear him," Ps. xxxiv. 7. Zechariah saw angels in chariots, vi. 1—7. Angels are everywhere attendant on Christ. They announced his birth; they sang a welcome to it over the plains of Bethlehem. When Peter assailed the servant of the high priest who was about to arrest his Master, Christ rebuked him and said, "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels?" Matt. xxvi. 53. The angels then were in waiting, and were at his bidding. "Angels came and ministered to him," after a forty days' fast in the wilderness, Mark i. 13. "Angels strengthened him," when he agonized in the garden of Gethsemane, Luke xxii. 43. Angels opened the sepulchre, at his resurrection, Matt. xxviii. 2. Luke xxiv. 23. Well might he say to Nathaniel, at the opening of his ministry, "Hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man," John i. 51.

Such then was the *δύναμις* or *powerful force* which ever surrounded and accompanied the Saviour, at his bidding. Of course we might well expect that they would be with him, when he came to the terrible work of destroying his once favourite city and nation. Our English translation has obscured and hidden from the common reader the meaning of the word *δυνάμεις* in Matt. xxiv. 30. *Power* does not give the requisite sense, but *powerful host*, or (as we say) *powerful force*. In like manner do the angels accompany him at his final coming, Matt. xvi. 27; 1 Thess. iv. 16; 2 Thess. i. 7. But to deduce from all these declarations the *visibility* of angels; to interpret literally in this way, would be passing strange in most of the cases. In some, as in the case of Gabriel (Luke i.), and of the angels at the sepulchre, a visible form was doubtless assumed, for special purposes. But other cases are like that in 2 Kings vi. 17. "The horses and chariots were present, and were round about Elisha," yet his servant could not perceive them. A *reality* and a *visibility* are, or may be, two very different things. *Spirits* are realities, but not visibilities.

There is and can be no doubt, that Christ did come, in the Bible-sense of *coming*, to destroy Jerusalem: none, that the

angels would on such an occasion be in attendance on him. What then remains, to vindicate v. 30 from the literal interpretation, but the clause δόξης πολλῆς, *much splendour*? Only a word, however, need be said of this. Whenever or wherever God, or his spiritual messengers, are represented as making a special development, splendour, fire, light, bright radiance, in other words the Heb. הִבְרֹךְ, or the New Testament δόξα, always

attends them. On this occasion, it being a mission to inflict desolating judgments, all the awful splendour of Sinai, or such as is depicted in Ps. xviii. 8—13, or in Ezekiel i. and x., might well be expected. Splendour is a necessary accompaniment and complement of the picture. But the literal visibility of all this to the natural eye, i. e. the literal sense of the passage, which requires that the objects mentioned should thus be seen, is quite another question. I trust enough has been said to show that, if we may reason from analogical cases, no such interpretation is at all necessary.

But v. 31 still remains. This says, "He shall send his angels *with the sound of a great trumpet*." Here, of course, is a recognition of the δύναμις or *powerful host* who accompany him, in order to execute his will. What then is *the sound of the great trumpet*? Or (to begin with the scenes of the last day), what is "the trump of God" in 1 Thess. iv. 16; and "the last trump" in 1 Cor. xv. 52? Is it a literal trumpet, one literally heard by sleeping dust and ashes of countless millions? That would be verily a *forcible* exegesis, which would give *literal* ears and hearing to lifeless dust. But the last trumpet, in these two cases, is just as literal as the one now before us; and no more. In neither case can the language exhibit anything more than an illustration or simile, borrowed from the ancient use of trumpets. This was various. "The voice of a trumpet exceedingly loud" gave notice of the approach of Jehovah to mount Sinai, Ex. xix. 16. A still louder sound prepared for his communications there to Moses, v. 19. So in the Christophanies of the Apocalypse, Rev. i. 10; iv. 1. Moses appointed trumpets for the signal to summon the assembly of the people; and to warn them when to begin the march of their camps. By the different sounds of these, all their movements were directed. Trumpets were blown to summon armies together, to direct their evolutions, and to proclaim the onset of battle. Nor was this all. The days of gladness and thanksgiving were ushered in with trumpets; as also the monthly feasts, and the fasts, Num. x. 1—10; Joel ii. 1. The *sound of the trumpet* in the verse before us, resembles the latter class of these cases. It is not sounded on an occasion of impending contest, nor merely of

alarm to the elect. It was a summons to *gather them together*, so to speak, that they might put themselves under the protection of the Son of man, while his judgments were abroad in the land. If, in the verse before us, it were a summons for the final judgment, why should not the *wicked* be gathered together, as well as the righteous? In Matt. xxv. 31 seq., which clearly represents the general judgment, it is said, that "*all* nations shall be gathered together" before the Son of man. In John v. 25—29 it is said, "*All* that are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." Here then the trumpet-voice which summons to judgment, gathers *all* together, both the righteous and the wicked. Such also is the representation in Dan. xii. 2. In Rev. xx. 12, John says, that in prophetic vision "he saw the dead, small and great, stand before God." For these, two books were opened, i. e. the one for the wicked, the other for the righteous. So in 2 Thess. i. 7—10, the wicked and the righteous are both summoned, and both receive their appropriate final sentence. *But not a word in our text about both parties being summoned together.* Not a word about the final condemnation of the wicked; nor is anything but temporal evil that is to come upon them, implied in the preceding context. What should make this case so unlike all the others which I have just cited?

There is, however, a still more analogous case in Ps. l. 5. The Psalmist is denouncing Divine judgments on the wicked, who are threatened in the sequel with being "*torn in pieces*," v. 22. But with the righteous the case is different. They are to be saved from the threatened evils. The Psalmist hears the Divine majesty giving commandment (doubtless to the angels), and saying, "*Gather my saints together* unto me, those that have made a covenant with me by sacrifice." How *gather* them? Is the meaning *literal*, or *figurative*? Doubtless the latter; for an actual bodily assembling is surely not contemplated by the Psalmist. God is represented here as *coming*: "Our God shall come," v. 3. Then he commands his angels to "*gather his saints together*." And yet there are no visible angels here, and no physical assembling. Just so in Matt. xxiv. 31. The *gathering* is emblematical of promised *protection*. When the Saviour says, in the preceding context (Matt. xxiii. 37), "*O Jerusalem, Jerusalem . . . how often would I have gathered thy children together*, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not," does he expect to be understood as meaning to designate a literal assembling of them? To what purpose could this be? Indeed, did any one who ever read this, attach such an idea to these words? I think not, because it would

make no assignable pertinent meaning. If so, then we can have no difficulty as to the idea to be attached to the phrase *gathering together the elect*, in our text. As indicated by our Saviour's words, the brood of a hen are accustomed to gather under her wings for *protection*; little children gather around their parents instinctively in times of danger, for protection. The inhabitants of a country, when it was invaded, gathered together in their fortress for protection and safety. The elect of the Redeemer may therefore well be represented, at a time of desolation which was then approaching, as about to be "gathered in his arms and carried in his bosom." Just this same thing is predicted of the Redeemer, in Is. xl. 11: "He shall *gather* the lambs with his arm, and carry them in his bosom." Is this now a *literal* gathering? If so, then is it a literal carrying in his bosom? But it is neither. It is figurative language borrowed from a gathering which is literal, and one for the purpose of protection. I do not see any room for doubt or hesitation here. As little can I see any, in the case now before us.

Finally, the elect are to be gathered "from (*ἐκ*, *out of*) the four winds." Are there, in point of fact, no more than four? And if *literality* be insisted on, then we may ask, whether the elect live *in* those winds, and so are to be gathered *out of* them. But passing this as of little moment, we must, of course accede to the Hebrew use of this phraseology; and this was such as that the meaning exactly corresponds with our expression, *From every quarter*. The same idea of *four*, is comprised in the English expression *quarter* (= *quartum*). But it has now lost its arithmetical meaning, and has come to designate something equivalent to the phrase, *From every direction*. In short, *four winds* are named, and four only, because four cardinal points include all the inferior ones.

A somewhat different idea is designated by the expression, "From the extremities of the heavens unto the extremities of them." *Literally*, what is the *extremity* of the heaven? That would be a difficult question indeed. Less difficult is it, however, to find out what the Hebrews meant by this phraseology. With them the earth was viewed as an extended plain, having finite, or rather definite, bounds. The *extremity* was where the visible heaven or welkin comes down upon the earth, and makes boundaries for it. This great arch or visible heaven they regarded as supported by pillars around and under its border. Thus Job: "The pillars of heaven tremble, and are astonished at his reproof," Job xxvi. 11. Thus the extremities of the heaven and of the earth were commensurate and conjoined. Hence we read of "the pillars of the *earth* that tremble" before God, Job ix. 6. Accordingly in Mark (xiii. 27),

we have the phrase in question expressed thus: "From the extremity of the land unto the extremity of heaven." Except in *diction* merely, there is no difference between Matthew and Mark.

After all these explanations and modifications, we may now ask, What can be the meaning of literally gathering the *elect* from the very extremities of the earth and the heavens? Do they—will they live at the Arctic and Antarctic poles? These are extremities indeed; but not such ones as will be inhabited, methinks, when the trumpet shall sound for the assembling of the elect.

The simple idea of the two latter clauses is, 'From every quarter, and to the utmost extent where these elect are to be found.' De Wette puts the question here, as well he might, "For what purpose are the elect assembled?" His only answer is, that the disclosure breaks off here, and is resumed in xxv. 31, seq. He hints, indeed, at a *first* resurrection of believers only, as being implied here; and he compares 1 Thess. iv. 17; 2 Thess. ii. 1, where he finds, as he believes, this sentiment. But all this gives us no satisfactory reason for abruptly breaking off the narrative, and then inserting immediately afterwards three parables which are monitory and hortatory, and finally, after a digression so long and partly irrelevant, returning at last to the work of completing the description, at the end of chap. xxv. Does not all this seem passing strange, in such a grave discourse? The theme is left *in medio cursu*; left just half finished, in case the general judgment be the subject of it; and left without a word to tell us what will be the future lot of the wicked. In all other cases, the representations of the general judgment bring to view the righteous and the wicked as *both gathered together* before the tribunal of Christ. Yet not a word of all this is here. How could the author quit his theme so abruptly, quit it *re infectâ*, and at the very time when most of all it becomes peculiarly interesting and awful?

It seems difficult of supposition, that any attentive and well-informed reader should not be impressed with such palpable defects and lack of congruity and symmetry as the verses before us exhibit, in case the general judgment be the subject of them. It would be like breaking off the Iliad before the slaying of Hector, and the subjugation of Troy. In what other part of the New Testament can be found such an abruptness and transition to another subject before the main object of any passage is developed, as takes place in the passage now under consideration, in case it relates to the general judgment?

Let us take the whole matter now, and place it in another

light. If the destruction of the Jewish metropolis and commonwealth is admitted as the theme of the passage under discussion, then all is natural. The discourse itself of Jesus commences with his disciples calling his attention to the beauty of the temple and city. He tells them that all this is speedily to be marred and destroyed. They anxiously inquire when this will take place; what will be the sign of his coming, viz. in order to carry his threatening into execution; and, lastly, when the end of the αἰών would take place, xxiv. 1—3. This last word is, indeed, a somewhat difficult one. Αἰών originally means *age*, *perpetuity* or *eternity*; and these are its leading senses. So with the Hebrew עוֹלָם. But the Hebrew word (and

so the Chaldee) came, in process of time, to mean *world* among the Rabbins. The manner of this *derived* signification may be explained, as it seems to me, by a reference to such passages as Ecc. i. 4, "The earth (i. e. the world) abideth *for ever*." To call the world *perpetuity*, then, was an easy matter; and עוֹלָם

may be viewed simply as an *attributive* designation = *the perpetual*. The same may be said of αἰών. Sometimes the secondary sense becomes enlarged, and means *the world with its cares, temptations, sins, and sorrows*. In this sense it is called an *evil world*, Gal. i. 4, and Satan is called the *god of this world*, because it is evil, 2 Cor. iv. 4. Looked at in this direction, αἰών seems at times to be equivalent also to the *world of men*; as when we say, 'The *whole world* knows or does so or so.' We can hardly give it any other sense in Eph. ii. 2, than *wicked generation* of living and acting men. Did the disciples so use it? This seems doubtful. But the Apostle (1 Cor. x. 11) speaks of ensamples under the Old Testament dispensation "for our admonition, on whom τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων have come," i. e. plainly the end of the *Jewish world* or *dispensation*. He speaks as though this were a familiar mode of phraseology. If so, then why, after all the instruction which Christ had given his disciples about his *new* kingdom and *new* dispensation—why may we not reasonably suppose that the disciples meant to ask a question pertaining to that αἰών, which was about to end? Plainly this would be altogether consonant with the drift of the preceding questions. There is nothing in the preceding part of Matthew's gospel which leads us to the supposition, that Christ had taught the apostles, or that they believed, the final end of the world was to come at the commencement of the kingdom of heaven. He taught them, indeed, that there would, at some time, be an end of the world, and a general judgment, Matt. xiii. 36—43. In Matt. xvi. 27, "the Son of man coming

in the glory of his Father, with his angels," and distributing rewards according to works, probably refers also to his final coming. But there v. 28 asserts another and a different thing, viz. that there "were some standing there, who should not taste of death till they should see the Son of man *coming in his kingdom*." The kingdom of Christ was then taking its rise, commencing and growing slowly during his incarnation. After this it was to come *with power*. Hence the duty of praying, Thy kingdom come! This is one of the ways, the first one, in which the Son of man was to come. A second way is the coming to take each disciple to himself, when he dies, John xiv. 3. Another is the coming to destroy Jerusalem. Another is to be at the Millennium. Then there is a *final* coming in the glory of his Father, to raise the dead and judge the world. I regard v. 28 here as serving merely to confirm what had been said in the preceding verse. It is as much as to say, the proof that he will finally come and judge the world, may be gathered from the fact, that his kingdom, according to his declaration, shall be firmly established before the generation then living should pass wholly away. This first coming would be the earnest or pledge of his future judicial proceedings and of his rewarding the righteous.

I know not whence then the conclusion is made out, that the disciples believed the judgment-day to be contemporaneous with the destruction of Jerusalem. There is nothing in chap. xxiv. 1—4 which leads to such a turn of the question on the part of the disciples. It is quite inapposite, unless we can make out a good reason to believe, that the disciples cherished the opinion attributed to them. And I cannot see why we should assume such an extravagant belief on their part, one which was plainly in contradiction to all the current opinions of the Jews of that period on this subject. They expected the Messianic time to continue at least a thousand years. It was to be the *sabbath* of the world. Where did the apostles get the notion, that this period was to endure only one generation? Not from Jesus; he taught no such falsehood. Not from the Old Testament; for a *long* and prosperous reign is everywhere there given to the Messiah. Will the advocates of this notion, then, show us where the disciples could obtain it? Until they do, I must content myself with believing that the *end of the world*, means what it does in the mouth of Paul, 1 Cor. x. 11, as quoted above. If so, then all is consonant and harmonious.

But let us go on with the discourse. False Christs are to come; wars are to be frequent; persecution will arise; false prophets will come; the gospel will be preached wide abroad; the Roman army will invade Judæa; the disciples must flee for safety; false prophets will in vain promise the appearance of a

Christ, i. e. of a deliverer; and finally, the coming of Christ to the work of desolation will be sudden and unexpected. The Roman eagles will pursue until they light upon the carcass which they intend to devour.

Thus far as an introduction to verses 29—31, on which I have now been commenting. Then comes the scene of the devouring. It will be a day of awful gloom, as if all the luminaries of the skies were extinguished. The signs that betoken the impending doom will fill the land with bitter mourning and lamentation.

But in the midst of all this, the elect, the true-hearted disciples of Christ, will be safe. His angels will guard them. *He will gather them under his protecting wing; "gather them with his arm, and carry them in his bosom."*

Here we have a beginning, a progress, and an end. At the end is comfort to the elect, and destruction to the wicked and malignant persecutors.

[To be concluded.]

ART. VI.—THE PRACTICAL ELEMENT IN CHRISTIANITY.

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DIVINE revelation may be regarded either as a body of truths for intellectual inquiry and admiration, or as a collection of rules and motives for the guidance of human life. These two aspects run into each other, but may be properly conceived of and spoken of separately. For its contemplative uses, religion cannot be too greatly esteemed and respected. Its lessons and influences, however, for this real acting world, where we spend the preparatory portion of our being, are more immediately important and indispensable.

It is the happy feature of our time that Religion, like science, has left her cloistered retreats and her abstruse speculations, and passed into the earnest, matter-of-fact concerns of mankind. This decided assumption of the practical on the part of religion, marks the present as a signal era, in her aggressive movements toward the conquest of the world. This was to have been unhesitatingly looked for by all the pious students of the Divine character. A visible and effective industry is a distinguishing attribute of the great Author of Christianity. Said Christ, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." This, that is, the Divine example, is the great principle of the uni-

verse. Christianity without practical bearings would have been an anomaly and a contradiction in the Divine dispensations.

We proceed to consider the *fact* and the *advantages* of a practical character in Christianity.

I. First, the *fact* of such a practical character.

One proof of this may be found in the mission itself which religion is to fulfil in the world. That mission is, in brief terms, to carry light, purity, happiness, to the entire family of man. Its great work in this universal sphere is to wake all the immense tract of intellect that slumbers in the nations; to purify all the moral spirit that heaves and glows underneath it; to effect an intellectual and moral creation, striking and illustrious like that of the six days of Omnipotence in the beginning. There is included, it is perceived, in such an immense accomplishment, a mission into every heart of a thousand millions, a mission into every such heart, as a place of evil spirits to cast them out, as a place of death to raise the dead, as a place vacant of all moral goodness to settle a family of affections fit for heaven. Such a mission to all that dwell on the face of the earth, a mission charged with such social, intellectual and moral regenerations, leaves no doubt of the character of religion being that of a great practical instrumentality.

A glance at the almost insuperable difficulties to be overcome in effecting the meliorating religious changes indicated, will serve farther to establish the practical nature of Christianity. The contentedness of ignorance with its own darkness; the depth of moral corruption; the inveteracy of human prejudice; the tendency of men to fatal forms of error;—these present obstacles and resistances which nothing but an agency most practical can remove. What pains and prayers and incessant persuasions are required to train one child to virtue! What practical power then is wanted to enter a *world* and cleanse all human thought, all human feeling, all human action! It is to be remembered that the world besides being purified is to be kept clean. Each thirty years presents another thousand millions for the action of Christianity. It has the same great regenerations to effect for each successive generation down to the end of the world. Religion, in order to such a vast and continued accomplishment, must be perpetual as well as an immense activity.

The practical element in the system of Divine ethics appears in the prominence which it gives to the individual as a responsible actor.

Pantheism absorbs man in the Deity. God, according to this form of Atheism, is the immense ocean including all existence; man is a single drop of the grand universal mass, undistinguish-

able and irresponsible. Other forms of infidelity extinguish all but a single point of man's existence, by cutting off all of it lying beyond death, thus robbing him of immortality. To a being thus narrowed to a hand-breadth, action or inaction, industry or indolence, have but a slender importance. The Socialists are in danger of sinking and paralyzing the individual by lodging in a community nearly all his independent motives and responsibilities.

In all society constructed under despotisms, monarchies, titled aristocracies, the individual is generalized and much obscured in a great amalgamation known as the national character, will, government. In respect to all private interests, as well as public, the visible organ of authority, the representative of the empire, speaks, arranges, decides; the individual is scarcely known, consulted, cared for. Like one of the boxes or packages of a ship's cargo, he goes with the rest and partakes of the general destiny, not of his own will or wisdom, but simply because he chanced to be stowed away in the hold along with the common mass. Religion contemplates specially our individuality. It clusters upon man a large family of individual duties. It does not overlook his relations to society, nor remit or diminish one claim resting upon him to mingle and move with the mass of the community. But here, in this his social position, where he is wont to be counted, not as a whole but as a small augmentation of a whole, as an infinitesimal of the common mass of public feeling, public opinion, public influence—even here Religion follows out her element, her commingled drop, arrests it, and legislates for it as a unit, an isolation! She invests her individual with full undivided responsibility. She never permits him to merge himself with his fellows, corporate or non-corporate; she never permits a single particle of his conscience to be yielded up on his entering any fraternity; she never permits one item of service to be withheld on the plea that copartners are under equal obligation to perform it; she proposes to bestow her full glorious rewards on him singly, if he singly be worthy; she proposes all her woes to him singly, if singly he be unworthy. By thus separating men from masses and amalgamations, by thus setting down each man apart and constituting him an entirety accountably to breathe, to think, to desire, to will, to act, to attain, religion holds an influence in producing human activity of vast and incalculable power. Left with none to depend on but himself, he must act, or gain nothing; he must act, or lose everything. No man has an oarsman to push him while he is asleep. He must up and strike for himself; lustily and alone must stem the tide, or be swept on hopelessly into uselessness, ruin and oblivion.

The associated fact, ever recognized in the Scriptures, if not

by statement certainly by inference, that the great ends of life, not attained personally, are not attained at all; that who succeeds not by his own labours has failed; and who wins not by his own prowess is defeated—this adds a perpetual and powerful influence to great and multiplied individual labours. The conscious dignity with which religion invests men, by investing them with this conscious individuality, is an additional inducement to human activity. As a self-constructing, self-acting, self-responsible isolation among the works and intelligences of God, man is intensely prompted, in order to be worthy of himself, to attempt great outward efficiency and accomplishment. Brave a man may be, as an undistinguished ingredient of a body of soldiery; but detached and drawn forth singly for a daring exploit, the motive to chivalrous action is immensely augmented. By religion, every man without exception is thus detailed and assigned singly to a momentous, hazardous, a holy service. He feels the honour and importance of his position; he turns his eye upon the great interests dependent upon himself alone; his heart swells with noble, high purposes, as he thinks of the part committed all to himself to perform. Under a lofty and generous impulse, created by this consciousness of a great entrustment exclusively in his own hands, he will go out to almost incredible energies and labours.

Religion, by thus making every man an independent, responsible actor, has set up and secured in the world an agency capable of producing a religious industry and thrift and accomplishment as great and important as the world needs. What forbids that the earth should be all tilled and all be made fruitful even as a well-watered garden?

The practical bearing of religion is apparent from another fact, that it enjoins those internal states of the heart which are eminently fitted to produce action.

Whatever links and involves itself immediately and strongly with the warm workings of the soul, will always necessarily have an eminently active and practical character. The production of outward activities is on this wise. All feeling, all stirring in the heart, loves and demands an outward expression, an ostensible form. Emotion will not remain in the soul still and quiet permanently, any more than ignited gunpowder will smoulder slowly away without an external manifestation. Nor is the spirit's excitement content with the moving of particles among themselves as a mere ebullition; they swell up, run over, spread abroad; they create all around a rich scene of life and of fruit. Without emotions issuing thus into action, man would be, in respect to all other beings, if not in respect to himself, a mere physical structure, a mere block to move and be moved by im-

pact or attraction. But he is not such a thing; he is no block; he is a being of deep, vivacious sensibilities, every one of which is making outward demonstrations incessantly. Is it for a moment to be supposed or admitted that the human affections, in all other cases giving birth to vigorous activities, become inoperative lethargies the moment they have a religious character? The moment they have a religious character they rise to intenser energies, superior stability. Especially do they make larger and more remarkable external exhibitions. Let us represent to ourselves, then, the assiduous labours, the crowded occupations, to which men are pushed by their worldly passions in the absence of religious feeling. Let us mark how, under the love of money, man crosses all the lines of latitude and longitude; how impelled by a love of honour he goes up to the cannon's mouth; how under the impulses of a secular enterprise the earth is covered over with the traces of his presence and his industry; how the mark of his axe and his fire is left wherever he has pitched his tent; how, wherever he has favourably settled himself, dwellings, roads, harvests, cities, temples, exchanges, armaments, overthrows, reconstructions, have invariably attended him. These are testimonies of his vast outward energies and achievements in obedience to the secular portion of his sensitive nature.

My allegation is that, equal to all this and greater than all this, and a thousand fold better than all this, are the active services which are produced by the emotions of religion. Affectionate reverence for God is one of these. Let the Divine character be opened gloriously to a susceptible, responsive understanding and heart, so that this affectionate reverence shall be deep and great; equally deep and great will be the active obedience that shall follow. There have been celebrated earthly captains, who had inspired such an enthusiasm and respect on the part of a subject people or an armed host, that their announced wish and will would instantly put millions in motion. Will not a fervent consecration of the heart to the great Sovereign of the world make his intimations more effective? Will not his presence and his word call out submissions and services greatly surpassing these in fidelity, importance and permanence? Think of a company of men; the Almighty in the midst of them; their souls all moved, thrilled, uplifted toward him! What will they shrink from to which their great Master calleth?

Another of the emotions of religion is a penitential feeling, a true contrition for all offences against the will of heaven! Than this there is no more active a principle belonging to our nature. What service does he not attempt whose spirit, for having neglected service or having committed wrong, is broken, deeply

sorrowing! Nothing is so marked as his obediences, nothing so assiduous and careful and persevering. I would rather have a suffusion of the soul with sorrow for past misdoings to induce Christian duty, than all the developed terrors of the world to come, than all the opened glories of heaven. We sometimes see a man, with an energy and a perseverance and a vigilance above himself, doing whatever his hand findeth to do; undismayed, unceasing, uncomplaining, we observe him in all circumstances whatsoever; so resolute and undiverted and effective is he as to arrest general attention. That man has just come from the confessional, the world's great confessional, the cross of Christ! Into the ear of mercy has he just uttered his penitential griefs for his many transgressions. These services that we witnessed were the works meet for repentance. Let the penitence of the church be quadrupled, and her holy accomplishments will be probably fifty fold. And penitence is the grand fundamental inculcation of the Gospel, a great and radical element of a Christian character. Wherever Christianity passes, and plants this contrition for sins deep in the heart of a community, we look with confidence for most visible external reformations.

But the great emotion of religion is benevolence. This cannot live in the heart unproductive of visible labours without acting contrary to its character. It is well-wishing to others; it is fellow-feeling; its objects are out of itself. In behalf of these it produces large and numerous visible exertions, according to intensity and opportunity. Were man a bundle of perfect selfishness, he would act vigorously on a sphere around him just so broad as to include every possible contributor to his own dear interests. This area would constantly change its dimensions as he fancied he might bless himself by extending or contracting it. So would his labours on the same field be diminished or increased on the same principle of personal advantage. How infinitely superior to this varying narrowness is the principle of benevolent feeling as a generator of human action! This has no change or contraction of boundaries. Wherever in the universal family of man good is needed, thither would it travel; every acre of the world would it plant thick with the trees of righteousness. It would permit nothing to abate its efforts but the diminution of human want and woe. As there is always a tide to stem, it never lays upon its oars. As human society is always full of evils, so it is always abroad with both hands full of blessings.

Better than statement or discussion here would be an actual example of practical results in matters of religion under the action of this principle. Let the life of Paul be that example. We set out with the Apostle, all fired with religious philanthropy,

from the city of Antioch, on the express business of carrying the religion of Christ through the provinces of Lesser Asia. In Pisidia he boldly preaches the name of Jesus ; his person is insulted and his life endangered. He flees to Iconium and lifts up his voice to the people in behalf of the same cause ; at the prospect of being stoned he escapes to Lystra, and there, in the midst of his proclamations, is actually stoned and drawn out of the city for dead. He revives, and after other efforts, returns to Jerusalem and relates the story of his preaching, his sufferings and his deliverances. Now we cross with him the Ægean Sea, on the same holy errand as before. He first stops at Philippi and announces his great message of mercy from Heaven. Here, after being whipped cruelly, cast into prison, thrust into the inner dungeon, made fast in the stocks, he was delivered from his enemies and passed on to Amphipolis, Apollonia, and Thessalonica, everywhere preaching the word. At the last city, the master of the house where he lodged was dragged before the magistrate for admitting him within his doors. From the next place he is compelled to make his escape by a private journey, but not until he has fulfilled his mission to the people. Now he is in Athens, next at Corinth, in both places unfolding and discussing, in his own warm, argumentative, impetuous eloquence, the gospel of Christ. An insurrection in the latter drives him to Ephesus ; from thence he passes to Jerusalem. Will he not now rest in the bosom of the church, and venture no more abroad to endure the malice and assaults of the enemies of the Gospel ? Oh no ! this is not the spirit of the Apostle to the Gentiles. Too ardent in his great mission to allow ease or rest, quickly we find him back again to Antioch ; from thence he pushes through all the northern provinces of Asia Minor ; stops two years at Ephesus, where he nearly lost his life in a great clamour and tumult raised against him. Next he visits Greece, travels over all Macedonia, then is at Corinth, then back to Macedonia, then through Asia, visiting the cities on the Mediterranean ; then again at Jerusalem. Here he is arrested and confined ; after two years he proceeds bound to Rome. The undaunted Apostle preaches the kingdom of God in the imperial city two years, teaching with all confidence those things which concern the Lord Jesus Christ.

Such was Paul under the impulsions of the grand passion of religion. No stonings, no exposures to wild beasts, no labouring with his own hands for support, no hunger or thirst, no imprisonment, no shipwrecks, no over-awing edicts of governors, no perils of robbers, no intrigues of false brethren, no maledictions of open foes, no solicitations of friends, produced the least discouragement or remission in his immense activities. Had

these obstacles and persecutions been a hundred-fold greater, if not positively insuperable and intolerable, he would have been the same man of ubiquity. The same cities and countries would have heard him thundering in the midst of all their corruptions and dissipations; courts and kings would have been startled with his unintimidated reasonings of righteousness, temperance, and judgment. This too, be it remembered, was no peculiar enthusiasm which moved the Apostle of the Gentiles to such incredible exertions. True, it is a spirit which is mightiest in the mighty. In Paul's warm, vast heart it found a readier welcome and a richer nutrition than is generally afforded it; in his life it made grander demonstrations than is usual. But it is essentially the same powerful excitement and agency in every man whom it occupies at all. Suppose it actually to have effected a lodgment in every individual of a whole community, and to have set all stirring zealously forward after the manner of the great Apostle. The surface of society would present a scene of religious energies and accomplishments truly wonderful. Almost the industrious assiduities and ripe blessedness of heaven would be there.

There is not a single emotion belonging to Christianity which is not in like manner productive of great and noble action. If in many instances religion in the hearts of men has not produced in the lives of men the fruits which ought to have been expected, it has not been owing to the lack of practical capability and tendency on the part of that religion itself, but to the feebleness of holy feeling in the soul, and also to wicked disobedience to what faint promptings did exist within.

It is to be also remembered that Religion does not receive credit for all that she effects among men. Her accomplishments are not always so marked and striking as to be immediately and fully acknowledged. She has her noiseless labours, her invisible, permeating social influences, her unnoticed assiduities at the fireside, her created amenities in the retirement of humble life. Often by means of this busy interior working, there comes over the face of a community a delightful moral health, a refreshing benevolence and peace, while careless on-lookers are scarcely aware of the blessed power which has been quietly, unostentatiously producing the important change.

Let the soul of an individual or of a community be imbued as the spirit of God imbueeth, with a deep, living godliness, let both be true to themselves, and they will become but blessed personifications of religious energy. A scene full of works of faith and labours of love will ever rejoice around them.

Our conclusion is, that the Gospel, by arousing and appropriating to itself the most powerful and expansive passions of

which man is capable, becomes the source of the highest and the widest outward accomplishments of which man is capable. Most clearly Christianity is not a thing for the monastic cell, not a thing for entombing in the interior heart, not for retirement within itself to live solely in its own fervours, joys, hopes. It is a family of outbursting emotions, to speak audibly in startling tones, to walk abroad among men, to act and energize among the elements of society, to effect a moral resurrection and life in the midst of reigning desolations.

The practical character of religion appears, also, from the nature of its doctrines. These are of decidedly active tendency.

In theological dogmas, more than anywhere else, we are to look, it has been supposed, for the mere theoretical of Christianity. Here, it has been understood, lie treasured sublime facts, deep philosophies, pure intellections solely for the mind's occupation and enjoyment, not for application to our earnest labours, physical or moral. Here cloistered fanatics have thought was food for the soul through a whole life of world-renunciation and world-abandonment. Religion has no such abstractions, no dogmatic and scholastic speculations separated from the serious duties of life. Were it admitted that possibly there may be doctrines in physics without practical bearings, Christianity claims to have no unfruitful principles; it insists everywhere that in respect to its revelations there can be no faith without works. Every one of its announcements has the form or the force of a precept or a motive, a direction or an impulsion to outward action.

A practical tendency will be admitted at once to belong to God's great moral laws with their impressive sanctions; to the developed methods of his providence; to the announced principles of right and wrong by which he governs and judges mankind; to the revealed conditions of mercy according to which he pardons, cleanses, justifies. These laws, dispensations, principles, conditions, recognize all human duty, address all human conscience, appeal to all human susceptibility of gratitude, involve all human interests. Both singly and unitedly they must, from their relations to us, very powerfully influence human action. If, therefore, among the revelations of Christianity there be anything approximating to mere abstractions, mere matters of the mind's thought alone, apart from vigorous doing, it cannot be any of these promulged laws, duties, sanctions, provisions of salvation, principles of providence, awards of government. It must rather be found connected with the Divine attributes. That an isolated perfection of Jehovah should stand in its infinite grandeur wholly unconnected with human activity, may seem perhaps a natural supposition. It is, however, undoubtedly

a mistaken one. These attributes are in and of themselves great practical lessons in human duty; they are high and impressive motives to Christian diligence. Christianity represents them as everywhere present and everywhere most vigorously employed. We ourselves perceive that of the whole universe of matter and of mind nothing is still. Action is made to re-act, enterprise to beget enterprise, events to elaborate events, thought to generate thought, result to evolve result. And all this energy and movement and development and accomplishment, of which the heavens and the earth are full, the Scriptures counsel us to regard but the mighty and constant working of God's wisdom and goodness and power. Here is an ever-speaking rebuke of all our lethargy and idleness, a vast excitement to all practicable enterprise and industry. Who can stand still while his great Creator and Benefactor is busy at work all around him with an infinite skill, benevolence, and energy?

The Divine perfections opened by Christianity arouse to effort and labour in another manner, by presenting to men a high and perfect standard of duty and character. The moral nature of the Deity, as one grand assemblage of excellences, as one great glory to which each attribute contributes a separate pencil of rays, is too pure, exalted, and impressive, not to produce on the part of man a deep sense of delinquency and depravity, not to awake most earnest struggles after likeness of character.

Another practical tendency still have the attributes of God, from their bearing toward us as under religious responsibility. When God's omniscience is presented, an infinite, universal intelligence, from which no darkness can exclude, no distance remove, no secrecy escape, which is equally familiar with the hidden and the open, the minute and the vast, the heart and the life; when such a searching knowledge is presented by Christianity as ever looking down into the depths of our hearts and abroad over every portion of our earthly conduct, we are startled into solicitude and carefulness; we are awaked and pushed to great vigilance and exertion. When also by the same Christianity the high purity and justice of the Deity are described as turning from our corrupted natures and evil lives with deep and utter loathing, and then issuing upon them both a dreadful, unmingled, eternal reprobation, we are still more intensely and permanently roused to cleanse thoroughly our hearts before God, to run unceasingly in the way of all his commandments.

In opening in upon the souls and the conduct of men in this way, the all-seeing eye, and the holy, just heart of the Eternal One, with attendant approvals and condemnations according to

character, the Gospel has provided as powerful an inducement to laborious, untiring, serious industry, as it is possible for us to conceive. The same is true of all the "invisible things" of God. The doctrines of the Divine attributes, no less than theological tenets generally, are arguments for human action, manifest, strong, effective.

The plain, unmetaphysical manner employed by the Scriptures in announcing the doctrines of religion, give them this same practical aspect and tendency. Regeneration, for example, is not presented as a theological subtlety, involving the question of the subject's activity and passivity; of the exact division of labour between the Spirit and the sinner himself; of the change consisting in a new-implanted principle or a new current of exercises; these matters are not discussed nor so much as alluded to. As a momentous practical concern it is everywhere treated. Has the moral resurrection taken place? Has the costume of darkness been laid aside, and the garments of light been put on? Has the convert stopped sinning? Is he abounding in the work of the Lord? Do grapes grow on the vine, sweet waters flow from the fountain? These are the great questions which the Scriptures present to be settled. Entirely practical are they all.

So of the resurrection. Religion presents this doctrine with no abstruse speculations on the subject of identity. It neither asks nor declares anything in respect to the rising with the same particles that were buried; concerning the re-junction of limbs and portions left on different continents; the reclaiming of human dust that had entered into different individuals successively. The presentation is fitted to have an impressive bearing upon our behaviour. They that have done good shall come forth to the resurrection of life; they that have done evil shall come forth to the resurrection of damnation. With solemn emphasis it is practically inquired, what manner of persons therefore ought ye to be in all holy conversation. The doctrine is announced to regulate life; to induce arrangements for death and for a glorious appearing with him who is our Resurrection and our Life.

The doctrine of the atonement has the same practical mode of inculcation. Did the Saviour literally suffer the whole penalty of the law, so as to be in a strict and full sense the sinner's substitute? Can man on that ground put in any claim to heaven? If just penalty were not all endured, how could the remainder be remitted? Is the Saviour's own personal righteousness literally imputed to believers? Did the Divine nature suffer? If that is impossible, how could the sufferings of mere humanity be a satisfaction to Divine justice? Why should the innocent suffer for the guilty? Who has found a single one of these questions either propounded or satisfied in the sacred volume? In all sim-

plicity is it announced as a great practical truth: "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me; Behold the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world; He that hath the Son hath life; He that abideth in me and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; The love of Christ constraineth us." The simple doctrine, Christ crucified, unconnected with mystery or philosophy, is presented not only as a solid basis of all Christian reliance and hope, but as able to work a hearty abandonment of all wickedness; to lead men in the way of holiness; to act the part of a grand, constraining, moral power for the world.

In like manner is presented the general judgment, practically. No metaphysical curiosity is gratified in respect to time, place, practicability and uses of the final hearing before God. No question is answered as to the reason of bringing the guilty out before the universe, instead of permitting them to go silently and unnoticed to their fearful destiny; nor as to the reason that when once assigned to their last doom, they should be afterwards summoned before the Almighty for trial. Nothing of all this is found. But the great, solemn audit is referred to for the sake of an immediate influence upon the conduct and character of men. The scenes attendant, the revelation of all character, the separation of the righteous from the wicked, the final retribution, dreadful or glorious, the beginning of the eternal states of all the dead—these are announced to awake men to deep solicitude and watchfulness over the deeds done here in the body, so decisive of all questions and destinies before God: to present a vast incentive to every individual to make his ten pounds or five pounds gain other ten or other five; to induce men to perform assiduously, religiously, the six great charities to the Saviour, when a hungered, athirst, a stranger, naked, sick, in prison; to arrest and awe and prostrate the world in actual, prevailing prayer before the throne, for mercy, sanctification and hope. The simple Scripture, "For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ," exerts now and is adapted ever to exert a wide and amazing practical power over mankind.

The profoundest student and believer in Christian doctrine is likely to be the most assiduous observer of Christian precepts, the most valuable example of Christian practice. A grand working world this would be, were the doctrines of religion admitted to their full and rightful place in its communities. It is to be feared that they have not their proper prominence and power in the public preaching of the country. These neglected, practice dies, just as, when food is withdrawn, muscular action ceases.

II. I pass from the *fact* of the practical tendencies of religion to a consideration of the *value* and *importance* of such tendencies.

The external services of Christianity render it capable of becoming an effective counteraction of all irreligion.

The powers of evil are decidedly practical. All the passions of vice produce the activities of vice ; all the interior devisings of mischief appear in the outward accomplishments of mischief. Though in its grosser forms wickedness loves the night time, and skulks in lanes and concealments, yet even from these places it steams up infections into the whole structure and movements of society. It finds its way in some of its forms into all the business and all the pleasures of life. It is upon all the currents of travel, and in all the bazaars of traffic. It seems never to sleep, and never to suffer the least paralysis or remission. It is ever and everywhere on the alert. It is a busy, malicious meddler in the house and by the way, in the city and country, in the workshop and on the farm, in the counting-room of the merchant and in the office of the manufacturer. It does something to move the muscles and limbs of all communities. It speaks all languages. It knows the technicalities of all arts and professions. It sets up distilleries and grogeries and gambling houses. It patronizes theatres and circuses and duels and street fighting. It fills every community full with wrong and outrage.

Now religion was never expected to oppose and remove this active, universal mischief-doer, by nestling itself down cosily and quietly in a sweet, gentle corner of the human heart. It was not expected to do this by merely insinuating itself into the intellects of mankind as a passive faith in the great doctrines of Christianity. It was not expected to do this wholly by even the devotions and Divine communion permitted to the followers of Christ in the presence-chamber of God. These doctrines and these devotions, it is most true, are heavenly, are entirely essential ; they are the great frame and limbs and vital circulation and invigorating breathing of religion. But in order to compete with such a spirit and power of wickedness as the world is filled with, besides a strong structure and an interior vitality, religion must be an outwardly stirring, pushing, aggressive agency, and that beyond any other which is abroad in society. In the grand rush of the powers of evil, that must rush still more powerfully. Christianity must have more eyes out upon the scene of life, must employ more spades, pickaxes, and drills, to push moral thoroughfares and aid the travels and freights of philanthropy, than Satan can muster to assist the dissemination of iniquity and woe. This that it needs to do the practical character of religion, adapts and empowers it to accomplish perfectly. All that sin can do, religion can undo ; all its infections it can neutralize ; all its wastes and deaths restore.

There are special evils attendant upon the rapid advancement of society in general wealth and improvement. There come in with this progress toward refinement, lavish expenditure, luxury, effeminate gratifications, dwarfed mind, neglect of life's serious duties, fatal religious opinions, depreciated integrity, general corruption. As an antidote to all these deteriorations, religion carries its practical agency into the busiest scenes of enterprise and advancement; with all its industrial energies, sound practical teachings and transforming power, keeps up flush with the front rank of civilization. Expended, however, in desires, joys, hopes, blessed meditations, religion would have but little influence on the projecting, accomplishing generation of the present time.

The world all abroad on the currents and waves will pay its deference to religion, if it sees that also as one of life's craft dashing its way with other keels, and trying the same tides and winds. The world will even acknowledge superiority and accept a pilot from the sacred bark, if she is out in the ocean-roads, and at the mouths of the great havens and marts of commerce. But they will not run after her into coverts and eddies, or under the lee shores of promontories and islands. It is just the practical genius of Christianity, with her full sails set, to be visibly abroad where pass all the world's inbound and outbound cargoes; it is just its practical genius to be out amid all the adventures, expeditions and movements of men, to convoy, to pilot, to moor. Let no one indulge fears for human society, except from the exclusion of true religion. Let this, in the use of its full energies, assist and augment all our thrift, consecrate all our enterprise, appropriate all our accumulations, dictate all our legislation, breathe in all the eloquence of our orators, speak its authoritative lessons in all our pulpits, spread its purifying power everywhere, and all is safe, all is illustriously progressive.

The practicalness of Christianity makes it an important nourisher of piety in the heart.

It is an important principle in our moral constitution, that outward expressions of emotion become themselves stimulants of emotion. The reaction is as invariable and certain as the action. Excellent works minister nutrition and vigour to the interior powers of godliness, just as a thrifty foliage furnishes elaborated juices for the roots below. Emotions which are fainting and sinking, it is always found, can be immediately revived by carrying them into action; by giving them outward manifestations; by permitting them to breathe out audibly and visibly. Thus the obediences of Christianity work the spirit of Christianity; the visible doings of righteousness, the interior vitalities of righteousness. Not only does the practice of religion

enrich the soul of religion, but in the absence of such practice, godliness shrinks and decays. The sensibility of the heart becomes effete when denied outward and visible activities, just as fires are suffocated when driven in upon themselves and pent up closely and fast.

The allegation is, therefore, that, both by positive enrichment and by preventing deterioration, godly doing creates godly feeling, so that he who is making a purity and a light around himself, is erecting a holiness and an illumination within himself. It is not enough at a safe distance inactively to survey human want and woe. Man must descend from his post of observation, and actually pass into every habitation of ignorance and sin, which the eye has surveyed. If one do this; if as an angel of mercy and of light he give himself to the great work of purifying and enlightening the whole population; if he carry instruction to all who will receive it; if he approach every corrupted one with holy and urgent counsels; if he pull the brutalized and lost out of the fire by his own exertions; if he prosecute these incessant labours in rescuing men from sin and woe and ignorance, in the face of dangers and obloquy and ingratitude and misrepresentation, his piety will have grown into a great, rich, inexhaustible fountain, into a grand reservoir of living waters, always to overthrow and refresh.

Besides a happy influence directly in warming and augmenting the piety of the heart, outward exertions assist to keep that piety well balanced and symmetrical. The religious character left in monastic seclusion is likely to have its qualities unequally excited and advanced. Devoutness before God may be cultivated to the exclusion of benignity toward men; spiritual fervour may become more prominent than patience and self-control; the spirit of reverence may grow to be stronger than the spirit of forgiveness; the spirit of exhortation and rebuke, than the spirit of self-sacrifice; a vague admiration of holiness, than intelligent desire for personal righteousness. Piety confined in the heart is likely to select some object, and grow enthusiastic and extravagant and exclusive in its behalf, until a partial monomania succeeds. A thorough-going system of activity in the cause of God and man, is the best thing to effect an equilibrium. It arouses and cultivates the *whole* interior man. All that monasticism had permitted to sleep, is likely to be carried into the grand current of zeal and self-improvement. Personal piety in this way receives back to her noble form her withered limbs, her blind eye, her deaf ear, her dumb tongue, all made whole; her clustered graces live and shine together like a full orb without spot or eclipse.

There is one sad deterioration to which religion, shut up in the

soul, is specially liable, an over-estimate of itself, self-complacency, spiritual pride. This is, as all know, an obstacle to improvement nearly insuperable. Swollen up with a belief of one's superior godliness, higher attainments are not struggled for, scarcely prayed for. Self-conceits and self-gratulations on account of great supposed godliness, are best cured by hard service out in the families of the world, much as the swell and bluster of imagined courage are in the actual strife of life for life. The matter is subjected to the test of experiment. In order to humble religious pride, great self-sacrifices and self-fatigues and self-dangers should be entered upon. The self-exalted one, to know his metal, must try the battle-axe, and the winter campaign, and the night-watch, and the short allowance, and the forced march. It is easy to imagine one's self in a state of communion with God, when by seclusion worldly attractions are totally excluded; gentle, and easy to be entreated, when nothing is met to ruffle the spirit or thwart the purposes; full of benevolence, when no being of want is present to solicit our charity; a prodigy of philosophic contentment, when everything is wafting us prosperously whither we most desire to be borne; a wondrous example of self-possession and of fortitude, when there is no danger and no required endurance. To learn humility, to dispossess the spirit of its imagined strength and worth, let men go out into the world, where they will be tempted and sifted and vilified and persecuted and defrauded and afflicted and cast down and forsaken. That is the furnace to discover to the individual himself what in his character is dross, and what is gold. In order then to a deep, symmetrical, humble, unexceptionable piety in the heart of the church, visible labours, great labours in the cause of truth and righteousness, must be valued, insisted on, augmented, persevered in.

Mark further how the practical character of religion assists the cultivation of the stern public virtues of the Christian. In the cloister many negative qualities may be well enough acquired. From envy, revenge, avarice, discontent and malice, the heart may be kept comparatively clean, when deeply sequestered where there are few excitements, all away from the busy scenes of the world. But the sturdy, positive virtues grow best in the conflicts and struggles of life. Love of right becomes strong and lofty, when cherished and obeyed under those powerful temptations and rivalries found on the open theatre of human action. Submission to Providence grows into a sublime and Christian philosophy under the painful ills and reverses of the real world. Consecration of one's self to the work of human progress and salvation, is nourished into a holy magnanimity in the active labours of beneficence. All the moral attributes of man are wrought into the soul as inseparable elements and vigorous habits, under

external difficulty and obstacle and discouragement and labour and blandishment. Shut up a man in still seclusion, to deep meditation, to soul-exercises and effervescences, if you would make him a pale, moral pigmy. If you would construct and mould him into a glorious being of giant heart, bring him out to the sun ; let the winds sweep over him ; let the storms rock him ; let the tides dash him ; let the currents take him and drift him and peril him. Great Christians were never wholly or chiefly made in retirement, any more than great captains in genteel saloons, or great navigators on board dismantled receiving-ships, moored to the wharves of elegant cities. The stirring scenes where religion calls men into action incessant and arduous, are certainly the places to educate true moral heroes. Out of great tribulation, where all was struggle and labour, came they who are glorious in heaven.

Such is the influence of the practical character of religion in promoting both interior godliness and the great public virtues. It is not asserted here that this method of active Christian labour is the only one of fostering noble, pious qualities. It is not intimated that much time alone with God is not absolutely essential to growth in grace. Close, warm, frequent communion with Heaven is entirely indispensable. An additional manner of cultivating the heart is all that is here suggested. When other efforts have nearly failed, and one of Christ's disciples has been left frigid and sterile, new labours of love and augmented works of faith have often sent great life and love down into his spirit. Every blow of his arm in the service of God has started a new gush of the spiritual current into and out of his heart, and sent a living and waking thrill through his whole moral being. Piety, on the other hand, confined in the soul, is warmed only to be evaporated by its own ebullitions ; is kept under a bushel only to be suffocated ; is withdrawn from circulation only to become a rust-eaten coin ; is stopped in a pool only to grow stagnant or freeze.

These observations in reference to the existence and valuable influence of the practical element in Christianity, have many substantiations in the Scriptures. On this subject the testimony of the Bible is clear and emphatic. Not every one, taught our Saviour, not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven. Said Christ, in another place, I must work the works of him that sent me. It was a world of works when he fulfilled his mission ; the mission itself was a mission of works. By works is faith made perfect ; faith without works is dead, writes an apostle. Do works meet for repentance, is a Divine injunction. Blessed, it is alleged in the Re-

velation, blessed are the dead who die in the Lord ; they rest from their labours, and their works do follow them. My Father worketh hitherto, and I work. A sublime truth ; an illustrious example ! It is another scriptural proof and recognition of the practical nature of Christianity, that the heaven for which it proposes to prepare us, is presented as a scene of immense, unceasing, vigorous, universal engagement ; that every resident spirit is described as only a concentrated, energizing, everlasting activity, whom every evolving age of eternity will call to more crowded, more august occupation.

The practical element of Christianity renders it specially suited to the present times of unusual action and progress. Amid the universal enthusiasm now prevalent, religion is decidedly the greatest excitement ; amid the vast stir and advancement, it is the most stirring and progressive agency ; among all agitations, the greatest agitator ; among all things revolutionary, the boldest innovator.

It would be proper, in showing how fitted Christianity is to our stirring era, to refer to the very special and valuable development of purity and of power which it is itself likely to receive in the excited and crowded scene where it is now called to act. But our immediate concern is with the fact that into this great Babel the Gospel is competent to introduce all needed excitement, aggressiveness, direction, order and righteousness. Be it so that human passion is pushing into unheard-of schemes, avarice making bolder attempts for gain than ever before, ambition playing more desperate games for place and power, love of pleasure levying wider and more imperious contributions for sensual gratification. Be it so that the excitements and collisions and turmoils and hurrying rush of business exceed all that society has ever witnessed. Immense as these activities are, religion is perfectly adapted to them all, can control them all, can move with them all, can turn them all into the channel of its own still vaster and holier operations. Certainly a practical and active Christianity has special adaptations to the present age.

The practical element of Christianity offers no small encouragement to the ministers of the gospel. They preach an active and efficient religion. Their messages and appeals faithfully delivered will spread around them manifest and marvellous effects. They are permitted to see the work of their own hands. Stop, stop ! some one cries ; is not the sovereignty of Divine grace overlooked and forgotten in this remark ? Doth not the Scripture say, that Paul may plant and Apollos water, but God giveth the increase ? This is not forgotten. The sovereignty of Divine grace is unconditionally subscribed to. But the freeness and the fulness with which the same grace is made to attend upon

the faithful ministrations of the Divine word, are ever to be freshly remembered, as a high encouragement for Paul to plant and Apollos to water. The history of the church for eighteen hundred and fifty years is appealed to for proof that visible and real religious reformations, actual establishments and extensions of the church, have occurred under a kind Providence, to a great extent in proportion to the able and godly preaching of the Gospel. In connection with such preaching, have the sovereign riches of Divine grace been signally revealed and exerted. Let us stand then on the grand truth, corroborated by a thousand Scriptures and by innumerable providences, that religion faithfully preached is a most efficient practical transformer all around the preacher himself. Ministers, it is true, frequently witness seasons when they seem to labour in vain and spend their strength for nought; when they are constrained to cry, "Who hath believed our report, to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?" But as in nature so in morals, there are often processes and advancements which are silent and unobserved. We go out in the spring-time, when the world is waking into life, and we cannot see the actual growing of a single germ, spire or plant. Let only a few days pass, and nature will be found to have put on, as if by rapid creation, a gorgeous, luxuriant vegetation. So under the able and godly preaching of the word, without apparent, incipient movements or manifested causes, all invisibly and noiselessly, will a rich moral scene frequently be discovered to have sprung up and spread itself abroad to greet and gladden Christ's desponding servants. All godly ministers shall reap if they faint not. Rejoicing shall they come bearing sheaves, golden, ripe, abundant.

In respect to private Christians, it is a just expectation that they bear much fruit. The religion they profess being remarkable for its outward, striking, important effects, certainly labours, sacrifices, reformations, moral progress should be ever understood to be inseparable from their lives. Imbued with the energetic, enterprising spirit of Christianity, where they find in the great moral field no harvest, they will push the plough, scatter the seed, cultivate, protect and make one; when they find one already ripe, they will put in the sickle with a strong arm and bind up the sheaves. Great things are to be done; they will go forth and do them. Life weareth away; what their hand findeth to do, they will do quickly and with their might.

ART. VII.—REMARKS ON THE IDEA OF RELIGION,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL QUESTIONS, BY D. KARL LECHLER, CHAP-
LAIN OF THE INSANE ASYLUM AT WINNEN-
THAL.

BY REV. WILLIAM A. STEARNS, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

[This Article is from the last number of the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1851. In giving it an English dress, considerable condensation has been attempted, and a few passages altogether omitted, as unimportant to the subject. By the preparation of this treatise for the press, an endorsement of all its thoughts and shadings of thought is not intended; it is presented to the readers of the *Bibliotheca* simply as an able discussion of a most important question, and as showing the present tendencies of the German mind in its sounder theological circles. On the subject of the active and passive will, and on the relations and forces of the church as a Divine organism, its complexion is Lutheran; but the position that religion is a LIFE supernaturally and divinely imparted, and that the appropriate sphere for the workings of this life is in and through an organized kingdom of God, no evangelical theologian of whatever school will deny.]

Is religion a certainty of the understanding, of the feelings, or of the will? Is there a single side of the soul's life into which, as an element of the same, it can be inserted? What is the relation of religion to other manifestations of this life? And how, from the idea of religion, can all those circumstances, activities, ordinances, &c., which are necessarily connected with it, be developed? On such and such like questions, numerous inquiries respecting the nature of religion have latterly turned. Especially from the time that rationalism and supernaturalism began to desert the theological field, two views have stood forth in opposition to each other, that of Schleiermacher, which explains religion as something belonging to the feelings, and that of Hegel, which maintains it to be a kind of knowing. The contest between the two need not be considered as yet completely settled. Both systems have always a number of valiant champions on the plain, and the efforts to transfer the scientific strife to another domain, though in some respects important, have been attended with no durable result. The doctrine of Schleiermacher, especially, demands the concession, first, that on the psychological ground which forms the basis of its idea of religion, a dogmatic system has been erected, which may be considered the fullest scientific apprehension of Christianity, contemplated from the position of

the evangelical creed, yet given ; and second, that its fundamental thoughts, more than those of any other system since Kant, have penetrated into the common views of Christian life. A notion of religion which resolves the whole system of dogmatics into statements respecting the devout frames of the Christian mind, and thereby destroys all security for the objective truth of the same, must certainly meet with great opposition on the side of an objective science. It is readily confessed that in this way scientific theology would be in danger of entirely losing its value, because faith in the foundation of it would be grounded, not on something existing without itself, absolutely certain in and of itself, but on a mere inward persuasion. The school of Hegel, under such circumstances, might boast, not without reason, having rescued the honour of science, for it has been acknowledged from the beginning as unquestionable, and might be proved with dialectic demonstration, not only that the absolute which forms the object of religion, is something absolutely certain, but also that an adequate knowledge is essential to the human spirit. It was not yet clear, however, what position should be accorded to religion in distinction from philosophy, when both had to do with a knowledge of the absolute. In the first place, religion was held for an incomplete form of philosophy ; this form, also, was considered unessential, though without any intention to represent its *real meaning* as unessential. But further investigation made it evident, that this supposed difference between meaning and form was a mere delusion. It was evident that religion must be conceived of, both in form and meaning, as an indispensable member of the whole intellectual life, and so be considered equivalent to philosophy, or, the equivalence of its meaning must be allowed. On the principle of consecutive thinking, the former was impossible, for, according to the fundamental principles of Hegel, which both in form and meaning embrace an essential knowledge of the absolute, this knowledge was the province of philosophy alone. Feuerbach, consequently, sought room for religion in the lower forms of intellectual life, and found it in the fancy and soul. These, moreover, yield only their lowest activities for the production of religion. For the soul was in his view only the place for the peculiar, selfish emotions of man, for which fancy might furnish the material ; so that religion at last was nothing more than the satisfaction of the finite necessities of man, consequently differing only in degree from fleshly lust. This is the extreme point at which religion can still be allowed the name of science, and beyond which nothing further deserving of attention has been undertaken.

We must not, however, pass by in silence an attempt which has been made in the Hegelian school, though from the outset,

with entirely different premises. It is the treatise of Tzeller, in the Tübingen Theological Annals of the Year 1845, in which at first this theoretic idea of religion was entirely set aside: the effort to assign one of the three acknowledged intellectual powers to religion was given up, and religion was defined as a pathological relation of person to person. In the meanwhile, this scholar of Hegel found it impossible to keep in the new track. According to him, the object of religion is the intuition of God. But this he knew not how to define, better than as a perfect knowledge of God. Thus his investigation slid off into the old track, and that, too, just as quietly as if nothing had happened. But Tzeller is not the first who has attempted in vain to escape the magic circle of those three fundamental faculties. Many a one before him, through the co-ordination of the three powers or through the invention of a fourth, or in some other way, has striven to break the scientific connection, and the consequence has been that they either explained nothing, or before they were aware of it, fell back again into one of the three tracks already mentioned. As in other cases, so here, conclusions may be drawn from the past in respect to the future. The history of theology and philosophy shows that every one who has thought seriously upon the nature of religion, has come to the conclusion that it consists either in *knowing*, *feeling* or in *acting*. If, in order to give a greater certainty of the definition chosen, any one should prefer to represent religion as not belonging exclusively to either one of the intellectual faculties, but partially embracing the others, the result would be the same in this as in every other vivid perception. To philosophize is, indeed, an action of the understanding or of the reason. But who could philosophize without repeated acts of *the will* to do it, or without a feeling of pleasure, resulting from the action of the understanding? The question then is just this: What in reality is religion? In which side of the subjective life does it have its root or its seat, as some express it? This question cannot be passed by. Religion is actually a manifestation which proceeds from the human soul. Room must be made for it, therefore, whether it is included in one of the faculties already known, or in some new power discovered for it. Now it is very remarkable that, up to the present time, neither course has been successfully taken. We might be allowed, no doubt, to enumerate in their order the various efforts which have been made to reach the true idea of religion—and to subject each attempt successively to an examination—from the Church-fathers down to the Reformation, and from thence through Bacon and Descartes to Schleiermacher and Elwert, Hegel and Tzeller, Twesten, Nitzsch, &c. Whoever knows the history of our science, even in a moderate degree, will be readily reminded of the peculiar course the religious idea has already passed through.

With the discovery of each new system, religion has been accordingly transferred to a different section of the intellect, and so, very properly, personifies in itself the restlessness of scientific development. As far as collecting and examining views already historical is concerned, much has been done in several recent treatises, especially in that of Elwert, published in the *Tübingen Theological Annals* in 1835. And our learned predecessors need not be surprised, if we take the liberty to avail ourselves occasionally of their labours. But at the same time, we hope by a more extended discussion, by drawing a sharper definition of what has already been brought forward, to render science some humble service. We shall endeavour, therefore, first of all, *to subject to a new examination the three psychological explanations of the nature of religion.*

As to the proposition, that religion cannot consist in knowing, it is perfectly evident that equal degrees of knowledge may exist together with very different degrees of devotion, and that so the rule of Schleiermacher will apply, viz., That which does not form the measure of a thing in its variations cannot be received as its real measure. This assertion has a scriptural foundation in 1 Cor. xii. 8, where the gift of the *γνώσις* is represented as conferred upon one and not upon another (except in an inferior degree); while at the same time the religious character of the person does not bear a corresponding proportion, as the Apostle expressly adds *ἡ γνώσις φύσις*.

It must be confessed, on the other hand, that such a relation exists between knowledge or cognition and devotion, that a certain degree of knowledge, for instance a knowledge of sin, is absolutely necessary to devotion. Devotion, indeed, not unfrequently arises from intelligent thinking, especially among men constitutionally adapted to intellectual action, and that too even where the mental faculties are not disproportioned to each other. Among such persons, it is worthy of remark, that their devotion is affected by their knowledge, more than by anything else. The sermon, for example, which in others excites the liveliest emotions, influences them chiefly through the instruction which it affords, and they are best edified by discourses of a scientific character. Common experience also teaches, that knowledge and devotion have more to do with each other, than the reasoning of the followers of Schleiermacher would lead us to suppose. But of much more importance is the teaching of the Scriptures, where, for example, Christ says, John viii. 31, *ἐὰν ὑμεῖς μένητε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ, ἀληθῶς μαθηταὶ μου ἐστέ, καὶ γνώσεσθε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς*. It is undeniable, that here knowledge is set forth as the root of Divine life, of true freedom, whatever meaning you may attach to the word *ἀλήθεια*. The truth, to which clearness of thinking unquestionably belongs, is

not so much felt as known and understood, just as light is not felt but seen. Of the same import is the passage, John xvii. 3, where Christ sets forth the *ζωὴ αἰώνος* as consisting in a knowledge of the only true God, and of Jesus Christ whom he has sent (*γινώσκωσι*). Passages of similar meaning may be brought forward in great numbers. They are found not only in the four Evangelists, but also in the writings of Paul, for instance, 1 Cor. iii. ; also James v. and elsewhere. Should any one say in opposition, that here the sacred writers are speaking of a living, that is, of a practical knowledge, of a knowledge which implies action, the peculiar nature of religion as here set forth would still continue to consist in thinking, the practical part being only a property or result of the intellectual. Besides, no critic of the Schleiermacher school could intend to divest knowledge of its living nature in order to make an impassable gulf between it and religion. Otherwise, not only must the possession of religion be denied to a great part of Christendom, especially to the pure Christian Gnostics of the Alexandrian church, to all the speculative mystics of the Romish and German churches, but a circuitous mode of interpretation must be adopted, for a great number of Scripture passages, such as even the peculiar exegesis of Schleiermacher would not justify. Letting these results stand as preliminaries, and engaging to attempt, further on, a solution of apparent contradictions, we now proceed to the second question, viz. Does religion consist essentially in action ?

If religion is action, say they, then it is either equal to morality or not. In the latter case, both would be equal to a third, or one be subordinate to the other. Now religion cannot be a part of morality, otherwise there would be a morality which is not of a religious nature. Nor can morality be a part of religion, for everything which is religious is also moral. In case of their equality and common subordination to a third, the difference is only in form, religion and morality being only different expressions of one and the same meaning. But there may be moral actions which are not religious. The same action may proceed from religion or be performed without religion ; and in the same person there is frequently a different degree of morality and religiousness.

If we have rightly understood these statements, that is at last actually received which was at first rejected, viz. that there may be a morality without religion, and consequently a religiousness without morality. This they will not expect us to confess. A religiousness which is not moral does not deserve the name, but is a degeneracy and perversion of the nature of religion.

But ought we not to distinguish somewhat between the not moral and the immoral ? Such an inquiry is proper where the

question turns upon the contrariety of things belonging to the impersonal and the personal life. But within the dominion of the personal and self-conscious spirit, such a separation is wholly unknown. But in fact, there is a peculiar difficulty in thus setting religion and morality as opposites to each other. Man has everywhere and for a long time been accustomed to work scientifically, with both names and with the conceptions corresponding to them. But what shall we say if it should appear necessary to subject these elements themselves, which they receive as given positions, to a more careful investigation before they can be applied to the operations of thought, and it should become apparent, that by this means only, a position is obtained on the firm ground of a clear conception?

What, then, properly speaking, is morality? It appears to us that by it is commonly understood the irreproachable character of outward conduct, conformable to the law of good, so far as this conduct proceeds from an inward principle. In this case legality, in which the latter addition, viz. inward principle, is wanting, forms the contrast to morality; and then morality, by which is signified, not an objective law, but the inward intentions corresponding to it, has those inward intentions for its measuring rule. Morality is good action for goodness' sake. Legality is good action for the sake of some advantage, or, what in principle amounts to the same thing, action to which one is impelled by fear of a penalty. Works of human love, for example, when they are actually done out of love to man, and not for the sake of some honour or emolument, also professional fidelity, frugality, &c., may be considered as belonging to morality. If this is morality, then of course there is little difficulty in showing that moral actions can just as well spring from a pure, natural emotion, as from religion, that is, from faith, love to God, or generally speaking from man's relation to God. Otherwise you must deny to loving an enemy, to professional fidelity, &c. by an atheist, not only its actual value, but in the end indeed its actual being; and such like actions, where they do not spring from a sense of religion, must be considered as absolutely not moral. But under these circumstances, what becomes of Christian ethics? If the first is actually and essentially different from the other, then we have no less than three kinds of morality, viz. that which is independent of all religion, that which springs out of any religion whatever, and that which belongs to the Christian religion. According to this, Christian ethics might properly have three or at least two parts, one common to it with heathen religions and at the same time with downright infidelity, and another peculiar to itself. To the latter might be attributed, for example, prayer in the name of Jesus, participation in the sacraments, in the

work of missions, and the like, for which there is unquestionably a place in Christian ethics. To the former, on the other hand, belong all those actions which one not a Christian performs, when he does them out of an inward principle. Now to distinguish these two kinds of morality from each other, we propose to use the word "moral," for all that which is commonly connected with morality, but to designate the peculiar morality of the Christian religion by the title of super-moral, after the example of a high-sounding term in dogmatics, where in like manner it is usual to speak of the rational and the super-rational. This does not entirely relieve us, however, from difficulty, for we shall have to find a similar distinction for the externals of Christian morality for which we have no designation at hand. Indeed, we are in the same condition that supernatural theology formerly was. For any one might reasonably ask us whether this *super-moral* were something moral or something not moral; whether morality without this super-moral could be a whole and independent existence, or whether by the incoming of the latter quality an essential change was experienced, and the like? We are not in a position to remove these objections.

But this is not all. Morality, say they, is good action proceeding from an inward principle. What, then, is inward principle? Fear of punishment, desire of gain, are one kind of inward principle. It ought perhaps to be called such a principle as lies in the very nature of the case. But in the nature of human free-agency, the principle is unquestionably included, that every action is attended with a corresponding consequence, good with a good, evil with an evil, consequence. For all that appears, then, thus far, fear or venality might be an inward principle. We are not willing to regard the subject from so low a point of view as to consider the consciousness of having done good as no reward, the acquisition of substantial advantage as the only motive to right action, and so esteem sickness as a greater punishment than an evil conscience, nay, even disconnect the latter from the idea of punishment altogether, and exclude a good conscience from the idea of advantage.

The question here arises, Does an action cease to be truly moral, when it springs from a desire for the blessings of everlasting life, yea, for the approbation of God, or, on the other hand, from fear of everlasting punishment, of exclusion from the presence of God? These however, according to the commonly-received ethical idea, are not internal principles. Here the formula is again forced into service, that you must love and do good, for the sake of the good, and that such conduct is morality, in the fullest acceptation of the term. But we know, indeed, no proposition so much adapted to bring confusion into moral

philosophy and build up the scientific edifice, not upon a sandy foundation, but right into the fog, as this. For in the first place, the question would be, whether love to the good in its highest personal essence, that is, love to God, and the act of good for the sake of God, may not be a higher form of morality than love to a mere abstract idea of good. Secondly, it might be very difficult to explain how a man could be in a position to do good for the sake of the good. For no one performs an action merely to have done it—that would be to act without an object: but he has some end in view; either that humanity may be improved, and then he performs his action, not out of love to the good, but for humanity's sake; or that he himself may be improved, in which case he has done good for his own sake, out of love to himself, and not out of love to the good. In view of this and similar consequences, resulting from the distinction usually made between religion and morality, we cannot agree with the fundamental principle of the above-mentioned explanation. The case is the same when we carefully consider the individual action belonging to the department of morality. Science, as it appears to us, falls into a great error when it considers actions, usually esteemed as morally good, the common property of all those who possess the powers of a free moral agent. *Duo si faciunt idem, non est idem.* This is nowhere else so true as it is here. The moral actions of a Christian are distinguished from those of a person not a Christian, not merely in the form, or through the incoming of a peculiar element as religious feeling, but "*toto celo*;" for they have an entirely different beginning, middle, aim and end. The atheist, for example, who bestows alms by the power which the natural man possesses of doing a thing or leaving a thing undone, at his pleasure, does it for the relief of a temporal necessity; and consequently that both his own temporal welfare and that of the receiver may be benefitted thereby. In the latter case, his action rests on love to the creature, which takes precedence of love to God, in principle excluding it altogether; and the consequence is, so far as it depends upon the giver, that his own eternal salvation is imperilled, the peculiar honour of God neglected, and the whole Divine arrangement of the world is destroyed. The Christian, on the contrary, so far as he acts like a Christian, bestows alms out of love to God, to which love to the creature is absolutely subordinate; bestows alms in consequence of, and according to, the working of the Holy Spirit in him; bestows them for the promotion of the glory of God, and then, secondly, for the relief of distress; bestows them, finally, with the actual consequence that God's name is honoured thereby, and his own eternal salvation promoted. The work of a Christian differs

from a similar work performed by an infidel, not merely in respect to the person for whom it is performed, but differs in its inmost nature and substance, the two things, indeed, having nothing in common but form and name. It is not, however, asserted that he only is in a position to do good, who has become conscious of a Christian life within him. Moral good, in its concrete reality, in other words, the Holy Spirit, so far as it produces free actions conformable to the law of God, is an objective power, which is also efficacious, in the preliminary stages of moral development, and must be acknowledged paramount, wherever human action depends on a principle of life not in opposition to the Holy Spirit. Nor is it difficult by this means to perceive correspondences to the true good, in other words, a reflection of Christian morality, in some who are destitute of the Christian life.* In such cases, however, inward independence in moral action, proper free-agency which is conditioned on the living communion with God, and is the essential, fundamental principle of good action, is wanting; so that the scientific result is always the same. But in contemplating this result, we hold that the question, whether the nature of religion consists in action, cannot be lost sight of, so long as you adhere to the rationalistic or deistic idea of morality, so long as you do not limit the expression morality, and place the living Christian idea, which we express by the word righteousness, as the only scientific idea, in its place.

However the aforesaid question may be viewed, we are still unable to answer it in the negative. When, for example, admission to the kingdom of heaven is made to depend upon doing the will of God, the essence of religion is clearly placed in action. Still more to the point is the expression of John: do the truth, compared with another, the truth shall make free. The expression of James, that the man shall be blessed in his deed, may be taken perhaps as the most decisive proof-text, for the practical idea of Religion. Moreover, no one will doubt that sin is a practical conception, nor that conversion, implying an entire change of the whole religious condition, is brought about by an act of the will. Is it even evident that no manifestation of the religious life, certainly no progress in the same, can be thought of, except as connected with, conditioned on, and produced by some action? Progress in knowledge, for example, is conditioned on a determination to the same, and the degree of this knowledge depends upon the strength of this determination; so prayer, the

* In a similar way, the Christian is subjected to the influence of the unsanctified part of his nature, so that his works and feelings proceed partly from mere nature, and are consequently of perishable value, and partly from nature intermingled with grace.

production of artistic exhibitions, such as songs, orations, and the like. Thus we have neither in the Scriptures nor in experience any reason for supposing that religion does not consist essentially in action.

Because in the school of Schleiermacher, religion can neither be knowledge nor action, its disciples infer, as the only thing that remains, that it belongs to immediate self-consciousness; in other words, to the feelings. Feeling and consciousness are not properly the same thing; but by the word consciousness, we mean something deeper, more comprehensive, than by the word feeling. But it is also evident, that consciousness, as often as a definite psychological application is made of it, might be transformed again into feeling, and so both be nearly synonymous. We, therefore, shall make use of the latter expression, in which the Schleiermacher doctrine first received an intelligible form. Religion, say they, is feeling. Proof: in the first place, universal intuition, when it relates to the heart. This accords with the old Lutheran definition; according to which, religion is essentially *dilectio Dei*. But love is a feeling; so also repentance, remorse, dependence on God, joy in God; all these are manifestations of pious feeling. Furthermore, prayer and devotion, which bring to view the proper nature of religion, are of the same character. Most evidently, it is added, the correctness of this apprehension becomes apparent in states of higher devotion, as trances, visions, speaking with tongues, all which are evidently set forth in the New Testament, as belonging to the highest degree of religious perfection. There is then no pious condition, in which feeling might not exist, while there are those in which knowledge and action have but little if any influence. As to the objection, that in this, religion would have a purely subjective character, it is answered, that knowledge is not purely objective, nor can it be denied, that religion, in order to permeate the whole being, should be defined as subjectively as possible.

By this explanation, we are brought against the peculiar fashionable obscurities and errors of the times, the avoidance of which is of the highest importance to theological science. We here refer especially to the ideas of love and prayer just presented. We affirm that love is not strictly a feeling. On the contrary, it is the highest kind of action, the most powerful and comprehensive operation of will. For it consists in the coming forth out of the proper I, in an entire renunciation of the I, in itself considered, in the giving one's self away to another person or assemblage of persons. It is wishing to be and to live in others, and a course of action corresponding thereto. Love is never necessarily itself a feeling. It is indeed, according to human experience, conditioned on a feeling of want. But this

is not the case with God. On the contrary, you have to suppose that in the creation of man, through a resolution of Divine love, such a relation of God to man was first established, that in consequence God, without his fellowship with man, would experience a sense of want. In like manner must the sense of want among men be awakened by a resolution, so that the giving one's self away to another being precedes all sense of necessity of thus giving one's self away, and the former never can be fully explained as arising out of the latter. Love is further accompanied by feelings of joy, blessedness, &c. But these feelings are not one and the same as love. It may indeed be accompanied by feelings which are contrary to its own nature. For it is characteristic of love to strive after a perfect harmony between the loving and the loved. If this harmony cannot be reached, then love is accompanied with a feeling of dissatisfaction which appears in the form of an all-consuming restlessness. But love itself is not consequently diminished, but perhaps becomes stronger than ever. Love may come to the determination to renounce the beloved object, without itself ceasing to exist, so that a rest follows, which has nothing in common with the desire of love. Even when love has attained its desired end, it is by no means an absolute feeling of satisfaction, but the feeling of anxiety, of sorrow, &c., is connected with the most perfect abandonment of self to the object beloved. If now such various feelings can be connected with love, and the several kinds of feeling rise and fall again, without love itself undergoing any essential change thereby, then it is certain that love itself is not synonymous with feeling, but it is something which transcends feeling, which controls it; in other words, love is an act of the free-will.

Similar remarks may be made respecting prayer. This is used in our later science in a sense the most subjective possible, and we must say in a sense the *weakest* possible. If prayer is nothing more than an expression of devout feeling, then it is either an expression of anguish, of want, or of joy and contentment, according to the momentary character of a person's state of mind. Certainly it could not be an address, arising from a determination to pray in consequence of an express command of God, without any reference to the presence or the absence, the strength or the weakness, of inward emotion. The same may be said of striving and wrestling in prayer, especially as it occurs in times of temptation; for we fight against hostile powers, not by feelings, but by acts of the free-will. But prayer is really a very active exercise. So far as it utters itself in supplication and intercession, it is the expression of an earnest desire, and so it is a manifestation of will. A good man who finds himself unable, in obedience to the Divine command, to break down his own will,

prays. He endeavours to make the will of another subservient to himself, just as the person who commands, only not in the same way. So it is with prayer. Its design is, to give the will of God a definite direction towards our salvation; also to make his will serviceable to the human will, and consequently to exert a definite influence upon the Divine government. This idea of prayer is not too bold, but as all the exhortations and promises enforcing the duty, and especially as the history of Jacob's wrestling by night, go to show, it is the simple Scriptural idea; and it is one of the principal faults of the doctrine of Schleiermacher, that the true idea of prayer has been so completely abandoned.

This false conception of the nature of prayer appears somewhat more plausible when applied to adoration, thanksgiving, &c. But this plausibility has no foundation except that, in adoration, feeling becomes a very powerful element of the devotional exercise, it being a high form of spiritual manifestation, and therefore including within itself a high degree of mental concentration. But adoration is in itself likewise an act of the will, in one of its highest exhibitions. For it is the giving one's self away to God, the declaration of unconditional submission, and that profound reverence which is his due. Hence, also, these utterances of the spirit in the Sacred Scriptures are represented as an offering, consequently removing them from the circle of mere feeling. What, on the contrary, in modern speech, is understood by adoration, or as it is more commonly expressed, by devotion (we here distinguish between the modern sentimental use of the word, and the true Christian use of it), is a condition, in which the natural man commits himself intentionally to his obscure religious feelings, and in this obscurity finds enjoyment. Prayer, then, in its twofold form, need not be looked upon as proceeding from a consciousness of want on the part of man. Pure Christian prayer has a different origin. It is the fruit of obedience to a Divine command: Thou hast said, Seek ye my face,—Thy face, Lord, will I seek, Ps. l. Ask and it shall be given you,—I will that men pray in all places, &c. And out of this obedience arises an independent inclination, which, however, constantly needs to be enlivened, and newly awakened by the spirit of obedience.

They say further that repentance, confidence in God, &c., are feelings and are of a religious character. That this, however, as respects repentance, is not the case, we have striking evidence in the repentance of Judas. There is no need of any knowledge of God in order to experience some forms of repentance. It may exist in an atheist as well as in a Christian. Confidence in God is of course a religious feeling, and joy in God is also a

Christian sentiment. But can a dogmatic view of God, received objectively from Him, be less religious in itself considered, than these feelings? Finally, it is evident in respect to these feelings that religion, when essentially feeling, is also a matter of fact; as this cannot be denied, it is sufficient to establish the proposition in question.

If a person should now bring forward ecstasies and visions to prove that religion consists in feeling, the case may be examined on its own merits. Vision is a peculiar kind of supernatural percipency, which can hardly be brought under the common psychological nomenclature, but belongs rather to the theoretic departments of intellectual life. Ecstasy is not a mere elevation of feeling, but according to the words, 2 Cor. xii. 3, *εἶρε ἐν σώματι οὐκ οἶδα, κ. τ. λ.*, is such an extraordinary departure from usual conditions, and appears so completely disconnected from customary religious development, that it cannot properly be taken into the account. The case is different in respect to speaking with tongues. That this is a purely religious phenomenon, in which thinking and acting predominate, almost in opposition to feeling, cannot be denied. According to Paul, this gift has merely a selfish, personal value, and does not belong to the highest conditions of the religious life.

Finally, we have a word more to say against the doctrine in question, drawn from the commonly-received view of religion, as a matter of *the heart*. Warmth, inwardness, animation, with which Divine truth is received or expressed, and by which it can be commonly ascertained whether religion may be a matter of the heart or not, is represented as always belonging to the feelings. But experience does not indicate that where there is the greatest warmth, there is always the highest degree of religion. On the contrary, there are innumerable examples of highly excited and by no means hypocritical feeling, in connection with which may be found an unexpectedly small measure of the otherwise necessary characteristics of the religious life; for example, knowledge, conscientiousness, &c. On the other hand, frequently a singularly moderate measure of feeling, a certain coolness of the understanding, hides from view a very strong and pure devotion. As to the second case, it need not be overlooked, that the expression "heart" is applied just as correctly to a high degree of courage, spirit of enterprise, and the like. No one would understand by a hearty warrior, a man full of feeling. The expression "heart" denotes here nothing more nor less than the centre of the soul's life, the concrete expression of life, without regard to its psychological analysis, or its more external parts.

While almost all the arguments, according to which religion

consists in feeling, have by degrees disappeared, there are certain opposing considerations which must not be passed over in silence. First of all is the fact, that while the *term* feeling is *never* found in the Scriptures, its *meaning* is *rarely* found in them. What comes nearest to it are such expressions as these: joy, rejoice in the Lord, sorrow, godly sorrow, &c., in distinction from the sorrow of the world, but especially the term blessedness. Of these expressions, only the latter occurs so frequently, and in such clear positions, that we can make any use of it in our investigation. It must, indeed, be shown, that blessedness and religion are essentially the same. That such is not the case has been already proved. For prayer to Christ, for instance, which brings blessedness along with it, only as a consequence or as an attendant feeling, but does not involve the idea of blessedness, can be offered without this feeling. Nor is it by any means true, that a person is religious in proportion to his happiness, but, on the contrary, there is frequently much religion where there is but little joyous feeling. Religion, then, is not the same thing as blessedness or happiness, and so in this respect is not feeling.

In the next place, out of this æsthetic idea of religion arise many highly-suspicious consequences. If religion were feeling, then the fine arts, when employed on religious subjects, would furnish the highest form of religion, higher even than prayer, preaching and improvement of the word, the sacramental supper, &c. For art is neither a matter of the will nor of the understanding, but of feeling, because it has to do with beauty. Accordingly, the chorals of Luther would be more religious than his sermons; a piece of passion music or an "ecce homo" superior in this respect to the discourses of Augustine; St. Peter's church at Rome would express more devotion than the magnificent religious service performed in it. Then further, according to a commonly-received opinion, the female sex live more in feeling than the male sex; consequently female piety would be a higher expression of religion than masculine piety, which concerns itself more in objects of knowledge and action. And when through advancing years feeling subsides, and everything, even that which is of a religious nature, comes to be considered more as an object of reflection and action, piety would diminish. It would become less and less as age increased, till its very spirit might go to the grave with the form that contained it. With such an idea of religion, the entire order of the religious life would be reversed. Indeed, so long as feeling is taken in the sense of Schleiermacher, or in the polemic sense of the Hegelian school, religion itself is in fact destroyed. For if feeling is the proper seat of religion, then, as has been frequently remarked, in opposition to Schleiermacherism, the rise of a theology

and of a Divine service would be impossible. That feeling cannot be described in words and ideas is an acknowledged proposition. As the most it can do, it may suffer itself to be translated into the peculiar language of feeling, poetry, music, and, most of all, the fine arts. But here it cannot bear the touchstone of truth, and finally turns out to be a failing as before. Moreover, it is not true that feeling really produces fellowship. That this is not the fact, the Apostle teaches when speaking of the gift of tongues, 1 Cor. xiv. But in truth, feeling is just as much repellant as connective. For, whenever there is a necessity for sharing joy and sorrow with others, the ultimate ground of this communication is not the advancement of an objective end, but the advancement of one's own life; while for the undertaking of a common enterprise, in which every one bears his own proportion, there would be no ground whatever.

We cannot forbear alleging, against the æsthetic idea of religion, a one-sided subjectivity. That religion must be subjective, and that knowledge cannot be purely objective, because both would then lose their vitality, we are far from denying. But the objective can become subjective without ceasing to be objective. For a civil law, though not arising from the feeling of an individual citizen, yet when heartily received by the subject, becomes of course subjective, while it still retains its original objectivity.

If, now, we were to draw a conclusion from all that has been advanced, it would be this: that religion might consist in knowledge as well as in action and feeling; in other words, in neither of the three. We are not at all aided by their mere juxtaposition. If one should imagine the elements intermingled in an equal proportion, the question immediately returns, which element gives to the mixture its proper character? Or what is the result of this mixture, the fourth element arising out of the three? Absolute equality of mixture, is an indifference of elements, in respect to each other. Absolute equilibrium is death in the spiritual as well as in the physical life. An attempt has been made to discover a higher power than the three, in which the three may be united. Such an attempt, for instance, is the above-mentioned treatise of Tzeller, to which, before proceeding further, we must return.

Religion, according to Tzeller, is neither action, nor knowledge, nor feeling, but a pathological condition, in which everything turns on the personal relation in which the human being stands to God. It is a relation of person to person, of the finite subject to the absolute subject, and through this condition, the various theoretic and moral activities become religious. The great effort of the religious man, according to Tzeller, is to become

happy. This happiness consists in an intuitive vision of God, a perfect knowledge of the absolute Deity. Unquestionably the learned author, in these remarks, has opened some clear and correct views respecting the nature of religion. But, as we have already remarked, and as might have been supposed from the word, knowledge of Deity, he is treating of something comprehensible, viz. of knowledge. The end of religion is an adequate knowledge of the idea of God, which, according to his opinion, can be reached only by philosophy. If that is the end of religion, its beginning, its thus far concealed root, is no other than knowledge. While one treats in religion about the knowledge of an idea, he does not treat of a person; for, that a person is not an idea, and that an idea is not a person, even an Hegelian—from the view of the distinguished author—will not at this day presume to deny. For the peculiarity and independency of religion has here also as little continuity as elsewhere in the department of the Hegelian school. Moreover, Tzeller does not hold to the universal, philosophically inherent necessity of this knowledge of God as being a form of religion. For of what use is a lower form when there is a higher one in which it must be swallowed up? Can a want find place in the perfect to lean upon the imperfect? or shall that want as an absolute demand of personality be allowed to remain as an unexplained matter of fact? Where then is the absolute law of philosophy?

But indeed with those first most excellent remarks, only one side of religion comes into notice, and the investigation, if it had gone further, in the first beaten track, would have returned to the usual result. First of all, we must demand an explanation, how that pathological condition may be considered psychologically. Where the discourse is psychological, we imagine a *πάσχειν*, a suffering, a susceptibility, or something of the kind. Now a man is susceptible either while he perceives something, or while he allows some object to affect his desire, or while he is conscious of his own condition, as an individual or in connection with the whole, being determined by some person without. In which of the three last elements referred to is a person pathologically conditioned? We abide by the most conclusive of the expressions of Tzeller, that blessedness consists pathologically in this, that a person becomes conscious of his condition as it is determined by his relation to God, as being a condition corresponding to his nature. But in this case, religion seems to approximate feeling, and we stand again at the threshold of the idea of Schleiermacher. If it is said that neither of the three are meant, as Tzeller originally maintained, but something which comprehends the whole man, the expression "pathologic" stands in the way. For religion includes not merely conditions but

also activities, such as conversion, which under the given suppositions ought not to be considered as a pathological condition.

But what is of more importance, to be happy is not the exclusive interest of religion, nor even its highest interest. The practical, that is to say, the pastoral application of religious truth, may express the nature of religion, as though it were the chief care of man to obtain a sure hope of everlasting life. But science has reason enough in Scripture, as it has in common religious life, to seek out a still higher position. This is evident from the arrangement of the Lord's Prayer, and of the Ten Commandments. If the commandments having reference to the being, name and kingdom of God, are first put down, then those which direct individual and social life; and if in the second instance prayer is offered for hallowing the name of God, for the coming of his kingdom, for the doing of his will in heaven and on earth before the subjective need of forgiveness of sins, deliverance from temptation, &c., is thought of, then it cannot be denied that this by no means accidental arrangement must furnish the right point of view for the explanation of the religious idea. Accordingly, the effort of the religious man is not first, and still less exclusively, to obtain his own salvation, but that God may be honoured and his will may be done. Of course, the latter includes the former. For whenever the human individual does not prevent nor pervert the forth-going of the kingdom of God by opposition thereto, the blessedness of humanity as a whole is naturally furthered thereby. It may be said that the honour of God is secured, not only in them that are saved, but also in them that are lost; hence prayer for hallowing the name of God includes a confession that his name ought to be hallowed in the wicked, by their condemnation. But in the thought of hallowing the name of God is included also the thought of human salvation. The objective brings the subjective along with it; the former indeed produces the latter. The same however is not true of the subjective in relation to the objective, for it is not only possible but actually happens, that, for example, an individual prays for the pardon of his sins, without thereby and without therefore having a desire that the will of God may be done in the universe, and the kingdom of God universally established. But to return.

It is evident that, according to those passages which are used for the explanation of the religious idea, something more than a mere subjective perception must be obtained; an objective point of view must be found. How high this objectivity rises in the Scriptures, we have a remarkable instance in the earnest desire of Moses expressed in Ex. xxxii. 32: "Forgive them their sins, if not, blot me also out of thy book, which thou hast written." And in the words of the Apostle, Rom. ix. 3: "I could wish myself accursed from Christ, for my brethren, for my kindred according

to the flesh." Here, if anywhere, the highest degree of the religious life is in the right place. Such expressions must be understood as the almost superhuman concentration of all the powers of the religious life, or else as insanity. Still more conclusive is the thought expressed in Gal. iii. 13, where Christ becomes a curse for us, that the blessing may be conferred upon the heathen. While in the case of Moses and of Paul, &c., there is but a momentary thought of the renunciation of their own blessedness for the sake of that of others, in the latter case there is the actual accomplishment of this renunciation. One shrinks with awe from receiving the words in this amazing sense. Schleiermacher's doctrine of the untroubled felicity of Christ is entirely destroyed by it. But we cannot explain the deepest conceptions of Scripture on this point in such a way as to exclude the idea of real truth. Much better does our opinion, agreeably to the expression in Galatians, agree with the words of Christ on the cross, in which he represents himself as being forsaken of God, and with the nature of the agony in the garden of Olives, and also with Heb. iv. 15, where, according to the evident meaning of the author, an actual forsaking of Christ on the part of God is intended, though this forsaking is to be understood only as an actual withdrawal of heavenly felicity by a Divine act. Consequently, until a more satisfactory explanation of these very mysterious words is given, we claim them, in their full extent, on our side. Moreover, it appears to us that those expressions of Moses and Paul first find their true explanation, when we perceive that the actual banishment of Christ from God may serve for the real foundation of them. Perhaps we ought to add, that, if what those men desired had not actually been fulfilled in Christ, both of them would have attained in their thoughts to a higher degree of self-renunciation than Christ himself had attained in his act. Finally, there remains to us the passage, 1 Cor. xv. 28, where the *ἵεός τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν* is spoken of as the ultimate end of believing desire, in the realization of which a condition is brought to view, where the individual with his salvation completely in God ascends or descends, so to speak, in him. Whatever meaning may be given to this for ever unfathomable passage, thus much is evident from it, that, when the whole work of God is completed, believers together with Christ will then be united in a manner far transcending anything which has ever yet fallen within the circle of human consciousness.

If, now, we place together such Scripture passages as these on the scientific scale, numerous explanations of religion by Tzeller and others—which rising on the ground of a Scriptural theology are included in it—will be found too light, and it will appear in the course of our investigations, that the objective phenomena of religion demand much firmer foundations, in order to be ap-

plied to the construction of a valuable religious science. But that we have until now remained so far behind the demands, which the subject itself makes upon us, must not be attributed as a fault to individual philosophers and theologians, nor even to science itself. Tzeller's idea of religion, as also the Hegelian, and that of Schleiermacher, and others like them, are the offspring of their times. They are not merely the scientific setting, but they are the scientific reflections of religion, as it actually and practically existed at a given period. Theology and philosophy have described to us just what and only what they saw. We do not overlook the fact, that this scientific mode of viewing the subject, together with the phenomena of life out of which it springs, has struck its roots too deeply into the soil of our times, has spread too far abroad, and gone up too completely into the highest branches, to leave it possible for another system (which is just as much the result of an entirely altered state of the public life) to secure reception in the wider circles, or even to be clearly set forth or carried out to its logical results. In the meanwhile, we wish to collect such materials for a new construction of theological and philosophical science, as have been produced by the powerful revolutions of our later history, and to express our thoughts about the form of the contemplated construction. Perhaps we may hit the right point, or at least give an impulse to further inquiry.

If we now put together the various attempts at the transformation of the religious idea as they have lately been made, there appears in them a threefold effort, through which a threefold defect of the commonly-received notion may be corrected. Religion has been defined as a life, to avoid the one-sidedness of the psychological idea, according to which it would consist in knowing, feeling, or acting. It has been defined, again, as a fellowship, to avoid the one-sidedness which would belong to it, if taken as a property of the individual life. It has, finally, been defined as an act of God, to avoid the one-sidedness which would belong to it as proceeding from man, instead of the source of all existence, religion not excepted. By uniting these points of view, thus far considered important only in an individual way, a key may be found for solving our problem. We begin the argument with this last point.

There appears, indeed, in the first place, no reason why the idea of God should not be put forward in religion as well as in everything else which has to be referred to its ultimate cause. Religion is indeed a phenomenon which belongs to the nature of humanity; but as humanity is produced by a Divine act, so is religion. The Pauline proposition, that we are not sufficient to do or think anything as of ourselves, but that our sufficiency

is of God, and the other proposition, that it is God who worketh in us both to will and to do, must furnish the starting point for our idea of Religion. Religion is an act of the Holy Spirit—is an act of God. Instead of rising from a knowledge of the individual life to a knowledge of the collective life of Christian fellowship or of the church, and from thence to a knowledge of God and his more perfect manifestation, we receive the idea of God as the fundamental principle of all religious knowledge, and descend from that to the idea of the Church, and finally embrace the whole religious life in all its parts. This latter method should be taken as the foundation of the former; the objective view of religion serves for setting forth the subjective, not *vice versa*. Religion is a Divine act, a well-considered and predetermined manifestation by God of himself in humanity. Hence the possibility of explaining the fellowship of humanity, with God. This fellowship with God can no more be explained from the nature of humanity, nor indeed of the individual man, than the idea of God can be developed out of the idea of man. The existence of God is the cause of human existence. Consequently, fellowship with man must be first comprehended in the idea of God, not fellowship with God in the idea of man. That this is so, will be seen when we have proved the first part of the position. Our affirmation is, that the knowledge of God is first; self-knowledge, second. Humanity comes through the knowledge of God to its self-knowledge, and not through self-knowledge to the knowledge of God. The phenomenon, the obvious development of self-knowledge, not the nature of this entity, is now before us. If out of the fact of self-knowledge, the fact of the knowledge of God might be made to follow by logical development, then the latter would be only a property, an element of the former; the original would be only a part of the derived. "I am; I am, but not without God; therefore God is." That would be the conclusion of which this view is the foundation. But while I consider the idea of God, and refer it to the idea of the Ego, I invert the conclusion; the absolute and actual being is God, for my being is only possible and a subject of thought under the supposition that God is. So the supposition becomes clear, God is; but because my being is actually connected with the being of God, it follows that I also am. Self-consciousness cannot be equal to a consciousness of God, still less predominate over it, but must be subordinate to it, both in idea and fact.

If such is the case with these two opposing ideas, we must look for something intermediate, namely, the idea of Religion, to connect them together. The reference of the I to God in human self-knowledge, as in human life generally, comes not through the idea of the I, but first through the idea of God, the former

being derived from the latter. Concretely expressed, the fellowship of God with man is not established by man, but by God; out of this divinely-established fellowship of God with man springs then the fellowship of man with God. The influence of this apparently little change becomes obvious, as soon as we understand how to apply both the one perception and the other to the development of some theological opinion. If you proceed in the way marked out, there will be no difficulty in the explanation of such facts as the incarnation of Christ, the operation of the Divine Word, the Church and the Sacrament. Religion is a fellowship established by God between himself and humanity. The incarnation is a miraculous act, foreordained in the Divine arrangement of things, and in fulness of time accomplished, by means of which act, fellowship with God broken off by man, or neglected, might be restored. The Word is a divinely-appointed and necessary means for the foundation, construction, and vitalization of this fellowship. The same is true of the sacraments, only with this difference, that here God makes use of certain natural elements to accomplish his purposes. The church, considered as an organized whole, is a fellowship established or renewed by the Divine act. In all applications of this idea, the grand characteristic, without which these subjects cannot be understood, is the Divine act.

If now we seek to derive the same ideas out of religion as viewed by Schleiermacher, we stumble at the very first step. "Religion is an absolute feeling of dependence." But, can we derive out of this absolute feeling of dependence the incarnation or the sending of the Holy Spirit, even though we add to it a reference to Jesus of Nazareth? In other ideas, for instance, that of prayer, of repentance, of faith, &c., the derivation can be made without an apparent deficiency of logical consequence. But to the idea of religion now set forth, everything which forms an essential part of theology is directly referred; as in jurisprudence every subject is referred to the established idea of law.

The same is true with the Hegelian idea of religion as originally presented, where religion is set forth, in the form of its presentation, as the knowledge of the absolute; also with the opinion of Tzeller, according to which, religion is a pathological relation, relating exclusively to man's happiness. Never can it be shown that the Lord's Supper originated in consequence of any conceivable development of human reasoning. Nor is it possible for the church to refer its origin to man's desire of happiness. The latter supposition would be an absolute contradiction to historical fact, according to which the church is an ordinance of the Son of God, a fellowship founded on his authority, and sustained by his agency. The former case is positively ab-

surd, and affords nothing better than a scientific contradiction. The ideas above mentioned are actually not derivable from the system of Schleiermacher and Hegel, but are forced in, wherever there is a convenient place for them. Whatever might be developed out of the fundamental principles of the aforesaid schools, there would be, for example, in the Lord's Supper, only the desire of a person feeling himself absolutely dependent on Jesus, and referring his dependence to the supper, and the effects which the ceremonial produces upon him, &c. And when, finally, Hegel considers worship as an activity which is to be referred to no other than this same concrete principle, it is easy to see how entirely insufficient such a view of the nature of religion is, for the scientific construction of religious doctrine, when the very last trace of the influence of God upon man is excluded from worship and religion.

We hope, in what has been said, we have so clearly explained ourselves; that we shall not be charged with holding to a view of religion, by which God himself would be designated as religious. When we explain religion as an act of God manifesting and imparting himself to man, we do not say that this act of God himself springs from religion, but only that religion is created by this act. When God is the author of religion, he is no more on that account religious than he is worldly because he has created the world, or human because he has made man. The misunderstanding through which our principles might be reduced to an absurdity, rests on a change of religion, from the objective to the subjective sense, and will be entirely removed further on, when we come to speak about the expression, "Religion itself." But the scientific claim hitherto set up, speaks for itself.

Next to this first and principal claim we have a second to make. We have from the beginning avoided the expression, religion is a fellowship of God with man, and have used instead the word humanity. This word, man, seems to us here wholly insufficient; for neither in creation, nor in redemption, nor in the termination of the world, has God to do with this or that creature, in his individual capacity, but he has to do with an articulated whole, with an organism, with the individual members of this organism only as they *are* members of it, or if not members, then only as they are capable of becoming such. We imagine the creation of man not in this way, that God willed to call into being a certain limited number of individual personalities, in his image; but in this way, that from the beginning the question is about the presentation of a humanity which, considered in a downward direction, in its ever-recurring totality, should make out the head, the middle point and the connection of that part of our creation which is not in the Divine image,

but, in reference to what is above on the contrary, should be bound mutually together as an articulated whole, through its communion with God, and that too whether this connection may have been already completed in itself, or, on the supposition of an apostasy, by the incarnation of the Son of God. We think of the idea of the Divine image in man, not as if every man in his individual capacity were a complete image of God; this would be too atomical and mechanical. God's creation partakes much more of a universal life; the organic is an essential characteristic of his work from the greatest down to the least. It is not easy to see how a perpetual series of individual human creations would promote the revelation of God, when every new specimen would be merely a repetition of the preceding. We should rather say that every individual man reflects the Divine image only in part, the complete manifestation being realised only in the sum total of humanity, including every person from Adam and Eve down to the end of time. It is therefore easy to understand why a series of human generations must rise and fall in order to bring the thoughts of God into manifestation. Here then we have a sufficiently complete point of view for the historical development of humanity. It would moreover be entirely impossible, that the perfection of God should be mirrored in a single human being. This is conceivable only of that being who stands at the head of all humanity. Every other individual of the human race reveals only a part of the Deity. But wherever a part is truly present, the whole being connected with it is in some sense present also; hence it is not improper to say that every man is an image of God. As this must be confessed of individual persons, it is also true of individual families, tribes, nations, so that every people must be considered as a partial representation of the Divine being, but the whole human race together, the perfect representation. This is just what the sacred Scriptures say of the relation of the church as a whole, and of every individual member of the church to Christ. In every individual Christian, Christ must be formed; but in every one, as many passages show, especially those where the church is called the body of Christ, he must be formed in a peculiar, partial manner, in a manner which requires all the other members to complete the formation. The church, as a whole, not the individual Christian, is the body of Christ, as appears from 1 Cor. xii. 12. Exactly in this New Testament view may be found the biblical justification of the sentiment we have expressed concerning the image of God. For the church is not something absolutely new, but only the carrying out, through Christ, of the original plan of Divine manifestation, ordained from the beginning. Humanity was originally destined to be

what it has since become through Christ, and such it would have been if the apostasy had not intervened. In this we say nothing new, but maintain the pure biblical thought, that redemption is a second or new creation.

Humanity is thus out and out a body. According to this, we do not consider the progress of renewal in Christ as it is carried forward by the Word and ordinances, as if here and there an individual was newly created and appended to the existing whole with which previously he had no connection; but, because every man and every people is already a member in the great body politic of humanity, but this body is dead through the apostasy so that every new member brings death in a spiritual sense along with it, our question, therefore, generally speaking, respects the reviving of the body. The proper original power of humanity to produce personalities, that is to say, manifestations of God by his image in man, must be restored. The soul of humanity, or what is better, its spirit, its pneumatic power, must be awakened, new-created, in order that its organizing activity may be able to act again, as the body of Sarah was quickened anew, that it might be able to bring forth a human person in the natural sense. This comes to pass, through the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Through this act of God, the power of spiritual generation is restored again to the unfruitful body of humanity. The restoration commenced in an appointed organ of the body, in the people of Israel, and the body thus quickened in this most important organ becomes the first community. But by means of the articulated connection in which the whole humanity stands with the people of Israel, and this people again with the first fruits of the same, and by means of the living connection between these first fruits or the new humanity and its head, Christ, the whole humanity is ideally, or if you please mystically, vivified again. For Christ is not merely the life of Israel but of the whole world. Humanity is now transformed into the church. Humanity as such is renewed, not merely a small part of the individual persons belonging to it. From the very moment when Christ took away death reigning in it according to its nature, and imparted to it for the second time its original principles of life, the renewal began.

If now we compare these propositions with the commonly-received view, it will not be difficult to perceive the difference. The common view takes its rise from man as an individual, develops the various sides of his being, according to which he needs the complement, in order to realize his conception, that is, in order to become as an individual what he as an individual might become, and out of this necessity explains the social union constituting the religious fellowship which we call the church. Humanity, according to this, is not originally an inseparable articulated

whole, to which every individual man belongs, as a limb belongs to the body, and in which every one feels himself to be a limb of the body, but it is at first only a general idea, and becomes an actuality only by these scattered limbs moving together through a common attraction in orderly march—the monades uniting by pre-established harmony—till out of the intersection of the radii there arises a centre. The process would perhaps be the same as that by which the old atomic philosophy produced the creation of the world out of the unexplainable congregating of unnumbered primitive particles. The view we have advanced makes the process like that in Ezekiel xxxvii., where the bones move and come together. In this parable, if you look beneath the surface, you find the very view which we have presented. First, indeed, the passage speaks only of a multitude of scattered fragments, which stand in no connection with each other, but the circumstance that they are the bones of the dead, and so fragments which formerly existed together as they are about to exist again, brings us to the conclusion that before the mind of the prophet there was the form of a body when he contemplated Israel, in its original character. Besides, in this parable there is no indication that the parts were brought together and quickened into life by any naturally inherent power. But Ezekiel speaks of a power standing above them, the breath of life, a soul, through which they are brought together again. In a word, it is our opinion, that in the fellowship of religion, in like manner, the whole precedes the parts. The quickening of the individual man must be considered as a consequence of the quickening of humanity. The founding of Christ's kingdom on the earth is the reason why individual men come into fellowship with God; the new birth of individual men, and the conduct of such men, springing out of the new birth, is not the reason for establishing Christ's kingdom and founding the church. If what we have now advanced is correct, it follows that, when you wish to explain the nature of religion, you will not need to speak of a fellowship between God and the individual man, but a fellowship of God and of humanity, and the relation of the individual to God can be understood only by its connection with the whole. We must not, however, understand this as if God could have no intercourse with the individual except through the medium of the whole. This would be an impracticable thought; for there must be somewhere a point through which the power and operation of God enters the whole, and that point can be no other than some individual man, through whom the Divine working passes on to the remaining members. If, now, in any instance this individual member should not be the head, but some humbler member, though a most important one, there seems to be no good reason why the working of God should not

come into the body total, through the humbler member, even though it be in a humbler way. This in fact is the case. God stands with every member of the whole, partly in a mediate and partly in an immediate relation. Every member to a certain extent, and according to its importance, can become the middle point for the whole. That is the conditioned independence of the individual upon the whole. On this account, you can properly say, that the relation in which the member stands to the whole body, may be dependent on the relation in which it stands to the head of the body, to God. But never can the individual member be organized with God, in a state of dismembership, when, in such a state, especially as respects the head of humanity, Christ, it could not exist. But its fellowship with God is obtained by the restoration of its membership to the whole body of humanity; by means of the generating power again restored to the body politic through the Holy Spirit, the member is renewed according to its original destination. Thus much has been said to avoid a misunderstanding, to which we might be exposed by the above arrangement of individual and whole, and by the mediate connection with God which we have set forth.

We now proceed to the third point, the psychological question: To which of the intellectual faculties does religion belong? In the first place, it is evident that the question no longer turns upon the problem of bringing the idea of religion into a definite section of psychology. We have set forth religion as the result of a Divine act—an act which seeks the advancement of humanity as a whole, in its peculiar collective life. In this may be found our answer to the question in hand. Religion is neither knowing nor acting nor feeling. It is LIFE, nothing more, nothing less, than the life of humanity; not a certain form or expression of life, but the collected life itself. We limit the idea only by saying, that it is this life, so far as God has bestowed it, so far as it is a communion with God. For humanity depends, on the other side, upon its connection with the world, living in and with the world, being also a part of the world. This worldly side of the entire life of humanity falls without the circumference of religion, and stands in opposition to it, under the name of worldly life; for this reason we might characterize religion by the expression God-life, a term for the choice of which we have scriptural authority, in the words, Thou man of God, flee such things, &c. The question no longer turns on distinguishing religion from single expressions of life, science, art, &c.; for these are only forms of life, not the life itself: but religion is the actual concrete life of humanity. God, the absolute life, lives in humanity, and humanity in God, just as the life of humanity on the side of nature lives in the world and the world in it. Religion and the being of

humanity are in a certain sense completely identical conceptions. For *being*, indeed, is of two kinds, absolute being, having in itself the power to break through all limitations of time and place, in other words, ETERNITY (immortality is too weak an expression), and conditional being, or that which is perishable. The former only is properly and really *being*. Now the nature of humanity and man is to live for ever, for eternity is involved in the very idea of God's image. But religion subjectively considered, is God's image, eternity; hence religion, in the absolute sense, may be designated as no other than the being of humanity. As soon as we separate the idea of religion from the idea of humanity, we destroy the latter unconditionally and entirely, just as we destroy the idea of conditional humanity when we take the worldly life away from it; and as it is with humanity as a whole, so it is with man as an individual. Man is religious, in other words, he is. A man who is not religious, is absolutely *not*. His being is the mere appearance of being, unconditional nothing in the outward form of something, death in the attributes of life. As now we would not raise the question whether human life consists in knowing or acting or feeling, and as it is self-evident that it embraces all three, it is equally clear, that the question ought not to be raised in religion. If religion is life, and indeed the life of humanity, it may just as well be a *knowing* as action and feeling; science belongs to it no more than art, and art no more than legislation, government, &c.; they are all important to it.

The case is different, if we raise the question, whether, generally speaking, these three intellectual faculties (assuming that they have been rightly set forth) are equivalent to each other in the life, so that we must say, not only that religion is at the same time threefold and one of the three as much as another, but also, it is one in the same sense as another. The latter supposition is an impossibility. For, as we have said above, an exact mathematical equivalence of several forces working together in a life, would be the destruction of the very idea of life. Working and counterworking, attraction and repulsion, opposition, are essential to the life. But where there is opposition, there is no unconditional equilibrium; for while the one force rules, the other must serve, and in general the ruling must be more on the side of the one, the serving on the side of the other, force. As certain as sound psychology shows that, generally speaking, one of the intellectual activities assumes pre-eminence over the others, so certainly do we affirm of religion, that one of those three forces must, in a certain sense, be first, and make out the proper seat of religion, and so our first question returns again.

It might, indeed, beforehand, excite suspicion of our affirmations, if that question should appear altogether superfluous; for

it is hardly supposable that science would continually return to this point, when it offers no scientific interest connected with the nature of our subject. But, in fact, the new problem has been somewhat changed, as we approach it from an entirely different direction. According to the former mode of treating the subject, the hypothesis of our investigation is simply the existence of the I, as that in which religion is, and it only remains for us to find the proper place for it in the I. Here, on the contrary, we come prepared with the idea of God, of creation and humanity, of redemption and the church, and have nothing to do but to find the connection by means of which the life of God and of humanity, and the life of the individual being, exist together. In other words, we ask, what is that activity of man through which the Divine act of founding a fellowship of life with man becomes and continues a reality, in every particular individual? So much is certain, the fellowship of life on the part of God *cannot* be caused or made possible through any preceding action or preceding condition on the part of man; for it is coetaneous with the creation of man. For a stronger reason, all religion begins with God. Religion originates in an unconditional and immediate act of God. Man was so created that at first he could not be anything other than religious. Consequently, there remains on the part of man only the receiving, the retaining and the improving of what was given absolutely by God. The absolute act on the part of God demands on the part of man, for its complement, nothing but an equally absolute sufferance of the act; the immediate inserting of life, an equally immediate permission for it to remain; the unconditioned gift, an equally unconditioned reception. Sufferance, permission, reception, however, are not movements of feeling, nor movements of knowing, but of the will. It is passive volition which first produces, on the part of man, the fellowship of life with God. This passive volition is nothing other than faith, or a free self-devotion to God, produced however, not by a self-inspired determination, but by a divinely-inspired determination. We say, therefore, of the religious life nothing different from what we say in principle of the natural or worldly life. The act by which life is imparted to the natural man, demands likewise for its realization a permission to be on the part of man. In this form, in the form of passivity, personal life comes forward, moreover, when the time of conscious free agency has come. The quickening of the man depends on this, that he suffers himself to live, that he does not oppose the procession of life by violently resisting involuntary respiration. Out of the passivity of the will, by means of which man does not prevent his life, an active determination is developed to cherish his life, just as in the life of God, out of this mere consent to be de-

terminated, true free-agency or love is produced. We here come upon acknowledged biblical ground, for, according to Heb. ii., faith, trust, confidence, absolute submission to God, is the fundamental activity by which the good of all times stand in connection with God. The cause of the apostasy is distrust, opposition to the Divine life-giving and life-sustaining act. The means by which the human and Divine communion is renewed, is the free but unconditioned sufferance of the Divine act of redemption, in which absolute faith is the counterpart of absolute free-grace. Finally, we accord in our representation, with evangelical doctrine; for the doctrine of the evangelical church, we mean the doctrine of justification by faith, expresses in different words the same thing which we expressed, viz. that the reunion of this fellowship with God consists on the part of man only in the unconditional, the absolute, reception of it.

Religion would consequently be, psychologically defined, a matter of the will, and religion would be explained, not as an action, but as the receiving of an action. For in the first place, πίστις, as its derivation from πισθαιν and its usage show, is not a purely theoretical idea, but involves the practical. Knowledge, as belonging to belief, is something which passes over into the character, the will. Belief, so far as it comprehends the subjective certainty of the truth of a word, arises from the condition which the believer has received from him who utters the word. In the second place, which is a point of great importance, the pre-eminence we have given to the will, does not exclude the other two intellectual activities. On the contrary, the more important, as respects the personal life, an act of the mind may be, the more completely does it involve all the other essential faculties of that life; this is particularly the case with faith, because if not the very highest, it is one of the highest expressions of personality. Faith, and every single act of faith, exists only in connection with the knowledge of its object, and is, generally speaking, impossible without corresponding feeling, viz. the feeling of blessedness. With the highest expression of will, viz. the suffering of the work of God, the highest activity of the understanding and reason, viz. the perceiving and receiving of Divine truth, and the highest species of feeling, viz. the consciousness of unconditional union with God, is necessarily connected. By the prominence here given to the will, we are not to suppose that all the various characteristics of religion meet only in the element of will, but the other two elements have each a certain independence of their own. The acknowledgment and utterance of a religious truth is an expression of the religious life, without regard to the question whether the act of faith which stands in connection with it, and gave the first impulse to it, actually corresponds in its

strength to the depth of that religious truth. The Christian minister, for instance, who stands in a living connection with Christ, can present the doctrine of justification by faith, in consequence of his knowledge of Scripture and his skill in logical reasoning, with almost perfect success, without having experienced the full power of the doctrine which he theoretically comprehends. The comparatively smaller measure of faith connects itself with a greater measure of intelligence; knowledge outruns faith and secures the corresponding strength of faith only through the subsequent further formation of the religious life. This is sometimes the case with scientific theologians, and even, though perhaps less frequently, with the preacher and pastor, called by his office to maintain the truths of his creed. It would, however, be great injustice to doubt the existence of piety wherever this incongruity appears. It is seldom, and only when a man of extraordinary powers, by means of understanding and imagination, is able to seize on the almost entire contents of Christian dogmatism—that knowledge without faith presents the true semblance of spiritual life. The same is true of the life of feeling. It is indeed possible and sometimes happens, that a man becomes enamoured with the beauty of the Christian religion in some of its elements, as, for instance, Christian poetry and music, simply because, having a natural genius for these arts, his mind applies itself to the nearest objects of the kind, and thus a species of religious life is awakened and sustained within him. If, from this conclusion, it does not follow that Christian truth comes more closely home to such a person, and his devotion to God becomes more complete, but he continues to be enamoured with religion by his love of Christian beauty, we have a case similar to that before mentioned respecting knowledge. And, indeed, this religion of Christian beauty is more common than the religion of theological science. This is evident from the multitude of artists, who without any experimental knowledge of the truth, without repentance or faith, merely by the higher movements of a creative imagination, are able to produce works of art which actualize the religious idea and promote personal edification. Just so frequently does it happen that a person makes rapid strides in religious feeling, while knowledge and faith linger far behind. The paragons of this kind must be sought for chiefly within the circles of an effeminate religiosity. Finally, the will itself, the centre of the soul's life, faith in distinction from knowledge and feeling, may be developed in disproportionate strength, and so the partial independence of the soul's forces upon each other be brought to light. On the whole, this fact has been most unfrequently observed within the circle of sound intellects, and for the simple

reason that with the normal vitalization of the centre, the animation of the other forces is connected. In the meanwhile, an uncommonly feeble organization of the cognizing faculty, and the same is true of the emotional faculty, may hinder a justly proportioned development. This is often the case in melancholy, mental imbecility and temptation. Here experience shows that, in a confused state of knowledge and feeling, the will is the only uninjured element, which not only furnishes a connecting point with the foregoing, but also, while great weakness and indolence of action in both the other departments is felt, makes rapid growth. The case is different from what has been said respecting feeling and knowledge; that activity of will should exist without actual life is not conceivable. Faith in God cannot, like knowledge or feeling, be received in a merely superficial way; entire consecration to God is under all circumstances the actual religious life. Religious life does not always exist wherever there is a knowledge of religious truth; nor does it always exist wherever there is a taste for the beauty of Christian fellowship; but always wherever faith exists, there is also an actual participation in this fellowship. And here it is evident, again, that faith must be looked upon as the proper centre of religious life.

One thing here must not be overlooked. We have placed the centre of the religious life in the passive will, correlative to which stands the active will, namely love, as the fruit of the passive. But here a relation may arise which does not correspond to the nature of religion. We refer to the presence of a religious love, which has not sprung from a corresponding degree of faith. Where this love is developed altogether without faith, there it is not at all of a religious nature, but belongs to the higher degrees of worldly love. But there is a real development of religious love, to which the foundation of a complete, absolute devotion to God is wanting, and which, more carefully considered, appears to consist of a mixture of worldly love, with the love of God. This is that form of religion in which fellowship with God is sought, partly through the reception of the Divine work, but still more in the performance of human works. To such a form of the religious life, actual religion need not generally be denied. It is evident, however, that the manifestation predominates over the reality, that the appearance surpasses the truth concealed behind it, and that, consequently, here also a change has taken place in the relation of the religious forces prejudicial to religion itself.

If now we look back to the result of the positions established, we can derive a new argument from them to show that religion is actually nothing other than life, and that it cannot be placed

by the side of other similar phenomena, as science and art stand by each other, and are thus subordinate to a third and higher element. The relation of these two forms of human life to each other is entirely different from the relation of either of them to religion. Wherever logical knowledge and expression fail, there is no science. The reasoning form is such an essential characteristic of science, that where it is even partially wanting, as in dialogue and allegory, though designed to present under these forms logical thought, the bounds of science have been overstepped. Just so it is with art. Without beauty, as without the definite form in which cultivated feeling and imagination express themselves, there is no work of art. The beauty may be very defective, but the idea lies at the foundation, even when the execution in every respect contradicts the ideal. A didactic poem, however beautiful, has no title to be considered a work of art, and if the meaning of a play is brought into the form of a treatise, its artistic character is entirely destroyed. If, now, religion were feeling, that action of feeling or state of mind which we call religious, would cease to be religious, as soon as it began to be exhibited scientifically, or in the form of a treatise. But this is by no means the case. The thought that God created the world, is a religious thought, whether it is expressed in the forms of rhetorical beauty, or in the noble strains of the Oratorio, or as a scientific proposition. Remembering that an act may be objectively religious, when not performed in a religious spirit, we may say that the study of interpretation is just as religious an employment, as the singing of a hymn, or prayer to Jesus, or the writing of ecclesiastical canons, or the guiding of a soul to Christ. But whatever remains essentially equivalent to itself, though brought into the most diverse forms of life, cannot be itself a form of life, but must be the life itself.

The truth here explained is of great importance to a question, which has been latterly much discussed, the question about the difference between religion and philosophy. It is by no means difference of form, which makes a thought now a religious and now a philosophical thought. Philosophy is manifestly a business of the natural man, as may be proved from this, that in the fullest and most perfect form it belongs to heathenism, whereas it did not belong to Christianity before heathenism entered into the kingdom of God. For the Old Testament contains nothing which resembles philosophy, except in the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, &c., but is essentially of a theological nature. The case is different with Grecian theology. Grecian theology finds its explanation in the philosophy of nature, in which there are correspondences to a λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, but nothing more. Hence

philosophy has to do with the worldly life of humanity, the nature and laws of which can be known without Revelation. Its peculiar seat is anthropology; its most common and deepest principle is the Grecian *γνώθι σεαυτόν*. But while the worldly life and the divine life are most intimately conjoined in the true humanity, and while the intellectual laws of the natural man, generally, not unconditionally, remain the same in a mind enlightened by the Holy Spirit, the laws of spiritual operation may be contemplated from a natural point of view, and thus habitually be applied to theology and so to religion. So far as philosophy has to do with purely natural objects, there is almost no opposition at all between it and religion. Only perhaps in the doctrine of the Trinity can the question arise, whether there is anything in this doctrine inconsistent with the laws of philosophical ratiocination. But the certitude of the doctrine does not depend upon our answer to this question; as the doctrine was not deduced from the laws of thought, the critic is not here subjected to them. This is ground on which religion and philosophy come no more into contact than anatomy and politics. But the question must be referred to some ground common to both; in other words, to the philosophy of religion. On this account we must postpone the answer in part, till we come to investigate the idea and the title of this science itself. At present we only say that, when observation teaches that a person can be religious without thinking philosophically upon religion; and again, that philosophizing upon religion does not destroy but rather confirms it, it becomes evident that philosophy may be a form of the religious life existing in connection with other forms of the same. And while many think of religion without philosophizing upon it, religious philosophy on the other hand is a form of religious thinking; indeed, the peculiar form of a particular side of the religious life. Philosophy is either religious or not religious, that is, worldly; and religion is either philosophical or not philosophical. Consequently it is clear that religion and philosophy are not to be contrasted, but only a certain form of religion and a certain form of philosophy. Religious thinking which is not philosophical, is perhaps contrasted with religious thinking which is philosophical; and if religious thinking which is not philosophical should, generally speaking, and by means of a denomination *a parte potiori*, be called theology, then the question purely conceived becomes clear, how religious philosophy stands related to theology? If, finally, there is a form of philosophy which approaches peculiarly near to philosophical thinking upon religion, viz., the so-called speculative theology, the sphere of the two contrasted subjects becomes still more contracted while the question is put,

how religious philosophy stands related to speculative theology? What is the difference between them? We must confess that we see none. If there is any, it must be this: that while religious philosophy undertakes to show, that the laws of thinking agree with the dogmas of religion, speculative theology turns the subject round, and shows that the dogmas of religion agree with the laws of thought. But if we take in hand a religious philosophy and a speculative theology of the Hegelian school, it must be confessed, that even this difference cannot be maintained, but the two must be considered about the same, both in meaning and in form. Should it be said that speculative theology proves the dogmas of religion, but religious philosophy solves them, then it follows that the latter is not a form of religious thought, but of worldly thought, perhaps logic or anthropology, just as the latest Hegelian school considers religion anthropology and has resolved it into the same.

In the meanwhile, let us suppose again, in order to fulfil all righteousness, that philosophy, so far as it has to do with subjects of religion and religion, that is, religious thinking, are the different forms of one and the same meaning, the one being a lower and the other a higher form. According to the Hegelian school, (and the same is elsewhere also popular,) the proposition that God is triune, set forth in a sermon or in a book of devotion, might be contemplated as a religious proposition, that is, a proposition which belongs to a mode of representation. The same truth, expressed in a treatise of religious philosophy, would be a philosophical proposition. But wherein consists the difference? In the use of certain technical expressions of philosophy, as, for example, that it is the nature of the absolute to distinguish itself within itself, and in this distinction to be identical with itself. Every one sees that the use of such terms is not essential, even to philosophy; equally clear is it that a proposition does not cease to be religious whenever it is translated out of the vulgar dialect into the language of scientific abstraction. Who would engage to show the difference between the doctrine of the word of God, as contained in the prologue of John's gospel, and as expressed in some treatise of religious philosophy? Are not the passages in John speculative in form as well as in meaning? Are Schleiermacher's discourses upon religion composed in the form of philosophical thought, or in the form of religious presentation? Where is the boundary by which one of Jacob Boehme's books of devotion can be separated from Schelling's doctrine of freedom, or from Spinoza's mystical ethics, so that you can assign this to philosophy and that to religion? Perhaps it may be said, the difference lies in the connection and aim which is pursued in the utterance of a

truth. But this would be an unsafe retreat ; for it would bring us in the end to the affirmation, that a proposition would cease to be philosophical as soon as it should cease to appear in the connection of a treatise. Enough of this. We return to our original affirmation, viz., philosophy, religious philosophy, is a part, a peculiar form of religious life, and the difference between it and religion is, consequently, that existing between a member and its body, and like other members it has power to become a conditional centre of Divine life, while the leading member and first centre is the passive will or faith.

We call the passive will the first centre, and connect with it several centres in one and the same whole. In principle, we have done this already, as we have spoken of a conditional independence of the two other faculties of the soul, also of the active will in distinction from the passive. Here we must be allowed a wider range for considering a proposition of the highest importance in an historical respect.

It is, generally speaking, a law of life, that an organic whole has not merely one, but several centres, poles, foci, which are of unequal importance as respects the whole. Corporeal life, for example, has not only the brain for its centre, but also the heart and organ of digestion. What, now, is the centre, which must act as such, which must, under certain limitations and at certain times, predominate over all the others, so that the centres of a higher class become subordinate to it? The brain, for example, becomes dependent upon the organ of digestion, loses something of its power of action during digestion and sleep, and no longer controls the other activities of the system, or controls them only in a limited way ; but the organ of digestion is still an inferior form of the entire corporeal life, as the organ of sensation and of motion is of a higher activity. These truths are commonly acknowledged, though not properly considered and applied. But another consequence growing out of them is not so generally noticed : that with the wounding and debility of a principal organ, life is not destroyed. The intemperate and untimely working of a subordinate force produces, indeed, disorder, sickness, disease, but not necessarily death. Just so is it in reference to the spiritual life. For, first of all, according to the true idea of the life, the leading faculty, faith, does not always maintain pre-eminence. But the religious life applies itself with more vigour occasionally to the other powers ; the passive will giving place to the active, the active to knowledge, and knowledge to feeling. The remark will apply to the life of an individual and the life of a community. This periodicity is indispensable in religion. The activities of life bend now in this direction and now in that, in order to restore the

equilibrium at its centre ; and so long as this restoration is duly secured, the rising and falling of the scales will not be injurious, but advantageous. Experience teaches that individuals, as well as whole tribes and nations, are organised apparently for the maintenance of some inferior element, and to preserve it for the good of the whole. And, again, history so changes, that from time to time a different form of life takes precedence. Religious philosophy, therefore, must accommodate itself in a scientific respect to the occasional development of the religious idea. Accordingly, at one time, religion may be held in the leading form of knowledge, because the life of the community applies itself in that direction : at another time, feeling may take precedence. If we overlook these truths, we must consider all the forms of social, religious development, not excluding the most recent, as untrue or as mere temporary forms. According to a religious philosophy which takes its rise from the Lutheran creed, the Grecian, Roman and Reformed Churches must all be considered as mere perversions of the religious life. All those forms of the religious idea, which present religion as chiefly feeling or knowing, must be looked upon as mere mistakes, notwithstanding religious science has been greatly promoted by them and the discoveries made in these several schools are indispensable as respects the future.

If, on the contrary, you overlook the first part of our proposition, you will be brought to the impossible conclusion, that the perception of religion which is peculiar to the female sex, must be transformed into a masculine character, as it would have no independent authority of its own ; while nothing is more certain than that this perception of religion must exist as long as the female sex exists. For the same reason, we must deny to the present time, which leans more to the rational perception of religion, all its importance to the religious whole ; while it is unquestionable that the soil of the present is most fruitful in religious productions. These less perfect forms of religion are essential to the manifestation of its true idea. They have this advantage over the more perfect, that on account of their imperfection as a whole, they are the more perfect as parts, and to a certain extent afford a measuring-rule for the more perfect and the means of reviving them. They are not, indeed, in their want of perfection, a sickness or weakness, no more than feeling is a weakness of the will ; but they can easily become so, more easily than the central force, if by excessive action they strive to impress their stamp upon the life generally. And if this excess reaches its highest degree, the consequence is the entire destruction of the life.

Now in the religious life of those individuals and nations

which are adapted by natural organization to preserve the balance of religious tendencies, because they take up the religious life at the middle point—faith operates to prevent this excess. The principal excellence of the persons and nations in question, lies, not in their cultivating this or that side of the religious life, but in preserving all its elements in just proportions. This kind of religious life affords, comparatively speaking, the greatest security that no essential part of the same will remain undeveloped or be suddenly curtailed in its development. We say comparatively speaking, for it is impossible to avoid some fluctuating, when the question turns on the precedence of life. The central direction will now incline to the one side and now to the other, as the magnetic needle points not exactly north nor exactly south, but trembles towards the west or towards the east. These fluctuations are proportionally small, and do not change the main direction. This regulating character has masculine piety in distinction from feminine, or that of children and youth. The New Testament presents proof, and daily observation confirms it, that there is a peculiar susceptibility to religious influence, in the female sex. But the passive will inclines so much to the side of feeling, and this comes forth so strongly that religion confines itself in them almost entirely to their own persons, and does not manifest itself in the form of a discourse which produces life in others. Their relation to Christ appears to be chiefly subjective; but, personally speaking, religion is worth more to them than to the other sex. But their dependence on Christ for the advancement of religion in society, is less perfect than their personal dependence, and the efficiency of believing women in the New Testament bears no proportion to their numbers. Not only do they make much less progress in religious knowledge, but their activity confines itself very much to works of love in individual relations not affecting the community at large. Very different is the case with Peter, John and Paul. With them, faith, in distinction from feeling, is the proper centre of their religious life, though in Paul there is a remarkable inclination to the side of knowledge, in Peter a disproportionate strength of the active will, in John a most perfect balance of knowledge and feeling. But each possesses all the forms of life in a considerable degree, and the normal condition of their faith may be estimated by the success which the quickening word wrought through them in wider circles of life, while, in the full flower of mercy-gifts of every kind, they manifested a high degree of improbability and a considerable strength of the passive will.

Such a relation, though in a different respect, exists between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. Both rest on faith, but

the latter with a disproportionate leaning towards the department of knowledge. The consequence is, that knowledge, especially dialectic knowledge, is highly cultivated in the Reformed Church, but the department of feeling is almost entirely neglected, and faith is so limited and encumbered that, just at the point where the Lutheran Church is particularly characterized by a reception of Divine mercies, viz. in the Lord's Supper, the Reformed Church substitutes partly knowledge and partly self-activity, and injures religion at the very heart. The Lutheran Church by inclining less to the department of knowledge, brings both knowledge and feeling to a more harmonious development, and thus secures a more justly-proportioned form.

What has thus far been presented, may serve to verify the psychological idea of religion, which we have maintained. But here we must not overlook the essential fact that religion has also a corporeal form, being as much affected by the outward and the material as mind is by the body. How different are the religious phenomena of this kind, in some circumstances, from what they are in others. Sickness or health, this or that kind of disease, this or that employment, climate, clearly occasion characteristic manifestations. Religion often produces a change in modes of speech, in the cast of the countenance, in the gestures of the body. To this corporeal form belong the water, the bread and the wine of the sacraments, and the resurrection of the body from the dead.

These facts, in the mere subjective idea of religion, as that of Schleiermacher, remain wholly unexplained and unconsidered. They are at best exceptions, and come into the idea by a sort of violence, if they do not destroy it altogether. On the contrary, these facts lie exactly in the track of our explanation. Out of a mere feeling of dependence, the idea of the world's renewal can never be deduced. But how easily can we derive it from an act of God imparting a life. The idea of personal life brings along with it the idea of body—the working of spirit on matter and of matter on spirit, the direct and indirect mastery of mind through the body over nature and the reaction of nature through the body on the mind. It is the nature of personality not merely to be a self-conscious spirit, but to have in it a self-conscious spirit standing in an important relation to matter, either personally connected with it, as in the case of man, or capable of assuming it, as in the case of the Son of God and the angels. We thus hold to a view of religion in which the resurrection of the body, miracles, &c., which stand as an irrefragable barrier against mere spiritualism, find a conceivable and appropriate place.

We come now in conclusion to the solution of a problem

which goes to prove the actual necessity of our idea of religion. We are to show how this idea of religion comprehends all the branches of religious science within it. Possibly this may be considered our most dangerous rock, for we freely confess that the idea maintained by us is not adapted to the construction of a religious philosophy, as that science is commonly treated. Most clearly, we cannot say of the heathen systems of religion, nor of Mohammedanism, that they came from God or embrace an actual fellowship between Deity and humanity. They rest on a perversion of the divine idea, and include no act of God or living fellowship with him. If we must have a religious philosophy which embraces heathenism as a legitimate portion of it, Schleiermacher's feeling of dependence, or Hegel's self-consciousness, to which systems, by a distinction of degrees and kinds, all that is merely subjective in religion can be reduced, would be better adapted to the purpose. But this becomes possible only by embracing an idea of religion of such a general and insignificant character, that, for conducting Christianity especially in its subjective parts out of the same, only a very narrow passage way remains, while the objective, which is the most important element, reaches far beyond these limits, and brings us to the confession, sufficiently obvious at first blush, that Christianity is something much more than mere religion; otherwise we shall have a scientific idea of religion which fails at the very point where it ought to be most perfect. Or if we would extend and animate the idea of religion so as to embrace Christianity, we should be driven to straits, in another direction, and have an idea too exalted for the heathen religions, and indeed exactly opposed to them. For if you place at the foundation of your inquiry about the nature of heathenism, not merely the oft-quoted passage in Acts xvii., but the more complete and extended one in Romans i., you have in heathenism *religio a non religando* or *religendo*. According to Paul, in this passage, heathenism in its noblest form, the Grecian, is a perversion and consequently a destruction of the idea of God. It proceeds not, like Judaism, from a partial development of acknowledged truth towards a full reception of the same; but by degrees, sometimes through apparent progress, it goes on to a total loss of true divine knowledge, as is actually the historic course of heathen religions to this day. Of course there remain some traces of truth in false religions. How else could they rise, exist, advance, recede, yea, destroy themselves, if there were no element of truth in them? It is moreover not denied that individuals have sometimes risen in a religious respect above the communities in which they lived; but that which properly belongs to heathenism, its grand characteristic, is a lie! Consequently we must

either cease calling Christianity religion, or else cease calling heathenism and Mohammedanism religion, and so give up the idea of a universal religious philosophy ; we may still however philosophize about religion, about Mohammedanism and heathenism on the one hand, Christianity and Judaism on the other. We are also of opinion, that the name, religion, unscriptural, heathenish, radically subjective, uncertain in meaning, as it is in philological derivation, had better be applied exclusively to heathenism and Mohammedanism, and a different term, such as revelation or spiritual life, be used to denote Christianity. Religion would then have reference to the common relation of the human mind, we say not to God, for this would not be true of heathenism, but to some mighty supernatural being. In this way we might avoid that endless confusion of speech and idea, which has arisen from not making a proper distinction between the subjective and the objective, and from transferring the characteristics of the one to the other. Nothing would then prevent us from treating religious philosophy as preliminary to the philosophy of revelation, thus making a negative preparation for Christianity. Finally, the investigation about Judaism and Christianity would respect their original derivation, and this would form a suitable introduction to heathen religions as perversions of the original revelations. Or, more correctly, when the philosophy of revelation, not merely of its proper self, but the perversion of it in all the various forms of the same, comes to be scientifically comprehended and put in contrast with Judaism and Christianity, then heathenism will form the reverse side of the philosophy of revelation. And as then, on the side of the divine-life process, the Old and New Testament fellowship follow their originals, so on the reverse side, gnosticism, Mohammedanism, pantheism, atheism, and all the manifestations belonging thereto, are included in heathen religion, and so two parallel series of historical revelation would arise, of which the one would be a development of the truth, the actual fellowship between God and man ; the other, on the contrary, would embrace the perversion of the original revelation, would be an apparent development, and a final self-destruction. Thus the separation of that which does not properly belong together, would be completed, and at the same time the unity of philosophic examination would be preserved.

All the remaining theological sciences might be set forth without difficulty, as belonging to the idea which we have presented. Thus, biblical theology has to do with the scientific presentation of the truth imparted by God in that fellowship of life, received and understood by man, and, indeed, received in its original and proportionate form. Dogmatism would concern itself with the same truth, so far as it has been formed into symbolic propositions, and has become the foundation of ecclesiastical knowledge. Ethics has re-

ference to the same truth, so far as it serves as a measuring-rule for the critical examination of the common and peculiar fellowship of life. Historic science would bring to view the continued series of Divine acts, and of human experience corresponding thereto, in which the living fellowship between God and man is truly unfolded. In the liturgy, we should seek to comprehend the Divine acts through which the fellowship of life existing in the community is partly propagated, partly renewed and strengthened, and the activities by means of which man receives this Divine action upon himself, and also the expressions of the self-acting will through which it authenticates the presence of that fellowship of life as organic in its relation to God. In ecclesiastical law, the Divine working might be considered as coming to utterance in the community through which this fellowship of life is regulated, conformably to the necessities of humanity, in its relation to the worldly life. The teaching of Christian art would bring us, finally, to an understanding of those acts of revelation by means of which Divine thoughts are expressed by human genius in the form of beauty.

If now, by our idea of religion, we gain this advantage, viz., that all the theological sciences come before us in a living and compact membership, whereas before there was scarcely room for one of them, and others were degraded to a place unworthy of them, it seems to be of the utmost importance that we attempt the construction of a theological system on this basis, viz., that religion, instead of being mere knowing or acting or feeling, or a combination of these three elements, is a *LIFE*, a life of God imparted by Him, and in which all the elements of religion cohere.

ART. VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. MORNINGS AMONG THE JESUITS AT ROME.*

THIS work has, but a few days since, fallen into the hands of the reviewer, although it is the *fourth* edition, from which the title-page is here copied. It is a recent work; and it must have had a great run in England, to have already passed through so many editions. To these may be added at least one edition, in our own country.

The attentive and intelligent reader of the work will not wonder at its popularity. It discusses one of the most urgent topics of the times in England; and one which seems about to become

* *Mornings among the Jesuits at Rome.* By the Rev. M. Hobart Seymour, M.A. Fourth edition. London, 1851.

deeply interesting to American Protestants. The importation into our country of nearly half a million of foreign emigrants in a year, and the fact that the great mass of them are Roman Catholics, are things adapted to take strong hold of a sensitive mind, whose sympathies are strongly on the side of Protestantism. In days that are past, our country has, for the most part, looked calmly and unconcernedly on the immigration of *Romanists*, because they were so few in comparison with our Anglo-Saxon population, who are attached to the cause of the Reformation. But now, when the Irish emigrants and their descendants begin to be reckoned more in number than their countrymen who remain in Ireland, it is time for this *Protestant* country to look about them, and try to discover, if possible, what are to be the issues of this matter. The Romanists, as is well known, from their own boastings, are flushed with hopes of future victory and conquest, especially in the Great West, where they are labouring to anticipate Protestant influence. Nothing but numbers is now wanting, to embolden the Romish Jesuits among us to lift up their voice, in behalf of the universal dominion of the Pope, and the subjugation of all the United States, at least as to their religious concerns, to his mandates. The claims of the Sovereign Pontiff are always and everywhere the same; and if those claims are not at all times and in all places preferred, it is only because prudence forbids urging them prematurely.

England has once more been agitated to its very centre, by the arrogant division, at Rome, of its domain into Catholic bishoprics. Never have we been more forcibly reminded of the old adage, *Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat*, than when we read the rescript of the Pope, parcelling out England just as he would the Roman States. The spirit of Cranmer, of Jewell, of Ridley, of Latimer, and their compeers, awoke at once to new life and vigour. The nation as a body regarded the Pope's doings as an insult to the people of England and to its Queen and Parliament. They have taken, and are taking, measures accordingly. Never were pens and presses more busy, than for the last few months. Protestants, by hundreds of thousands, have lifted up their voice and remonstrated; and the state of feeling has called forth the tongues and pens of those whose office and duty it is to enlighten and guide the public sentiment.

Among the many books relative to the Papal controversy, which have lately made their appearance, some grave and argumentative, and others eloquently declamatory, the one whose title stands at the head of this Article seems to us to be specially distinguished. We have read it with unmixed and unabated pleasure. There is everywhere an excellent tone and temper manifested. Comity is never infringed upon. Declamation does not once make its appear-

ance, in the whole work. Everything indicates the finished scholar and the gentleman. Not a drop of bitterness is mingled with the refreshing draught. Yet there is no flattery, no conjoining, no game of compliments, no affectation of indifference in order to catch at a reputation for candour, no hanging in doubtful suspense as to whether the balance ought to sink or rise. Mr. Seymour has evidently put on the entire panoply which fitted him to engage in a twenty days' battle, and by means of which he is left unscathed in every rencounter. He must have spent years in training himself for such a contest; for he has manifestly shown himself a greater master, not only of ecclesiastical history and antiquity in general, but even of the Papal Romish records, than any of the Catholic masters in Rome itself. As a theologian he possesses an acute discernment, and an extensive knowledge. As to ratiocination and logic, we think him fairly entitled to a place among the very first rank. The book should be read by every Protestant minister in our land, and by every private Christian who wishes to become well informed of the weak foundation on which the Papal structure rests.

We have said enough, as we hope, at least to excite a curiosity in our readers, to know something specific about Mr. Seymour. We have no individual personal history of him; but of the manner in which his book originated, and of his conferences with the Jesuits at home, he has furnished us with all requisite information. We quote from his Introduction, p. 2.

“The second source of information was not so dependent upon myself, but was opened to me by circumstances as unexpected as they were gratifying. I allude to the opportunity of close intercourse with many members of the priesthood, by which I might learn their opinions and feelings, and receive their explanations of all that was passing around me. It arose from the following circumstance. During my constant attendance at all the services of the Church of Rome, I was observed by a Roman gentleman who held office in the Papal court; and being acquainted with him, he remarked one day to my wife, that I seemed much interested in these things; and asked whether I would not like to make the acquaintance of some of the clergy. Having learned from her my wishes to that effect, he called some days after to say he had been with his personal friend the Padre Generale,—the Father-General of the Jesuits, and had mentioned to him my wish to enter into communication with the clergy, and he seemed to intimate that this was sure to convert me to the Church of Rome. He added that the Father-General had directed two members of the order to wait on me, to give me any information which I might desire. These gentlemen came in due course. They soon

presented me to others. They introduced me to the professors of their establishment, the Collegio Romano, and thus a series of conversations or conferences on the subject of the points at issue between the Churches of England and Rome commenced and were carried on, as occasion offered, during the whole period of my residence at Rome. A portion of my notes of these conversations constitutes this present volume, of 'MORNINGS AMONG THE JESUITS AT ROME.'"

In speaking, further on, of the repeated visits of the Jesuit Officials to him, he proceeds thus:—

"These visits were not mere visits of courtesy. They were made in obedience to authority. They were made with the frank avowal of an intention, to induce me to enter the Church of Rome. They were not less than twenty in number, and, without a single exception, were exclusively devoted to those religious topics which suited the object they had in view. The Jesuits never concealed their intentions from myself, nor their hopes from others, and—especially as I had never revealed their names—I have ever felt there could be no breach of confidence in publishing, for the instruction of others, the arguments by which they endeavoured to entangle me, and the means by which I was enabled to escape them.

"I dealt with all frankness with these several gentlemen, as to the object of their visit. They were under the impression, which they were at no pains to conceal, that I was disposed favourably towards their Church;—that I was one of those Anglican clergymen who neither understand nor love the Church of England, and who, in a restless dissatisfaction and love of change, are prepared to abandon her communion for that of Rome, and who only wait a little encouragement and perhaps instruction, before taking the last step. I was very careful to undeceive them, stating that I should be most happy to confer with them on the differences between the two Churches, but that I could not do so under a false colour,—that I was devotedly attached in judgment and in feeling to the Church of England;—that I looked on her as the Church of God in England, and the most pure, most apostolic, most scriptural of all the churches of Christendom;—that, without unchurching other churches, she was still the church of my judgment and of my affections; and that I had never for a moment harboured the thought of abandoning her for any other church, and especially for the Church of Rome."

Mr. Seymour has here proclaimed himself a hearty friend of the *Anglican church*; but he has, in another passage, shown us that

he is no bigot. The conversation related there, turns on the point of the claim, on the part of Romanists, that they are *THE CHURCH*, i. e. exclusively and only the church in which salvation can be obtained. The wily Jesuit, his antagonist, after Mr. S.'s declaration of hearty adherence to the Anglican church, urges him with the question, 'If you claim to belong to a true Scriptural church, what is to become of Lutherans, Calvinists, and other Protestants, who differ from you?' The Jesuit expected, of course, that Mr. S. would *unchurch* them. But not so. Mr. S.'s reply will enable us to see that he is no bigoted Churchman.

"I said, that I had often observed an error pervading the minds of Roman Catholics, as to the real position which the Church of England claimed for herself—that I had frequently observed it among our mutual friends at Rome, and that it lay at the foundation of his present argument. The error was that which supposes that the Church of England claims to be *THE Catholic Church*, or *THE Church of Christ*, in an exclusive way. She presumes not to so exclusive a claim. She professes to be a branch—a part—a section of 'the One holy Catholic and Apostolic Church' of Christ. She believes, that as anciently there was a Church at Jerusalem, a Church at Antioch, a Church in Galatia, a Church in Corinth, a Church in Rome, and there are other seven different Churches described in Asia;—and as each of these was not singly and exclusively *the Catholic Church of Christ*, but only a branch, a part, a section of that Church,—so now the Church of England merely claims for herself to be considered in this subordinate position, not as the whole, but as a part of the whole Church. Now his whole argument was to the effect that if I claimed for the Church of England that she exclusively was *THE Catholic Church*, then I must unchurch the Lutherans, the Wesleyans, and the Calvinists, &c.; or I must, by churching them, make, not one, but many Catholic Churches; whereas not making any such claim for the Church of England, all his inference must vanish away. The truth is, that all these Communities or Churches were branches more or less fruitful, parts more or less sound, sections more or less extended, of the One holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of Christ. The truth is, that we all claim the title of Churches, we all claim the title of Christian, we all claim membership with the Church of Christ. We, none of us, pretend to an exclusive claim: and the Church of Rome stands alone in so strange and unproved a pretension."

Such a position will commend Mr. S. to a fair hearing, among Protestants of all denominations. They will see, that he is not fighting the battle of the Anglican Church merely, but that of all

the Churches which admit "the Lord Jesus Christ to be the true and only Head of the Church," and who believe that "the Holy Scriptures are the sufficient and only rule of faith and practice."

Mr. S. exhibits the Jesuits as highly distinguished from all other Romish sects, both as to learning and morality. The fundamental principle of the Order is, *complete, unhesitating, and unshaken obedience* to its Superior. The Jesuit disputant insisted, that where a command is given by the Superior, it must not only be obeyed, whether conscience doubted or not, but that the stronger the doubts were, the more meritorious obedience became, because it demanded a greater sacrifice of one's own feelings. The manner in which Mr. S. managed this, may serve as a specimen both of his reasoning, and of his mode of exhibiting it.

"I felt on hearing this, that I might, without the risk of giving offence, proceed a step further: I therefore said that this principle might lead to the utter overthrow of all morality and religion, for it was quite possible that the General might issue some command that might be positively immoral and irreligious,—that it might be utterly opposed to all the religious convictions, moral feelings, and conscientious scruples of the man,—one that must necessarily bring guilt on his soul, as being an act against all his light and knowledge. I said that in such case, obedience would be sin.

"He at once denied my conclusion, saying that the very circumstance of its being against our notions of what was moral and religious—the very circumstance of its being in open hostility to all our convictions, feelings, and conscience, made the act one of greater self-denial, and therefore all the more meritorious. He stated that humility and modesty became the members of the Order of Jesus, and that whatever be the private convictions, feelings, or conscience of the individuals, they must at once give way to the declared judgment of the Superiors of the Order; that humility requires such surrender; that duty demands obedience; that religion demands self-denial; that the more difficult the obedience, the greater the merit; and that as to the character of the act commanded, the responsibility rests not with the subordinate members who obey, but with the Superiors who give the command.

"I felt that this was a principle that would justify any crime; and I could not shrink from saying so. I saw that according to this principle, there was no treason against the state, and no villany against individuals, that might not be perpetrated by a Jesuit; he imagining at the moment, that the more hateful and revolting to his own feelings and convictions the act might be, the more really meritorious it was in the sight of God."—P. 24.

After the first publication of this, Father Mazio, Professor of

Canon Law in the Jesuit College, denied (in a published letter) that the Romish Church, or rather, that the Order of the Jesuits, held to the necessity of obedience, in cases where it would be deemed sinful. He appealed to the *Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola*, and to the *Constitutions of the Society of Jesus*, for information which would enable any one to correct Mr. S.'s mistake. To these documents Mr. S., in his fourth edition, betakes himself; and from the latter of these works he produces the following passage:—

“That holy obedience may be perfect in us in every point, in execution, in will, in intellect, doing whatever is enjoined us with all celerity, with spiritual joy and perseverance, *persuading ourselves that all is right, suppressing every repugnant thought of our own*, in a sure obedience, and that moreover in all things which are determined by the Superior, wherein it cannot be defined, as is said, any kind of sin appears. And let every one persuade himself, that they who live under obedience should permit themselves to be moved and directed under Providence by their Superiors, just as IF THEY WERE A CORPSE (*ac si cadaver essent*), which allows itself to be moved and handled in any way, or AS THE STAFF of an aged man (*atque senis baculus*), which serves him, wherever and in whatever thing he, who holds it in his hand, pleases to use it. Thus obedient, he should execute anything on which the Superior chooses to employ him in the service of the whole body of the Society, with cheerfulness of mind, and *altogether believe that he will answer the Divine will better in that way than in any other which he can follow in compliance with his own will and differing judgment.*”—P. 43.

From the *Exercises* of the Founder of the Jesuitical Order, Mr. S. next produces the following most extraordinary passage:—

“In order that we may altogether be of the same mind, and in conformity with the Church herself, *if she shall have defined anything to be BLACK, which to our eyes appears to be WHITE, we ought in the same way to pronounce it to be BLACK.*—[Autograph.]—That we may in all things attain to the truth, that we may not err in anything, we ought ever to hold it as A FIXED PRINCIPLE *that what I see to be WHITE I shall believe it to be BLACK, if the Hierarchical Church define it so to be.*”—P. 44.

If now, as the *Constitutions* teach, every subordinate is to “permit himself to be moved and directed, under Providence, by his Superiors, just as *if he was a corpse, which allows itself to be moved and handled in any way,*” or “*as the staff of an aged man,* which is entirely subservient to the pleasure of him who wields

it," then in the name of all that is called *free-agency* or *conscience*, where is a trace of either left for the subordinate? Not one; he is the veriest bond-slave among the whole human race. 'A *corpse* and a *staff*, for Jesuits to experiment on, and to handle at will! In the whole creation of God there exists not a greater absurdity, nor a more complete annihilation of all that constitutes the being made in the image of his Creator. And all this he is to be and do, as answering the highest end of his being. Nor is this all. According to the passage cited from p. 24 of Mr. S., the greater the violence done to conscience and moral feeling, the greater the *merit* of the action in the doer. It shows that self-denial is carried to a higher point than any mere abstaining from positive pleasure, or even in performing any outward penance. Here the *conscience* undergoes scourging and laceration; the *moral sense* is throttled; and the poor victim becomes not only like a *lifeless staff* or a *corpse*, but in reality a *dead soul* besides. The image of the living God is thus sacrilegiously defaced and marred, and nothing is left, in body or soul, of a free agent and a responsible human being, made to become higher than the angels.

So much for the *Constitutions* of the Jesuit Order. But what shall we say to the extract from Loyola himself, the founder and Coryphæus of the sect? A member of the Order is "ever to hold it as a *fixed principle*, that what he sees to be *WHITE*, he must believe to be *BLACK*, if the *Hierarchical Church* define it to be so." So then, it is not enough to tread under foot *conscience*, and treat the *moral sense* with contempt, but our *understanding* even is to be perverted and denied, and in the face of it we are called upon to tell and believe an absolute falsehood, as well as a downright absurdity.

If that apostate archangel, who dared to steal into the paradise of God, and whisper a lie to our first parents, has in the stores of his invention anything more offensive to the majesty of truth and of human reason than this, his power and dexterity must be greater far than we have ever yet given him credit for! We believe, were he himself to compete with the Jesuit for the honour of contriving the most stupendous falsehood, this prince of darkness would be compelled here to cry out, *Do manus!*

What says an infallible authority, on the subject of what has been brought about by such Jesuit tactics? In the Bull of Pope Clement XIV. (July 21, 1773), this supreme and (in this case at least) *infallible* Pontiff revokes the whole Order of the Jesuits, and "suppresses and abolishes them;" he confiscates all their property, and "annuls and abolishes for ever" all their institutions, rules, decrees, constitutions, offices and the like. He gives his reasons for so doing: "Complaints and quarrels are [by them] multiplied on every side; in some places, dangerous seditions arose, tumults,

discord, dissensions, scandals, which, weakening or entirely breaking the bands of Christian charity, excited the faithful to all the rage of party hatreds and enmities." Clement then proceeds to state, that his "dearly beloved sons in Christ, the kings of France, Spain, Portugal, and Sicily, found themselves reduced to the necessity of *expelling* and driving from their states, kingdoms, and provinces, these very companions of Jesus [the Jesuits], persuaded that there remained no other remedy for so great evils, and that this step was necessary, in order to prevent Christians from rising one against another, and from *massacring each other* in the very bosom of our common mother, the Holy Church." So much for the practical workings of Jesuitism!

Infallibly true, in this case, I doubt not, is the testimony of this clever and common-sense Pope. All that the Jesuits have done, and are doing still, serves abundantly to confirm the propriety of his decision.

Mr. S.'s second chapter, in respect to the *pardonning power* of the priest, is an admirably conducted argument, and one to which an answer by his Jesuit collocutor was evaded.

In a subsequent chapter, the subject of *Mariolatry*, or the worship of Mary, is introduced. The declaration of the Jesuit visitor respecting this, we shall give from Mr. Seymour:—

"My clerical friend, after a pause which I was unwilling to break, lest I should express myself as strongly as I felt, resumed the conversation, and said, that the worship of the Virgin Mary was a growing worship in Rome—that it was increasing in depth and intenseness of devotion; and that there were now many of their divines, and he spoke of himself as agreeing with them in sentiment, who were teaching that as a woman brought in death, so a woman was to bring in life;—that as a woman brought in sin, so a woman was to bring in holiness;—that as Eve brought in damnation, so Mary was to bring in salvation; and that the effect of this opinion was largely to increase the reverence and worship given to the Virgin Mary."

A little after, the same collocutor said:—

"That to his own knowledge, the religion of Italy was latterly becoming less and less the religion of Christ; and that 'the devotion of the most Holy Virgin,' as he called it, was certainly on the increase."

In a subsequent part of the conversation, Mr. S. remarked, that the words of his collocutor "seemed to imply that the religion of Rome was becoming more and more the religion of the Virgin Mary." After this Mr. S. thus proceeds:—

"I then added, that I had seen some remarkable things in a work by St. Alphonso De Liguori. It was entitled, 'The Glories of Mary,' and among other things described the vision of St. Bernard, in which he beheld two ladders extending from earth to heaven,—two ways by which the sinner could have access to heaven. At the top of one ladder appeared Jesus Christ, at the top of the other ladder appeared the Virgin Mary; and that while those who endeavoured to enter into heaven by the way of Christ's ladder fell constantly back and utterly failed, those, on the other hand, who tried to enter by the ladder of Mary, all succeeded, because she put forth her hands to assist and encourage them. I mentioned also, that I had seen this as an altar-piece in a Church at Milan, where the two ladders were represented reaching from earth to heaven; Jesus Christ at the head of one, and Mary at the head of another: and while none were succeeding by the ladder of Christ, all were succeeding by the ladder of the Virgin! I added that this was degrading Christ, in order to exalt the Virgin, and that it was representing her as a more merciful and effectual Saviour than the Saviour himself! I felt that I could apply no other language to this, than that I could not imagine a more hideous blasphemy than the language of Liguori, or a more frightful sacrilege than such a picture beside the altar of a Church."

From the same highly exalted saint, Alphonso de Liguori, Mr. S. quotes other passages contained in his work on *the Glory of Christ*; see pp. 164, seq. Among these is the following, which is stated by Liguori with his full approbation. It runs thus: "St. Bernardine of Sienna does not fear to say, that all things, *even God himself*, are subject to Mary's empire," Ch. VI. § 1. Again: "St. Peter Damien goes still further, asking himself the question, Why has God, before he became incarnate in Mary's womb, applied for her consent? For two reasons, he replies: First, to oblige us to be very grateful to her; and secondly, to teach us that *our salvation depends on the will of the blessed Virgin*," Ch. V. § 1.

All this is too shocking for a Protestant ear. It needs no comment. He who does not shudder at the blasphemy, will be disgusted at the folly and downright heathenism of the whole.

In Chap. IV. is an argument respecting the *infallibility* of the Pope, which is most triumphantly conducted. We should like to make long extracts, but our limits absolutely forbid it. We trust that the book itself will soon be in the hands of many intelligent readers. The manner in which Mr. S. draws out from the Jesuit his *tests of infallibility*, and his masterly confutation of the whole, leaves scarcely anything more to be desired.

Transubstantiation and the mass are considered in Chap. IX., and treated in a way not less deserving of commendation. No wonder that the Jesuit with whom he conversed, "concluded to make it his business to consult a certain Lecturer then in the College; and also their Professor, *to whom such questions belonged.*" But although Mr. S. saw the Jesuit afterwards, and had a long conversation with him after he had seen the parties referred to, he never could get any answer to the inconsistencies of the Romanists with regard to the *mass*, which Mr. S. had urged.

Many other subjects, such as indulgences, pardon of sin, celibacy, purgatory, praying to saints, worship of pictures and statues, and, in a word, all the important distinctive traits of Romanism, are fully discussed, and in the same energetic, discriminating and triumphant manner, as in the cases specifically mentioned above. Were we to begin making extracts any further, we should not know where to stop. We should feel obliged to take in nearly the whole.

Seldom has on assailant of Rome thrown larger bomb-shells or more devastating rockets into the very citadel and arsenal of the *eternal city*, than Mr. Seymour. He is entitled to the hearty thanks of every true Protestant: and he well deserves them from even the Romanists themselves, for unmasking their deceptive leaders, and showing the world how unreasonable, unscriptural and ungrounded their principles are.

And now, while we are compelled to dismiss the book, for want of room to say more, we cannot dismiss the subject without a word to our Protestant religious public.

Are the Anglo-Saxons, Protestants, free-men, educated to read and reverence the Bible—are they to come under a religious dictation, which will wrest that precious book from their hands, and bid them go to a priest for all their knowledge; and a priest too who prays for them only in the *Latin* tongue? Are they to substitute *Mary* for *Jesus Christ*, nay for *God the Father*? Are they to be taught that, cannibal-like, that are to eat the actual flesh and drink the blood of him who has ascended to the right hand of God on high, where "flesh and blood can never come?" See 1 Cor. xv. 50. Are they to become as *corpses* and a *staff* in the hands of a Jesuit Superior? Are they, at the mere bidding of ecclesiastics, to bow down to pictures and images, and pray to saints? Is a feeble, old, superstitious, haughty, domineering, time-serving, treacherous monk, on the throne of St. Peter, to dictate laws and customs and tithes and Peter-pence to the sons of the Pilgrims and of the godly in England who resisted unto blood Papal encroachments? Let the answer be No! No!! NO!!! in a voice of thunder that shall even cause the earth to quake, and which, reaching the inmost recesses of the Vatican, shall make

pale the empurpled and enthroned mock Majesty who sitteth there.

No young candidate for the ministry can be excused now, for not acquainting himself with Popery, and the arguments which overthrow it. Mr. S.'s book is a real *Multum in parvo*, a true *Vade mecum*. In every part of our country the Romanists are spreading; in every part, then, our preachers and our leading laymen should furnish themselves with armour, for the battle that sooner or later must ensue. Our all is prospectively at stake. Though the danger is, as yet, hardly a present one, to any alarming extent, yet mark our words: The old contest will ere long be renewed, to make America as well as Ireland and Italy bow in humble subjection at the feet of the Roman Pontiff. May we never live to see that day of more than Egyptian darkness! But if the young men of this generation are not on the alert, and are not furnished with appropriate armour, they may live to see it, and to weep over it too with tears of blood.

M. S.

II. UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.*

Dr. Bachman has long been pastor of a Lutheran church in Charleston, and Professor in the college there. He is highly and widely esteemed as a gentleman, and a thorough and indefatigable scholar. We take pleasure in noticing a book from the distant South, which contains discussions so candid and able, on a subject so vitally interesting to the naturalist and the Christian philosopher.

The book has marked characteristics. One is its originality. The author has spent a long life in making personal experiments in some of the more important departments of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. Almost every page contains some record of facts observed or experiments made by the author himself. By means of correspondents and personal friends, he has been put in possession of many curious phenomena, and valuable and rare specimens in Natural History. We have seldom perused a volume which is so full of the results of personal investigation. A second characteristic of the work is its exclusive scientific character. It meets the opponents of the unity of the human race on their own ground. Dr. Bachman, though he fully believes in the conclusiveness of the Scriptural argument, yet leaves it entirely out of consideration. We may mention, as a third characteristic, the candour with which the argument is conducted, notwithstanding much provocation to

* The Doctrine of the Unity of the Human Race, examined on the Principles of Science. By John Bachman, D.D., Professor of Natural History in the College of Charleston, and member of many learned Societies. Charleston, S. C.: C. Canning. 1850. pp. 312. 8vo. London: Trübner & Co., 12, Paternoster Row.

the indulgence of a contrary spirit. It is well known that there are in the Southern States some opponents of the doctrine of the unity of the race, whose discussions have been marked with not a little bitterness and personality. We add that the whole subject was earnestly discussed for several evenings in successive weeks, by a literary society in Charleston, S. C., composing all the leading men of science there.

The positions which Dr. B. thinks he has sustained by sufficient proofs, or which are self-evident, are such as these: There is but one true species in the genus *homo*. All the varieties show a complete correspondence in the number of the teeth, and in the 208 additional bones in the body. They are perfectly alike in the peculiarity of the shedding of the teeth, in erect stature, in the articulation of the head with the spinal column, in the possession of two hands, in the absence of the intermaxillary bone, in the teeth of equal length, in a smooth skin of the body, and a head covered with hair, in the number and arrangement of the muscles, the digestive and all the other organs, in the organs of speech and the power of singing, in the possession of mental faculties, conscience, and the hope of immortality; they are all omnivorous, capable of inhabiting all climates, have a slower growth than any other animal, are subject to similar diseases: the varieties in men are not greater than are known to exist among domestic animals; all the varieties of men produce with each other a prolific offspring, which is perpetuated in new races, which is not the case with any two species of animals, &c.

A considerable part of the volume is taken up in examining two papers published by Dr. Morton of Philadelphia, in *Silliman's Journal* in 1847, in which Dr. M. undertook to prove from facts, "that different species of animals are capable of producing together a prolific hybrid offspring; therefore hybridity ceases to be a test of specific affiliation, and consequently the mere fact that the several races of mankind produce with each a more or less fertile progeny, constitutes in itself no proof of the unity of the human species." Dr. Bachman, in our opinion, has conclusively shown that some of Dr. M.'s facts are not supported by competent authority; that others are disproved by naturalists of a higher order; and that, when his statements have been freed from matters resting on very doubtful authority, the result proves that his facts militate against his theory, and in reality support the doctrine of the unity of the human species. In another part of the volume Dr. B. states his objections to the views of Professor Agassiz, and maintains that the same species of animals, as far as our knowledge extends, is not created in separate localities.

III. THE TYPOLOGY OF SCRIPTURE.*

Martin Luther was accustomed to say, that human nature was like a drunken Dutchman, who, in attempting to mount his horse on one side, was sure to tumble over on the other. On all topics of permanent interest the human mind is like a vibrating pendulum, now away up from the true centre on one side, and then again immediately as far away from it on the other. A few generations since, almost all writers, preachers and students of the Bible gloried in the types, and found them on every page of the Bible "thick as leaves in Vallombrosa." He that found the greatest number of types (and the more odd and grotesque they were, the better) was the greatest Scripturist, especially if he sought them where they were very hard to find, and where nobody had ever before thought of looking for them. As it is in the back-woods, "a man was famous according as he had lifted up axes upon the thick trees;" and the thicker the tree the greater the fame. It was an inexhaustible source of innocent amusement to the pious mind gravely playful; and to minds of a different cast, a source of amusement not always innocent. The solemn wit of John Bunyan, and the mournful mirthfulness of Immanuel Swedenborg, here found abundant materials to work upon; and many a time at little reunions, around the crackling fire of a farmer's kitchen, have we heard and seen solid New England deacons scintillate and sparkle from the portals of the great temple in Ezekiel, and from among the herds of clean and unclean beasts in Moses, in a manner that was to us youngsters utterly astounding. Those were great times, and had no little influence in forming our minds to an intense love of biblical study. "It turns on my mind (said one) that the lily work on top of the temple pillar (2 Kings vii. 20—22), and the pomegranates over against the belly of the same, are a type of the ministry, and it signifieth that if ministers will do their duty and be pillars in the church, the Lord will adorn their heads, and feed their bellies." Now think of such savory and quickening exposition of Scripture, and call to mind the doughnuts and cheese, the apples and cider, that garnished the close of the social party. But the march of improvement shut up the bright old fireplace, and fixed there a dark, gloomy cook-stove; the temperance reform took away the cider: and a dry, rationalising exegesis flattened down the types as smooth as a fire-shovel. The types were all gone—human nature, in trying to reach the saddle on one side, had overreached and tumbled to the ground on the other—the pendulum was at the extreme point of the opposite vibration.

But, courage; we begin to breathe again. Here is a new book

* The Typology of Scripture, by Rev. Patrick Fairbairn. Two volumes in one. Philadelphia: Daniels & Smith. 1852. London: Trübner & Co.

on the types, and a very big book too ; and a book learnedly and ably written. Can we get into the saddle now without tumbling back to where we were fifty years ago ?

If the New Testament is to be received as the authoritative interpreter of the Old, the Old Testament is throughout typical of the New. Says De Wette himself, one of the severest and most rationalising of sober interpreters, "The entire Old Testament was a great prophecy, a *great type*, of Him who was to come. The typological comparison of the New Testament with the Old is by no means a mere play of fancy. Christianity lay in Judaism as leaves and fruit do in the seed."

We hail with pleasure Mr. Fairbairn's very able book, as an indication of good for the future. Though not by any means assenting to all his conclusions, we commend his book to earnest study, both for the subject of it, and the learned and instructive manner in which the subject is treated. This old topic needs to be gone over entirely anew, and here is a good introduction to a good work. Mr. F. aims at a thorough discussion of principles, and that is just what we need.

C. E. S.

IV. STUART'S COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF PROVERBS.*

This is the last work from the pen of Prof. Stuart ; he corrected the last proof-sheet only two days before his death. Both this commentary and the one preceding it on Ecclesiastes, exhibit a mellowness of spirit which savours of the good man ripening for heaven ; and the style is more condensed, and in that respect more agreeable, than in some of the works which were written in the unabated freshness and exuberant vigour of his mind. In learning and critical acumen they are equal to his former works ; and there is a touching interest about them which belongs to scarcely any of the others. No English reader, we venture to say, can elsewhere find so complete a philological exposition of these two important books of the Old Testament ; and all the friends of biblical learning will be glad to secure for themselves the last contributions to sacred science of that ardent, active and generous mind, which for forty years kept them constantly awake.

C. E. S.

V. WORKS OF LYMAN BEECHER, D.D.†

Few men, if any, have ever excelled Dr. Lyman Beecher in genuine pulpit power. His mind is thoroughly of the New Eng-

* A Commentary on the Book of Proverbs, by Moses Stuart, lately Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary, Andover. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1852. pp. 432, 12mo. London: Trübner & Co.

† Works of Lyman Beecher, D.D. Vols. I. and II. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co. 1852. London: Trübner & Co.

land stamp ; and whatever subject it touches, its constant struggle is for *definiteness, clearness, and utility*. Whatever it may be, dogma, metaphor or fact, it must be as exactly shaped and as easily seen, and as effectively handled, as a Yankee whittling knife, or he will none of it. Beautiful tropes which adorn nothingness and cover up emptiness, fine language which would express a thought handsomely, if there were any thought there to be expressed by it, language which is a mere cloud in the sunlight, poetic imaginings which float in the air by their own specific levity, and never touch either earth or heaven, for such things as these you will look in vain among Dr. Beecher's works. Like a true Yankee school-master, if he intends to use a birch rod, he strips off all the leaves in the first place ; and then come the blows in right-hearted good earnest.

In his style there is conciseness and pungency, brilliancy and vigour, clearness and sharpness, rhetoric and logic, in remarkable combination. Thousands who have heard him, and other thousands who can never hear him, will read these pages with delight ; and young ministers who wish to learn how to preach to some purpose should make these sermons their study.

The first volume contains the widely and justly celebrated Discourses on Atheism and on Intemperance ; and the second, the most admired of the Occasional Discourses. The subsequent volumes will contain other sermons and lectures which have never before appeared in print.

We congratulate our venerable friend on his healthy, active and happy old age, in which he is still bringing forth fruit ; and we congratulate the religious public on this rich accession to their literary treasures ; and we make our bow profoundly to the numerous fruit-bearing branches which have grown from the old trunk.

C. E. S.

VI. THE NEW TESTAMENT TRANSLATED FROM THE SYRIAC.*

Dr. Murdock, at the age of seventy-five, in less than one year, has completed a work that would have been highly creditable as the result of two years' labour of a scholar in the prime of life. The language of the old Syriac Version of the New Testament, is almost identical with the common speech of Palestine in the time of Christ ; the version itself is of the earliest antiquity, reaching up almost, if not quite, to the apostolic age ; it is a work also, in a critical point of view, of the highest merit. Competent judges have pronounced it the best translation of the New Testament ever made.

* The New Testament translated from the Syriac Peshito Version, by James Murdock, D.D. New York : Stanford & Swords. 1851. London : Trübner & Co.

Though it is not agreeable to us to read *legate* instead of *apostle*, and *vivifier* instead of *saviour*, and though we do not think fidelity to the original required these words, yet we do not hesitate to say that Dr. Murdock and his publishers have done their respective portions of the work admirably well, and we wish them an abundant remuneration.

C. E. S.

VII. THE BOOK OF GENESIS IN ARABIC.

We have before us a beautiful copy of the book of Genesis in Arabic, from the press of the American Mission in Syria. It is the commencement of a new translation of the Bible into the language of Ishmael, by the American missionaries, especially the Rev. Dr. Eli Smith, one of the most classical Arabic scholars of the living generation.

What would Father Abraham say if he were now to revisit the earth and light upon the land of his ancient sojournings? He would find there both the children of Sarah and the children of Hagar, as he left them there when he died and was buried by his sons Isaac and Ishmael in the field of Macpelah; but what a strange mutation of things! how sadly the legitimate heirs have fallen from their possessions and their dignity!—and though neither race have forgotten the true God, and though both yet venerate the memory of Abraham their father, yet neither of them have the faith of Abraham, nor are they, like him, the friends of God. And lo! men of a new race, strange both in countenance and speech, one of the far distant tribes blest in Abraham's great Descendant, have crossed the, to him, shoreless ocean, from a land in his time unknown, and probably not then in existence, to lead his children back to their father's faith, and to give God's Holy Word to both branches of his family.

Our friend, Dr. Smith, requests us, in looking over this translation, "to note any expressions that may seem to savour of a local dialect," &c. We can conscientiously assure our learned friend, that we have not discovered any such expressions, that so far as we have been able to examine the translation (and we have looked it carefully through), it seems to us as classical and elegant in diction, as it certainly is neat and beautiful in typography.

How glorious, both in a literary and religious view, have already been the results of the forty years' labour of the American Board of Missions!

C. E. S.

ART. IX.—SELECT THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

THE number of Students at the German Universities during the winter of 1851-2, has been as follows:—

	Theol.	Juris. & Pol.	Med.	Philos. & Philol.	Not matric.
Berlin,	190	710	286	388	809
Bonn,	{ 74 Evang. 214 Cath. }	335	104	228	
Erlangen,	167	133	170	15	
Göttingen,	125	223	201	148	
Halle,	337	141	68	48	
Heidelberg,	55	491	96	35	
Königsberg,	39	165	72	70	
Jena,	78	104	75	128	
Tübingen,	{ 141 Evang. 121 Cath. }	220	126	162	
Munich,	323	799	291	491	
Breslau,	{ 52 Evang. 251 Cath. }	293	86	162	
Leipsic,	164	367	236	70	
Marburg,	71	79	56	60	
Giessen,	56	94	156	73	
Freiburg,	189	56	72	29	
Würzburg,	84	199	300	144	
Zurich,	22	16	76	36	

The number of students during the year 1850-1 was as follows:

	Winter of 1850-1.	Summer 1851.		Winter of 1850-1.	Summer 1851.
Basil,	65	65	Jena,	376	434
Berlin,	2,107	2,199	Kiel,		119
Berne,	201	184	Königsberg,	332	332
Bonn,	941	1,026	Leipsic,	902	846
Breslau,	836	831	Marburg,	277	272
Erlangen,	387	402	Munich,	1,884	1,817
Freiburg in	} 405	403	Münster,	323	323
Breisgau,			Olmütz,	427	396
Giessen,	413	409	Prague,	1,747	1,284
Göttingen,	715	691	Rostock,	106	122
Grätz,	611	611	Tübingen,	805	768
Greifswald,	192	208	Vienna		
Halle,	624	646	Würzburg,	672	640
Heidelberg,	580	624	Zurich,	195	201
Innsbruck,		257			

In twenty-five universities (omitting Kiel, Innsbruck and Vienna) there were, in the winter semester of 1850-1, 16,123 students, of whom 1,759 were not matriculated. The number of professors ordinarii was 781; extraordinarii, 315; honorary, 86; privat docenten, 849; whole number of teachers, 1,481. At eleven universities, the number of Catholics studying theology was 1,802; at seventeen universities, the number of Protestants studying theology was 1,641; at twenty-three universities, the number of law students was 5,800; the medical students at twenty-three universities were 3,030; students of philosophy (including philology, &c.) at twenty-four universities was 2,791.

At twenty-seven universities (omitting Vienna) in the summer semester of 1851, there were 16,074 students, of whom 1,670 were not matriculated. The number of professors ordinarii was 816; extraordinarii, 330; honorary, 37; privat docenten, 403; total, 1,586.

Bonn had, during the last year, a greater number of students than ever before. Among these it boasted of eight princes! The number of Catholic theologians was 196; of evangelical, 77. The popularity of the university is not perhaps owing so much to any great distinction in its professors, as to its almost unequalled situation in the valley of the Rhine; to its mixed character as a Catholic and a Protestant Seminary, being in the midst of a great Catholic population; to its accessibility to foreign countries; and to its being a favourite university of the king of Prussia. Among its eminent professors are Lassen, the orientalist, Welcker and Ritschl, the classical philologists, and the theologians Bleek, Dorner and Rothe.

Erlangen is the Protestant university for Bavaria, and is distinguished for its evangelical character. About half the students are preparing for the ministry. Prof. William Stahl, who has taken Schmittener's place in Giessen, is considered a great loss to Erlangen. Among the well-known professors are Von Raumer, Ebrard, Hofmann, &c.

Giessen is likely to lose its department of Catholic Theology, by the establishment of a seminary at Mayence. At the last semester there was but one Catholic student of theology at Giessen. Liebig is the great attraction at this university. It is thought that he will remain here, though strong inducements are held out to him at Heidelberg. His laboratory and means for experimenting are of the most perfect character.

At Göttingen there are 124 students of theology. Wieseler has gone to Kiel in Liebner's place. Matthäi, and Lünemann the commentator, have been made professors extraordinarii of theology.

Breslau has lately lost a very distinguished astronomer by the death of Dr. Von Boguslawski.

The university of Heidelberg has purchased the very valuable mineral cabinet of Dr. Schüler of Jena.

The university of Jena has experienced a very severe loss in the death of Dr. Ferdinand Hand, Professor of Eloquence. He was born at Planen, Feb. 15, 1786, and died at Jena, March 14, 1851. He had been professor in the university since 1817. He studied under Hermann, with whom he afterwards kept up a constant correspondence. He was also highly benefitted by the instructions of the philosopher Carus. He was an accomplished scholar in the fine arts, as well as in philology. His house was the centre of the musical talent in Jena. The works which have made his name honoured throughout the classical world, are his *Tursellinus*, 4 vols., 1829-45, on the Latin particles, his *Manuals of Latin Style*, his *Manual for Exercises*, &c. Prof. Hand was most estimable in all the relations of life, and took a leading part in everything intended to promote the well-being of his fellow citizens. On the 16th of May, 1851, the veteran Dr. J. T. L. Danz died at Jena. He had been for some years an emeritus professor, and was nearly eighty-three years of age. The last years of his life were employed in investigations on the German, Greek, Latin and Hebrew languages, which fill several MS. volumes. At his death he had reached the word *lux*!

The university of Kiel has suffered greatly in consequence of the war and subsequent commotions in Schleswig-Holstein. A letter writer there says: "We have troublous times here. God only knows what will be the end!" Some students have gone to foreign universities; others are compelled to give up a university education.

Three eminent professors in the university of Leipsic, Haupt, Jahn and Mommsen, have lately resigned their places. It is still earnestly hoped that they will resume their offices. Dr. Liebner, from Kiel, in his introductory lecture at Leipsic, spoke on the relation of theology to philosophy, taking occasion to attack "the Schleiermacher tendency."

The departure of Dr. Lehnerdt from Königsberg for Berlin, was honoured with tokens of the highest regard for his person, and with sorrow for the loss which the university and people of the former place have sustained. He takes with him a very valuable private library.

We have been unable to procure any account of the number of students at the university of Vienna. It still enjoys the special oversight of the "paternal" government. Dr. Galba, a privat docent, was lately dismissed, because he spoke too freely in his lectures of a "rationelle Politik." The philosophical faculty recently chose a dean who was a Protestant. This choice was set aside as illegal, in consequence of the representations of the theological

faculty. The Academy of Sciences at Vienna have given a prize of 1,000 florins to Dr. Franz Miklosich for his Comparative Grammar of all the Slavicklanguages.

The University of Pesth in Hungary have secured, as a private teacher of the oriental languages, a young man of extraordinary attainments by the name of Repicsky. He will instruct in Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Sanskrit. The number of students in 1850-1 was 742, of whom 506 attended the Hungarian lectures; the rest, the German.

The students at Olmütz fall off in the summer session, as there are no teachers for many special studies.

The number of Protestant students of theology at Tübingen was, in 1850-1, 152; Catholic, 147. The university library contains about 200,000 volumes, 50,000 dissertations, and 2,000 MSS. There are three catalogues. Two of them are alphabetical, one for the librarian and one for the public, the latter in twelve folio volumes. The third is a catalogue by subjects, divided into twelve departments, viz., philosophy, mathematics and natural sciences, philology, art, political economy, history, theology, law, medicine, general literature, matters relating to Würtemberg, and manuscripts.

The university of Dorpat in Finland at the close of 1850 had 30 professors ordinarii, 4 extraordinarii, and 17 other teachers; total, 51. The number of students was 620, of volumes in the library, 82,777.

The three Dutch universities had, in 1849-50, on their books 1,037 students, of whom 454 were at Leyden, 367 at Utrecht, and 216 at Gröningen. The Athenæum in Amsterdam had 117 students, that in Deventer 11. The last two do not confer degrees.

The aged neologist, Paulus, died, as our readers well know, at Heidelberg, Aug. 10, 1851. He was born at Leonberg near Stuttgard, Sept. 1, 1761. He was active in literary labours till the close of life, though he had not lectured since 1844. The skeptical tendency, of which he was one of the principal authors, long ago left him far behind.

Another veteran scholar, Prof. J. G. Gruber, died at Halle, Aug. 7, 1851. He was born at Naumburg, Nov. 29, 1774. He was transferred from Wittenberg to Halle, on the dissolution of the university in the former place. He was for many years one of the editors of the Allgemeine Litt. Zeitung. With Ersch he founded the great "Encyclopædia of Sciences and Art," which has now reached its 103rd volume. Under his editorship the section A—G was nearly completed.

Professor Franz of Berlin, author of the *Elementa Epigraphices Græcæ*, and latterly associated with Böckh, as editor of the great

Corpus Inscriptionum Græcarum, died, in 1851, at the early age of forty-five.

Fifteen volumes of the "*Corpus Reformatorum*," edited by Bretschneider, were published at the time of his death. Bindseil of Halle is now the editor. Vols. 16, 17 and 18 will complete Melancthon's classical works. The first two are now published. Subsequent volumes will be occupied with his theological writings.

The "*Studien und Kritiken*," January Heft, 1852, contains the following articles: By Ullmann, an article introductory to the new volume, reviewing the last quarter of a century, which has passed since the establishment of the S. and K. By Schenkel, "*The Object of Biblical Theology*," delivered on occasion of the inauguration of the author as Prof. Ord. at Heidelberg. By Tiele, a criticism on "*Kurtz on the Unity of Genesis*." By Pfeiffer, "*The date of the Composition of the Epistle of James*." This number contains reviews of "*Thenus's Commentary on the Books of the Kings*," and other recent publications. Further, in the practical department, an address by Dr. Schenkel on "*The Importance of the Ministerial Calling*," delivered by the author at the opening of the Preacher's Seminary at Heidelberg. Also an article by West, on "*The Propriety and Import of the Christian Oath*." The April Heft contains first an article by Bleek, on "*The time of the Composition of Zachariah, chaps. ix.—xiv.* ; with expository comments." Also, by Kathardt (a licentiate at Erlangen), an article on "*Ἐργον τοῦ Θεοῦ and πλῆσις*, in their mutual relation, according to John's Gospel." By Umbreit, on "*The Change of the name Saul to Paul*," and by Ullmann, "*A word from France*." A review of Martensen's *Dogmatik*, by Dr. Schöberlein; and of Vinet's *Pastoral Theology*, by Kienlen; a notice of the proceedings at the 4th Evangelical "*Churchday*," at Elberfeld; and the new programme of the Hague Society for the defence of the Christian Religion.

The Lutheran "*Zeitschrift*" of Rudelbach and Guericke, for 1851, contained among other articles the following: by Dr. Kurtz, on "*Symbolism in the Old Testament worship*;" by Neumann, "*Symbolism in the Mosaic worship*;" by Delitsch, "*When did Obadiah prophesy?*" by Kiel, "*Names of God in the Pentateuch*;" by Rudelbach, "*State-Religion and Religious Freedom*;" by Ströbel, "*The danger of a Protestant Papacy*;" by Althaus, "*Lutheran Church Constitutions*;" by Voss, "*Satanology*;" by Delitsch, "*Two Inquiries respecting the Prophet Joel*," and "*Critical Inquiries concerning the Pastoral Epistles*." The January Heft for 1852 contains an article by Höke, on "*The doctrine of the Church and its Office*;" by Manchmeyer, "*The Office of the New Testament*;" by Ströbel, a continuation of his article on "*The danger of a Protestant Papacy*," &c.

Baur and Zeller's "*Jahrbuch*" for 1851 contains from Dr. Baur, "Introduction to the New Testament as Theological Science, &c." (continued through three numbers); "The Nature of Montanism," and "A defence of Calvin against Catholic aspersions." From Zeller, "The Acts of the Apostles, its composition and character" (continued through four numbers). From Schweizer, "Sebastian Castellio as opponent of the Calvinistic doctrine of Predestination." From Planck, "Ground Elements of the idea of Redemption." From Beck, "The Value of the Old Testament conception of Immortality." From Ritschl, "The present position of Criticism respecting the Synoptical Gospels," &c. The January Hef for 1852 contains from Baur, "Contributions to the Interpretation of the Epistles to the Corinthians," and on Phil. ii. 6 seq.; an article by Schweitzer on Moses Amyrædus; one by Hilgenfeld on the Gospel of Mark; and one by Zeller on Bruno Bauer's Criticisms on Acts.

Dr. Julius Müller's "*Zeitschrift für theologische Wissenschaft, &c.*," contains in its second volume (1851) articles from Prof. Jacobi, "Remembrances of Neander," and "A review of the new edition of Origines' *Philosophoumena*;" from Lange of Zurich, "von dem Zweifachen Bewusstsein, insbesondere von dem Nachtbewusstsein und seinem polaren Verhalten zu dem Tagesbewusstsein des Menschen;" by Lücke, a review of Martensen's *Dogmatik*; from Müller, "Discussions on the Principles of the Evangelical Church, according to their formal side," and a review of "The Science of Modern Speculative Theology in its principles," by C. A. Thilo; from Neander, a letter to Prof. Schaff of Mercersburg, and a sketch of Ratherius; from Nitsch, an article on "Law and Gospel in their special relation to the Christian community," in three parts (not yet complete); from Pfeiffer, on the Temptation of Christ; from Reuter, two articles on The Problem and the Nature of Dogmatic Discussion; by Karl Ritter, one on Hebron, the City of the Patriarchs; by Scherer, a rejoinder to Merle D'Aubigne; from Schneider, a letter of Neander's; from Rudolph Stier, "On Inspiration—a rejoinder;" from Tholuck, a reply to Stier's rejoinder, and two articles on the Lutheran doctrine on the fundamental articles of the Christian faith; from Ullmann, "The words of Christ, 'He who is not with me is against me,' and 'He who is not against you is for you,' in their mutual relation," &c.

Prof. Ewald of Göttingen has published three volumes of his "*Annual of Biblical Science*" (*Jahrbücher der Biblischen Wissenschaft*). It is in a duodecimo form. The last volume, that for 1850, contains 294 pages. About 180 pages are taken up with essays by the author on the Interpretation of the Biblical History of the Creation; the Strophes in Job; the Greek Proverb-book of Jesus, the son of Sirach; a continuation of the essay on the Origin and

Nature of the Four Gospels, &c. The remainder of the volume contains the usual brief survey of the works in biblical science, which appeared in Germany, England, &c., in 1850. It includes a notice of the more important articles in the periodicals, as well as of independent works. Those who know the character and writings of Prof. Ewald, need not be told that the praise which is bestowed is faint and "far between." The Tübingen and Erlangen schools are alike the objects of his contempt. With the late Dr. Gesenius, he had no fellowship. Tholuck and Hengstenberg are alike put out of the pale. With Dr. Samuel Lee of England, he has long been in open hostility. Of course his judgment of books must be received with much allowance.

Of the more important works, noticed by Ewald in his third volume, are the third edition of Von Raumer's *Palestine*; the first and second volumes of Ritter's *Geography of Palestine and Syria*; Lynch's *Expedition to the Jordan*, &c. (highly commended as honourable to the author and his country); Tischendorf's edition of the *Seventy*; Meier's *Commentary on Isaiah*; Hahn's and Schlottmann's *Commentaries on the Book of Job*; Hitzig's *Daniel* ("containing some good investigations"); Ewald's translation and exposition of the first Three Gospels; the second edition of Ebrard's "*Kritik*" of the *Evangelical History*; Smith on *Paul's Voyage* ("no interpreter of the Acts can hereafter neglect this work"); Steinhof's *Commentary on the Romans*; Lünemann's *Commentary on the Epistles to the Thessalonians*, and Huther's on the *Pastoral Epistles*; the third edition of Tholuck on the *Hebrews*, and L. Stengel's on the same book; Ebrard and Wiesenger's continuation of Olshausen's *Commentary*; Knobel's "*Völkertafel der Genesis*" (commended as an important work), &c.

Dr. Frankel, with the co-operation of others, has recently established a *Monthly Periodical*: "*Für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums*." Three numbers had appeared before the close of 1851.

For some years there has been no *Review* in Germany devoted purely to Philosophy. Drs. Wierth, Fichte and others have recently established a *Philosophical Quarterly* entitled "*Studien Philosophische*," the first number of which appeared last autumn.

In addition to the *Classical Quarterlies* which have been long established, we notice the appearance about a year ago of No. I. of a new *Quarterly* devoted to purely philological investigation in the Latin, Greek and German languages. With the constant support of such men as Bopp, J. Grimm, Curtius, Hartung, Benary, Weber, Zumpt and others whose names have already appeared in its pages, the review will be of no ordinary value. Its title is "*Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*," &c.; the editors are Drs. Aurfrecht and Kuhn.

In the department of Exegesis and Biblical Criticism, the following recent works deserve notice: A Commentary on the Prophecy of Hosea, by Dr. August Simson, of Königsberg, which is highly commended; on Micah, by Caspari, of the Norwegian University at Christiana (well known as the author of an Arabic Grammar, &c.); on the 68th Psalm, by Ed. Reuss, Jena, pp. 106; on the Apocalypse, by Hengstenberg (Vol. II. Abth. 2), the second edition of whose Commentary on the Psalms is just completed; a second edition of H. A. W. Meier's Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians; a continuation of Bruno Bauer's "*Kritik der Evangelien, &c.*"; and a Commentary on the 2nd Epistle of Peter, by W. O. Dietlien, who maintains zealously, and triumphantly it is thought, the genuineness of the Epistle. The well-known Commentary of Gerlach, interrupted by the author's death, is now taken up by Dr. Schmieder, Professor in the seminary at Wittenberg. The First Part of Vol. IV., which has just appeared, pp. 626, contains a biographical notice of the former Commentator; and the prophecies of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel. The notes of Dr. S. are concise, clear, and profound. Prof. Dr. Frz. Delitzsch has published a Commentary on Solomon's Song, pp. vii., 239. The author's theory is, that this book was designed to present the true Biblical conception of the marriage relation. Dr. Maurer, Frz. J. B. D., the well-known commentator, has recently published "*A Compendious Lexicon of the Hebrew and Chaldee of the Old Testament,*" pp. xii., 1,139. Dr. Julius Fürst has also commenced the publication of a new Hebrew and Chaldee Old Testament Lexicon. It is to be speedily completed in 6 parts, the first of which has already appeared, p. 176, handsomely published by B. Tauchnitz, Leipsic; price not to exceed four and a half thalers (the price of Maurer's is two thalers). The 16th edition of Gesenius's Hebrew Grammar, edited by Rödiger, has recently appeared.

The 5th Part of Vol. II. of the very valuable Polyglott Bible, edited by Drs. Stier and Theile, is now published; and among the many new editions of the German Bible issuing from the press, we notice one of special value, published at Halle, under the supervision of Drs. Bindfiel and Niemeyer. Part 1, pp. 240, has appeared. It is carefully corrected by the original edition. "*A Harmony of the Synoptical Gospels, illustrated by selections from the church literature and traditions older than Irenæus,*" by Prof. Auger, of Leipsic. "*The Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles,*" edited by Prof. Tischendorf. Prof. T. has revised the six apocryphal Acts, formerly edited by Thilo, and has added seven, which he now for the first time edits from manuscripts. In connection with this we notice an essay on "*The Origin and Use of the Apocryphal Gospels,*" by Prof. T.; an essay to which a prize was recently awarded by the Hague "*Society for the defence of the Christian Religion.*"

A Commentary on the Apocryphal Books of the Old Testament, edited by Drs. O. F. Fritzsche, of Zurich, and W. Grimm, of Jena. Vol. I., just published, (Fritzsche ed.) contains the 3rd Book of Ezra, Baruch, and the smaller fragments. Three other volumes, which complete the work, are expected to appear within this year, in a form like that of De Wette's New Testament Commentaries. (Gersdorf's Repert. commends the work highly.) A Commentary by Wessel Albert von Hengel, on the 15th Chapter of 1 Corinthians, pp. xii., 269. Part 2 of Schlottmann's Commentary on Job; Vol. 4 of Hengstenberg on the Psalms (2nd ed.); Part 2 of Lücke's "Introduction to the Apocalypse, and Apocalyptical Literature in general" (2nd revised and enlarged ed.). Part 1 of Lisco's "Practical Commentary on the Old Testament" (2nd enlarged ed., without the text). "Der Schriftbeweis," by Prof. Hofmann, of Erlangen; an Exegetico-dogmatical discussion of the Biblical arguments for the various doctrines of Dogmatic Theology, Part 1. By Dr. L. Reinke (Catholic), "Contributions to the Interpretation of the Old Test." The work discusses the origin and true solution of the numerical difficulties and contradictions of the Old Testament; the right of the Israelites to Canaan, and the various modes of justifying the plundering and destruction of the Canaanites, and Jephthah's vow, pp. vii., 532. Vol. I. of a 2nd edition of Steir's "Discourses of the Lord Jesus." "Die Weisheit's Lehre der Hebräer," by Dr. Bruch, of Strasburg; an attempt to develop, principally from the didactic portions of the Old Testament, the philosophical system of the Hebrews, of which, strangely enough, they alone of all ancient nations have often been considered destitute. Dr. Z. Frankel, whose 'Vorstudien zum Septuaginta' is well known, has recently written a work, "Ueber den Einfluss der palästinischen Exegese auf die alexandrinische Hermeneutik." Of some interest with regard to Luther's German Bible, is the "History of the Bible translations (German) before Luther," together with 34 of the earlier versions of Matth. 5th, by Dr. Kehrein. The author's object is to discuss the claim of Luther's translation to originality. Kindred works in the department of oriental literature, are an edition of the Book of Henoch in Ethiopic, edited by Dr. Aug. Dillman, and the Book of Genesis according to Abā-Sa: ido's Arabic version from the Samaritan Pentateuch, edited by Kuenen; also, "Pistis Sophia, a Gnostic work ascribed to Valentinus," translated from the Coptic into Latin by Schwartz, and edited by Petermann. In the oriental department we have also the first two volumes of a History of Arabic literature, by von Hammer Purgstall. These bring down the history to A. D. 750. Also from Spiegel, "Alexander Sage bei den Orientalen," and the first part of a new edition of the (Zend) Avesta. From Ewald, a treatise on the Phœnician views of the Creation, and the Historical

merit of Sanchoniathon. The Catalogues report among other works; the first part of Pfizmaier's great *Wörterbuch der Japonischen Sprache*; the continuation of Freytag's Commentary on the *Hamasa*; the Pehlvi *Bundehesh*, edited by Westergaard, with a dissertation on the antiquity of the Pehlvi language; *Heldensagen von Firdusi*, consisting of selections from the *Shah Nameh*, translated into German by A. F. von Schaack, with an Introduction on the Iranian Epos. An Article read by Lepsius in the Berlin Academy, on "The first circle of the Egyptian Gods, and its historico-mythological origin," has just appeared in print. A new Sanscrit Grammar has just been published, by Dr. Benfry, of Göttingen. We notice also two interesting works on the ancient and modern pagan systems: Cavovè's "*Vorhalle des Christenthum's*," which presents a historical view of the religions preceding Christianity; and Part 1 of Wattke's "*History of Heathenism, in relation to Religion, Science, Art, Morals and Politics*." This Part discusses heathenism among the savage nations, as also among the Huns, Monguls of the Middle Ages, Mexicans and Peruvians. A short time ago, Wattke received a prize from the Hague Society for an essay "on the Cosmogony of the heathen nations," which has recently been published.

Those curious in Cabalistic studies will be interested in some treatises recently announced, by Adolph Jellinek. One bears the title "*Moses Ben Schem-Tob de heon, and his connection with the book Sohar*." This Spanish scholar of the latter part of the 13th century is proved to be the author of the *Sohar*; and Jellinek points out the various evidences which disprove the claim of the book to a greater antiquity. In Part 1 of "*Beitrage zur Geschichte der Rabbala*," Jellinek gives two valuable articles in the same department of study. In regard to the study of the very old book *Jezira*, which gives evidence of the influence of the Ionic natural philosophy, Pythagoreanism and Gnosticism upon Jewish mind, the author gives much curious information. He sketches the history of the *Jezira* and its commentators since the 10th century in Egypt, Barbary, Babylonia, Spain, Thrace, Italy, Germany, and Palestine, and adds a history of the text. In regard to the *Sohar*, the author adds an article in which he discusses the language and style of the book, its mystical interpretations and doctrines, especially its curious Natural Philosophy and Zoology, &c. He promises future articles on the Mystical *Sich Saadja*, and on the Speculative *Cabbala* of Rabbi Asriel.

In more immediate connection with Church History, we notice Vol. VI. of Neander's Church History, edited from the author's papers by Dr. Schneider. This volume continues the history from the time of Boniface VIII. to the Basle Council. Dr. Jacobi has recently edited a collection of Neander's Miscellaneous and Scien-

tific essays, most of which were read before the Berlin Academy. A second edition of Hagenbach's History of the Reformation in Germany and Switzerland has lately appeared; also from the same author a little treatise on "Leonard Euler as Apologist for Christianity." Vol. I. of a new edition of Ranke's History of the Reformation has just been published. A new contribution of considerable interest in its relation to the History of the Reformation, is an edition of Spalatin's writings, many of which are now for the first time published. There are to be seven volumes: Vol. I. (just published) contains "The Life and Times of Frederick the Wise;" in the following volumes are to be included Sketches of the Elector John the Constant, the Elector Ernest and his two sons, together with other papers relating to the Papacy and Empire in the time of the Reformation; and Spalatin's Autobiography and Correspondence. Licent. A. W. Dieckhoff has written a History of the Waldenses of the Middle Ages, pp. xii., 408. On the Catholic side we have Vol. I. of a revised and enlarged edition of Dr. Döllinger's History of the Reformation. This volume takes up the History and the Effects of the Reformation within the precincts of the Lutheran Confession. Part I of Tholuck's History of Rationalism is expected to appear in a few days.

A work of decided interest has recently been published by Prof. Karl Hase, of Jena, under the title "Neue Propheten." The work consists of three historical political sketches in Church History, the subjects of which are "The Maid of Orleans," "Savonarola," and "The Anabaptists." The author has a twofold object: to discuss the relation of Old Testament Prophecy to the prophetic inspiration claimed in modern times; and also to show how a Church History might be written, which should cast off the style of the lecture-room, without descending to a familiar, commonplace style, and should thus meet the wants of the educated community. The author displays great skill in managing this style himself. References to authorities, &c., he has collected in an appendix. Pp. 262—367.

A new Manual of Church History, intended for Students of Theology, has been published by Prof. Heinrich Schmid of Erlangen. It omits altogether references to the sources of its information. 8vo. pp. 434. Prof. Ludwig Richter, author of a work on "Kirchenrecht," has published a History of Evangelical Church Government in Germany. F. W. Krug has published a volume of Lectures on the Protestant religious fanaticism, sectarianism, and disorganising innovations which have exhibited themselves in the Grand Duchy of Bay, especially in Wupperthal. The book, although apparently of only local importance, becomes of general interest, as it involves discussions relating to men like Dippel, Tersteegen, Collenbusch and Köhlbrugge.

Some interesting sketches in Church History appear in the Evangelical Calendar for 1852. This Calendar has appeared two years before, under the supervision of Prof. Piper of Berlin. Adopting the general custom of designating each day by the name of some person prominent in the annals of the church, the author's intention is to make the series one of evangelical names. Where it may be, the individual gives his name to the day of his death, which, in the happy conception of the early church, was commemorated as the birthday of a new life. Accompanying each Calendar is a Year Book, containing sketches of individuals named in the Calendar. In the preceding numbers, sketches were given by such writers as Neander, Tholuck, Ullmann, &c. In the Year Book for 1852, among others are, biographical notices of Clement of Rome, by Hagenbach; Gregory of Nazianzen, by Ullmann; Henry of Zutphen, by Claus Harms; Bartholomew Ziegenbald by Nitzsch, &c.

In the department of Dogmatic Theology, we have a new (6th) edition of Nitzsch's "*System der Christlichen Lehre.*" Vol. II. of Rückert's Theology. A small posthumous work of Bretschneider's, entitled "*Trifolium*," containing essays on the doctrine of the Trinity, the Fall and Original Sin, &c. The concluding part of a little work by Dr. Theile, "*Pro confessionis religione adversus confessionum theologiam.*" A sixth edition of Ullmann's "*Sündlosigkeit Jesu*" is in press. Dr. Julius Müller has in preparation for publication his system of Dogmatics. Here we may mention that a translation of Müller's "*Christian Doctrine of Sin*," which is to form a part of Clark's Theological Library, is nearly completed. A new volume of the "*Corpus Reformatorum*," edited by Bretschneider and Bindseil, contains Vol. XVII. of Melancthon's works. The concluding Parts of Dr. Schenkel's "*Wesen des Protestantismus*" are recently published. The author announces a supplementary Treatise on "*Der Princip des Protestantismus.*"

A new Theological work of great interest and value has recently been undertaken, in the shape of a Theological Lexicon. It is to consist of eight or ten large octavo volumes, and is to cover the whole ground of theological science, representing in its articles the views of the more evangelical party among the German theologians. The superintending editor is Dr. Weissenborn of Halle, who has the co-operation of the Heidelberg Faculty, with Prof. Tholuck and others as referees. Contributions are to be solicited from theologians throughout all Germany.

Dr. Nitzsch's "*Practical Theology*," Vol. II. Book 2. Part 2. "*On Evangelical Worship*," pp. viii. and 245—473. Hagenbach's "*Encyclopædia and Method. Theolog. Wissenschaft*;" third edition. Lange's "*Christliche Dogmatik*," Book 2. "*Positive Dogmatik.*" A work by Prof. Dr. K. Fr. A. Kahnis on the

Lord's Supper. A second enlarged and revised edition of the well-known work of Dr. Alt on the "Christliche Cultus." Of Sartorius's work on "The Doctrine of Holy Love;" the first part of Vol. III. has at length appeared. It treats of uniting, purifying, active and obedient love. The concluding part is to discuss love of neighbours, enduring, hoping, and, finally, triumphant love. Simultaneously with this appears the third edition of Vol. I. We see announced also Dr. J. W. Hanne's "Vorhöfe zum Glauben, oder das Wunder des Christenthums im Einklange menschlichen Vernunft und Natur." Vol. II. Part 2.

From Erlangen we have Dr. J. W. F. Höfring's "Doctrine of the early church on the sacrifice in the life and worship of Christians." Two works of considerable interest from their connection with the early history of German Protestantism, are "Theologia deutsch, which teaches many sweet and divine truths, and is a very great and fine thing (help) for a perfect life." A new edition, from the only hitherto known manuscript, by Frz. Pfeiffer, pp. xvi. and 120. The connection of this work with the early history of the Reformation, makes this new edition interesting. The other work referred to is "The Smaller Catechism" of Luther; the first edition, found in a Low Saxon translation; edited by Bed. C. Mönkebey, and published with an inquiry into its origin, pp. xi. and 176.

We are glad to notice the publication in Berlin of a German translation of Prof. Rogers's Article on "Reason and Faith," which appeared some two years since in the Edinburgh Review. The 7th and 8th volumes of a translation of Dr. Channing's works are also recently announced.

A book attracting no little attention in the department of Controversial Theology has appeared from the Pen of C. A. Thilo, a Hanoverian pastor, hitherto unknown in literature. The title of the work is "The Science of Modern Speculative Theology examined in its principles." The work examines the weapons with which the prevalent theology is contending against Pantheism and Atheism, and finds that they are drawn from the armoury of these very foes, i. e. from Spinoza. The author adopting Herbert's philosophy, which he manages with great earnestness and ability, combats particularly the modern theology of Schleiermacher, Rothe and Julius Müller. In No. 42 of "Die deutsche Zeitschrift," Dr. Müller commences a critical examination and refutation of Thilo's book, admitting the great merit and ability of the work which he reviews.

In the department of philosophy, we notice the recent publication of Vol. IV. VIII. IX. X. and XI. of Hartenstein's edition of Herbert's philosophical Works. The publication of the collected works of Baader, under the supervision of Frz. Hoffmann and other of Baader's pupils, has recently commenced. The series is to include the posthumous works, memoir and correspondence, together

with the works published during the author's life. Vol. I. contains his speculative logic; Vol. II. commences the metaphysics, pp. lxxii. 420, lxxx. 536. The treatises of Hoffmann introductory to these two volumes have been published separately under the title, "Outlines of the History of Logic in Germany, from Kant to Baader," and "Frz. Baader in his relation to Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Herbart." Vol. II. Part 1 of J. H. Fichte's "System der Ethik" has just appeared. A work of more general and popular character is entitled "Buch der Weltweisheit." It contains an abstract of the doctrines of the most eminent philosophers of all times, two volumes, pp. viii. 343, viii. 352. From Prof. Erdmann we have a popular work entitled "Psychological Letters," and another more elaborate work entitled "Philosophical Lectures on the State." Parts 2 and 3, completing Dr. Weissenborn's "Logic and Metaphysics," have recently appeared; also Ulrici's Logic. Vol. XI. of Ritter's History of Philosophy is in press. Vol. III. of Zeller's History of Philosophy, containing the history from Aristotle to the Stoics, is just out. Aristotle's *Ethica Eudemia* has just been published in a new edition, edited by A. T. N. Fritsche.

In the Department of Classical Literature, we notice the recent publication in the *Bibl. Græca* (Jacobs and Rost) of Vol. IV. Part 2 of Poppo's *Thucydides* (VI. 2 of Greek Prose writers), and Part 1 of Kühner's *Anabasis* (IX. 1 of the whole work). Part IV. of the Leipzig edition of Poppo's *Thucydides*, containing the supplements and Index. Vol. II. of Boehm's *Thucydides*. Part 1 and 2 of Vol. III. of the revised edition of Dindorf's *Demosthenes*, containing Or. XLI.—LXI. Vol. I. of the 4th edition of Rost's *Greek Lexicon*, pp. xx. 684. Among the Latin authors, Part 1 of Freund's *Virgil*, containing Books 1—6 of the *Æneid*. Vol. II. of Klotz's *Cicero*; Koch's *Horace*, and Vol. I. of Baiter's *Horace*. Hermann's work on *Grecian Antiquities* is just completed. Part 1 of Vol. III. of Marquandt's continuation of Becker's *Roman Antiquities* has lately appeared. Also the first of two volumes of a *Geographico-Historical work on the Peloponnesus*, by Prof. Curtius, pp. vi. 496.

Among other works in the Classical department, we have continuations of Schneidewin's *Sophocles*, Ritschl's *Plautus*, Passow's *Greek Lexicon* edited by Rost, Palm and Krenssler (to art. *πρόδρομος*), Pauly's *Encyclopædia of Classical Antiquity*, continued by Waltz and Teuffel (to art. *Vocatio*); the second volume of Böckh's *Civil Economy of the Athenians*, new and enlarged edition; the sixth volume of Schwenck's *Mythology*, containing the *Mythology of the Germans*.

Marcus Niebuhr, son of the great Historian, has published the third volume of his father's *Lectures on Ancient History exclusive of the Roman*. The subjects of this volume are, the *Macedonian*

kingdoms, Hellenizing of the East, fall of ancient Greece, and universal empire of Rome. The work consists of lectures delivered by Niebuhr while Professor of History at Bonn, and now collected and arranged from the manuscript notes of his pupils. An English translation by Dr. Leonhard Schmitz will appear in London, in three volumes; it is announced as already in press. Chapman and Hall of London advertise the *Life and Letters of B. G. Niebuhr*, with essays on his character and influence, by the Chevalier Burzen, and Professors Brandis and Loebell. The works mentioned in the above report are to be had by order of Trübner & Co., 12, Paternoster Row, London.

SWITZERLAND.

There were in 1846, 1847, and 1848, fourteen higher seminaries, viz., three universities, three academies, and eight lyceums. The academy at Neufchatel was closed in 1848. To the three universities, Basil, Zurich and Berne, belong the four faculties of theology, law, medicine and philosophy. Berne has a special department for veterinary science. In the two academies of Geneva and Lausanne, there are three departments, law theology and philosophy. The lyceum at Sion teaches theology, law and philosophy; the lyceums at Lucerne, Freiburg and Solothurn teach theology and philosophy; and those in Einsiedeln, Schaffhausen and Lugano, philosophy. The universities and academies are Protestant, the lyceums are Catholic. No polytechnic department is attached to any of the seminaries. The number of students, during the three years referred to, was 1,023, viz., 372 philosophy, 296 theology, 187 medicine, 168 law. The number at the universities was as follows: Berne 213, Zurich 128, Basil 80; at the academies: Geneva 168, Lausanne 104, Neufchatel 22; the remainder were at the lyceums. About 165 were foreigners, frequenting particularly the Jesuit lyceums at Freiburg and Sion, which are now closed.

The number of professors in the above institutions, not including Neufchatel, was 180: laymen 117, clergymen 63. The number of professors at Berne was 34, Zurich 27, Basil 25, Geneva 20, Lausanne 16, and 58 at the lyceums. The maximum of a professor's salary at Berne is 3,000 old Swiss francs, at Basil 2,800, at Zurich 2,310, at Lausanne 2,200, at Geneva 2,130.

The expenditure of these seminaries, for teachers, libraries, museums, &c., is provided for from special foundations or funds. Still the income is inadequate. The institutions at Berne and Lausanne are sustained exclusively from the public treasury. In Zurich 20,000 francs from the city treasury, and from 26 to 27,000 from the so-called foundation fund, are distributed to the university, the gymnasium, and the industrial school. The academy at Geneva is entirely supported by the cantonal government. The

Economical Society at Geneva raise annually for public instruction from 38 to 39,000 French francs. The university fund at Basil about half supports the university. It suffered a great loss a few years ago on the division of the canton. The following is about the annual cost of all kinds of the five institutions :

Berne,	75—78,000 old Swiss francs,
Zurich,	50—54,000 ,,
Basil,	39—40,000 ,,
Lausanne,	40—45,000 ,,
Geneva,	58—60,000 ,,

In the way of stipends, helps, &c., for students, nearly all the cantons have cantonal, town or family funds or foundations. The whole sum of these charities amounts to 970,000 Swiss francs. Among the most important of these funds are two in Berne, one of 400,000 francs, the other of 72,000. Basil has an academical stipend fund of 153,000. In the canton Grisons, there is a fund of 14,000 francs given by several families. For theological stipends, Berne appropriates yearly about 9,000 francs, Basil, 1,500, Aargau 2,500, Grisons 200, Thurgau 1,500, and Lucerne 1,800.

The number of Swiss students at foreign universities is estimated at from 600 to 700. They resort mainly to Heidelberg, Munich, Halle, Freiburg, Tübingen, Berlin, Vienna and Paris. The students of the Canton Tessino repair to Pisa, Pavia and Turin. Catholic theologians from Switzerland are somewhat numerous at Como, Milan and Rome. Those who pursue mechanical studies go to Carlsruhe in Baden. About 27 Swiss are now professors in foreign universities: some of them, e. g., Agassiz and Guyot, have a European reputation.

Earnest discussions are now going on in Switzerland in respect to changes and improvements in education. Sixteen cantons have decided more or less in favour of a central university for Switzerland; ten cantons, more or less in favour of a central polytechnic school; two cantons, Uri and Schwytz, against such a school. If a central university should be established, it will be placed, it is supposed, at Zurich. A commission of four members have lately made a report in favour of a central university, and given a detail of the plan. But special, and, perhaps, insurmountable difficulties are in the way of such an institution, from the diversity of languages and religions (a part of the Catholic population being very bigoted, and a part of the Protestant being strongly tinged with infidelity), from the want of a system of elementary education in a part of the cantons, from fear that the university would injure existing institutions, and from the mutual jealousies and spirit of independence in the different cantons.

The university of Basil seems to be in a somewhat depressed state. The number of students is diminishing. Dr. Schenkel, who was elected in De Wette's place, has just had a call to Heidelberg, as professor of theology and superintendent of the preacher's seminary.

At the beginning of 1851, there were published in Switzerland 204 journals devoted to politics, belles lettres, religion, &c., of which 102 were in the German language, 46 in the French, 5 in the Italian, and one in a peculiar language spoken in the Grisons. Forty were published in the canton of Berne, 23 in Zurich, 16 in Basil, 15 in St. Gall, 14 in De Vaud, &c.

GREAT BRITAIN.

We have examined with interest some parts of the first volume of Alford's Greek Testament. This volume embraces only the Gospels, though it occupies 750 pages. The author is a clergyman of the established Church in Leicestershire, and late fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. It is the first production from his pen which we have seen, and furnishes encouraging indications of what may be expected. It is on the general plan of Dr. Bloomfield's Testament, but differs from it in important particulars. Mr. Alford appears to be much more familiar than Dr. B., with the most recent German treatises and speculations on the Gospels. He also grapples more closely with the difficult questions which occur, and gives his own opinions in a more independent manner. Both are well trained in the classical Greek as studied at Cambridge. Both profess to have paid special attention to the state of the text. Mr. Alford's revision has been conducted on the following principles. Wherever the primary MSS. (the seven principal in the uncial character) are unanimous, in any reading affecting the sense, that reading has been adopted, to the rejection of the commonly-received text. Where the primary MSS. are divided, the received reading is retained, but marked as doubtful, with an asterisk. A digest of various readings is given between the text and the notes, from Lachmann, Scholz, and, after Luke xvi., from Tischendorf. Besides the topics just alluded to, the author treats in his Prolegomena, of the general characteristics of the first three Gospels, and the characteristics of each Gospel singly, and finally describes his *apparatus criticus*. Mr. Alford agrees with Dr. Davidson and others in regard to the Hebrew original of Matthew's Gospel, the doubtful genuineness of the last ten verses of Mark's Gospel, &c. Whatever may be the ultimate judgment of the critical public in regard to the value of Mr. Alford's labours, it is pleasant to see the awakened attention which able English scholars are paying to the inspired records.

Dr. Bloomfield's volume of *Additional Annotations* was published in 1850, in 448 pages, small print, double columns. The author remarks that "he has seen reason not unfrequently to alter or modify his former opinions as to certain readings. On the whole, however, he has felt constrained to differ almost *in toto* from Lachmann, and in a great measure from Tischendorf." Yet he speaks of the latter as having laid the Christian world under the highest obligations by his travels and researches, and his discoveries and collations of several most ancient MSS. of the New Testament. In the philological Notes, Dr. B. "has adduced several thousands of illustrations, in citations from the Greek classical writers, or from Josephus, Philo, and the Septuagint, with few exceptions collected by the author himself, in the course of twelve years' further study of those writers."

Mr. John Kenrick, author of the elaborate work on *Ancient Egypt*, London, two vols., 1850, is preparing, on the same plan, the history of those countries of the East, whose civilization preceded and influenced that of Greece. Syria and Phœnicia will form the next volume.

Among the works advertised in Great Britain we find the following: "Nestorians and their Rituals, Narrative of a journey to Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in 1842, and a visit in 1850, by George P. Badger, chaplain to the East India Company," a name that acquired some undesirable celebrity a few years ago; a *History of France*, by Sir James Stephen, Professor of History in the University of Cambridge, compiled from Sismondi and other French writers, in one volume, for Schools; Gutzlaff's *Life of Taou Kwang*, late Emperor of China, with *Memoirs of the Court of Peking*, 8vo; *Five Letters to Archdeacon Hare*, by the Chevalier Bunsen, on Hippolytus, author of a recently-discovered book ascribed to Origen, and on the bearing of this work on leading questions of Church History and polity; Dindorf's *Æschylus*, vol. 3rd, containing Greek Scholia; Paul's *Analysis of the Hebrew Text of the Book of Genesis*; Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, from the 124th Olympiad to the death of Augustus, 2nd edition; Clinton's *Epitome of the Fasti Hellenici*; Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, vol. 3rd, from the death of Julius Cæsar to the establishment of the empire under Augustus; Madvig's *Latin Grammar*, translated by Wood, 2nd edition; Stoll's *Handbook of the Religion and Mythology of the Greeks*, translated by the Rev. R. Paul, and edited by the Rev. T. K. Arnold; *Germania of Tacitus*, with *Ethnographical Dissertation and Notes*, by R. G. Latham.

The first Part of the *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography*, edited by Dr. William Smith, has been received. This Part contains 128 pages; the other Parts are to appear quarterly, the whole forming one octavo volume. The first Part gives promise that the

work will be as valuable and complete in the department of Ancient Geography, as the previous works by the same editor are in their respective departments. The present number has small plans of several cities, and also the coins of many places. The more important Articles on Greek Geography are furnished by the editor. The work is strictly a treatise on Ancient Geography, not being confined to Greek and Roman Geography.

The second and last volume of Dr. Traill's translation of the "Jewish War" by Josephus, has appeared. This is a very beautiful as well as valuable edition of the "Jewish War," and is illustrated by seventy-five engravings made in Palestine for the work.

Among the deaths of eminent men in Great Britain, during the last year, we notice that of Prof. George Dunbar, who had long held the chair of Greek Literature in the University of Edinburgh, and was well known for his dictionaries and other works.

UNITED STATES.

MR. G. P. Putnam, of New York, has published, as a part of his Home Cyclopædia, a very valuable Handbook of Literature and the Fine Arts, compiled and arranged by George Ripley and Bayard Taylor.

Messrs. Gould & Lincoln, of Boston, propose to publish an elementary work on Geology, for the use of Colleges and High Schools, by Prof. J. R. Loomis of Waterville, Maine; also, a new Geological Chart, prepared by Prof. James Hall, of Albany, N.Y. A new edition of Lyell's Elements of Geology is soon to be published by Messrs. Little & Brown, in connection with a London House.

Mr. Putnam, of New York, has published a work entitled, "Five Years in an English University, by Charles Astor Bristed, two volumes." The work contains some severe reflections upon the University system in our own country.

Sir James Stephen's Lectures on the History of France have been re-published by the Messrs. Harpers, of New York.

A new and revised edition of President Woolsey's *Antigone* of Sophocles has been published by Munroe & Co., Boston.

Blanchard & Lea, of Philadelphia, have published a School Dictionary of the Latin Language, by Dr. T. H. Kaltschmidt, in two Parts. Part 1. Latin English, 18mo. pp. 478. They have reprinted the School Horace of Schmitz and Zumpt's series; and also R. W. Browne's History of Greek Classical Literature.

